

Chinese Communist Power
and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977

Donald H. McMillen

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This book is the first in-depth study of Chinese Communist rule in Xinjiang, a Muslim region lying along the Sino-Soviet border in central Asia. The degree of similarity and difference between the power and policy perspectives of the regional leadership and those of the central authorities in Peking after 1949 is a central concern of the book. Particular attention is given to describing and analyzing the emergence of a well-entrenched regional elite under Wang Enmao and the moderate policies by which it sought to achieve Xinjiang's integration de novo with China proper.

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Abbreviations

| | |
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| <u>APC's</u> | Agricultural Producer's Cooperatives |
| <u>CAR</u> | Central Asian Review |
| <u>CB</u> | Current Background |
| <u>CCP</u> | Chinese Communist Party |
| <u>CTK</u> | Ceteka (Prague) |
| <u>CNA</u> | China News Analysis |
| <u>CNS</u> | China News Summary |
| <u>CPPCC</u> | Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference |
| <u>CPSU</u> | Communist Party of the Soviet Union |
| <u>CQ</u> | The China Quarterly |
| <u>DGB</u> | Dagong bao (L'impartial) |
| <u>ECMM</u> | Extracts of China Mainland Magazines |
| <u>F.A.</u> | Field Army |
| <u>FBIS</u> | Foreign Broadcast Information Service |
| <u>FEER</u> | Far Eastern Economic Review |
| <u>GAC</u> | Government Administrative Council |
| <u>GLF</u> | Great Leap Forward |
| <u>GMD</u> | Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) |
| <u>GMRB</u> | Guangming ribao (Bright Daily) |
| <u>GPCR</u> | Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution |
| <u>JAS</u> | The Journal of Asian Studies |
| <u>MAT's</u> | Mutual-Aid Teams |
| <u>MZDTP Teams</u> | Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams |
| <u>MZTJ</u> | Minzu tuanjie (Solidarity of the National Minorities) |
| <u>NCNA</u> | Xinhua she (New China News Agency) |
| <u>NDYL/CYL</u> | New Democratic Youth League/China Youth League |
| <u>NPC</u> | National People's Congress |
| <u>NWAC</u> | Northwest Administrative Committee |
| <u>NWCCP</u> | Northwest Bureau, Chinese Communist Party |
| <u>NWMAC</u> | Northwest Military and Administrative Committee |
| <u>NWMR</u> | Northwest Military Region |
| <u>PLA</u> | People's Liberation Army |
| <u>PRC</u> | People's Republic of China |
| <u>RHNWC</u> | A Regional Handbook on Northwest China (HRAF, No. 59) |

| | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| <u>RMRB</u> | <u>Renmin ribao (People's Daily)</u> |
| <u>SCMM</u> | <u>Summary of China Mainland Magazines</u> |
| <u>SCMP</u> | <u>Survey of the China Mainland Press</u> |
| <u>SEM</u> | <u>Socialist Education Movement</u> |
| <u>SWB</u> | <u>Summary of World Broadcasts</u> |
| <u>URS</u> | <u>Union Research Service</u> |
| <u>WHB</u> | <u>Wenhui bao (Literary News)</u> |
| <u>XJMD/XJMR</u> | <u>Xinjiang Military District/Xinjiang Military Region</u> |
| <u>XJPCC</u> | <u>Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps</u> |
| <u>XJRB</u> | <u>Xinjiang ribao (Xinjiang Daily)</u> |
| <u>XJ Revoly. Cmte.</u> | <u>Xinjiang Revolutionary Committee</u> |
| <u>XUAR</u> | <u>Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region</u> |
| <u>ZQNB</u> | <u>Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth Daily)</u> |

Preface

The focus of this book is the evolution of Chinese Communist (CCP) power and policy in Xinjiang from 1949 to 1978. Particular attention is given to describing and analysing the emergence of a well-entrenched Party, military, and government hierarchy under Wang Enmao and his Han comrades from the First Field Army of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the policies by which it sought to achieve the distant region's integration with the rest of the People's Republic of China. The author has endeavored not to analyse power and policy in Xinjiang in isolation from what transpired elsewhere in the nation. In fact, a central question treated throughout this work is the degree of similarity and difference between the power and policy perspectives of the regional leadership and those of the central authorities in Peking during rather well-defined periods after 1949. In this regard, special attention is paid to the period following the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in 1966.

Because the region's ethnic minorities, strategic location, and natural resources have had such a crucial impact on the larger issues of CCP power and policy throughout the post-1949 period, efforts have been made to assess the Party's attempts to achieve the ultimate political, socio-economic, and cultural integration of Xinjiang and its predominantly Muslim population with the more "advanced" Han areas of China. Although it is treated as a sub-theme throughout this work, integration is nonetheless an important, albeit complex, issue. James Sheridan has stated that "national integration refers to the degree of cohesiveness of a nation, the extent to which its various elements interconnect to form a consolidated national unit."¹ Seymour has suggested that

. . . when we speak of integration we refer to the manner and degree to which parts of a social system (its individuals, groups, and organs) interact and complement each other. The more

differentiation and specialization that occur, the more integration required.²

Coleman and Rosberg see national integration as being a broad, subsuming process, whose two major dimensions are:

(1) political integration, which refers to the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and a participant political community; and (2) territorial integration, which refers to the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal plane in the process of creating a homogeneous territorial political community.³

To these definitions of integration may be added that of June Dreyer, which for our purposes here seems to be especially relevant. "Integration," she says, "may be defined as the process whereby ethnic groups come to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities to a new center, whose institutions assume jurisdiction over, and responsibility for, said groups."⁴ The methods of achieving integration, according to Dreyer, may be arranged along a spectrum from the extremes of pluralism to assimilation. In the former, the minority groups retain their respective cultures and other distinguishing characteristics. In the latter, members of the minority groups have absorbed the characteristics of the dominant group to the exclusion of their own and become indistinguishable from members of the majority. Ranged in between are a variety of intermediate positions which may be called accommodation, whereby minority groups may accept certain characteristics from the dominant group, such as language and style of dress, while still maintaining many elements of their own traditional cultures and varying degrees of ethnic identification.

No matter how it is defined, the point at which integration actually occurs can rarely be defined precisely.⁵ It is a relative and variable term. Whereby some nations may be weakly or loosely integrated, others may be tightly or strongly integrated. Moreover, territorial, political, social, and economic integration in any one state may occur at different times in the nation-building process.⁶

In the study of contemporary China, including Xinjiang, the author has been conscious of the re-

search hazard of "disinformation." The CCP authorities, much like their Soviet counterparts, have occasionally propagated information that is either misleading or false, and have sometimes concealed much that is true. In part, this was undoubtedly done by the ideologues or power-seekers to rationalize their conduct to their own satisfaction as a prerequisite for some higher philosophical or social good. Thus, the information selected from Xinjiang and other Mainland Chinese publications has been chosen for its presumed reliability and every effort has been made to establish "confirmation" by other sources. This "data problem" was especially acute during the tumultuous GPCR period when the existing media system virtually collapsed into a state of chaos and new sources emerged in the form of numerous Red Guard publications that represented nearly every political or factional persuasion then bursting onto the Chinese scene. Since the validity of many of these Red Guard reports is highly debatable, they have been utilized with caution and supplemented wherever possible with eyewitness accounts by native and foreign observers. Any errors in analysis or interpretation in this study, nevertheless, remain the sole responsibility of the author.

As a final note, the pinyin system of romanization has been adopted throughout the text, with the one exception of the word Peking. Also, a list of abbreviations has been provided for those terms which the author has shortened in the text.

Acknowledgements

Although the author cannot list all the intellectual debts he has acquired in the preparation of this study, a few acknowledgements of assistance and encouragement must be noted. Thanks are due, posthumously to Professor Earl Swisher, a pioneer China scholar, who "opened the doors to Asia" as the author's advisor and friend. To Dr. Noel R. Miner of the University of Colorado goes my deep gratitude for his invaluable advice and unwaivering support in the research and writing of this study. I am likewise indebted to Professor James Jankowski, also of the University of Colorado, and two colleagues in the School of Modern Asian Studies at Griffith University, Professor Colin P. Mackerras and Dr. Edmund S.K. Fung, for their perceptive reading of the manuscript and their help on many technical points. For their patience and superb job of typing the manuscript, I must thank Jennifer Park and Gail Stanley. My gratitude also extends to Mervyn W. Adams Seldon who provided useful editorial assistance.

A good deal of the research work was accomplished in Taiwan and Hong Kong with the support of a Fulbright-Hays Dissertation Research Fellowship. I am grateful to the Institute of International Relations in Taipei, Taiwan for allowing me to use their archival materials dealing with Mainland China and Xinjiang. To my respected colleagues and friends at the Universities Service Centre in Hong Kong, especially Mr. John Dolfen, goes my sincere appreciation for many kindnesses and much intellectual stimulation.

Finally, to my families in both the United States and Indonesia, who have given their unflagging support in this lengthy endeavor, I give my loving thanks. Most importantly, I cannot possibly express my love and appreciation to those closest to me, my wife Dini and our children Damon and Santi, for their constant inspiration and sacrifices.

Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977

Part 1

Xinjiang: Setting and Historical
Overview to 1949

1. The Setting


Xinjiang, the "New Dominion" of China, is the largest political unit of the People's Republic of China with an area of 635,829 square miles, or one-sixth of China's total area. Located along China's western frontier, Xinjiang is bounded by three Soviet Central Asian republics in the west, the Mongolian People's Republic in the northeast, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, and Tibet in the south, and Qinghai and Gansu provinces in the east. Xinjiang is virtually surrounded by high mountains, including the Altyn Tagh, Kunlun, Karakoram, Pamir, Tianshan, and Altai ranges. Figure 1.1 shows the location and land forms of Xinjiang.

A series of strategic passes and low-lying gaps through the mountains on the western frontier of Xinjiang, including those near Kashgar, the Yili River valley, and the Dzungarian Gates, afford relatively easy access from Soviet Central Asia and contribute to the region's geographical orientation toward the west. In the east the only route suitable for land travel between Xinjiang and the core area of China Proper has, until recently, been through the Gansu Corridor. Because of its greater distance from the national capital than from Soviet Central Asia, the integration of Xinjiang with China has been difficult to achieve. As a result, both the indigenous non-Han inhabitants and the local Chinese administration centered in Urumqi (Dihua) have often been virtually independent from the central authorities in the Chinese capital and subject to a great deal of Russian influence in the modern period.

GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS

Xinjiang consists of three major subregions; the Dzungarian Basin in the north; the Tianshan Mountains in the center; and the Tarim Basin in the south. The most striking physical feature of

Figure 1.1
Xinjiang: Physiography



Source: W.A.D. Jackson, The Russo-Chinese Borderlands (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1968), p. 78ff. Reprinted with permission.

Xinjiang is the Tarim Basin, which comprises about one-half of the region's total area. The oval-shaped basin can be visualized in the form of a series of concentric belts, proceeding from the outer mountain barriers, past foothills and alluvial fans, over a string of oases, across the sandy and harsh Takla Makan Desert,³ to the playa lakes and salt wastes of Lop Nor in the east. More than one-third of the entire Tarim Basin consists of deserts and wastelands. The basin is drained primarily by the Tarim River system, which carries melt-water from the mountains in a broad loop around and through the Takla Makan.

The numerous oases of the Tarim Basin support nearly 90 percent of the population of southern Xinjiang, with the bulk of this population being located around the western fringes of the desert at Hetian, Xiache, Kazgar, Aksu, and Kuerle.⁴ The oases are populated primarily by Uighurs, a Turkic-speaking, Muslim people. The oases of the Tarim, like their counterparts in Dzungaria, have traditionally been important as trading centers along the famous "Silk Roads" that led from China Proper through Central Asia to Europe. In fact, the alignments of the "Silk Roads" have largely remained the main routes in Xinjiang's east-west transportation network on both sides of the Tianshan.

The Dzungarian Basin, situated north of the Tianshan, is smaller in size than the Tarim Basin. It extends north to the Altai Mountains, and from Gansu province in the east to the Dzungarian Gates in the west along the Soviet border. The latter are symbolic as being the gaps through which the Mongol hordes of Genghiz Khan poured westward centuries ago.⁵ The zone of oases along the edge of the steppe and desert belt in Dzungaria includes Urumqi, Qitai Manass, Wusu-Dushanzi, Tacheng, and Altai. Several small rivers, rather than one unifying system, flow into Dzungaria from the surrounding mountains, including the Urumqi, Manass and Upper Irtysh rivers. The basin is slightly less arid than the Tarim, receiving about ten inches of rainfall per annum compared to as little as one-fifth of an inch per annum in southern Xinjiang. The cooler climate of Dzungaria is derived from cold Siberian polar air that brings moisture-laden winds from the north. The Tianshan block these polar air masses (and whatever moisture they carry) from reaching the Tarim Basin.

The lofty Tianshan Mountains extend eastward into Xinjiang from Soviet Central Asia for some


1,000 miles, effectively separating the Tarim Basin from Dzungaria. The Tianshan, like the other encircling ranges, contain numerous glaciers which spawn fast-running streams that flow into both southern and northern Xinjiang. Intermontane basins and valleys lying below the snowline, that average 13,000 feet, support a pastoral and limited agricultural economy among the local population. The Yili River valley in the extreme west along the Soviet border, with its principal urban center at Yining (Kuldja), is fertile and densely populated, but is geographically oriented toward the west.

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY

In accordance with the moister climate, fertile soils exist along the piedmont in Dzungaria and in the Yili River valley. The steppe vegetation there constitutes an important belt of grazing land, being more extensive than that in the south. Between 15 and 20 percent of Xinjiang's total area, or about 760 million mou,⁶ is suitable for animal husbandry, either on a seasonal or year-round basis. Two-thirds of the total pasturage is located along the fringes of the Dzungarian Basin, primarily in the Yili, Tacheng, and Altai districts. There, where the nomadic pastoralists historically reigned supreme, nearly 40 percent of the population is engaged in animal husbandry. About 10 percent of the region's total population has traditionally been pastoralists, being predominantly Kazakhs and Mongols in the north and Kirghiz and Tadzhiks in the western margins of the Tarim Basin. In 1949, Xinjiang's livestock totalled an estimated 11.8 million head, including sheep, cattle, horses, and camels. In that year, animal products constituted over 90 percent of Xinjiang's exports to Russia. Russia, in fact, received over four-fifths of all exports from the region in exchange for machinery and equipment, armaments, and finished goods.

Prior to 1949, oasis agriculture in southern Xinjiang accounted for 70.3 percent of the region's cultivated land⁷ and occupied about 40 percent of the population, while only 2 percent of the people were engaged in stock-breeding.⁸ Most of the major clusters of cultivated land today were major agricultural centers some 2,000 years ago, but the center of cultivation has shifted to the western Tarim Basin (see Figure 1.2). Agriculture was devoted to various food grains and crops, fruit (such as grapes, apples, and melons), cotton, and some seri-

Figure 1.2
Agricultural Areas in Xinjiang.



culture. Irrigation, water conservancy, and land reclamation have been necessary conditions for successful farming in Xinjiang. But such problems as the rise of the water table, which produces dense reed growths in the fields, and the secondary accumulation of salts in the soil have required continuous soil leaching and proper drainage, thus proving that the mere application of water has not been enough to ensure crop growth. The vicissitudes of Xinjiang's climate, ranging from drought to flooding, and from frost and hailstorms to dry, searing sandstorms, have continually plagued agriculture, as have insect pests and crop diseases.

In 1915, the total cultivated acreage of Xinjiang was about 11.43 million mou,⁹ or approximately 1 percent of the region's total area. By 1949, the total arable acreage reached an estimated 18.1 million mou.¹⁰ Only 16.7 million mou had actually

been sown to various crops, and the irrigated area amounted to 14.4 million mou. Food grain production was slightly over 1.1 million tonnes, with wheat comprising over 50 percent and rice and oil-bearing crops each accounting for 15 percent of the total. Raw cotton production from some 472,973 mou was nearly 4,900 tonnes.

NATURAL RESOURCES

In general, Xinjiang has abundant natural resources, but the systematic exploitation of these potential riches by the Chinese only began on a large scale after 1949.¹¹ The main factors that had previously hampered China's efforts to exploit and develop the region's natural wealth included: (1) the vast distance between Xinjiang and China Proper and the inadequate transportation facilities into the region from the east; (2) the greater accessibility from Russia, which in the modern period had allowed the Russians to actively intervene both politically and economically in Xinjiang's affairs and assume a virtual monopoly over its trade and the exclusive right to exploit many of its natural resources; (3) China's lack of sufficient capital, equipment, and technical expertise; and (4) virtually uninterrupted rebellion within Xinjiang and civil war in China Proper.

Petroleum is by far the most important fuel resource in Xinjiang. Initial commercial petroleum production dates from about 1940, when the relatively small Dushanzi field was developed, largely by the Soviets, some fifteen miles southeast of Wusu, a highway junction west of Urumqi. In 1949, exploration began in the Karamai area in central Dzungaria. Large petroleum deposits were discovered there, and in the late 1950s oil refineries and pipelines were constructed to exploit and develop the Karamai fields.¹² Secondary oil fields exist at Xiawan, Urumqi, Kuche, Aksu, Kazgar, and Zepu. There are also known oil-shale deposits in the Urumqi area.

In contrast to petroleum, Xinjiang's coal industry has been developed primarily for local consumption rather than for national needs. The region's known coal reserves as of late 1959 were 32-35 billion tons, comprised mostly of shallow bituminous deposits near Urumqi and Hami.¹³ A large open-pit mine was developed near Hami in the early 1960s.

The Tianshan Mountains, and the other ranges which fringe the region, contain valuable natural

resources, including water, timber, furs, and minerals. Most of Xinjiang's iron is mined in the environs of Urumchi at several small mines. Tungsten and molybdenum are found near Qinghe, Fuyun, and Wenchuan. Copper deposits are worked in the Baicheng-Kuche area, while lead, zinc and silver are mined west of Kazgar at Wuqia and east of Yining at Nilike. Placer and lode deposits of gold exist in the Altai district and in the Kunlun Mountains. Hetian has long been famous for its jade.


Significantly, Xinjiang also has quite substantial known deposits of radioactive elements in both the southern and northern mountains and in the western portion of the Tianshan. In 1950, Peking and Moscow cooperated in establishing a uranium mine at Pishan in southern Xinjiang, whose ore was sent to Russia for processing. Following the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations a decade later, China took over complete control of all uranium mines in Xinjiang. In June 1964, a Taiwan source mentioned some eight uranium mines in the region, four of which were described as being "rich".¹⁴ In the 1960s, the Chinese set up an integrated uranium refinery between Urumqi and Hami, a plutonium separation plant on the Tarim River, and an unconfirmed "ore processing facility" at Urumqi whose processed ore was then presumably sent to Lanzhou. On October 16, 1964, China detonated its first nuclear device at Lop Nor, its main nuclear weapons test site.

ETHNIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS

Ethnically, the population of Xinjiang has traditionally been over 90 percent non-Chinese. On both sides of the Sino-Russian border in Xinjiang, which cuts abruptly and arbitrarily over rugged topography and through the homelands of the indigenous ethnic groups, there historically have been only a small number of Chinese and Russians who constituted on their respective sides of the border a very thin veneer of overlordship. In terms of ethnic composition, then, the frontier between China and Russia in Xinjiang is not merely a line, but a "zone".¹⁵ This "zone" constitutes a melting-pot of over a dozen different ethnic groups. In 1949, the major ethnic groups in Xinjiang and their approximate share of the region's total population were: Uighurs (75%), Kazakhs (9%), Han Chinese (6%), Chinese Muslims -- or Hui -- (4%), and others -- including Kirghiz, Mongols and Daur, Manchus, Sibos and Soluns, Tadzhiks, Uzbeks, Tatars, and Russians --

(6%). The ethnic composition of Xinjiang is illustrated in Figure 1.3.

Figure 1.3
Xinjiang: Ethnic Groups



Source: Michael Freeberne, "Demographic and Economic Changes in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region," *Population Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (July 1966), p. 109. Reprinted with permission.

Some 75 percent of Xinjiang's peoples were Muslims in 1949, primarily of the Sunni sect but also including Shi'ites and Sufis. A smaller proportion were either Buddhists or Lamaistic Buddhists. The vast majority spoke Turkic languages and used the Arabic script. There were also significant numbers who spoke Tunguso-Manchu dialects or Chinese. Illiteracy was almost universal in Xinjiang. The minute political and socio-economic elite, which was generally either literate or semi-literate, was composed of tribal or clan headmen of the native pastoralists, the indigenous landlord class, the Muslim or Buddhist clergy, and the Chinese administrators and garrison troops stationed in the region. Ethnic jealousies, religious differences, and rivalries

between sedentary and nomadic groups were an integral part of Xinjiang's history. It is of the utmost significance that many of the region's peoples are ethnically akin to the peoples of Russian Central Asia. In the past, Sino-Russian border in Xinjiang was little obstacle to the movement of large numbers of nomadic groups, especially the Kazakhs, back and forth through the mountains.¹⁶

The population of Xinjiang in 1949 was somewhat over 4 million. After 1949, the Chinese Communist (CCP) authorities undertook a massive program of Han resettlement from China Proper, which included workers, peasants, and youths, with the intended goal of increasing the Chinese component of the region's population. By 1973, Xinjiang's population was slightly less than ten million people, with the Han nationality constituting about 35 percent of the total (see Table 1.1)¹⁷ In 1976, official Chinese reports claimed that the regional population had increased to over 10 million.¹⁸

Table 1.1

Estimated Ethnic Population of Xinjiang in 1973.

| Ethnic Group | Estimated Population |
|----------------------------|----------------------|
| Uighurs | 5,100,000 |
| Han Chinese | 3,500,000 |
| Kazakhs | 700,000 |
| Hui (Chinese Muslims) | 300,000 |
| Mongols and Daur | 180,000 |
| Kirghiz | 105,000 |
| Manchus, Sibos, and Soluns | 36,000 |
| Tadzhiks | 20,000 |
| Uzbeks | 18,000 |
| Russians | 10,000 |
| Tatars | 9,000 |
| Others | <u>Negligible</u> |
| Total | 9,978,000 |

Sources: Compiled by the author from Renmin shouce (People's Handbook), Peking, 1965, pp. 115-116; Amrit Lal, op. cit., pp. 4-25; Theodore Shabad, op. cit., pp. 307-318; Michael Freeberne, op. cit., pp. 103-124; W.J. Drew, op. cit., pp. 205-216; and various reports from the China Mainland press and radio.

As of 1949, the pattern of habitation in all of Xinjiang represented a roughly duplicated pattern of sedentary and pastoral conditions on either side of the Tianshan Mountains. Approximately three-fourths of the population was in the oases of southern Xinjiang, where the majority was concentrated at the western end of the Tarim Basin. At least four-fifths of the population of the region was rural, living in small villages or seasonal settlements. Of the rural population, over 80 percent was agricultural, 12 percent pastoral, and the remainder a mixture of the two.¹⁹ Prior to 1949, landlords controlled over 80 percent of the farmland, although they constituted less than 5 percent of the regional population.²⁰

After 1949, the pattern and composition of Xinjiang's population were substantially altered by industrialization,²¹ urbanization, and the influx of youthful Han immigrants accompanying the arrival of the Xinjiang-Lanzhou Railroad in early 1961 (hereafter referred to as the Xin-Lan R.R.). Dzungaria was especially affected by these phenomena, and its share in the regional population total increased rapidly compared to that of the Tarim Basin. Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of population in Xinjiang as of the late 1960s.


MAJOR URBAN CENTERS

Urumqi, which has been the administrative capital of Xinjiang since the region was given the status of a province on November 16, 1884, is located on the northern piedmont of the Tianshan Mountains.²² In 1949, its population was about 80,000, but has since grown nearly ten-fold. The municipal area, which was about 81.3 square kilometers in the early 1950s, was expanded to 640 square kilometers in 1958²³ so as to include several natural resource bases within the confines of the municipality in preparation for its becoming the region's economic and industrial center. A new industrial district was developed within the municipality in the 1950s outside of the old walled city on the right bank of the Urumqi River.

Urumqi has also become the transportation hub of Xinjiang. The arrival of the Xin-Lan R.R. in the early 1960s was of paramount importance in Urumqi's displacement of the border towns of Yining and Kazgar, the reorientation of their trade and economy away from Russia, and the integration of the whole region with China Proper. Highways radiating from Urumqi connected the railhead there with the rest of

Xinjiang. The regional CCP and military authorities have also extended or developed the north-south highway system within the region, such as the Urumqi-Kuerle highway, and have built a new highway network into southern Xinjiang via Ruoqiang from Qinghai province.

Figure 1.4
Distribution of Population in Xinjiang



Areas of moderate-dense population.

Limits of habitation.

These projects were based not only on the need for economic unity between the north and south, especially to overcome the traditional inadequacy of the highway system in handling the shipment of supplies, agricultural produce, and other raw materials from the Tarim Basin to Dzungaria, but have also been based upon the more recent perception that the old highway system was subject to potential interdiction from the Soviets in the western Tarim Basin and in the Gansu Corridor near the border with the Mongolian People's Republic. The major cities


of Xinjiang are also linked to Urumqi and to China Proper by domestic air service. A modern international air terminal has recently been completed in the regional capital. The transportation network existing in Xinjiang by the mid-1960s is depicted in Figure 1.5.

Yining, the chief urban center in the predominantly Kazakh-inhabited and strategically located Yili River valley, had a population nearly equal to that of Urumqi in 1949. Being relatively isolated geographically from the rest of Xinjiang and physically oriented toward Russia, Yining was traditionally the agricultural, livestock, and trading center of much of northern Xinjiang. Periodically it served as the locus for rebel uprisings against Chinese rule, as in the period 1944-49.

Kazgar is the largest urban center of the Tarim Basin, and had a population of nearly 80,000 in 1949. Located at the apex of the routes around the Takla Makan Desert near the Russian border, this ancient crafts, marketing, and trade city on the "Silk Road", has been fairly isolated from Urumqi by distance. Kazgar, which has traditionally been a Uighur city, has also periodically been a center for various rebellions against Chinese rule.

Other major urban centers in Xinjiang, with their functions and estimated populations in parenthesis, include Hami (trade and manufacturing; 100,000), Xiache (trade and textiles; over 80,000), Shihezi (reclamation and manufacturing; 120,000), Tacheng (trade; 25,000), Altai (mining, reclamation, and animal husbandry; 25,000), Hetian (trade and textiles; over 50,000), Aksu (trade and agriculture; over 90,000), Karamai (petroleum; over 70,000), Qitai (agriculture; over 20,000), Turfan (agriculture and fruit; about 20,000), Kuerle (trade; 15,000), Wusu (trade and oil refining; 15,000), and Dushanzi (oil refining; 20,000).

Figure 1.5
 Transportation Network in Xinjiang



2. Historical Overview to 1949

XINJIANG PRIOR TO THE QING DYNASTY

In 138 B.C., Zhang Qian led a mission from the court of Emperor Han Wudi to the Ferghana Valley via the Tarim Basin with the objective of securing an alliance with the Yuezhi people against their common foe, the Xiongnu, who were ravaging China's north-western frontiers.¹ Rebuffed in their attempts to gain cooperation, and continually harassed by the nomadic "barbarians" from the steppes and deserts, the Han leaders pursued a more dynamic, military course and overran much of eastern Central Asia by 100 B.C.² Key points along the frontier and the trade routes to the west were garrisoned with Imperial troops. Investitures of tributary status were granted to local leaders and trade missions were exchanged. Combining diplomacy with military might the Chinese court often adopted the policy of divide-and-rule, or "using barbarians to control barbarians," by sowing or playing upon dissensions among the region's native groups.³

The eastern portion of Central Asia, which the Chinese referred to as Xiyu (or the "Western Regions") came to constitute a defensive buffer zone against the alien invaders from beyond the Great Wall. While China primarily sought security, she was not indifferent to the growing importance of the trade routes, called the "Silk Roads," that passed through the oases of the region to the west. Increasingly, Imperial hegemony in eastern Central Asia became identified with the legitimacy of succeeding dynasties in Confucian terms by suggesting that the Emperor had the "Mandate of Heaven" because of his ability to control the barbarians.

Chinese hegemony in eastern Central Asia waxed and waned throughout the following centuries, however, and the frontiers remained unstable. Indigenous states periodically arose and threw off Chinese suzerainty, and Imperial power ebbed and flowed according to the strength of the throne. During

periods of dynastic decline alien invaders marched into northern China from beyond the Great Wall, and brought new blood, ideologies, and techniques to the Middle Kingdom. From the fall of the Han Dynasty in 220 A.D. to the eighth century nomadic peoples took over much of northern China, and it was during this period that Buddhism made its first appearance. Having been brought into China via eastern Central Asia where it was gradually altered by indigenous beliefs, Buddhism was eventually appropriated by the Chinese culture and effectively sinicized.⁴ A resurgence of Chinese power in eastern Central Asia occurred during the vigorous Tang Dynasty in the eighth century and lasted for nearly two hundred years.

With the decline of the Tang Dynasty and the concurrent rise and expansion of Arab power and Islam between the seventh and tenth centuries, much of eastern Central Asia once again slipped gradually out of Imperial control. Thereafter, the influence of Islam continuously spread throughout much of the region, being only temporarily interrupted by the influx of the Mongols under Genghiz Khan who were primarily Lamaistic Buddhists. By the fourteenth century, Mongol power waned, most of its leaders were slowly converted to Islam, and local native states were established on the oases where the population had become overwhelmingly Muslim.

XINJIANG UNDER THE MANCHUS

It was not until the late seventeenth century, after the Manchus had consolidated their authority throughout China Proper, that Imperial power was once again sufficient to reassert Chinese hegemony in Eastern Turkestan. In the 1690s, the Kangxi emperor began the conquest of the region, which was then largely under the sway of Galdan's Western Mongols (Olods, or Dzungars). The region's easternmost city, Hami, was garrisoned with Imperial troops, and Peking's power was felt in the oases north and south of the Tianshan Mountains. By 1757, the Manchu General, Zhaohui, had completed the conquest of the Western Mongols at Yining for the Qianlong emperor. Two years later, the Tarim Basin was taken and Imperial residents (administrators) and garrison troops were stationed in the major oases. Sixteen military colonies were established, primarily in Dzungaria, which were composed of Manchus brought in from Manchuria and resettled Han Chinese from Gansu and Sha'anxi provinces.

In 1768, the area formerly designated as "Chinese Turkestan" was renamed Xinjiang, thus denoting Peking's intention of incorporating the region in perpetuity as the "new territory" of China. The Imperial administration, composed of a thin upper stratum of Manchu bannermen and Chinese subordinates, ruled indirectly in Xinjiang through the traditional native feudal structures, with the existing begs (gentry), headmen, and princes used as instruments of local rule. These native leaders were placed in charge of such matters as taxes, trade, and justice. The Imperial position in Xinjiang was somewhat limited by the relatively small Manchu-Chinese population, and was further complicated by the tendency toward equivocal loyalty and the inclination among the native population to go with the winning side during periods of crisis, even though the authority of Peking was backed up by 20,000 troops.

Because of the great distance between Xinjiang and China Proper, the Imperial bureaucrats and military leaders in Xinjiang enjoyed a large measure of autonomy and virtually ran the region according to their own devices. The high Manchu-Chinese officials were generally favored by tax concessions and other privileges, and often made fortunes by imposing irregular levies on the local populace. In addition, Xinjiang continued to be used by the Court as a place of political and legal banishment. Few efforts were made toward the assimilation of the native peoples during the Qing period and, in fact, political and socio-economic discrimination was practiced by the ruling elite against the various local nationalities. Thus, a considerable degree of resentment grew up between the indigenous groups and their regional Manchu-Chinese overlords.

Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, conflict and rebellion were recurring themes in the history of Xinjiang. Periodic native uprisings often took on the flavor of Muslim "holy wars" against the infidel Chinese Suzerains. But, lacking in adequate leadership, internal unity, and materiel, these local rebellions failed to oust the Chinese. During these periods of internal turmoil, however, Xinjiang was ripe for external intervention from any power which had the desire and the capability to "fish in troubled waters." During the nineteenth century, in particular, the expansion of the Russian Empire to the borders of Xinjiang in Central Asia brought about an increasing British concern for the security of India. The confrontation between Russia and Britain became focused upon Xinjiang,

which the latter viewed as an essential neutral buffer area on the flanks of the Indian sub-continent. Intrigue by these two powers intensified greatly within Xinjiang during the mid-1800s.

It was Russia, however, that gained predominant influence in Xinjiang during the heyday of Western imperialism in Asia. When the declining Manchu Dynasty was forced into signing various "unequal treaties" with the West, Russia was able to exact diplomatic, commercial, and territorial concessions in Xinjiang. The Yili Treaty (1851), the Tacheng Protocol of the Treaty of Peking (1860), and the Treaty of Tarbagatai (1864) granted to Tsarist Russia a virtual trade monopoly (with reduced customs levies) in Xinjiang and specified that the boundary there be based upon the then-existing line of permanent pasture pickets (markers). China, in effect, surrendered her claim to nearly 350,000 square miles under the terms of these treaties with Russia.

From 1864 to 1877, a Muslim revolt led by Yakub Beg wrested control from the Imperial authorities in much of Xinjiang.⁵ This wily leader manipulated the Russians against the British by signing trade agreements and exchanging diplomatic missions with each.⁶ In 1870-71, the Russians under General K.P. von-Kaufmann, intolerant of Yakub's two-faced policies and fearful of British intentions in Xinjiang, invaded and occupied the fertile upper Yili River valley and virtually annexed it as a protectorate on the pretext of maintaining law and order during the revolt against Chinese administration. The great Chinese General, Zuo Zongtang, mustered a formidable Chinese army against Yakub and began a slow reconquest of the rebel strongholds. By 1877, Zuo had sanquinarily repressed the revolt and demanded that the Russians relinquish their control over the Yili area.

As the result of the initial negotiations in St. Petersburg, the Treaty of Livadia was signed by a Chinese delegate but was never ratified by the Chinese government because of the unfavorable terms of the agreement. A strong position was taken on this matter by China. A massive force was gathered in Dzungaria under Zuo and Peking sent another delegate to Russia to renegotiate the settlement on more favorable terms. Under the terms of the resulting Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1881, which was ratified by the Chinese, the Russians agreed to return most of the Yili River valley, the Tekes Valley, and the passes through the Tianshan. A small area west of the Holkuts River was ceded to Russia for the purpose

of settling those inhabitants of Xinjiang who preferred to live under Russian rule. China was also obliged to cede some 18,000 square miles of land southwest of Yili and west of Tacheng, and pay an indemnity of nine million silver rubles as compensation for the Russian military expenses. Additional Russian consulates in Xinjiang were also permitted.⁷

After China regained control in Xinjiang, additional troops were left to garrison the region so as to prevent any repetition of the events of the preceding two decades. Xinjiang was made a province of China in 1884, and control of the provincial regime slipped largely into the hands of the families of the military and civilian officials who had accompanied Zuo from the province of Hunan. Until the Revolution of 1911, Xinjiang was ruled by generally able bureaucrats from this group, and the Imperial government took an active interest in increasing, or at least maintaining, its control in the border region. For example, in 1909-10 there were in existence in the province two mixed brigades of the Chinese New Army at Yining and Urumqi.⁸ Despite the Imperial government's desire to maintain its control over Xinjiang, however, the region nonetheless remained largely autonomous.

WARLORDISM AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN XINJIANG

Following the Revolution of 1911, Xinjiang entered an era of warlord rule which was to last until the mid-1940s.⁹ The successive provincial leaders, all of whom were Han Chinese, were Yang Zengxin (1911-29), Jin Shuren (1928-33), and Sheng Shicai (1933-44). Each of these warlord rulers maintained their own military forces, collected their own taxes, formed loyal, Han-dominated administrations in which native leaders continued to handle affairs at the local levels so long as they complied with the authority of the provincial leadership, and maintained their own diplomatic relations with Russia.

The decades following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 were marked by a growing Soviet influence in Xinjiang's affairs and a major rebellion led by the young Muslim General, Ma Zhongying, from 1931 to 1934. In 1931, the Soviets established the Soviet-Xinjiang Trading Company (Sovsintorg) under an agreement with Jin Shuren.¹⁰ This enterprise had representatives in the major trading centers, and, along with the five existing Soviet consulates in

the region, allowed for extensive Russian penetration.

Soviet influence in Xinjiang reached a pinnacle under Sheng Shicai (pictured in Figure 2.1), who initially appealed to them for assistance in quelling Ma Zhongying's forces. In return for their aid, which included troops and advisors, weapons, a 5 million gold ruble loan, and diplomatic recognition, Sheng granted the Soviets exclusive rights for the exploration and exploitation of the region's mineral and petroleum resources, a monopoly on Xinjiang's export trade, and the right to establish a propaganda and information network in the province.¹¹

Figure 2.1

Sheng Shicai (center) Bidding Farewell to a Soviet Economic Mission.



Source: "The Angry Frontier," Life, Vol. 66, No. 11 (March 21, 1969), p. 35. Reprinted by permission.

As in the 1870s, Russian troops entered Xinjiang twice during domestic insurrections in the 1930s and suppressed rebellions which the local authorities in Urumqi, not to mention the Chinese Central Government in Nanjing, appeared incapable of handling. The Soviet forces, however, came at the invitation of the provincial authorities -- albeit without the approval of Chiang Kaishek. In neither of these cases did Soviet intervention lead to an outright annexation of territory, however, The reasons for this were complex, but in the main could

be traced to: (1) the Soviet perception that China's cooperation was needed against the Japanese, and any overt action to detach Xinjiang would undermine such an alliance; and (2) the Soviet estimation that its main goals could be achieved more efficaciously by working through a compliant regime in Xinjiang.¹²

The Soviet position in Xinjiang under Sheng's regime and the degree to which he was willing to go in order to maintain their support were best exemplified by the "Tin Mines Treaty" of 1940 which virtually signed over the natural resources of the region to Moscow.¹³ In the late 1930s, Sheng proclaimed himself a Marxist and was eventually made a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). He vocally advocated anti-imperialism, announced a program of political and socio-economic reforms that were outwardly liberal and progressive, and drew up a Soviet-style three-year economic plan for the province. To a degree, Sheng's ideological stance and his avowed programs of reform set him apart from most other warlords in China. Soviet advisors were sent to Urumqi to serve under Sheng, a number of CCP members arrived from Yan-an to assume positions within his regime, and liaison was established in the provincial capital between the CPSU and CPP.¹⁴ However, no formal Communist Party was established in the province, and Sheng pursued a repressive policy against all groups who might show any opposition to his rule.

When it seemed as if Russia was near defeat at the hands of Hitler's invading forces in late 1942, Sheng swung away from the Soviets, purged the province of all Communists and their sympathizers (including Mao Zemin, the brother of Mao Zedong), and struck out on his own.¹⁵ With the Soviets withdrawing from Xinjiang, in late 1943 Sheng voiced his support and allegiance to the Guomindang (GMD) government in Chengqing. Shortly thereafter, the GMD began to send in troops and officials so as to undermine Sheng's authority and assert its control over the province. The central authorities also sponsored a program of resettling Han from China Proper in Xinjiang. Realizing his untenable position in Xinjiang, Sheng willingly agreed to a transfer to Chengqing, where he was given the face-saving post of Minister of Agriculture in August 1944.

GMD RULE AND THE YILI REBELLION

With the appointment of Wu Zhongxin as Chairman of Xinjiang in late 1944, it seemed that for the

first time since 1911 the province would be more firmly tied to the central authorities. But, in fact, this was not to be the case. In June 1943, even before Sheng had been removed from the province, Osman Bator led a Kazakh rebellion in the Altai area against the provincial regime. A year later, a similar revolt broke out against the provincial authorities among the Uighurs and Kazakhs in the "Three Districts" of Yili, Tacheng, and Altai in the northwest.¹⁶ This uprising was vehemently anti-Han in tenor. By early 1945, the insurgents had occupied Yining, and there proclaimed the establishment of an independent "Eastern Turkestan Republic." It was nominally headed by an Uzbek named Abdul Nair Ture, who had the reputation of being primarily a religious and local nationalist leader, but not particularly pro-Soviet. Thereafter, the Yili rebels continued their advance under a Central Staff led by Akhmedjan Kasimi, a Soviet-educated, pro-Communist Uighur. The leadership of the insurgents, in fact, increasingly slipped into the hands of pro-Soviet minority nationals, including Akhmedjan, Saifudin Azizov (a Soviet-educated Uighur from Kazgar who was a member of the CPSU), Rakhimjan Sabir Klojaev (a pro-Soviet Uighur), Abdul Karim Abasov (a revolutionary who had been educated at Xinjiang College), and Saifulaev (a local Uighur nationalist).

The Yili rebels gathered a sizeable army, known as the Yili National Army,¹⁷ extended their control over Tacheng, Altai, and the northern Tarim Basin oases such as Aksu, and pushed the GMD troops back from Manass, a key town in Dzungaria near which the main route from Urumqi to the west divides. During their military offensive, the Yili forces undertook a fairly widespread pogrom against Han Chinese nationals.¹⁸ Throughout the course of the Yili rebellion, the insurgents were given clandestine support and encouragement by the Soviets, possibly including arms, equipment, supplies, and troops.¹⁹

At the end of 1945, Chengqing sent Zhang Zhizhong, recently appointed as Director of the GMD's Northwest Headquarters at Lanzhou, to negotiate with the Yili regime. Zhang secured the "good offices" of the Soviets to act as mediators and a temporary truce was arranged.²⁰ He replaced Wu Zhongxin as Provincial Chairman in July 1946, and formed a brief coalition government which included several leaders of the Yili faction.²¹ Reforms were promised, but neither side fully abided by the terms of the settlement. The Yili leaders refused to incorporate their troops into the GMD Army, and

and renewed fighting broke out shortly thereafter. When Masud Sabri, a conservative, pro-GMD Uighur (who had long been associated with the reactionary "C-C Clique"²²), was appointed as Provincial Chairman in the spring of 1947, tensions continued to mount. The Yili group, feeling that Masud was a mere figurehead of the reactionaries within the GMD and did not truly represent the interests of the nationalities, left the coalition government, retired to Yining, and revived the dormant "Eastern Turkestan Republic."²³ At about the same time, Osman Bator broke with the Yili group and was briefly enlisted by the Xinjiang Garrison Commander, Song Xilian, to support the provincial regime.

During the period when it had reestablished control over the "Three Districts," the Yili group once again opened up some of Xinjiang's richest natural resources to Soviet exploration and exploitation. Soviet consulates were reopened, Russian trade missions arrived, Soviet scientists and engineers went back to work, and disguised Red Army troops reportedly filtered into the Yili-held areas. To a significant extent, the Soviets thereby managed to quietly penetrate the northwest area of Xinjiang and reestablish their political and economic foothold. By 1949, in fact, the Yili area was rapidly evolving as a de facto Soviet dependency.²⁴

In December 1948, Burhan Shahidi, a Tatar, replaced Masud Sabri as Provincial Chairman.²⁵ Burhan was to be the last chairman of the province under GMD rule. Throughout 1949, the GMD was faced not only with serious problems in Xinjiang, but was also handicapped by the civil war against the CCP in China Proper. The financial position of the Urumqi authorities steadily worsened as inflation, maladministration, and agricultural stagnation became serious.²⁶

In 1947, for example, the provincial budget had been 49 billion yuan, only one-third of which came from provincial taxes and customs. The remainder came from central subsidies which were presumably channeled through the Xinjiang Garrison command. Many of the proposed socio-economic reform programs promised during the rule of Sheng Shicai and, later, under Shang Zhizhong were dropped for lack of funds. These factors only increased the tensions between the GMD authorities and the local people of Xinjiang.

XINJIANG ON THE EVE OF THE COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER

By July 1949, the First Field Army units of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had marched into neighbouring Gansu province and were poised for entry

into Xinjiang. In August, a delegation of Yili leaders headed by Akhmedjan departed from Yining by plane to attend the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Peking. The whole group was killed on August 27 in a crash that oddly went unreported for several weeks. With the leading pro-Soviet spokesman of the Yili group dead, the mantle of leadership passed to Saifudin²⁷ who happened not to be on the plane. Politically, Saifudin was virtually isolated, and power flowed almost automatically into the hands of Burhan, who emerged as a less radical spokesman of the local nationalities. Both Saifudin and Burhan now spoke of Chinese nationalism, and the previously anti-Han orientation of the Yili group was reinterpreted according to the CCP line as one of antifeudalism against the corrupt GMD regime.²⁸

During the last days before the entry of the PLA units into Xinjiang, the Soviet Consul-General in Urumqi reportedly approached the recently appointed Xinjiang Garrison Commander, Tao Zhiyue, and suggested that he declare the province's independence from China on the precedent of Outer Mongolia.²⁹ The Soviets reputedly offered to order the PLA to stop its planned advance into Xinjiang. After considering the Soviet offer, Tao apparently refused for reasons unknown, thus rebuffing Moscow's last minute scheme and leaving the door open to the PLA. On September 25, 1949, Tao cabled the peaceful surrender of the 80,000 GMD troops under his command to the Communists, and Burhan, representing the provincial government, followed suit on the next day.³⁰

For a period of about four weeks, the province lapsed into a state of near chaos as counterrevolutionary elements, including reactionary GMD officers and local ethnic leaders, such as Osman Bator, refused to abide by the terms of the "peaceful surrender" made by the Xinjiang government and military authorities. Efforts were made to provoke a mutiny among the units of the Xinjiang Garrison, which had defected to the Communists, and to harrass the incoming PLA troops. Martial law was proclaimed on September 28, and was enforced by the arrest of some recalcitrant GMD supporters. On October 12, the troops of the PLA First Field Army group, led by Wang Zhen, Guo Peng (commander of the PLA units that were to garrison Hami), and Wang Enmao (political commissar of the First Field Army), began their march into Xinjiang. On the following evening, these forces entered Hami, where they disarmed most of the GMD troops and commandeered transportation for their

journey to Urumqi. A week later, PLA units arrived in the provincial capital. Other subordinate PLA troops under Wang Enmao moved on to Yanqi, Kuerle, and Kazgar.

SUMMARY

On the eve of CCP liberation in late 1949, Xinjiang was a province whose historical past left many important legacies. In general, these legacies constituted obstacles to the integration of this vast, inhospitable, and distant frontier region with the new regime that was emerging in China Proper. A long tradition of ethnic and religious animosities among the native peoples, and between them and the non-Muslim Han peoples from China Proper, had provided the conditions for continued mistrust, resentment, opposition, and rebellion in Xinjiang. Cultural and economic differences among these groups also complicated the situation.

Being all but isolated from China Proper by geography and distance, and the historical inadequacy of transportation and communications, Xinjiang remained largely an autonomous appendage of the Chinese state. It was subject to a great deal of outside influence and penetration, especially from Russia. Due to the comparatively easier physical access into the province from the west, Russia was often able to take advantage of local ethnic, religious, and other unrest without any fear of intervention from a weak regime in the Chinese capital after the mid-nineteenth century. By the terms of the treaties it signed with China, and later with local Chinese warlords in Xinjiang whose power rested upon her military backing, Russia gained vast tracts of territory in Chinese Turkestan, numerous diplomatic privileges, wide-ranging and monopolistic economic and trade concessions in Xinjiang, and the right to exclusively develop and exploit the province's rich natural resources. For over a century this Russian influence grew until Xinjiang became virtually its economic and political satellite. Many of the border areas in the province became almost wholly oriented toward Russia, with Russian influence and ideologies becoming thoroughly entrenched. One such area was the strategically located and rich Yili River valley, which by 1949 was the center of the Soviet-backed separatist regime called the "Eastern Turkestan Republic" headed by non-Han nationals.

Although the Chinese central authorities re-

tained nominal sovereignty over the province despite their various internal and external problems, in reality Xinjiang was more often than not ruled by Han Chinese, but not by China prior to 1949. No Chinese central regime, including the Nationalists, ever fully controlled the province to the complete exclusion of outside influence for any long period of time, nor had any Chinese regime ever been able to develop the potentially rich natural resources or the economy of the province independent of foreign interests. Although the central authorities briefly conquered the region by military means, attempted to maintain control there through such devices as military colonization, and tried to sinicize it by limited Han immigration, their influence remained very superficial. Local affairs were left primarily in the hands of native leaders who, so long as Chinese power and influence was sufficiently strong, accepted Han overlordship. Whenever Chinese power and influence declined, however, there was a prevailing tendency for local groups to throw off central control. Periodic rebellions provided the local peoples with experience in and continued aspirations for local autonomy and independence. Moreover, the basically opportunist and exploitative nature of Chinese and Soviet policies in Xinjiang, when coupled with internal turmoil in the province and civil warfare in China Proper, did not set a proper climate for extensive reforms in the region. In 1949, therefore, Xinjiang was an economically underdeveloped and backward, ethnically and attitudinally non-Han, religiously Muslim, and politically divided "province" of China.

Part 2
The Evolution of Xinjiang's
Leadership, 1949-66

3. The Administrative Elite in Xinjiang to 1966

The establishment of Communist authority in China in 1949 required the extensive use of veteran PLA officers in positions of administrative authority and control. Military control was designed to be a short-term method of establishing the basis for effective control and authority for the CCP throughout China, and was to yield to elected civilian government under Party direction as soon as political and socio-economic conditions were satisfactory. In the Northwest, however, military control under the PLA First Field Army (hereafter cited as the PLA 1st F.A.)¹ was more extensive and prolonged than in most other areas of China. In part, this was due to the unfinished business of suppressing active remnant Guomindang (GMD) elements and others branded as counterrevolutionaries and criminals. Firm military control was also necessitated by the fact that the region, including Xinjiang, was populated largely by non-Han ethnic groups with a strong tradition of anti-Chinese sentiment and activities. In the CCP's view, moreover, the region was deemed to be of great strategic and economic importance. Therefore, stronger military forces were required to pacify and control the indigenous population, eliminate the separatist groups and influences among them, and lay the foundations for Chinese exploitation of the region's existing (and potential) natural resources.

Since the CCP had virtually no established organization in Xinjiang prior to liberation, the establishment of Communist rule and the building of a Party organization in Xinjiang was wholly the work of those PLA 1st F.A. elements who also belonged to the CCP. Despite the fact that former GMD functionaries and native leaders were absorbed into the Xinjiang elite at the lower levels or in supernumerary positions of prestige at the higher levels, the real authority was to remain in the hands of the Party elements in the PLA 1st F.A. group who had assumed concurrent military duties

and high administrative positions. By 1952, Wang Enmao, a veteran member of this group, emerged as the most powerful Party-military man in Xinjiang, and was to remain such until the Cultural Revolution fifteen years later. Throughout the course of Xinjiang's history under Communist rule, the legacy of the early post-liberation predominance of the PLA 1st F.A. group in provincial affairs was to be of great importance.

THE LEADING POST-LIBERATION ADMINISTRATORS OF XINJIANG

From the outset of Communist rule in Xinjiang, the PLA 1st F.A. units played a crucial role in creating an administrative establishment in the non-Han border region. For nearly the first half-decade, the military directly administered Xinjiang through military control committees and sponsored the building of Party organs and the creation of representative organs throughout the region, including local autonomous units for the minority nationalities. When representative governmental institutions were established, the military continued to exercise indirect control of the new administrative bodies, either through its representatives who were elected to high-ranking positions of authority within the various governmental organs, or through the various CCP committees on which military representation was very high. All governmental organs in Xinjiang, as elsewhere in China, were responsible to higher state organs. In turn, the higher state organs were ultimately controlled and directed by the Party apparatus which emerged as the military achieved the restoration of order and stability. Although Xinjiang's administrative organs were to retain a comparatively high percentage of non-Han and non-Party elements, there was never any question as to their continued subordination to the CCP throughout the 1949-65 period. Moreover, the Party was to be dominated by Han elements drawn primarily from the PLA 1st F.A. faction.

In order better to understand the evolution of Xinjiang's elite after 1949, brief biographical sketches of Peng Dehuai, He Long, Wang Zhen, Wang Enmao, Burhan Shahidi, and Saifudin Azizov are presented at this point to clarify the origins and the rather complicated relationships which existed within the regional hierarchy.²

During the initial stages of the establishment of Communist authority in northwest China, Peng

Dehuai was, for a brief period of time, the nominal leading Party and military figure in the region. In 1937, Peng had become a deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army, concurrent with He Long's assumption of command over the 120th Division, which had jurisdiction over Wang Zhen's Brigade 359. Significantly, the troops under He's 120th Division, including Brigade 359, constituted the nucleus of what was later to emerge as the PLA 1st F.A.

In early 1947, Peng Dehuai led the recovery of Yan-an and was made commander of the Northwest Field Army, which included the bulk of He Long's troops. In 1948, the Northwest Field Army was redesignated the PLA 1st F.A. While Peng became its commander and political commissar, and also held the position of commander of the Northwest Military Region (NWMR), He Long was named president of the Northwest Military and Political College, that was responsible for the recruitment, organization, and training of military and Party cadres. After the liberation of Xi-an in April-May 1949, He became chairman of the Military Control Commission there. A part of He's troops went on to liberate Lanzhou in August 1949 under Peng's command, and He took another portion of the PLA 1st F.A. into Sichuan and helped to organize the Southwest Military Region.

Troops led by Wang Zhen, but under the nominal command of Peng, went on to liberate Xinjiang in September-October 1949. Following this, Peng assumed the titles of commander and political commissar of the Xinjiang Military District (XJMD), and held these posts until late 1950, when he was assigned to command the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) in Korea. Since Peng was also named first secretary of the Northwest CCP Bureau (NWCCP) and chairman of the Northwest Military and Administrative Committee (NWMAC), it is likely that his duties in Xi-an and Korea fully occupied his time. As a result, for practical reasons much of his authority in Xinjiang was delegated to Wang Zhen, who emerged as the leading Party and military figure in the border province.

Thus, it should be emphasized that while Peng Dehuai nominally emerged as the leading CCP-PLA authority in the Northwest during liberation, his tenure there was brief and his association with the PLA 1st F.A. system, which had emerged almost wholly under He Long, had spanned only a little more than half a decade.³ Moreover, his influence in Xinjiang must have been minimal, since Wang Zhen had supervised the liberation there and had actively

assumed the top posts in Urumqi. The implication is that Peng probably had not built up a deeply rooted loyalty system in the PLA 1st F.A. base before he was "promoted out" of the region, first as commander of the CPV in Korea in late 1950 and, later, as vice-premier of the State Council and minister of National Defense in late 1954.

Wang Zhen, a native of Hunan, had joined forces with the Red 2nd Army under He Long in 1934, thus creating the 2nd Front Army. Wang participated in the Long March, and upon reaching Yan-an became commander of the Red 6th Army Corps. In 1939, he led Brigade 359, Division 120, 8th Route Army to the Sha'anxi-Gansu Border Region so as to strengthen the Communist defense of the Yellow River and to begin a mass movement in production for self-sufficiency. From 1940 to 1944, Wang's troops quartered themselves in the Nanniwan area southwest of Yan-an and there undertook land reclamation and agricultural production.

Wang and those officers⁵ and soldiers who participated in the production and construction endeavors at Nanniwan later became the rather heroic symbols of CCP literature as the living models of battle hardened veterans who were willing to undertake mundane and arduous work in remote and difficult areas. The "spirit of Nanniwan," which came to symbolize "self-sacrifice" and "self reliance," remained an important legacy in the subsequent career of Wang and his subordinates.

As the civil war came to an end in the late 1940s, Wang Zhen emerged as chief of staff in the Shanxi-Suiyan-Sha'anxi-Gansu-Ningxia Military Headquarters, an area nominally under He Long's command. He, however, had led his troops eastward and Wang was left in virtual control there. From 1947 to 1948, Wang was commander of the 2nd column of Peng Dehuai's Northwest Field Army. In 1949, he became commander of the 1st Army Corps of the PLA 1st F.A. which entered Xinjiang in October of that year.

As first vice-commander of the XJMD, Wang was for all practical purposes the top military man in Xinjiang since Peng was fully occupied with his various duties in Xi-an. By late 1950, Wang officially succeeded Peng as both commander and political commissar of the XJMD. He retained these military posts until August 1952, at which time he was appointed vice-commander of the NWMR in Xi-an. In his new position, Wang was nominally subordinate to Peng, but as Peng was then commanding the CPV in

Korea, Wang was probably the most important military figure in the Northwest until his transfer to Peking as commander and political commissar of the PLA Railroad Corps in May 1954.

Wang Enmao was born in 1912 in Yongxin xian, Jiangxi. Being of peasant background, he was apparently greatly influenced by the attempts made by CCP activists to organize the peasants against the local landlords in his native area, which was located near the Jinggangshan base where Mao and his followers had taken refuge in 1927-28. Between 1928 and 1931, Wang was admitted to the CCP, and was active in the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Communist base recruiting and training cadres during the early 1930s. Little else is known about his activities until 1941, when he was identified as a deputy political commissar in Wang Zhen's Brigade 359 at Nanniwan. For the next decade, Wang continued his close association with Wang Zhen. In 1946, he was elevated to political commissar of Brigade 359, and two years later was promoted to political commissar in the 2nd Army (commanded by Guo Peng), 1st Army Corps (commanded by Wang Zhen), PLA 1st F.A. (Peng Dehuai commander and political commissar).

Wang Enmao may have been with Wang Zhen's PLA units when they entered Urumqi on October 20, 1949. He is known to have pushed onward with a part of the PLA troops and reached Kazgar later that month. Aside from the fact that he became chairman of the Kazgar Military Control Commission, little else is known of Wang's work there. Since Wang was promoted to political commissar of the PLA 1st F.A. at about the same time, it is reasonable to assume that he was the top PLA-CCP official south of the Tianshan, where over two-thirds of Xinjiang's people lived. Moreover, it is likely that the Party wanted a veteran--and Han--such as Wang in the top posts in this inaccessible, non-Han area which had a long history of unrest. Given his other provincial-level duties as a member of the XJPPG and the Xinjiang CCP Sub-Bureau, Wang must have periodically been in Urumqi during these early years. Although he was also appointed to membership on the NWMAC in July 1950 (a post which he retained after the NWMAC was reorganized into the Northwest Administrative Committee, or NWAC), Wang did not travel frequently outside the province or Northwest region.

Wang remained in southwest Xinjiang until August 1952, when he was transferred to Urumqi to take over as the ranking secretary of the XJ CCP Sub-Bureau, as well as the ranking military leader in Xinjiang.

Wang was not, however, officially identified as political commissar and commander of the XJMD until early 1954 and 1956, respectively. In December 1954, he was made first political commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (hereafter cited as the Xinjiang PCC), as well as first secretary of its Party committee. Wang retained these posts in Xinjiang until late 1968 (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1

Wang Enmao (left) and Saifudin Speaking in Urumqi on October 1, 1965.



Source: Minzu huabao (Nationalities' Pictorial), No. 11 (1965), p. 27.

Burhan Shahidi exemplified the CCP's policy of utilizing former GMD functionaries after liberation. Besides being retained as provincial chairman by the Party, Burhan was also a member of the NWMAC and its Nationalities Affairs Committee, and chairman of the China Islamic Association. Significantly, his name was missing from the list of notables invited to attend the First Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in Peking during September 1949, although he was later elected chairman of the First Xinjiang CPPCC in 1951. It was not until November 1951, that he became a delegate to the CPPCC, and only in late 1954 was he made a vice-chairman of the Second CPPCC, the function of which had already been superseded by the National People's Congress (NPC). He became a member of the NPC and its Nationalities Committee in 1954, but did not receive a vice-chairmanship on that committee until 1956.

In all probability Burhan was essentially a

minority nationality figurehead in the political structure of the Xinjiang administration. He did, however, denounce the separatist aspirations of his fellow nationalities and repeatedly and vigorously supported the unity of Xinjiang with the rest of China throughout the period of the early 1950s. Burhan, significantly, did not hold any concurrent posts in the provincial Party and military structures, although he probably had been admitted to membership in the CCP.⁶ Furthermore, during the mid-1950s, his duties in the province decreased as those of Saifudin increased, and more of his time was devoted to foreign relations activities under the central government.

Saifudin, a Uighur, was born in Tacheng, Xinjiang (see Figure 3.1). He studied law and political science at the Central Asia University in Moscow, during which time he joined the CPSU. He subsequently returned to Xinjiang and acted as a Soviet agent in instigating rebellion among the minority people against Han rule. He participated in the Yili insurrection from 1944 to 1949, and became Minister of Education in the separatist "Eastern Turkestan Republic" which was organized in the "Three Districts." He was appointed Commissioner of Education in the brief coalition government arranged by Zhang Zhizhong in late 1945 between the Yili insurgents and the GMD regime in Urumqi. In 1948, shortly after the coalition government had collapsed, he returned to Yining and served as editor of Qianjin ribao (Progress Daily), which was the official organ of the Yili group's "Xinjiang League for the Protection of Peace and Democracy" whose avowed aim was to promote the nascent nationalistic aspirations of the ethnic minorities in northwest Xinjiang.

Shortly before Xinjiang was liberated by the Communists, Saifudin attended the First CPPCC in Peking, where he was elected as a specially-invited personage to membership on its National Committee. In October 1949, he became a member of the Central People's Government Council (CPGC) which was chaired by Mao Zedong, and retained that position until the CPGC was dissolved in 1954. Saifudin also became vice-chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Commission and a member of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee, both of which were subordinate to the Government Administrative Council (GAC). After the establishment of constitutional government in 1954, Saifudin was elected vice-chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and a member of its Presidium.

In addition to his posts as vice-chairman of the XJPPG and chairman of the Xinjiang Nationalities Affairs Committee, Saifudin was made a member of the NWMAC, and when it was reorganized into the NWAC in January, 1953, he was elevated to a vice-chairmanship. From 1950 to 1954, he was also a vice-chairman of the NWMAC-NWAC's Nationalities Affairs Committee, and from 1952 to 1954, served as a member of its Political and Legal Affairs Committee. As a result of his important duties in both Xi-an and Peking, Saifudin spent a good deal of his time outside Xinjiang.

In early 1950, Saifudin joined Mao and Zhou Enlai in Moscow, where he led a Xinjiang delegation to negotiate commercial agreements with the Soviets as attached protocols to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Two Agreements were signed on March 27 under which two joint-stock companies were established in Xinjiang, one for the exploration and exploitation of petroleum and the other for the exploitation of non-ferrous and rare minerals. While he was in Moscow, the Peking authorities announced that he had been admitted to the CCP. Unlike Burhan, Saifudin concurrently held several important posts in both the Party and military spheres (which will be described below).

While the reasons for Saifudin's continued rise and longevity in the Xinjiang elite from 1949 to 1966 are not precisely known, some speculations can be made. During the period of Sino-Soviet cooperation in the early 1950s, Saifudin's role as a Communist minority national was an important factor in his initial rise under CCP rule. Following his transferral from membership in the CPSU to membership in the CCP during early 1950, however, Peking presumably undertook measures to assure his loyalty. One factor that must have had considerable impact on the process was the fact that with the untimely death of most of the other former pro-Soviet Yili group leaders (including Akhmedjan Kasimi), Saifudin was virtually isolated as one of the last remaining leaders of this non-Han group. With his old Yili leadership base of support now all but gone, Saifudin likely had little alternative but to comply with the increasing power and authority of the CCP in Xinjiang.

Saifudin's treatment by the CCP was both correct and cautious in the early 1950s. This must have been partially based upon Peking's feeling that if Saifudin could be won over his support would bring substantial numbers of the Yili group and other

minority elements over to the CCP. One measure adopted by Peking which lends credence to this interpretation was Saifudin's appointment to several high-ranking posts in both the central and provincial organs. Such a tactic might have also been designed to pull him away from Moscow and thus achieve his further allegiance to the People's Republic of China. It is likely that in the performance of the duties associated with his various posts and during his frequent trips to Peking that Saifudin was patiently "cultivated and re-educated" by the Party leadership. In essence, the early post-liberation years constituted a period of Saifudin's weaning from Soviet influence and a time of proving his loyalty to the CCP. There were no indications that his words or actions were anything but "correct" in terms of the Party's line.

Throughout the early 1950s, Saifudin increasingly exhibited a strong stance against separatist sentiments among the Xinjiang minority groups, and gradually began to limit his ties with the Soviets. Especially after the death of Stalin, Saifudin began to rise within the Xinjiang Party and government hierarchies. His status continued to improve even as there were signs that the relationship between Moscow and Peking was beginning to deteriorate. Significantly, Saifudin's leading role in vehemently attacking local nationalism and denouncing many of his former comrades of the pro-Soviet Yili group in 1957-58 (see below) indicated that his conversion to the CCP (and China) had been complete and that he had gained the trust of his Han superiors in the Party. As the Party increasingly sought to extirpate Soviet influence from the border region, Saifudin distinctively maintained his high Party and government positions, joined in the chorus of anti-Soviet vituperation emanating from China, and roundly denounced his former tutors. In fact, he emerged as a model which the Party hoped would serve to convince other minority nationals to be loyal (and compliant) to the Chinese establishment.

Despite the amazing success and longevity of Saifudin's political career throughout CCP rule in Xinjiang, however, events were to show that he would not be fully entrusted with the top Party, military, or government post in Xinjiang. In part, this can be traced to the fact that the Party wanted to maintain Han predominance in the regional political and military leadership. Also, it was obvious that Peking had reservations about his Soviet background, even though he had been converted and his record

was clean. In this respect, it would appear that in subsequent years Saifudin's preliberation Soviet ties and, paradoxically, his ethnic background continued to be obstacles in his career.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL IN XINJIANG

Military control began at the local levels in Xinjiang as soon as the xian (counties) and shi (cities) had been liberated.⁷ Military control committees were established as the supreme administrative organs of the State, with the PLA 1st F.A. unit commanders as their heads. For example, Wang Zhen became the chairman of the Urumqi Military Control Commission, which had nominal jurisdiction over the whole province, while Wang Enmao and Guo Peng headed similar committees at Kazgar and Hami, respectively. All key positions were assigned to veteran Party members of the PLA 1st F.A. units.⁸

PLA work teams, the heads of which were nearly always Han CCP members, were dispatched to the local levels in Xinjiang, with the general exception of the "Three Districts," whose autonomy was "not altered for the time being."⁹ The PLA work teams unified and mobilized the masses, formed peasant's associations, and made preparations for the establishment of local representative organs based upon the Party's united front policy--which was designed to bring together the majority of all sections of society and all professions under the banner of patriotism, internationalism, and anti-imperialism.¹⁰ They also undertook Party propaganda and indoctrination work, recruited and trained cadres and activists, and "guided" various political and socio-economic campaigns at the local levels. Significantly, when organs of local government were eventually established, the PLA work team head usually retained actual power, and when Party branches were ultimately organized in a basic-level unit or area, he would almost always become its first secretary.

On December 18, 1949, Peng and Zhang Zhizhong, the former GMD leader in the Northwest who had defected to the CCP and was retained as a vice-chairman of the NWMAC, flew to Urumqi and issued a communiqué announcing the formation of the unified Xinjiang Provincial People's Government. The province was organized into eighty xian and shi, and ten special administrative districts (zhuan-qu)¹¹ which constituted intermediate administrative units between the xian and shi and the provincial (sheng) levels. The XJPPG which was appointed on that date comprised

thirty-one members, nine of whom were Uighurs.¹² Burhan was retained as chairman of the XJPPG, while Saifudin and Gao Jinchun, a high-ranking CCP member from the PLA 1st F.A. group, were appointed vice-chairmen. In addition to Gao, other prominent Han nationals appointed as members of the XJPPG included Wang Zhen, Wang Enmao, Xu Liqing, Rao Zhongxi, Deng Lichun, and Xin Lanting, all of whom were also veteran CCP members of the PLA 1st F.A. group. Table 3.1 shows a listing of the government elite in Xinjiang from 1949 to 1966.

Of the utmost significance was the fact that the key departmental positions within the provincial administration were virtually all held by this group. Wang Zhen was named chairman of the Finance and Economics Committee. As such, he controlled the Department of Finance and Trade,¹³ whose director was Xin Lanting, and the Department of Commerce, which was headed by Gao Jinchun. Deng Lichun was appointed director of the Department of Culture and Education. Liu Huping, whose background is not known, held the post of Procurator-General. Saifudin, although nominally subordinate to Burhan as a provincial vice-chairman, was appointed chairman of the Xinjiang Nationalities Affairs Committee, thus making him the top non-Han provincial authority dealing with minority problems.

On January 6, 1950, the GAC in Peking passed the "Organizational Regulations of the Provincial People's Governments." These regulations virtually reduced the Xinjiang Provincial People's Government (XJPPG) to an instrument of the NWMAC, which was formally inaugurated on January 19, 1950 in Xi-an under the chairmanship of Peng Dehuai. The NWMAC was given the power to nominate the members of the XJPPG "for the sake of a speedy establishment of the revolutionary order."¹⁴ The traditional authority of the XJPPG was thereby temporarily weakened by the NWMAC, which was succeeded by the NWAC from January 1953 to July 1954.¹⁵

Below the provincial-level administration, the composition of leadership was notably different in December 1949. For example, of the ten chairmen appointed to head the government organs at the administrative district level in Xinjiang, four were Uighurs, three were Kazakhs, two were Han, and one was a Mongol. On the xian and shi levels, only thirteen of the appointed chairmen were Han, while the remainder were minority nationals--including forty-five Uighurs.¹⁶

The pattern of civil administrative leadership

in Xinjiang, which has lasted up to the present day, found an increasingly high proportion of non-Han elements in nominal leadership positions from the provincial level down to the local level. Of utmost importance, however, was the fact that in nearly all cases where a minority national was chosen to be chairman, a Han national from the CCP-PLA 1st F.A. group was chosen as vice-chairman and more often than not exercised the de facto authority.

As a practical measure in Xinjiang, where CCP strength was traditionally weak, the Party utilized a significant number of former GMD functionaries and intellectuals, national minority leaders, native religious elite, and members of the former Yili group as cadres and activists under the United Front.¹⁷ As Wang Zhen later said:

The aims of the Chinese People's Central Government vis-à-vis the Northwest were: first, to establish people's representative governments made up of a democratic coalition of all nationalities; second, to enlist progressive elements of all nationalities and all classes to participate in the governments; and, third, to establish a people's democratic United Front . . . under the leadership of the people's governments and various branches of the CCP committees.¹⁸

The Party announced that all those who had maintained "close connections with the masses" and who were "sincerely desirous of reforming themselves" would be allowed to stay in office.¹⁹

In the latter half of 1950, the organs of local power in the "Three Districts" were generally re-organized. Administrative Control Boards were established in the main cities. They were headed by minority cadres of the former Yili group, and included Han representatives from the PLA work teams. The existing system of local rule by clan headmen among the Kazakhs, and other native leaders who had served under the Yili regime ("Eastern Turkestan Republic") from 1944 to 1949, was left largely unaltered.²⁰

In the urban areas of the "Three Districts," including Yining, the pro-Soviet minority nationality intelligentsia was allowed to remain in power, and was generally not required to undertake thoroughgoing ideological remolding or reform.²¹ A number of former Yili rebels were appointed to positions in the XJPPG. Jiakeluofu (a Uighur), for example, was made secretary-general of the XJPPG, while Aisihaiti

Table 3.1
Government Leadership in Xinjiang, 1949-65.

| Position | 1949 | 1950 | 1952 |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| Chm. XJPPG/XUAR PC | Burhan Shahidi (Tat, ex-GMD) | Burhan | Burhan |
| V-Chm. | Gao Jinchun (1st F.A.) | Gao Jinchun | Gao Jinchun |
| V-Chm. | Saifudin (Uig. Yili Gp.) | Saifudin | Saifudin |
| Member | Wang Zhen (1st F.A.) | Wang Zhen | Wang Zhen |
| Member | Wang Enmao (1st F.A.) | Wang Enmao | Wang Enmao |
| Member | Xu Liqing (1st F.A.) | Xu Liqing | Xu Liqing |
| Member | Rao Zhongxi (1st F.A.) | Rao Zhongxi | Rao Zhongxi |
| Member | Deng Lichun (1st F.A.) | Deng Lichun | Deng Lichun |
| Member | Xin Lanting (1st F.A.) | Xin Lanting | Xin Lanting |
| Member | | | Zhang Bangying (1st F.A.), 2/52 |
| Secy. Gen. | Jiakeloufu (Uig, Yili Gp.) | Jiakeloufu | Jiakeloufu |
| Proc. Gen. | Liu Huping (Unknown) | Liu Huping | Na Bijiang (Unknown) |
| Chm. Fin. & Econ. Cmte. | Wang Zhen | Wang Zhen | Wang Zhen |
| Dir., Commerce Dept. | Gao Jinchun | Gao Jinchun | Gao Jinchun |
| Dir., Cult. & Educ. Dept. | Deng Lichun | Deng Lichun | Anwar Hanbaba (Uzb) |
| Chm. Natlys. Cmte. | Saifudin | Saifudin | Saifudin |
| Dir., So. XJ Adm. Office | Wang Enmao? | Wang Enmao? | |
| Chm. XJ CPPCC | | Burhan, 5/51 | Burhan |
| Mayor, Urumqi | Qu Wu (ex-GMD) | Qu Wu | Rao Zhongxi |
| Position | 1955 | 1958 | 1965 |
| Chm., XJPPG/XUAR PC | Saifudin | Saifudin | Saifudin |
| V-Chm. | Gao Jinchun | Xin Lanting | Xin Lanting |
| V-Chm. | Xin Lanting | Yang Heting | Wu Guang (Central), 4/64 |
| V-Chm. | M. Iminov (Uig. Yili Gp.) | Pathan Sugurpaev | Pathan Sugurpaev |
| V-Chm. | Aisihaiti | Jiakeloufu? | M. Iminov? |
| V-Chm. | Pathan Sugurpaev (Kaz.?) | | Aisihaiti? |
| Member | Wang Enmao | Wang Enmao | Wang Enmao |
| Member | Burhan | Burhan | Song Zhihe? (3rd F.A.) |
| Member | Tao Zhiyue | Lu Jianren (1st F.A.) | Lu Jianren |
| Member | A. Aixia (Uig, Yili Gp.) | Tao Zhiyue | Tao Zhiyue |
| Member | A. Jiagulin (Kaz) | | |

| | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Member | Zhang Bangying | Tian Zhong (Unknown), 5/57 | Tian Zhong (also V. Chm.?) |
| Secy. Gen. | Jiakeloufu | | |
| Proc. Gen. | Saifulaev | | |
| Chm. Fin. & Econ. Cmte. | Wang Zhen | Wang Zhen | Wang Zhen/Xin Lanting |
| Dir., Commerce Dept. | Gao Jinchun | Chai Hansheng (Unknown) | Chai Hansheng |
| Dir., Cult. & Educ. Dept. | Anwar Hanbaba | Anwar Hanbaba | Anwar Hanbaba? |
| Chm., Natlys Cmte. | Saifudin | Saifudin | Saifudin |
| Dir., Civil Aff. Dept. | Muiti (Uig) | Muiti? | Muiti? |
| Dir., So. XJ Admin. Office | M. Iminov | | |
| Chm., XJ CPPCC | Saifudin/Burhan | Burhan? | Burhan? |
| Mayor, Urumqi | Ren Kebai | Yashenghutabaierti (Uig) | Yashenghutabaierti |
| Mayor, Yining | Hashannoufu? | Hashannoufu | |
| Head, Yili-Kaz. A.Z. | Pathan Sugurpaev | Kurban Ali. (Kaz) | Irhali Abrkajr (Kaz) |
| V-Head, Yili-Kaz. A.Z. | Li Chuan (1st F.A.) | Li Huiyou (Unknown) | Li Huiyou |
| V-Head, Yili-Kaz. A.Z. | A. Aixia | Hashannoufu | Abdul R. Sulitan (Kaz) |
| V-Head, Yili-Kaz. A.Z. | A. Jiagulin | A. Jiagulin | Youshufuhan |
| V-Head, Yili-Kaz. A.Z. | Jiaheda (Kaz) | Youshufuhan (Kaz?) | |
| Secy. Gen., Yili-Kaz. A.Z. | Aisihaiti (Tat. Yili, Gp.) | | |
| Head, Kazgar Dist. | A. Iminov (Uig) | | |
| Head, Hetian Dist. | Na Bijiang | | |
| Head, Zhangqi A.Z. | Yu Zhanlin | Yu Zhanlin | Yu Zhanlin |
| Head, Kizilsu A.Z. | Maimaiti Aixia (Kirg) | | Maimaiti Aixia? |
| Head, Bayinguoleng A.Z. | Bayin Kexike (Mong) | Bayin Kexike | Bayin Kexike |
| Head, Boertala A.Z. | Duerji (Mong) or Li Yaofeng | Bazhaer Bieke (Kaz?) | Bazhaer Bieke |
| Head, Tash Kurghan A.X. | Xiren Bieke (Tad) | Xiren Bieke | Xiren Bieke |

Sources: "Biographic File," American Consulate-General, Hong Kong, 1950-73; Chinese Communist Who's Who (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1970); Huang Zhenxia, Zhonggong junren zhi (Hong Kong: Research Institute of Contemporary History, 1968); Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-65 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); and Chinese Mainland press and radio reports.

(a Tatar) was appointed as a member of the XJPPG and held the concurrent position of secretary-general of the Yili Special District.

The anti-Han line espoused by the Yili insurgents in the late 1940s was reinterpreted and proclaimed by both Saifudin and Burhan as being an anti-GMD line. Burhan, for example, flatly stated that

. . . the national liberation movements of 1932-33 [led by Ma Zhongying] and that of 1948-49 [under Osman Bator] were both reactionary in that they were lackeys of the various imperialists, but [emphasis mine] the Yili movement of 1944 was a genuine revolutionary struggle, and formed part of the general movement of revolution by the whole Chinese people and socialism.²²

The "Three Districts" continued a rather separate administrative existence under nominal CCP authority, which was backed up by demobilized army production and construction units in the rural and pastoral areas until the mid-1950s. Party policies in regard to the "Three Districts," moreover, remained cautious and gradual throughout the period of Sino-Soviet cooperation and ideological unanimity. As Wang Zhen pointed out, there were special problems accruing to the Party's consolidation and socialization in northwestern Xinjiang following liberation.²³ Among these he cited: (1) the existence of strong traditional tendencies among the local nationalities for autonomy and even separation; (2) the presence of distinct cultures, languages, and religions in the primarily non-Han populated area; (3) the endurance of a basically Moscow-oriented Communist movement and Soviet influence in the area, and the consequent desire of the CCP not to follow policies there that would offend its ally; (4) the continued resistance by counterrevolutionary and bandit elements in much of Xinjiang during the early post-liberation period; and, (5) the great distances within the province and between Xinjiang and China Proper which were amplified by the inadequate nature of the existing transportation and communications network. These factors, he emphasized, had necessitated a slower pace of reforms and more gradual policies.

THE EMERGENCE OF ELECTED GOVERNMENTAL ORGANS AND THE CREATION OF THE XUAR

The system of direct military control in most of

Xinjiang began to pass to a system of local People's Representative Conference of All-Circles and Nationalities, also known as Chinese People's Political Consultative Conferences (CPPCC), in late 1950. These conferences were to be a transitional form of consultative-type government during the period of re-construction prior to the establishment of constitutional government at the xiang level and above in the province. Their primary functions were those of propaganda, debate, and policy recommendation concerning the work of the local People's Governments. From early 1951, these conferences elected corresponding People's Governments, controlled their activities, confirmed their budgets, and passed resolutions which had the force of directives once approved by the higher state organs (and by the CCP) according to the theory of democratic centralism.²⁴

In April and May 1951, the First Xinjiang CPPCC was convened with 524 delegates.²⁵ Four hundred and seventy delegates had been selected by various mass organizations and social groups, state institutions and enterprises, and army units, while the remainder had been chosen by the XJPPG from among the workers, peasants, merchants, students and intellectuals, religious groups, and CCP organs. Uighurs comprised over 40 percent of the delegates, or about one-half of their proportional share of the provincial population, and Han nationals constituted nearly one-fourth. Sixty members, fourteen of whom were Han, were chosen to form the Standing Committee of the First Xinjiang CPPCC, which was to represent the delegates between sessions. Burhan was elected chairman, while Saifudin, Gao Jinchun, Jiaqulin (a Kazakh), Maimaiti Aixia (a Uighur), Daxiafu (a Mongol), and Yu Zhanlin (a Hui) were chosen vice-chairmen. By this time, the total number of cadres and activists from the various nationalities at all levels in Xinjiang had reportedly increased from about 13,000 in late 1950 to over 23,000 by March 1951. Seventy-four percent were said to be from the minority nationalities.²⁶

In late 1952, a Preparatory Committee for Local Nationality Autonomy in Xinjiang was established with Burhan as its nominal chairman. The real authority within this committee, however, rested with Saifudin (a vice-chairman) and with Wang Enmao (a member) based upon the fact that both were ranking members of the Xinjiang Party Committee. Beginning in June 1953, the program for nationality autonomy was implemented at the local levels in Xinjiang with the avowed model being the Inner Mongolian Auton-

omous Region. The formation of autonomous areas in Xinjiang was to be achieved in five stages, beginning at the xiang and qu (district) levels and proceeding up to the provincial level where the Uighur nationality was to be the principal constituent. The establishment of autonomous areas was to be contingent not only on having a large number of minority nationality cadres and representatives, but also on the presence of Han nationality cadres and representatives who were to be retained to take part in work. Burhan, for example, stressed the fact that Xinjiang, and the minority nationality areas that were to be established within it, was an inseparable part of China.²⁷ Each autonomous area was to be a level of local government under the unified leadership of the central authorities and was to be led by the higher-level government organs (which ultimately fell under the authority of the Han-dominated Party organs).

Following the successful experimentation with autonomy at the basic levels, the conclusion of Xinjiang's census,²⁸ the completion of the election campaign, and the "basic victory" scored in the land reform campaign, some three dozen autonomous areas below the special district level had been established in Xinjiang by August 1954.²⁹ By 1955, zizhi zhou (autonomous districts), containing several xian, and six zizhi xian (autonomous counties) had been formed at the subprovincial level.³⁰

In all cases, the elected chairmen of the People's Councils in the autonomous zhou and xian were representatives of the dominant minority nationality in each locality, and invariably a Han CCP member was elected as the ranking vice-chairman. Of the 226 members elected to the People's Councils of five autonomous zhou and six autonomous xian in Xinjiang, 84.6 percent were minority nationals.³¹

In terms of administrative structure, traces of the former "Eastern Turkestan Republic" were discernible in the administrative organization of the Yili Kazakh Autonomous Zhou (hereafter cited as the Yili Zhou), which uniquely contained the subordinate special districts of Tacheng and Altai. Elections in some areas of the Yili Zhou, in fact, did not take place until 1956. The areas in question comprised some fourteen xian, which were generally located in the pastoral areas of the Yili Zhou. There, People's Political Consultative Conferences rather than People's Congresses were convened.

By April of 1954, People's Congresses had been convened in the remaining sixty-nine xian and shi of Xinjiang. They had elected deputies to attend

the provincial People's Congress in late July,³² including 231 Uighurs, forty-eight Kazakhs, forty-five Han, fourteen Hui, nine Mongols, four Uzbeks, and two Russians. The Han deputies, therefore, comprised about 13 percent of the total and the Uighurs over 65 percent--thus more closely approximating their respective share of the provincial population. Burhan was elected chairman, and Saifudin and Gao Jinchun were chosen as vice-chairmen. Twenty-one deputies were elected to represent Xinjiang at the NPC, including Burhan, Saifudin, Wang Enmao, Zhang Bangying, and Lu Jianren.

On August 21, the Southern Xinjiang Administrative Office was established at Kazgar, with jurisdiction over the Aksu, Kazgar, Xiache, and Hetian Special Districts and the newly established Kizilsu A.Z. and Tash Kurghan A.X.³³ Altogether, there were thirty-one xian and shi with more than 3 million people under its authority. The ranking Party member there was Lu Jianren, director of the Xinjiang CCP Sub-Bureau (XJ CCP) United Front Work Department. I. Turdi, chairman of the Xinjiang People's Supervisory Committee, and M. Iminov, the administrative officer of Southern Xinjiang, both Uighurs, were named as the ranking government representatives.

On August 2, 1955, the Xinjiang People's Council officially decided on the organization of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhiqu).³⁴ It resolved that the Preparatory Committee for Regional Nationality Autonomy should transfer some 150 cadres of various nationalities from the provincial and municipal organs to make active preparations throughout Xinjiang.³⁵ Seventy-nine officials from the first-grade offices of the central government in Peking were transferred to various local government organs and economic enterprises at the xian and qu levels on August 21. An additional 1,000 such officials were to be transferred from Peking to Xinjiang later in the year.³⁶ The decision to establish the XUAR was approved by the State Council and ratified by the NPC Standing Committee on September 13, 1955.

On September 20, Vice-Premier Dong Biwu told those attending the opening session of the Second Session of the First Xinjiang People's Congress in Urumqi that the basis for the founding of the XUAR lay in the elevation of patriotism and socialist consciousness of the people, the training and employment of large numbers of cadres from the various nationalities,³⁷ the high degree of unity among the various nationalities, and the selfless and fraternal help

of the Han people and the Soviet Union. He pointed out that


. . . to preserve and consolidate the XUAR, the people of Xinjiang must welcome the continued assistance of the Han people, actively assist one another in construction, pay serious attention to education in patriotism and socialism, prevent the tendencies of Great National chauvinism and parochial nationalism, and wipe out counterrevolutionaries. . . .³⁸

On September 29, the last act of the Xinjiang People's Congress was to elect the new XUAR People's Council (XUAR PC). Saifudin was elevated to chairman, thus replacing Burhan, and Gao Jinchun, M. Iminov, and Pathan Sugurpaev (a Kazakh) were elected vice-chairmen. Among the thirty-seven members elected to the XUAR PC were Wang Enmao, Xin Lanting, Burhan, Tao Zhiyue, and A. Aizia (a Uighur).³⁹ Aplitz Muhanmaiti, a Uighur, was made president of the XUAR Higher People's Court. The XUAR was officially proclaimed on October 1, 1955. Figure 3.2 shows the administrative divisions of the XUAR.

During the decade following the establishment of the XUAR, or until late 1965, Saifudin remained as chairman of the XUAR PC. As the top government administrator (and minority national) under Party authority in Xinjiang, Saifudin represented the Party's policy of nominal minority nationality autonomy. During the antirightist (antilocal nationalist) rectification (zhengfeng) campaign in Xinjiang during 1957-58, Saifudin and Wang Enmao co-chaired the ad hoc rectification committee that was set up by the XUAR CCP Committee. A number of minority nationals belonging to the CCP who held government positions were either demoted (such as M. Iminov and Aisihaiti) or purged during this campaign as local nationalist and anti-Party elements. As a result of the deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union and as an indication of China's growing emphasis on self-reliance and a strictly Chinese road to socialism under Mao, Soviet influence and minority elements suspected of retaining pro-Soviet tendencies (including some of the former Yili group cadres, except Saifudin) constituted the main targets of the movement. Increasingly, the government elite from the minority nationalities was thenceforth composed of those elements who had either been "de-Sovietized" through ideological remolding or those who had been fostered by the CCP itself since liberation. A subsequent minor

Figure 3.2

Administrative Divisions of the XUAR



- I Altai Special District; subordinate to the Yili-Kazakh Autonomous Zhou.
- II Tacheng Special District; subordinate to the Yili-Kazakh Autonomous Zhou.
- III Yili-Kazakh Autonomous Zhou; including the subordinate Special Districts of Tacheng and Altai, and Yining shi.
- IV Boertala Mongol Autonomous Zhou.
- V Karamai (Kelamayi) shi.
- VI Zhangji Hui Autonomous Zhou.
- VII Hami Special District.
- VIII Urumqi (Wulumuqi) shi.
- IX Turfan, whose area is under direct provincial-level administration in Urumqi.
- X Bayinguoleng Mongol Autonomous Zhou.
- XI Aksu Special District.
- XII Hetian Special District.
- XIII Kazgar Special District; including Kazgar shi.
- XIV Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous Zhou.

purge of pro-Soviet elements occurred in 1962-63 following minority unrest in the Yili area, where an estimated 62,000 Kazakhs and Uighurs fled to the Soviet Union. Interestingly, by late 1965, both M. Iminov and Aisihaiti had presumably been "rehabilitated" to their positions as vice-chairmen of the XUAR PC. The two other minority nationals holding vice-chairmanships were Pathan Sugurpaev and Timur Dawamad (a Uighur). There were also three Han nationality vice-

chairmen, including Xin Lanting, Wu Guang, and Tian Zhong.

By mid-1961, over 85 percent of the xian magistrates and deputy magistrates in Xinjiang were minority nationals. Over half of the commissioners and their deputies at the administrative district level, governors and vice-governors at the autonomous zhou level, and directors and vice-directors of departments and bureaux at the regional level were cadres of the minority nationalities.⁴⁰ This nominal minority nationality predominance in the administrative leadership of Xinjiang also prevailed to the end of 1965. The key departments and organs of the Xinjiang administration, however, largely remained in the hands of Han CCP members who either served as their heads or deputy heads. Moreover, every government organ and enterprise from the regional level down had a corresponding Party committee or branch, the ranking secretary of which (normally a Han) exercised de facto control and authority over policy implementation.

As of October 1965, minority cadres in Xinjiang numbered 106,000-plus, or 55.8 percent of the total cadre force of 190,000.⁴¹ Less than 10 percent of all minority cadres held "leading positions" at the commune/xian level and above,⁴² but they accounted for nearly 40 percent of all cadres of all nationalities who held such positions at this level.

Of the "leading positions" within the Xinjiang administration by late 1965, between 30 and 40 percent were held by active or demobilized PLA elements belonging to the CCP. Ninety percent of the military-administrators were at one time or another associated with the PLA 1st F.A. group.⁴³ The remainder of the "leading positions" were staffed by civilian Party cadres, four-fifths of whom were "insiders" (that is, primarily Xinjiang natives or Han nationals stationed in the region since liberation or shortly thereafter). Only about 10 percent of the civilian component in the regional level government elite were known to be "outsiders," with an equal percentage being of unknown origin. The central elite (from Peking) constituted the majority of "outsiders" including Wu Guang, while the PLA 2nd, 3rd and 4th F.A. groups were also represented.

4. The Military Elite in Xinjiang to 1966

MILITARY REORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP IN XINJIANG AFTER LIBERATION

On December 18, 1949, Peng Dehuai announced the formal establishment of the Xinjiang Military District (XJMD), which was under the Northwest Military Region headquarters in Xi-an. On paper, Peng held the post of commander and political commissar of the XJMD, while Wang Zhen became first vice-commander, and Saifudin and Tao Ziyue became vice-commanders. Table 4.1 provides a listing of the military elite in Xinjiang from 1949 through 1965.

Peng also announced that the majority of the GMD troops under Tao and Zhao Xiquang, former vice-commander of Xinjiang Garrison, were to be reorganized, reeducated, and incorporated into the PLA as the 22nd Army Corps. Tao was named as acting commander, and Wang Zhen was made political commissar. The Yili National Army, comprising some 20,000-30,000 men, was also to be absorbed into the PLA as the 5th Army Corps. Saifudin was made its responsible officer, although Leskin, an Yili-born Russian, presumably remained as the titular commander. On December 29, Tao's troops were formally redesignated as the 22nd Army Corps. By January 10 1950, the various GMD and Yili troops had been nominally integrated into the PLA and placed under the authority of those CCP elements who constituted the core of leadership in the PLA 1st F.A. group in Xinjiang.

The headquarters of the XJMD in Urumqi was staffed almost exclusively by officers from this group, and Wang Zhen emerged as the top military man active in the XJMD. Below Wang Zhen, the most important officer from the PLA 1st F.A. group in Xinjiang was Wang Enmao, who, as chairman of the Kazgar Military Control Commission, was the top PLA-CCP official in southern Xinjiang. The key positions of chief of staff and director of the political department of the XJMD were held by the PLA 1st F.A. officers Zhang Xiqin and Xu Liqing, respectively. Zheng

Table 4.1
 Military Leadership in Xinjiang, 1949-65.

| Position | 1949 | 1950 | 1952 |
|------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| Cmdr., XJMD/R | Peng Dehuai (1st F.A.) | Wang Zhen | Wang Zhen/Wang Enmao |
| V. Cmdr. | Wang Zhen (1st F.A.) | Saifudin | Saifudin |
| V. Cmdr. | Saifudin (Uig, Yili Gp.) | Tao Zhiyue | Tao Zhiyue |
| V. Cmdr. | Tao Zhiyue (ex-GMD) | | |
| COS | Zeng Chenwu (Unknown) | Zhang Xiqin (1st F.A.) | Zhang Xiqin |
| Pol. Cmsr. | Peng Dehuai | Wang Zhen | Wang Enmao |
| Dpty. Pol. Cmsr. | Wang Zhen | Wang Enmao | Li Quan |
| Dpty. Pol. Cmsr. | Wang Enmao (1st F.A.) | Li Quan | Zuo Qi? (1st F.A.) |
| Dpty. Pol. Cmsr. | Li Quan (1st F.A.) | | |
| Dir., Pol. Dept. | Xu Liqing (1st F.A.) | Xu Liqing | Zhang Zhonghan? (1st F.A.) |
| Dpty. Dir., Pol. Dept. | Zeng Di (1st F.A.) | Zeng Di | Zeng Di |
| Cmdr., So. XJ | Wang Enmao? | Wang Enmao? | Wang Enmao? |
| Cmdr., Urumqi | Zheng Yuechang (1st F.A.?) | Zheng Yuechang | |
| Cmdr., Yining | Leskin? (Russ, Yili Gp.) | Leskin? | Mazarov? (Russ, Yili Gp?) |

| Position | 1955 | 1958 | 1965 |
|---------------|------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| Cmdr., XJMD/R | Wang Zhen/Wang Enmao | Wang Enmao, 1956 | Wang Enmao |
| V. Cmdr. | Saifudin | Saifudin | Saifudin |
| V. Cmdr. | Guo Peng (1st F.A.) | Guo Peng | Guo Peng |
| V. Cmdr. | Tao Zhiyue | Zhang Xiqin? | Zhang Xiqin |
| V. Cmdr. | | Tao Zhiyue | Xu Guoxian |
| V. Cmdr. | | | Tao Zhiyue |
| COS | Zhang Xiqin | Zhang Xiqin | Xing Yuanlin (2nd/1st F.A.) |
| V. COS | Yang Jie (1st F.A.?) | Yang Jie | He Jiazhan (1st F.A.) |
| V. COS | Zunin Taipov (Tat, Yili Gp.) | Zunin Taipov | Ren Chen (1st F.A.) |
| Pol. Cmsr. | Wang Enmao | Wang Enmao | Wang Enmao |

| | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|---------|-----------------------|
| Dpty. Pol. Cmsr. | Li Quan | Li Quan | Li Quan | Li Quan |
| Dpty. Pol. Cmsr. | Zuo Qi | Zuo Qi | Zuo Qi | Zuo Qi |
| Dpty. Pol. Cmsr. | Zhang Zhonghan | Zeng Di | | Tan Kaiyun (4th F.A.) |
| Dpty. Pol. Cmsr. | Caodanoufu? (Uig, Yili Gp.) | | | Xiong Huang? |
| Dpty. Pol. Cmsr. | Zheng Di | | | Caodanoufu |
| Dpty. Pol. Cmsr. | | Xiong Huang | | Hawamuer (Uig?) |
| Dir., Pol. Dept. | Zhang Zhonghan | | | Xiong Huang |
| Dpty. Dir., Pol. Dept. | Xiong Huang (1st F.A.) | Zhu Jiasheng? (1st F.A.) | | Caodanoufu |
| Dpty. Dir., Pol. Dept. | Caodanoufu? | Caodanoufu? | | Zhu Jiasheng? |
| Cmdr., So. XJ | Guo Peng | Xu Guoxian (1st F.A.) | | Ma Sen? |
| Cmdr., Yining | Mazarov | Mazarov/Zhang Shigong | | Zhang Shigong |
| Pol. Cmsr., Yining | Zhang Shigong? (1st F.A.) | Zhang Shigong | | Zhang Shigong |
| Cmdr., XJ PCC (from 1954) | Tao Zhiyue | Tao Zhiyue | | Tao Zhiyue |
| V. Cmdr. | Zhao Xiguang? (ex-GMD) | Zhao Xiguang | | Ding Sheng (4th F.A.) |
| COS | Tao Jinchu (1st F.A.) | Tao Jinchu | | Tao Jinchu |
| V. COS | Chen Defa (ex-GMD?) | Chen Defa | | Chen Defa |
| V. COS | Yang Guanzhi (ex-GMD?) | Yang Guanzhi | | Yang Guanzhi |
| V. COS | Wang Genzeng (ex-GMD?) | Wang Genzeng | | Wang Genzeng |
| Pol. Cmsr. | Wang Enmao | Wang Zongsheng (1st F.A.?) | | Yang Zongsheng |
| Dpty. Pol. Cmsr. | Zhang Zhonghan | Wang Enmao | | Wang Enmao |
| Dpty. Pol. Cmsr. | | Zhang Zhonghan | | Ding Sheng |
| Dpty. Pol. Cmsr. | | | | Zhang Zhonghan |
| Dir., Pol. Dept. | Wang Jilong (1st F.A.?) | Wang Jilong | | Pei Zhouyu (2nd F.A.) |
| Dpty. Dir., Pol. Dept. | Xiong Huang? | Xiong Huang? | | Wang Jilong |
| Dpty. Dir., Pol. Dept. | Liu Yizun (Unknown) | Liu Yizun | | Xiong Huang? |
| | | | | Liu Yizun |

Sources: Same as Table 3.1.

Yuechang, from the same group, was named commander of the garrison forces in the Urumqi area.

The only non-PLA 1st F.A. elements in the XJMD elite in 1949-50 were Saifudin, who, as vice-commander, assumed the role as the leading minority national in the provincial military structure, and Tao Zhiyue, the GMD defector, who was also retained as a vice-commander but in all probability did not exercise much real authority.

The XJMD was functionally divided into two large subdistricts north and south of the Tianshan, both of which were further subdivided into local garrison commands at the special district levels. In the north, Zhang Xiqin emerged as the leading officer, while in the south, Wang Enmao (and subsequently Guo Peng and Xu Guoxian) became the leading officer. In the "Three Districts," the officers of the former Yili National Army, now incorporated into the PLA as the 5th Army Corps under Saifudin, retained positions of nominal command, including such figures as Leskin and Mazarov (of Russian nationality). The de facto military authority at Yining, however, was slowly placed in the hands of PLA 1st F.A. officers who assumed staff positions there. Among them were Ren Chen, who became chief of staff, and Zhang Shigong, who was identified as political commissar at Yining.

The evidence is insufficient to determine whether or not the minority nationality troops of the 5th Army Corps were regrouped into mixed units with the Han PLA troops. There were indications that, during the early 1950s at least, some company level units continued to be composed primarily of soldiers from the minority groups. A number of the troops belonging to the 5th Army Corps were eventually demobilized for civilian work of various types. Moreover, by 1954, nearly 200 minority cadres from the 5th Army Corps had been transferred to participate in work elsewhere within the various organs of the XJMD.¹ The implication was that the XJMD authorities were redistributing the leading officers of the Yili National Army throughout Xinjiang and placing them under Han superiors, while at the same time moving Han PLA officers into the Yili base to replace them.

Since data concerning military strength and deployment has always been a highly guarded state secret, only the most general and tentative estimates can be made concerning the total number, composition, and deployment of PLA troops in Xinjiang from 1949 to 1966. The PLA in Xinjiang, including the troops of Wang Zhen and the former GMD and Yili

units that were incorporated into the PLA, numbered between 175,000 and 225,000 in 1950. Less than 10 percent of the military forces in the province were minority nationals. About one-fourth of the total number were kept on active duty as frontline border defense or garrison troops responsible for public security and the suppression of active counterrevolutionary elements during the early post-liberation years.

In early 1953, the PLA units stationed in Xinjiang were hailed for their achievements in suppressing local bandits and counterrevolutionaries, maintaining public security, and consolidating the rule of the people's democratic dictatorship. The PLA was said to have sent large numbers of its cadres in work teams to the local levels to give aid in the organization of Party organs. It had also fostered large numbers of minority cadres while helping in the rent-reduction and antilocal landlord campaigns, and had transformed and remolded the former GMD troops and helped the former Yili National Army members to heighten their political consciousness. Significantly, by late 1952, Wang Enmao had been transferred to Urumqi where he presumably took over as acting commander and political commissar of the XJMD from Wang Zhen.


THE XINJIANG MILITARY REGION FROM 1955

In the autumn of 1955, the XJMD was redesignated the Xinjiang Military Region (XJMR). Since the great regional military commands, including the NWMR, had been abolished in late 1954, the new XJMR (which emerged at about the same time as the XUAR) became a "direct control region" under the central military organs in Peking (see Figure 4.1). As a frontier and predominantly non-Han populated region, Xinjiang was considered to be of great strategic importance, and the central authorities undoubtedly felt that they should retain a more direct line of command over the troops stationed there, especially during times of crisis. During more normative periods, however, an indirect line of command tended to predominate whereby the XJMR authorities under Wang Enmao in Urumqi played a more active role in the command structure and in the formulation and implementation of policies passed down from Peking.

From the early 1960s, China's military establishment was basically organized into three elements: main force units, comprised of some thirty-six army

corps and several independent divisions;³ regional forces, including independent divisions and regiments, border defense units, and garrison forces; and the people's militia. The command structure of the regional forces differed considerably from that of the army corps and the people's militia. The regional military commander controlled all forces within his region except the regular army corps, while the people's militia was basically an independent popular military organization that was, in theory, directly responsible to the Party center through the militia offices of the provincial (or regional) Party committees.


Figure 4.1
Approximate Delineation of the XJMR by 1969.



Source: Harvey W. Nelsen, *The Chinese Military System* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), p. 120. Reprinted with permission.

The XJMR was divided into a Northern Xinjiang Military District and a Southern Xinjiang Military District (see Table 4.2). Subordinate to the former were seven military subdistricts, including Urumqi,

Table 4.2
 Military Organization in Xinjiang



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— Indicates lines of direct command.

- - - - Indicates lines of direct command which, during times of crisis or need, may become lines of direct command.

* The Xinjiang Military Region is a "direct control region" under the Central military organs in Peking. Regular PLA troops and cavalry are concentrated along the Sino-Soviet border at Yining, Tacheng and Kazgar, along the Xinjiang-Lanzhou Railroad, between Qinghe and Urumqi, and around the nuclear facilities at Lop Nor.

Source: Zao Jing, "An Analysis of the Situation in the XUAR," Issues and Studies, Taipei, Vol. 5, No., 2 (November 1968), p. 10.

that generally conformed to the administrative districts and autonomous zhou. There were five such military subdistricts in southern Xinjiang, although another may have been added by 1969 in the Aksai Chin-Western Tibet sector. The command and staff officers in the XJMR were virtually all drawn from the PLA 1st F.A. group, as were the majority of political officers.

After Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated in the late 1950s and early 1960s, numerous border clashes between the two former allies were reported and unrest among the region's minority nationalities intensified. In 1962, hostilities broke out in the Yili area as well as along the Sino-Indian border. These events prompted Peking to seal off the Sino-Soviet border in western Xinjiang and build up PLA troop strength there. An additional incentive to the deployment of more PLA forces in Xinjiang was provided in October 1964 when China detonated its first nuclear device at Lop Nor.

By 1966, there were an estimated 250,000 PLA troops in Xinjiang, including frontline units and forces assigned to border defense, public security, and local garrison duty under the XJMR.⁴ At least four PLA infantry divisions and one PLA cavalry division were identified in Xinjiang at that time. The regular PLA troops and cavalry were concentrated along the Sino-Soviet border at Yining,⁵ Tacheng, and Kazgar, along the Xin-Lan Railroad, between Qinghe and Urumqi, and around the nuclear facilities at Lop Nor.⁶

As of 1966, the PLA 1st F.A. group in Xinjiang headed by Wang Enmao, retained its predominant position in the XJMR elite. Below Wang, all but one of the six vice-commanders, namely Saifudin, were from this group, while only one of the six deputy political commissars, Tan Kaiyun (who was affiliated with Lin Biao's PLA 4th F.A. group), was not from this group. During the mid-1960s, for reasons which will be further discussed below, an increasing number of individuals outside the PLA 1st F.A. base were transferred to the XJMR to take up posts as political commissars in subregional military units. Although the numbers are not known, the majority were probably affiliated with the PLA 4th F.A. group, while others were associated with the central (Peking) elite and PLA 3rd F.A. group.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE XINJIANG PRODUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION CORPS

Wang Zhen's long experience in leading Red Army

troops involved in production and construction tasks was illustrated by a speech he delivered to the Xinjiang Finance and Economics Committee in January 1950 outlining the tasks ahead in such work by a large portion of the military units in the province. By a decree of January 20, a reported 110,000 of the 193,000 men in the 22nd Army Corps and a part of the troops under Wang, including Brigade 359 as the hardcore, responded to Mao's December 5, 1949 directive of "turning the army into a working force".⁷ The troops involved in this large-scale demobilization were a combination of Tao Zhiyue's former Xinjiang Garrison troops and the PLA units of Wang who had gained production and construction experience at Nanniwan. The latter group remained lightly armed, and its leading cadres were generally placed in positions of authority over the former.

The demobilized army troops, who in fact constituted the prototype for and were the forerunners of the Xinjiang PCC, were ordered to take up positions on the fringes of the wastelands near the main oases north and south of the Tianshan, in the steppelands of western Dzungaria, and along the main transportation routes linking Urumqi with China Proper. There they began such undertakings as land reclamation, water conservancy, agricultural and animal husbandry production, sideline production, and capital construction. Some of the demobilized troops were assigned to engineering construction units and posted in areas where basic industries, housing, transportation facilities, mines, and other enterprises were to be further developed or established. The demobilized soldiers were told that their efforts in socialist construction, national defense, and reform through productive labor would be on a long-term basis. In later years, these army production and construction personnel were to be instrumental in the development of Xinjiang's rather backward economy, and were to constitute a model of collectivized labor that was to be emulated by the masses. They also were to be an important part of the driving-force behind modernization in Xinjiang.

The lightly armed PLA contingent of the demobilized army troops also provided backup support for the frontline border defense, public security, and garrison forces of the PLA in Xinjiang. To a significant degree they assumed a share of the responsibility for local police and security functions, and served as an arm of the CCP in the rural and, especially, pastoral areas where Party strength and authority was otherwise weak. After 1950, the PLA hard-

core units of the demobilized soldiers became increasingly active in the various political and socio-economic reforms launched by the Party in Xinjiang.

The role of the demobilized army troops, over 90 percent of whom were Han nationals, was reminiscent of that played by the military colonists in Xinjiang under the Manchu emperors. In fact, colonization was to become an important function of these units during subsequent years when large numbers of additional demobilized PLA-men and Han personnel from China Proper, including skilled workers, peasants, and educated youths, would join their ranks.

By March 1954, between 7,000 and 10,000 cadres of the army production and construction units in Xinjiang had been sent to the basic levels to participate directly in the the development of the rent-reduction and antilocal landlord campaigns.⁸ In October, another 2,500 cadres of good political standing and with production experience were transferred to 549 agricultural producers' cooperatives in twenty-five xian of the province to give long-term and systematic assistance, ranging from production techniques to business management. Their objective was said to be that of helping the peasants develop production, thus fully demonstrating the superiority of cooperation and attracting the laboring masses to firmly follow the socialist road.⁹

Beginning in August 1954, the various army units which had been demobilized and assigned to labor in Xinjiang were officially merged to form the Xinjiang PCC. The Xinjiang PCC was placed under the Ministry of Agriculture in Peking and its subordinate organs in Xinjiang in matters of production, and under the XJMD in military affairs. In actual fact, however, it was subordinated to the Party, including the provincial CCP committee and the Party organs within the various units of the PCC at all levels.

The inaugural meeting of the Xinjiang PCC leadership was held on December 5, 1954, during the First Representatives Meeting of the XJMD CCP Committee. At this meeting, some 800 persons outlined its future tasks and officially confirmed Tao Zhiyue as its titular commander. Wang Enmao assumed the position as acting first political commissar of the Xinjiang PCC and first secretary of its CPP Committee, while Zhang Zhonghan, another veteran of the PLA 1st F.A. group, was named its ranking deputy political commissar and second secretary of its CCP Committee. Thus, the real authority within the Xinjiang PCC rested in the hands of Wang and the veteran Han CCP elements of the

PLA 1st F.A. group.

In May 1956, the newly established Ministry of State Farms and Land Reclamation in Peking took over responsibility for the Xinjiang PCC from the Ministry of Agriculture. Wang Zhen was naturally chosen as minister of this cabinet-level organ on the basis of his past experience in leading army reclamation units. As head of the ministry, he was probably called upon more than any other minister to inspect the outlying regions of China, including Xinjiang, where reclamation work was being conducted. Until 1958, Wang concurrently headed the PLA Railway Corps as well, whose functions and responsibilities were in many respects complementary to those of the new ministry. Significantly, then, the members of the PLA 1st F.A. group dominated both the central ministry and the Xinjiang PCC, thus creating central-provincial ties which were to be of great importance later. In late 1956, furthermore, Zhang Zhonghan was appointed vice-minister of the Ministry of State Farms and Land Reclamation, but retained his position as deputy political commissar of the Xinjiang PCC.

The headquarters of the Xinjiang PCC at Urumqi was composed of military staff units as well as agriculture, animal husbandry, water conservancy, industry and commerce, finance and trade, supply and marketing, and transportation control departments. There were also research institutes for the agricultural, forestry, and pastoral industries, and courts, hospitals, schools, and factories under the authority of the PCC headquarters (see Table 4.3).

The second-level organs of the Xinjiang PCC included agricultural production and reclamation divisions and civil engineering divisions. Each of the divisions maintained a military organizational structure, being divided into regiments, battalions, and companies, and the triangular system was generally adopted at and below the company level. The divisions were responsible for geographical areas of varying size, and thus the number of subunits and personnel under each division differed accordingly. There came to be ten agricultural divisions and three civil engineering divisions in the PCC, and the existence of "independent regiments" indicated that the number of divisions was subject to expansion. Altogether, there ultimately were to be some 120-odd ministries, departments, sections, and subsections down to the regimental level in the Xinjiang PCC.

Generally speaking, the military staff departments at various levels within the Xinjiang PCC were reduced to a minimum, while those for political work

remained at normal size. The intermediate cadres of the PCC were primarily veteran PLA officers who had served under Wang Zhen, but also included reformed GMD officers. The officers of the PCC units were given the status of reserve officers, but received pay as active-duty officers, while the soldiers received their pay under the status of demobilized servicemen. Other members of the PCC were paid at civilian rates on the basis of work points and shares of profits (at the rate of approximately 18-20 yuan per month).

The agricultural divisions of the PCC were assigned to different reclamation areas, with headquarters at Yining, Tacheng, Altai, Wusu, Shihezi, Urumqi, Yanqi, Hami, Aksu, and Kazgar. Each agricultural division established state farms and livestock ranches (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3). They were to continue rendering aid to the peasants and herdsmen of the various nationalities in economic development and cooperativization by providing them with political and organizational guidance and technical assistance.

Figure 4.2

Members of the Xinjiang PCC Reclaiming Land in the Tarim Basin.



Source: Atlas of the People's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1971), p. 25.

The various state farms and ranches of the Xinjiang PCC were technically and scientifically more advanced than their civilian counterparts. With the aid of Soviet advisors in the early 1950s, the PCC developed more efficient and modern agricultural and animal husbandry techniques, better varieties of food grain and cotton seeds, more reliable methods


of preventing crop and animal diseases and insect pests, a higher degree of control over soil alkalinity, a greater use of water resources through irrigation and water conservancy projects, and a larger degree of agricultural mechanization. Peasants and herdsmen were often given practical training on the farms and ranches of the PCC, and members were periodically sent out from the farms and ranches of the PCC to provide training and guidance or undertake investigations. The PCC frequently turned over reclaimed land, seeds, tools, and other materials to the surrounding coops.

Units of the three civil engineering divisions of the Xinjiang PCC were stationed in those localities where major construction projects were to be undertaken, including Urumqi, Shihezi, Yining, Hami, Aksu, and Kazgar. In order to achieve self-sufficiency these units also established their own farms and factories. To the end of 1954, these engineering divisions had established and turned over to local management more than a dozen large, backbone factories, and had constructed ninety-two processing plants.¹⁰ They had begun the construction of new cities at Alaer and Shihezi, and were engaged in the building of a new industrial district in Urumqi. Units of the PCC were also involved in the repair and construction of highways and communication networks, and were involved in the building of the Xin-Lan Railway.

The Xinjiang PCC also continued to play an important role in the Party's policy of resettling Han from China Proper in Xinjiang, which had been stepped up in 1952.¹¹ The PCC provided an organization to which Han settlers could be assigned for production and construction, and which could be utilized to further strengthen national security and increase the Han component in Xinjiang's primarily non-Han population. In the autumn of 1954, the PCC numbered more than 200,000, being over 90 percent Han nationality in composition. Its membership was then made up of the hardcore, veteran PLA troops demobilized from Wang Zhen's units, former GMD troops, workers, students, peasants and herdsmen, "sent down" cadres, and reform through labour prisoners.

In 1954, cadres from the Xinjiang PCC were sent to various provinces and cities in China Proper to recruit workers and youths for participation in the work of building up the frontier in Xinjiang. Eventually, the PCC established offices in many such areas of China Proper, and maintained liaison groups

Table 4.3
 Organization of the Xinjiang PCC.




- | | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1. Commander | 28. 1st Division | 56. East Wind Boiler Plant |
| 2. Deputy Commander | 29. 2nd Division | 57. Tianshan Iron & Steel Plant |
| 3. Chief of Staff | 30. 3rd Division | 58. August 1st Cotton Textile Mill |
| 4. Deputy Chief of Staff | 31. 4th Division | 59. August 1st Weaving & Dying Plant |
| 5. Political Commissar | 32. 5th Division | 60. August 1st Woolen Textile Mill |
| 6. Deputy Political Commissar | 33. 6th Division | 61. Synthetic Ammonia Plant |

7. Party Committee Office
 8. Labor Wage Dept.
 9. Cultural Work Troupe
 10. Supplies Dept.
 11. Machinery Dept.
 12. Transport Dept.
 13. Troop Carrier Aircraft Dept.
 14. Capital Construction Dept.
 15. Control Dept.
 16. Budget & Finance Dept.
 17. Trade Dept.
 18. Health Dept.
 19. Personnel Dept.
 20. Air Transport Dept.
 21. Engineer Dept.
 22. Rear Services Dept.
 23. Political Dept.
- A. Other Technical Rear Services Units
 - B. Independent Regiment(s)
 - C. Hospitals
 24. Divisions' Hospitals
 - D. Engineer Construction Divisions
 25. 1st Engineer Construction Division
 26. 2nd Engineer Construction Division
 27. 3rd Engineer Construction Division
 - E. Agricultural Divisions
 34. 7th Division
 35. 8th Division
 36. 9th Division
 37. 10th Division
- F. Schools
 38. Hami Agricultural School
 39. Xinyuan Agricultural School
 40. Urumqi Agricultural School
 41. Wulaosi Junior School
 42. Hami Fifth Agricultural School
 43. Shihezi Hydro-Electrical School
 44. Manass Hydro-Electrical School
 45. Shihezi Political Cadre School
 46. Urumqi Art Theatre
 47. Shihezi Agriculture College
 48. Shixia Junior School
 49. Beitun Tenth Agricultural School
 - G. Plants
 50. Main Tractor Plant
 51. Tianshan Foodstuff Plant
 52. Army Martyrs' Family Shoe Plant
 53. Xishan Ceramic Plant
 54. August 1st Iron & Steel Plant
 55. Urumqi Leather Tanning Plant

Source: Zhang Yuntian, "The Establishment of Communist China's Production and Construction Corps": A Study of Its Conditions and Functions," Zhonggong yanjiu (Studies on Chinese Communism), No. 3 (March 1970), pp. 31 - 40.

Figure 4.3

Location of Xinjiang PCC Units Compared to Agricultural Areas



● Agricultural areas.

⊔ Approximate delineation of PCC areas (by divisions).

- 1A Agricultural 1st Division (at Aksu)
- 2A Agricultural 2nd Division (at Yanqi)
- 3A Agricultural 3rd Division (at Kazgar)
- 4A Agricultural 4th Division (at Yining)
- 5A Agricultural 5th Division (at Polo)
- 6A Agricultural 6th Division (at Urumqi)
- 7A Agricultural 7th Division (at Guidun)
- 8A Agricultural 8th Division (at Shihezi)
- 9A Agricultural 9th Division (at Hami; first reference in September 1969)
- 10A Agricultural 10th Division (at Altai)

- 1E 1st Engineer Construction Division (at Urumqi)
- 2E 2nd Engineer Construction Division (at Shihezi)
- 3E 3rd Engineer Construction Division (probably at Kazgar; formed in 1965)

Note: The PCC has under its jurisdiction a number of independent regiments, such as the 106th, 129th, and 151st, indicating that the PCC is still expanding its organization.

there. In Xinjiang, the PCC opened reception stations to receive the Han settlers and provide them with further physical and ideological training prior to their assignment to various PCC enterprises. From their place of origin to their ultimate destination in Xinjiang, the settlers were nearly always kept in groups. Each settler was required to sign a written pledge to serve the Party and the people of China in the frontier region, initially for a period of about three or four years but by the early 1960s the regional media was claiming that the settlers were being assigned there permanently.

By May 1957, the PCC membership had reached over 300,000, largely due to the influx of Han from China Proper. In that same month, a trade union was established within the PCC. It was to be incorporated into the national agricultural production and water conservancy trade union. Over 90 percent of the PCC's workers were to be enrolled in the new trade union by the end of that year. The creation of such an organization within the PCC was said to be justified by the fact that

. . . the change in the nature of the production missions and the participation of the new members have rendered the ration system ineffective, and crops of new problems relative to labor organization, administration of the various enterprises, wages and welfare, and education have come up The PCC, while serving as a detachment of the PLA engaged in the construction of the Fatherland, has gradually been transformed into a state-owned enterprise. The majority of its members, remaining as fighters of the PLA, have become workers whose main source of income is wages. This situation has urgently demanded the establishment of a trade union within the PCC to guide socialist emulations, welfare, and ideological work.¹²

During the periods 1958-59 and 1963-65, which respectively coincided with the Great Leap Forward and the outbreak of hostilities along the Sino-Soviet border and unrest among the minority nationalities in Xinjiang, tens of thousands of young and middle-aged Han settlers poured into Xinjiang.¹³ Han immigration to Xinjiang, over three-fourth's of which was to the various units and enterprises of the Xinjiang PCC, was not only a device that the CPP felt would aid in integrating the region and its non-Han population into China politically, but one that would also help

to bring about the conditions necessary for large-scale economic development and modernization there under Peking's direction. Xinjiang increasingly needed manpower and skilled labor for both agricultural and industrial development by the early 1960s, especially following the withdrawal of Soviet aid and advisors at about the same time.

The resettlement of Han in Xinjiang also provided an outlet for those areas in China Proper where overpopulation, military demobilization, and unemployment were viewed as serious problems. The bulk of the new settlers were educated urban (particularly Shanghai) youths who could not be absorbed into the existing labor force of intramural China. It is likely that the sending of such youths to Xinjiang was, at least in part, also ideologically motivated. The Maoist group within the Central Party leadership was probably anxious to ensure that the urban educated youth of China not become elitist and separated from the rural masses, not grow accustomed to comforts, or develop the attitude that there was no need for "tempering" in the revolutionary struggle. For the most part, the educated youths were assigned to manual labor on the farms and ranches of the PCC and placed under the command of veteran officers.

By 1966 the membership of the Xinjiang PCC had risen to an estimated 500,000 to 600,000. In terms of composition, the PCC remained almost wholly Han. The veteran (over thirty years of age) component in the PCC had decreased significantly compared to that of the youth, largely due to the influx of the latter from China Proper during the early 1960s. The vast majority of the PCC membership, therefore, was composed of youths who had recently arrived in Xinjiang to participate in labor.¹⁴ In contrast, the much smaller veteran group generally had long experience in production and construction work in Xinjiang and continued to hold all positions of authority within the PCC. The latter group included both ex-PLA fighters who had served under Wang Zhen and Wang Enmao and former GMD officers from Tao Zhiyue's units who had undergone proper reform.

The leadership of the Xinjiang PCC remained virtually unchanged to late 1965, with Tao as commander and Wang Enmao as political commissar. The PLA 1st F.A. group (including a number of former GMD officers) held over 80 percent of the "leading positions" at and above the divisional level. In 1965, there were, however, indications that "outsiders" were beginning to "infiltrate" the PCC

leadership. For example, Ding Sheng, from Lin Biao's PLA 4th F.A. group, was identified as the ranking vice-commander and the first deputy political commissar of the PCC, listed ahead of Zhang Zhonghan in the latter position. Pei Zhouyu, affiliated with the PLA 2nd F.A. group and with lengthy experience in the area largely controlled by members of the central (Peking) elite, was transferred from Hebei province to assume the post of third deputy political commissar of the Xinjiang PCC.

5. The CCP in Xinjiang to 1966

PARTY LEADERSHIP

The Xinjiang CCP Sub-Bureau in Urumqi, which was subordinate to the Northwest CCP Bureau in Xi-an, was to become the seat of ultimate power and authority in the province after liberation. It was almost completely dominated by officers of the PLA 1st F.A. While Peng Dehuai was nominally the top Party leader in the Northwest in 1949, Wang Zhen became the ranking secretary of the XJ CCP Sub-Bureau--thus emerging as the de facto Party leader in the province. Below Wang Zhen, the leading Party members were Gao Jinchun, Wang Enmao, Xu Liqing, Rao Zhongxi, Deng Lichun, and Saifudin. All but Saifudin were affiliated with the PLA 1st F.A. group. Table 5.1, lists the CCP leaders in Xinjiang from liberation through 1965.

In all probability, Wang Enmao was the leading Party figure in Xinjiang below Wang Zhen, based upon the fact that he was the top CCP-PLA (and Han) authority in the crucial southern Xinjiang area. In Urumqi, Gao Jinchun was Wang Zhen's top lieutenant, holding several concurrent positions of importance in the provincial administration. Saifudin was the highest ranking minority national in the provincial Party apparatus, and probably gained membership on the CCP committee following his admission into the Party in early 1950.

In August 1952, Wang Enmao was identified as the ranking secretary of the XJ CCP Sub-Bureau in Urumqi, a position which he apparently assumed shortly after Wang Zhen moved to Xi-an to undertake the military duties of Peng Dehuai. After 1952, Wang Zhen apparently played an increasingly indirect role in Xinjiang affairs. Gao Jinchun, Zhang Bangying, and Saifudin ranked below Wang Enmao on the provincial Party committee from 1952 to 1955. Other leading Party cadres in the province included Xu Liqing, Rao Zhongxi, Deng Lichun, Zeng Di, Lu Jianren, and Xin Lanting.

Following the establishment of the XUAR in October 1955, the XJ CCP Sub-Bureau, formerly under the

NW CCP Bureau in Xi-an, was renamed the XUAR CCP Committee and placed under the direct authority of the Central CCP organs in Peking. While most government organs were nominally headed by minority nationals, such as Saifudin, the regional Party leadership remained unchanged and continued to be dominated by Wang Enmao and Han elements from the PLA 1st F.A. group. Wang had been officially designated as Xinjiang Party Committee First Secretary in March 1954. The composition and ranking of the regional Party committee below Wang remained unchanged, with Gao Jinchun, Zhang Bangying, and Saifudin holding secretaryships. By early 1965, however, Saifudin advanced from fourth secretary to second secretary.¹

Other leading members of the XUAR CCP from the PLA 1st F.A. group included Wu Kaizhang, who was appointed as an alternate secretary of the regional committee, and Zeng Di, Lu Jianren, Xin Lanting, and Lin Bomin, all of whom held membership in that body or headed departments within the regional Party apparatus. Qi Guo, who was of worker origin, was among the few Han nationals from the non-PLA 1st F.A. group who held a leading position in the regional Party hierarchy. The minority nationals who held positions as members of the regional committee included three Uighurs, Saifulaev, M. Iminov, and A. Aixia, and one Tatar, Aisihaiti, all of whom were affiliated with the former Yili group.

From 1955, the key departments of the Xinjiang CCP Committee were virtually all headed by Han cadres. Lin Bomin was director of the Propaganda Department, Lu Jianren headed the United Front Work Department (thus making him the leading Party figure under Wang Enmao in the realm of minority nationality affairs), and Xin Lanting became acting director of the Finance and Trade Department as a result of the absence of Wang Zhen.² Anwar Jiagulin, a Kazakh from the former Yili group, and Anwar Hanbaba, an Uzbek of unknown background, nominally headed the Political and Legal Department and the Department of Culture and Education, respectively.

Although there was a turnover of about a dozen secretaries on the XUAR CCP Committee between 1956 and 1966, the leadership remained fairly stable. There were only two or three known purges of members from the regional Party committee during the anti-local nationalist campaign in 1957-58,³ while the remaining additions or dismissals were due to transferral or promotion. During the late 1950s, the pro-Soviet elements within the Xinjiang Party hierarchy, with the notable exception of Saifudin, were either

Table 5.1
Party Leadership in Xinjiang, 1949-65.

| Position | 1949 | 1950 | 1952 |
|---------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1st Secy. | Peng Dehuai (1st F.A.) | Wang Zhen | Wang Zhen/Wang Enmao |
| Secy. | Wang Zhen (1st F.A.) | Gao Jinchun | Gao Jinchun |
| Secy. | Gao Jinchun (1st F.A.) | Zhang Bangying? (1st F.A.) | Zhang Bangying |
| Secy. | | | Saifudin |
| Alt. Secy./Member | Wang Enmao (1st F.A.) | Wang Enmao Xu Liqing | |
| Alt. Secy./Member | Xu Liqing (1st F.A.) | Saifudin (Uig, Yili Gp.) | Rao Zhongxi |
| Alt. Secy./Member | Rao Zhongxi (1st F.A.) | Xu Liqing | Deng Lichun |
| Alt. Secy./Member | Deng Lichun (1st F.A.) | Rao Zhongxi | Zeng Di? (1st F.A.) |
| Alt. Secy./Member | | Deng Lichun | Xin Lanting? |
| Dir., UFW Dept. | | | Lu Jianren (1st F.A.) |
| Dir., Cult. & Educ. Dept. | | Deng Lichun? | Lu Jianren? |
| Dir., Organiz. Dept. | | | Deng Lichun |
| Dir., Fin. & Trade Dept. | Wang Zhen? | Wang Zhen? | Wang Zhen/Xin Lanting (1st F.A.) |
| 1st Secy., Urumqi | | | Rao Zhongxi |
| 1st Secy., Yining | | | |
| 1st Secy., Hami | | | |
| 1st Secy., Kazgar | | | |
| 1st Secy., Hetian | | | |
| 1st Secy., Aksu | | | Peng Yimin (1st F.A.) |
| 1st Secy., Yili-Kaz A.Z. | | | |
| Position | 1955 | 1958 | 1965 |
| 1st Secy. | Wang Enmao | Wang Enmao | Wang Enmao |
| Secy. | Gao Jinchun | Saifudin, 1956 | Saifudin |
| Secy. | Zhang Bangying | Zeng Di, 1/57 | Lu Jianren |
| Secy. | Saifudin | Wu Kaizhang, 2/57 | Li Quan |

| | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Secy. | | Lu Jianren, 5/57 | Wu Guang (Central), 11/63 |
| Secy. | | Zhang Fengqi (Unknown) | Qi Guo, 9/65 |
| Secy. | | Li Quan (1st F.A.), 1959 | Lin Bomin, 7/65 |
| Alt. Secy./Member | Wu Kaizhang (1st F.A.) | Qi Guo, 8/59 | Liu Xuebin (Unknown), 9/65 |
| Alt. Secy./Member | Qi Guo (Wkr.) | Lin Bomin, 1959 | Timur Dawamad, 4/64 |
| Alt. Secy./Member | Zeng Di | Yang Heting (Unknown), 3/61 | Aisihaiti? |
| Alt. Secy./Member | Lu Jianren | Timur Dawamad? (Uig) | M. Iminov? |
| Alt. Secy./Member | Xin Lanting? | Xin Lanting? | Song Zhihe? (3rd F.A.) |
| Alt. Secy./Member | Saifulaev (Uig, Yili Gp.) | | |
| Alt. Secy./Member | M. Iminov (Uig, Yili Gp.) | | |
| Alt. Secy./Member | Aisihaiti (Tat, Yili Gp.) | | |
| Alt. Secy./Member | A. Aixia (Uig, Yili Gp.) | | |
| Dir., Prop. Dept. | Lin Bomin (1st F.A.) | Lin Bomin | Lin Bomin |
| Dir., UFW Dept. | Lu Jianren | Lu Jianren | Lu Jianren |
| Dir., Cult. & Educ. Dept. | Anwar Hanbaba (Uzb.) | Anwar Hanbaba | Anwar Hanbaba |
| Dir., Organiz. Dept. | | Zhang Fengqi | Xin Lanting? |
| Dir., Rural Work Dept. | | Simayiyashengnuofu (Uig) | Simayiyashengnuofu |
| Dir., Fin. & Trade Dept. | Xin Lanting | Xin Lanting | Xin Lanting |
| Dir., Pol. & Legal Dept. | Anwar Jiagulin (Kaz, Yili Gp) | Anwar Jiaqulin | |
| 1st Secy., Urumqi | Ren Kebai | Ke Bai? | Ke Bai? |
| 1st Secy., Yining | | | Bai Yunhai (Unknown) |
| 1st Secy., Hami | | Zhang Jiashu (1st F.A.?) | Zhang Jiashu |
| 1st Secy., Kazgar | | Meng Shulin (1st F.A.?) | Meng Shulin |
| 1st Secy., Hetian | | | Huang Cheng (Unknown) |
| 1st Secy., Aksu | | He Jinnan (Unknown) | He Jinnan |
| 1st Secy., Yili-Kaz. A.Z. | | Zhang Shigong (1st F.A.) | Zhang Shigong |

Sources: Same as Table 3.1.

purged, removed from positions of authority, or subjected to intense reform. Timur Dawamad, a Uighur who had no prior affiliation with the former Yili group, and was thus deemed more loyal and compliant by the Han-dominated Party elite, became an alternate member of the regional Party committee. In this position, he presumably ranked next to Saifudin as the leading minority national in the Party, ahead of those from the traditional minority elite and those deemed to be pro-Soviet or local nationalist CCP elements.

The Secretariat of the XUAR CCP Committee was only slightly changed by the autumn of 1965. Wang Enmao remained as first secretary, followed by Saifudin, Lu Jianren, Li Chuan, Wu Guang, Qi Guo, Lin Bomin, Liu Xuebin, and Timur Dawamad. The elements affiliated with the PLA 1st F.A. group, who had been serving in Xinjiang since liberation, included Wang, Lu, Li and Lin. Saifudin and Timur Dawamad were the only minority nationals. Timur Dawamad, like Saifudin, had risen through the ranks under Wang's supervision. Qi Guo, a Han worker, had been identified as a member of the regional Party elite since mid-1957, and therefore was probably a loyal Wang supporter. Wu Guang, on the other hand, was the only known "outsider," having been transferred from Peking in late 1963. Wu's affiliations are not well known, but he presumably had established close ties with the Liu Shaoqi group in the Central Party leadership. Liu Xuebin was identified as an alternate secretary in September 1965, but his background and affiliations are not known. It is likely, however, that he was also an "outsider".

In terms of the generational composition of the XUAR CCP leadership (that is, the period during which the elite members joined the CCP), nearly all belonged to the third (or "Long March") generation of Party members, having joined during the years 1931-37. Their average age was less than sixty by 1966. Saifudin, who was then fifty years of age, had joined the CCP only in 1950, but had been a member of the CPSU since about 1940. Timur Dawamad, who joined the CCP in 1952, was among the youngest of the Xinjiang elite, being in his mid-40's in 1966.

Generally, the Xinjiang CCP elite in 1966 was composed of veteran Party members with long revolutionary experience. Most of the regional Party elite, moreover, had long served in Xinjiang. Wang Enmao and his PLA 1st F.A. colleagues continued to dominate the Xinjiang Party apparatus prior to the advent of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR),

with but little infiltration of leading CCP cadres from other factions or from areas outside of Xinjiang and the Northwest. In terms of ethnic composition, Han nationals retained a virtual monopoly on all key positions and often assumed multiple posts and duties of high authority or responsibility within the Party, army, and government organs. The general shortage of leading CCP personnel in Xinjiang during the immediate post-liberation period had obviously necessitated the concentration of authority in the hands of a small elite, and had later provided a justification for its perpetuation.

CCP MEMBERSHIP AND COMPOSITION IN XINJIANG TO 1966

As Burhan pointed out, there were "very few" CCP cadres in the province during the early post-liberation period, numbering no more than slightly over 3,000⁴ (Table 5.2 gives estimated CCP and cadre figures for Xinjiang from 1949 to 1966). Beginning in December 1949, Party members were recruited from among the "leading revolutionary elements" in the "Three Districts" and "progressive elements" elsewhere in the province in order to strengthen the Party organization.⁵ Minority nationals were gradually recruited, first in the cities and then in the rural areas, and initially from among the intellectuals and then from among the workers and peasants. New Party members were thereafter fostered from among the cadres and activists of various nationalities in Xinjiang who had "steeled themselves in struggle" during various campaigns or from the various CCP training schools and classes organized in the province.

By mid-1953, there were reportedly 276 village Party cells in Xinjiang with 1,544 members.⁶ By the end of that year, over 6,400 new Party members had been recruited, 78.68 percent of whom were minority nationals, thus bringing the total Party membership to slightly over 10,000 in the province. Minority nationality members, however, held only 26.1 percent of the "leading positions" in the Party organs at and above the xian level, and only about one-third of the cadres in Party committees at all levels were minority nationals.⁷ At that time, there were also over 30,000 members of the New Democratic Youth League (NDYL) in some 1,000 branches throughout the province.⁸

In mid-1955, it was claimed that 17,016 new CCP members had been trained or recruited during various campaigns in Xinjiang since 1949, with the majority gaining membership in early 1955.⁹ Based upon the

- Table 5.2
Estimated CCP and Cadre Figures for Xinjiang, 1949-65.

| | 1949 | 1950-51 | 1955 | 1956 | 1958-59 | 1960 | 1962 | 1965 |
|-------------------|--------|-------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|----------|
| Total CCP Members | 3,000+ | 5,000- 10,000 ^a | 20,000 (30,000-40,000) ^b | 62,478- 68,000 | 130,000- 134,000 | 176,970 | N.A. | 220,000 |
| Han Members | N.A. | N.A. | 10,000- 11,000 | 32,000- 41,000 | 68,000+ | N.A. | N.A. | 114,000 |
| Non-Han Members | N.A. | N.A. | 9,000- 10,000 | 27,833- 30,000 | 62,000+ | 60,000 ^d 61,490 | 85,000 ^d | 106,000+ |
| CCP Branches | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | 2,500+ | 8,982 | 11,000+ | N.A. | 18,000 |
| Total Cadres | N.A. | 23,000 | 54,000- 58,000 | 92,008- 100,000 ^c | 117,000- 134,000 | N.A. | 200,000+ | 190,000+ |
| Han Cadres | N.A. | 7,000- 10,000 | 18,000+ | 40,902 | 45,000 62,000 | N.A. | 88,500 | 84,000 |
| Non-Han Cadres | N.A. | 12,841- 16,100 | 35,659- 40,000 | 51,106- 63,935 | 62,000- 72,000 | 72,000 | 111,500 | 106,000+ |

^a Presumably not including CCP members in PLA and army construction-production units.

^b Presumably including CCP members in PLA and Xinjiang PCC units.

^c Not including the Xinjiang PCC.

^d Uighurs only.

Sources: Compiled by the author from various reports in XJRB and the China Mainland press and radio.

above estimates, Party membership should have reached only slightly over 20,000. It is impossible to know, however, whether or not the official figures included both civilian (Han and non-Han) and military CCP members.

The Party membership figures officially released for March 1956 tend to complicate both the membership figures of the earlier years and the rate of growth. They also imply some basic inconsistencies in counting. At that time, Party membership was said to be 62,478, of which 34,024 members had reportedly been added since 1950.¹⁰ The implication was that there had been over 28,000 Party members in Xinjiang at the time of liberation and immediately thereafter. This contradicts the authorities' earlier claims that Party membership in the province had been extremely low in 1949-50, and indicated that the Party leadership now desired to show that its strength in the province had been substantial at the time of liberation.

It is very doubtful that Party strength in Xinjiang during 1949-50 could have been so great. Since the Party membership had been composed almost wholly of Han CCP elements belonging to the PLA 1st F.A. group, it is hard to believe that over 25 percent of these troops were CCP members. It is conceivable that earlier Party membership figures were either incomplete or grossly underreported. It is also possible that a significant number of CCP elements were transferred to Xinjiang from China Proper immediately after liberation. The 1956 figures may also have been exaggerated. In any case, the large discrepancy in the reported totals for Party membership is difficult to rationalize. There were no indications, for example, that as many as 25,000 new Party members had been transferred to the province from China Proper during the years prior to 1956.

The mid-1959 official Party membership figures, furthermore, did not deny the implications of the 1956 reports on earlier Party membership in Xinjiang, but rather tended to further support them. By mid-1959, there was said to be over 130,000 CCP members in some 8,900 branches in Xinjiang.¹¹ Minority nationals comprised 62,000 of the Party membership, or about 47.7 percent of the total. From mid-1958 to mid-1959, the Party had drawn in 20,000 activists who had gone through the antilocal nationalist campaign and the movements for iron/steel and communes. The number of new Party members added since 1949 was said to be 89,000, including 6,000 during the period

of agrarian reform (1950 to early 1953), 58,000 during the period of cooperativization (1953 to mid-1957), and 25,000 during the period of June 1957 to June 1959.¹² Based upon these figures, then, party membership in Xinjiang in 1949-50 had totalled over 41,000!

By March 1960, Party membership had reportedly increased to 176,970 in over 11,000 branches.¹³ Uighur members numbered over 60,000, while Kazakhs totalled about 9,000. Over 38,000 new Party members had been recruited during the previous nine-month period, and 80,000 since 1957 (50,000 of whom were candidate members). About 30 percent of the national minority activists and cadres were said to be members of the CCP,¹⁴ 42 percent of the xian level Party committees and above were from the non-Han groups, and over 90 percent of the secretaries of these Party committees were minority nationals by mid-1961.¹⁵ The vast majority of the minority Party members in leading positions at and above the xian level were drawn from among the activists and cadres of the peasants, herdsmen, and outstanding intellectuals.

By the autumn of 1965, Saifudin reported that there were over 18,000 basic-level CCP organs (branches) in Xinjiang with a total membership in excess of 220,000.¹⁶ Over 48 percent, or 106,000, were minority nationals. It was claimed that 67 percent of the members of Party committees at all levels in Xinjiang were from the minority nationalities.¹⁷ Only some 6,000 minority CCP members (or about 5 percent of the total minority Party members) held "leading positions" at the commune/xian level and above, however.¹⁸ The majority of the secretaries of the Party committees at the subregional levels from the late 1950s to 1966 were said to be non-Han nationals, but the first secretaries (or the ranking secretaries) were, in fact, predominantly Han.

The available evidence, therefore, supports the conclusion that where minority nationals nominally headed subregional level Party committees, the de facto authority largely rested in the hands of those Han secretaries who were officially ranked below them. In 1955, for example, only 41.7 percent of the members of Party committees at the qu, xian and shi levels in Xinjiang were minority nationals. At the xian level and above, however, only one-third of the members were from the non-Han groups. These figures indicated a definite Han predominance on the upper and middle-level Party committees in the region.

Following the creation of the XUAR, and espe-

cially after the antilocal nationalist campaign in 1957 and 1958, the CCP authorities attempted to deflect minority and, increasingly, Soviet criticisms about Han suppression and dominance by publishing higher figures for minority Party committee membership. The mid-1961 figures cited above seem to support this view. Furthermore, it can be said that by 1960 the Party authorities had eliminated most of the suspected local nationalist (and pro-Soviet) elements from the Party committees within Xinjiang and therefore felt it was possible to increase the percentage of minority nationals on the committees since the proportion of loyal minority elements had increased. The vast majority of minority nationality Party members, nonetheless, were assigned to positions in the basic-level production and administrative units of Xinjiang as of 1965, and it was at this level that they held the highest share of "leading positions" on the Party committees.

Throughout most of the post-liberation period the Party authorities in Xinjiang emphasized the fact that minority nationality membership in the Party had increased very rapidly. During the first half decade of Communist rule in the province, the official figures for new CCP recruits indicated that between 70 and 80 percent came from among the non-Han groups. This trend continued until the end of the 1950s, when minority Party membership reached over 45 percent. Subsequently, minority membership in the Party levelled out at slightly less than 50 percent, and the proportion of new members from the minorities dropped accordingly.¹⁹ At no time after 1949 did the minority nationalities constitute a majority within the Party. Their share in the total Party membership, moreover, remained far below their share in Xinjiang's population.

It is also notable that the regional Party leadership increasingly stressed Party membership as a prerequisite for cadre status (especially "responsible" or "leadership" cadres) after 1960. The 1965 figures for minority cadres and minority Party members, for example, were reported as being identical--106,000.²⁰ Although the totals may have been misreported, they do imply that the Party authorities were emphasizing political reliability among the minority cadres. The rationale for such a trend probably included the continuing movement to purify the Party and cadre ranks of local nationalist and pro-Soviet elements, and the renewed ideological campaign which was launched by the Mao-Lin Biao group

in 1962 under rubric of the "Socialist Education Movement". Although the reports are either contradictory or vague, the percentage of minority cadres who belonged to the Party in 1965 had most probably risen to over 50 percent. Assuming that most new Party members were recruited from among cadres and activists in the region, this trend seems to be supported by the fact that between 1955 and 1965 minority Party membership increased by eleven times while minority cadres increased by only 1.5 times.

The most dramatic growth of Party membership in Xinjiang took place during the period from 1954 to 1966, thus occurring during Wang Enmao's tenure as first secretary. Prior to 1954, the machinery necessary for Party training and recruitment was being established in the province. The most rapid growth occurred during the years 1955-56 and 1958-59 when Party membership successively doubled, and during the years 1960-65 when it nearly doubled again. The expansion generally corresponded to periods of active, mostly radical, socio-economic and political campaigns, including the latter stages of cooperativization, the movement of regional autonomy, the "Hundred Flowers" and antilocal nationalist campaigns, the Great Leap Forward and commune drive, and the more prolonged "antirevisionist" struggle which accompanied the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. While significant numbers of Party members were either dismissed (purged), suspended, demoted, or sent down to lower levels for reform through labor and study during these various campaigns (or, in some cases, because of them), it is noteworthy that Party retrenchment was more than offset by Party recruitment.

In terms of Party composition according to sex, social origin, and age, most estimates must be considered as tentative due to the lack of detailed information released by the Xinjiang authorities. Based upon figures reported by Wang Enmao in mid-1956, however, some general trends can be seen.²¹ Of the claimed 62,478 Party members in the region (2,600 of whom were candidate members), women then numbered 4,780, or about 8 percent, while intellectuals accounted for 11.54 percent. Wang pointed out that Party branches existed in over 90 percent of the region's xiang, factories, enterprises, organs, and schools, but that the trial establishment of Party branches had only just begun in the pastoral areas (including, presumably, the Yili area). He also revealed a plan whereby the future ratio of Party membership to the total population in Xinjiang's

agricultural areas would be set at 1.27 percent, and in the pastoral areas at one percent.

During the next decade, no specific figures were given by the authorities concerning Party composition according to sex, social origin, or age. The reports did, however, indicate that the percentage of female Party members remained fairly stable, with perhaps a slight increase. Excluding the educated, urban youths who arrived in Xinjiang from China Proper during the early 1960s, the proportion of intellectuals in the Party may have decreased slightly from 1956 to 1966. In all probability, the percentage of Party members under thirty years of age (herein considered as "youths") increased significantly with the influx of Han youths from China Proper during the early 1960s. The older, veteran members of the Party in Xinjiang undoubtedly retained their majority within the Party and definitely continued to hold all of the top positions of leadership and authority within the Party hierarchy. The ratio of Party membership to the total population of Xinjiang in 1966 rose to between 2.75 and 3.15 percent, with the ratio of Han membership to Han population being much higher than that for the non-Han groups.²² The number of Party branches in the region had increased by 7-fold over that of 1956, and branches (and sub-branches and cells) existed throughout the whole region.

SUMMARY

To a remarkable degree, Wang Enmao and his veteran PLA 1st F.A. associates continued to dominate the Xinjiang elite throughout the pre-1966 period, with but little infiltration of representatives from other factions or areas outside of the region. Moreover, the composition of the Xinjiang elite under Wang remained almost wholly Han, and it was Han CCP members from the PLA 1st F.A. group who often retained multiple and concurrent positions of de facto authority in the Party, military, and government organs. One of the most striking characteristics of the elite establishment in Xinjiang, in fact, was the extraordinary degree to which the Party, military, and government spheres were interconnected by the leaders and personnel of the PLA 1st F.A. group under Wang. Wang himself had emerged during the 1952-54 period as the single most powerful figure in the region and came to concurrently hold the positions of XUAR CCP Committee First Secretary, commander and political commissar of the XJMR, and political commissar of the Xinjiang PCC.

By 1966, Wang could look to support from those elements within the regional CCP committee and XJMR

who had long served under him and had risen through the ranks during his lengthy tenure as the top CCP-military (and Han) authority in Xinjiang. The vast majority of the Party and military cadres in the region were, therefore, loyal to Wang.

In the government organs, which were staffed by a higher proportion of non-Han, non-PLA 1st F.A. elements, the ultimate authority rested in the hands of those individuals belonging to the Party. Furthermore, the key administrative positions were largely held by those Han CCP elements of the PLA 1st F.A. group under Wang's direction. In those cases where administrative organs were nominally headed by a non-Han, non-PLA 1st F.A. person, the de facto power probably rested with a member of Wang's faction who assumed a lesser title. For example, although Saifudin was XUAR People's Council Chairman, it is likely that Wang, who was a member of that body, retained a good deal of power either directly or indirectly through his PLA 1st F.A. associates who held positions as vice-chairmen. In any event, the ultimate authority controlling the activities and decisions of the government was the regional Party committee headed by Wang and dominated by his Han colleagues.

In the context of these power relationships, despite the fact that Saifudin was XUAR People's Council Chairman and chairman of the regional Nationalities Affairs Committee, and was thus the highest-ranking minority national in Xinjiang, he was subordinate to Wang and the Han group on the XUAR CCP Committee even though he held the post of second secretary. Saifudin's conversion and willingness to identify with the Han-dominated Party (and its policies) was undoubtedly the main reason for his rise and longevity in the Xinjiang elite. He also, significantly, became a model and spokesman of Peking's policies toward the national minorities. His hard-line positions on the issues of opposing separatist tendencies among the indigenous peoples of Xinjiang (and Soviet influence in the region) and supporting the region's integration with China served both Wang's power and policy objectives, and those of Peking, prior to 1966.

Despite the fact that the Party and military elites of Xinjiang had proportionately fewer minority nationals than did their government counterpart, the latter witnessed a higher respective share of purges, suspensions, or disappearances than the former. The stability and continuity of the Party and military elites in Xinjiang was much greater than

that of the government elite. The vast majority of those government elite members who were dismissed or criticized in Xinjiang prior to 1966 were from the minority nationalities. They included both reactionary local nationalist elements and those who were considered, by implication, to be pro-Soviet. While there were a few cases where Han Party elements moved into the positions held by the departed minority elements, most of the posts were nominally filled by minority CCP members who had been fostered entirely under the Party's sponsorship and guidance. Interestingly, not one case is known whereby a Han member of the government elite from the PLA 1st F.A. group was purged. There were, indeed, several cases involving the transferral of members of this group from their posts in Xinjiang to equal or higher ranking positions elsewhere. The same general trend occurred in the regional military elite, with the dismissal or absence of at least two of the very few minority officers (Mazarov and Zunin Taipov) from top-level posts in the early 1960s. Here, as in the government and Party elite structures, the PLA 1st F.A. group managed to perpetuate its virtual monopoly on the reigns of power.

Some members of the regional elite held concurrent posts of some importance in the central hierarchy in Peking. Wang, for example, held several posts in the Central Party and military organs, such as full membership on the Eighth CCP Central Committee and membership on the National Defense Council (a post which carried more prestige than actual authority). In February 1964, he was also identified as one of the secretaries of the CCP Northwest Bureau, which had been re-established in Xi-an in 1961 under the chairmanship of Liu Lantao. Although Wang was identified from time to time in Xi-an or Peking attending various meetings and celebrations, he spent most of his time in Xinjiang, unlike Saifudin who was often in Peking. Wang did have, however, close ties with several important Party and military leaders in Peking, including He Long, Wang Zhen, and to a lesser degree, Peng Dehuai (until 1959), all of whom had been affiliated with the PLA 1st F.A. group or had practical experience in the Northwest.

To a large degree then, the Xinjiang elite under Wang Enmao had put down deep roots in China's far west by 1966. In the process of consolidating Party and Han rule in the region, Wang had built a pervasive base of personal power as well. The available evidence presents the picture of a long-term

elite affiliation within Xinjiang of a single field army system dominated locally by Wang. Within the Xinjiang elite there emerged informal historical bonds of confidence, mutual security, and loyalty which undoubtedly brought with them a feeling of common interest. Whether for reasons of individual or collective values and goals, however, the evidence suggests an historical tendency of Wang and the Xinjiang elite toward a commitment to the overriding values of national unity and the integration of the region under CCP rule. It is quite conceivable that the preservation of Wang's political-military status within Xinjiang was of secondary importance, in his mind, to the more important goals of the unity, security and defense, development, and integration of Xinjiang.

Part 3

Policy Patterns in Xinjiang, 1949-66

6. Party-building and Cadre Recruitment Policies, 1949-66

Throughout CCP rule in Xinjiang, the major goals of the Xinjiang leadership under Wang Enmao and those of the central authorities in Peking were basically identical. As far as the future of Xinjiang was concerned, both were in agreement on the overriding issue of achieving the region's complete integration with the People's Republic of China. Both Wang and Peking wanted to establish Party, and Han, control and authority throughout this traditionally non-Han, Muslim region. Both desired to build and strengthen internal unity and solidarity among the various nationalities of Xinjiang under CCP rule. To achieve public security, all active and passive opposition was to be eliminated. To obtain a sense of common interest and identity, the concept of patriotism and loyalty to the Chinese state was to be nurtured among the region's inhabitants, and they were to be brought into the mainstream of the Communist revolutionary movement of China. This required that all sources of local nationalism be destroyed, and that political-ideological transformation be attained through indoctrination and reform.

Wang and the central authorities increasingly sought to strengthen Xinjiang's external security and defense. In particular, as border security became a critical problem with the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1950s, both Wang and Peking perceived continued Soviet presence and influence among the local population of the region to be a serious threat to their respective positions in Xinjiang. Clashes along the frontier, as well as unrest among some of the indigenous minority groups, required the deployment of additional troops in the region. The threats of Soviet meddling and minority resistance also stimulated the settlement of Han nationals from China Proper in Xinjiang for the purposes of increasing Chinese numbers and influence in the region, of building up national defense, and of providing skilled and semi-skilled labor for economic

development. There was also an urge to protect the region's strategic natural resources (and nuclear facilities at Lop Nor), so as to be able to exploit them exclusively for Chinese purposes.

There was also a consensus among Wang and the Peking leaders that the socio-economic backwardness of Xinjiang should be overcome. This implied the eventual elimination of the traditional system of class stratification and exploitation, the abolition of illiteracy and language barriers, the extirpation of old ideas, beliefs, customs, and habits inherited from the past, including Islam, and the transformation of the pre-1949 underdeveloped economy into a modern, socialist economy.

Throughout the 1949-65 period, the activities of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps highlighted the Party's major goals in Xinjiang. As a Han institution in a non-Han border region, the Xinjiang PCC acted as an arm of the Party, as well as a supporting military organization to the PLA; it played a vital role in strengthening internal unity and solidarity among the various ethnic groups under Han rule; and it contributed greatly to economic growth and development, serving as both an agent and model of modernization and collective enterprise.

POLICIES DURING THE EARLY POST-LIBERATION PERIOD, 1949-56

In 1949, Mao had said that without a large number of cadres and activists recruited from the minority nationalities, China could never succeed in thoroughly solving the nationalities problem or in completely isolating the reactionaries among the nationalities.¹ In some areas of Xinjiang, minority and religious resentments against the Han people were a serious problem, and so, to ensure that they did not simply reject Communism out of hand as a creation of the hated Han, it was necessary for them to receive it through cadres and activists of their own nationality or religious persuasion. Therefore, in the immediate post-liberation period the training of cadres and activists, especially from among the minority nationalities, was viewed as being a crucial task in the province. The first priority was given to the training of political and administrative cadres. Cadres were fostered in Party and government-run schools at various levels, and special training sessions were organized for minority cadres according to functional needs in commerce, agriculture, animal husbandry, justice, and translation

work. Cadres were also raised from among activists who "steeled" themselves in struggle during various campaigns.

Generally speaking, due to the critical need for cadres during the early years of Communist rule in Xinjiang, there was more concern with quantity than with quality in building up a cadre corps, with the result that the standards of political quality were somewhat lower during this period. Except for those outwardly anti-Han or anti-Communist elements who were eliminated, the social base from which cadres and activists were drawn was rather broad. Simply stated, the Party utilized all elements who were willing to abide by the Party's dictates. While both local nationalism and "Great Hanism" were attacked as counterrevolutionary tendencies, it was "Great Hanism" which was most violently opposed. Han Party and non-Party cadres were warned not to mechanically apply the policies developed for the Han areas of China, and were ordered to practice democracy when dealing with their non-Han counterparts and the masses. Policies at the local levels were to be flexibly implemented and based upon considerations of the special characteristics and objective conditions extant there. Moreover, some Han cadres were accused of paying inadequate attention to nationality differences and failing to consult with the minority cadres. "Commandism," bureaucratism, and isolation from the masses were publicly linked to the dangerous tendency of "Great Hanism."²

Local nationalism among the minority cadres was also attacked, however. Burhan charged, for example, that

. . . the imperialists, special agents of the GMD reactionaries, and a section of the nationalists among the reactionary bourgeois class (such as the pan-Turkists and pan-Islamists) continue to engage in various reactionary propaganda which fosters animosities among the minority nationalities and undermines their solidarity, alienates the ties between the Chinese and minority races, and sabotages Sino-Soviet friendship and cooperation.³

He went on to warn that language and religion did not provide the bases for a "nation," and that any nationalistic movement which sought separation from China would be considered counterrevolutionary. Tao Zhiyue added that hidden enemies were using "old relations, old friendships, and all opportunities

for winning over and buying over a few backward elements."4

Beginning in 1951, the universal shortage of cadres in all organs in the Northwest was criticized. In terms of quality, some cadres were cited as being not quite up to the desired ideological level or were unable to coordinate the theoretical with the practical, and were thus prone to lean either too much to the right or to the left in the execution of policy. There were other cadres who, fearing to make any mistakes, tended to incur the wrath of the people by procrastination or over-cautiousness. Consequently, it was decided to train larger numbers of minority cadres and to heighten the ideological level of existing cadres.

In late 1951, Wang Zhen announced that the Party and cadre ranks were to be rectified and consolidated. This movement was to be merged with the campaign for production increase and austerity and the struggle against waste, corruption, and bureaucratism (sanfan).5 Some 1,000 PLA cadres were transferred to the local levels to provide political and technical leadership in this movement.6 One of the objectives of the movement was to re-examine and select Party members and cadres on the basis of their political qualifications.

This rectification drive was the occasion for the screening and dismissal of large numbers of cadres who had been recruited earlier when the standards were, for practical reasons, lower. Cadres were either discharged, sent down to lower levels for reform through labor, or ordered to undertake ideological remolding. The main shortcomings of these cadres were cited as being: (1) the lack of political consciousness characterized by individualism due to poor attention to study and struggle; (2) the demoralization among veteran Party cadres, some of whom sought only enjoyment, better jobs or a return to their home areas, or were careless, inefficient, and corrupt; (3) the jealous or arrogant attitude on the part of veteran cadres toward new cadres; (4) the generally poor quality of the new cadres; and (5) the existence of friction between Party and non-Party cadres, and between Han and non-Han cadres. The existing nationality cadres were said to be high in enthusiasm but short on experience in class struggle. More attention was to be paid to the careful cultivation of nationality cadres on the one hand, and overcoming the work-style of Han cadres monopolizing all activities on

the other hand.⁷

The land reform campaign in Xinjiang provided a practical opportunity to "test and temper" rural cadres and activists, heighten their consciousness, and bring them closer to the masses. By 1953, the insufficient strength of the Party organs in the rural areas, the inexperience and low cultural levels of some Han cadres from the PLA, and the lack of interpreters were still presenting problems in cadre recruitment.

In 1954, by which time Wang Enmao had officially replaced Wang Zhen as XJ CCP Sub-Bureau First Secretary, the Party emphasized the theme of growing unity and strength within its ranks.⁸ By its own admission, however, there were still obstacles to unity within the Party and cadre ranks caused by the tendencies of "Great Hanism" and local nationalism among a section of the cadres. Cadres were exhibiting individualist ideas and "bourgeois" sentiments, and some were guilty of concealing their defects.⁹ In some units, the role of minority nationality Party cadres was being neglected. Most of the attacks on Party members and cadres continued to be directed against Han nationals, outwardly at least. It can be assumed, therefore, that the Party itself was still concerned with polishing its image among the indigenous population. This did not mean, however, that the Party was at all willing to allow local nationalism to rear its ugly head even though it emphasized an anti-"Great Hanism" policy.

Until 1956, the Party authorities in Xinjiang continued to attack Party committees at all levels for their insufficient implementation of the principles of collective leadership, democracy, and criticism. Wang criticized some units for failing to develop Party organs and recruit new members on a larger scale once land reform had been completed and the movement for cooperativization had begun in 1953.¹⁰ Party recruitment targets had not been fulfilled in many organs and enterprises, and there had been a tendency to "close the door to intellectuals." The tendency of Han chauvinism was said to be standing in the way of fostering local minority cadres.

Wang pointed out that in the future, Party policy was not to demand too much of the minority cadres in terms of ability. Rather, what was deemed to be imperative was their political quality. All minority cadres and activists with an education above the middle school level were to undergo further political training in rotation within the following seven years. They were to be trained in practical

work, language, and nationalities unity. Although less rigorous standards were to be applied in selecting minority cadres than in selecting Han cadres, increased attention to political, ideological, and technical training was to be instituted on a regular basis for both old and new minority cadres. The retention of a certain number of Han cadres working in the minority areas was also an important objective, but they were to respect their minority counterparts.

Thus, by 1956-57, there had emerged a fairly sizeable Party organization and cadre corps in Xinjiang. The original cadre corps that had been composed of a comparatively large number of former functionaries and leadership elements at the local levels from all walks of life, including "progressive" minority nationality, religious, or ex-GMD officials, had been utilized for practical reasons and then reformed. Undesirable elements were either purged from its ranks or subjected to intensified ideological remolding. As Party power increased in Xinjiang and its recruitment system became more efficient, new cadres considered to be more reliable were fostered according to political quality as well as ability and skills.

The Party had also retained most of the pro-Soviet Yili elements as cadres during this period of Sino-Soviet "cooperation and ideological unanimity." For the most part the Yili elements had allied themselves with the new CCP regime in Xinjiang, and there had been virtually no attempt by the Party to distinguish between those of pro-Soviet or pro-CCP leanings. Generally, they had not been subjected to the intensive ideological remolding ultimately experienced by other Party and cadre recruits. Moreover, in the context of Sino-Soviet relations during the early 1950s, the CCP had been obliged to tolerate the virtual perpetuation of the pro-Soviet minority leadership in the towns of the Yili area.

While Han predominance and authority was sought throughout the 1949-56 period, Han Party and non-Party cadres were instructed to cooperate with their minority counterparts, respect minority customs, habits, and beliefs, and implement Party policies according to local conditions and peculiarities. Considerable effort was made to overcome the traditional anti-Han or anti-Communist sentiments of the local populace. A general mood of toleration was promoted which forbade discrimination, condescension, "commandism," and coercion toward the non-Han Party members and cadres. As with the Party's national-

ities policy, which will be discussed below, the policy of minority Party and cadre recruitment was conservative in comparison with later policies.

THE SWING TOWARD RADICAL POLICIES, 1956-60

Beginning in the spring of 1956, the Central Party authorities launched the "Hundred Flowers Movement" of free speech and criticism as a device to elicit constructive criticisms about Party work, especially from the intellectuals. After nearly a year of reticence the response began in Xinjiang, when, on December 2, 1956, a People's Daily editorial entitled "Are There Truly No Problems?" blazed the way for later criticisms of the Party.¹¹ The editorial decried the fact that most government offices used only the Chinese language and refused to reply to Uighur comrades who wrote in their native language. Han comrades were said to be haughty in their treatment of minority comrades and refused to see any ability in them.

The "Hundred Flowers Movement" continued at a low key until February 1957 when measures were taken by Mao to intensify it further in his speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People."¹² In Xinjiang, Wang Enmao said that relations between the nationalities in Xinjiang must be harmonized, and that "Great Hanism" and local nationalism were both harmful to the solidarity of the nationalities and were internal contradictions which should be eliminated.¹³

On April 30, 1957, the XUAR CCP Committee appointed an ad hoc rectification team headed by Wang and Saifudin to formulate plans for a regional campaign dealing with the major contradictions in Xinjiang.¹⁴ A month later, Wang called on all Party organs in the region to organize meetings to "freely discuss and criticize" prevailing contradictions.¹⁵ Emphasis was to be placed upon exposing local nationalism and "Great Hanism." The criticisms were to be like a "gentle breeze and mild rain."

During the spring and summer of 1957, the rectification campaign in Xinjiang tended to focus on the Han Party members, cadres, and functionaries who had expressed criticisms of the Party beyond the limits set by the authorities.¹⁶ The Chinese editors of Xinjiang Daily were among the first to be purged, their avowed crime having been that they had printed articles and sent others to the Shanghai Wenhui bao complaining about the lack of free speech in Xinjiang compared to elsewhere in China.¹⁷ At about the same time, "leading cadres" at all levels in the region were directed to participate in physical labor for at

least one month each year. In late October 1957, the regional Party committee decided to transfer (xiafang) more than 2,700 cadres to the rural areas, with more to be "sent down" later.¹⁸ In part, the xiafang movement was a method of punishing cadres for various mistakes, but it was also used as a vehicle for introducing new Han and non-Han cadres in the rural areas, thus undercutting the position and authority of the traditional elite.

In September 1957, a "counterrevolutionary organization" called the "Chinese Nationalities Unity Party" (Zhonghua minzi lianhe dang) was uncovered by the regional Public Security Department in the Xinjiang Metals Company (formerly a joint Sino-Soviet enterprise).¹⁹ Two months later, another "organized resistance group" known as the Chinese Worker-Peasant Party was exposed. It was said to be composed primarily of Han people sent to the region to undergo reform through labor, and was held responsible for rebelling against the Party's policy of stationing PLA units in Xinjiang, repairing highways, the Party's cadre policy, and immigration plans.²⁰ The same report claimed that in 1957 some 830 persons had been arrested in the region, another 100,000 persons were suspected of counterrevolutionary activities or intentions, and some fifty-three Party cadres had been killed. In December mass trials were held to sentence various elements who had been exposed in the region, including merchants, former GMD officials, and "Daoist elements."²¹ Several weeks later, a group of "hidden counterrevolutionaries," said to be operating and sabotaging under the guise of cadres in the inner departments of government organs, was arrested by public security personnel. Those listed were said to have been former GMD functionaries who had maintained ties with various reactionary organizations including the Yiguandao secret society and the "Anti-Communist Salvation Army" (Fangong guomin qiangjiu jun).²²

By late 1957, the "Hundred Flowers Movement" in Xinjiang had opened a Pandora's Box of criticisms from the region's minority nationalities. As a result, in late November the antirightist rectification campaign increasingly swung in the direction of an antilocal nationalist struggle in the border region. The Party blamed the growth of local nationalism among the minorities on the earlier overemphasis placed on opposing "Great Hanism." Cadres were denounced for their alleged laxity in combatting local nationalism.

The regional press began to reveal the various

criticisms of the Party by the non-Han groups. For example, it reported that some minority elements had said that if they could be rid of the "CCP dictatorship" they would prefer union with their kinsmen in Soviet Union to rule by the Han.²³ There were also reported to be some minority cadres and elements who hated the CCP, shouted for independence and the establishment of an "Eastern Turkestan Republic," and demanded the expulsion and exclusion of all Han from Xinjiang. They charged that all of the responsible posts in the regional Party were held by Han and that autonomy was a farce. In construction projects they claimed that the Han cadres supervised and left the heavy work to the minority peoples. The local nationalists had also reputedly exclaimed that there were too many Han cadres and not enough minority cadres, and that the minority cadres did not voice opinions or criticisms for fear of punishment as local nationalists. The policy of promoting minority cadres only on the basis of their political condition but not on the basis of their working ability was also denounced by the non-Han critics of the Party. Significantly, at about the same time as these minority criticisms were being widely publicized in the regional media, the Xinjiang authorities began to withdraw systematically all textbooks translated from Russian and replace them with materials published in Peking. Also, pro-Soviet minority cadres and elements were increasingly attacked and purged.

On December 16, 1957, an Enlarged Conference of the XUAR CCP Committee was opened in Urumqi that dealt with local nationalism in Xinjiang for over six months. In his speech to the session, Saifudin hailed the rectification among the national minorities of the region as a major event in the history of the Party.²⁴ He disclosed that since the outset of socialist transformation in Xinjiang in 1956, local nationalism had been renewed among the national minorities to a serious extent, particularly among the intellectuals. It had become the most dangerous ideological trend of the day, especially since the "rightists" had begun their "frenzied attacks" against the Party that spring.

Saifudin emphatically pointed out that Xinjiang was an indivisible part of the territory of China and that any talk about secession and independence was reactionary. The problem of the revolution of the people of Xinjiang, moreover, was to be solved together with that of the Chinese revolution as a whole. Anyone deliberately opposing the advance to

socialism in China under the CCP and with the aid of the Han people would be following a nationalistic trend which was seriously counterrevolutionary. Those local nationalists who based their demands for independence on the symbolic figure of Akhmedjan Kasimi (who had led the revolt of the "Three Districts" in 1944) were wrong. The object of the revolt, Saifudin claimed, had not been independence, but rather the merger of the people of Xinjiang with the mainstream of the revolutionary struggle of all China. It was outrageous, he exclaimed, to cite Akhmedjan as a leader against China, when, in fact, he had waged a resolute struggle against imperialism and the GMD reactionaries. He warned that any efforts to prevent Han workers and Party members from coming to Xinjiang to help the revolutionary cause of the local peoples would constitute an act of sabotage and that anyone who branded minority cadres and Party members as "jackals serving the Han people" would be considered enemies of the people.

Saifudin revealed that some Party members and cadres had accused the Party of paying little attention to the local conditions, special needs, and ethnic characteristics of Xinjiang. While the Party had used much of the experience gained in the Han areas, he noted, it had also taken full consideration of the special needs and concrete conditions in adopting every important measure in the region. These were not to be allowed to alter or negate the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism concerning socialist revolution and construction in Xinjiang, however. It was true that the responsible persons in the regional Party committee were Han, but they represented, Saifudin emphasized, the advanced revolutionary experience in China and made decisions in the spirit of collective leadership and democracy. All talk about the "nationalization" of Party committees, therefore, was reactionary rather than progressive. The "nationalization" of the cadre ranks was to follow the principle of "communization." Negligence of minority cadre training was to be resolutely opposed, as was the random promotion of nationality cadres. The policy that all nationality cadres regardless of their quality and ability, must be given positions and promoted was roundly denounced. Wang echoed this line when he criticized those who advocated the "theory of one hundred percent nationality cadres" and the "theory of absolute majority of nationality cadres" in Xinjiang. He said that the proportion of nationality cadres was neither the only nor the most important factor, but

that the most important criterion was their political quality rather than their efficiency and ability.

At the end of the Enlarged Conference of the XUAR CCP Committee in late June 1958, Saifudin pointed out that the seriousness of the tendency of local nationalism lay among "leading cadres," particularly among intellectuals who had been raised from the landlord class and bourgeoisie.²⁸ A thorough victory over local nationalism was not an easy task and would require a long-term struggle, he added. A People's Daily editorial of the same date accused some local nationalists of having attempted to isolate Xinjiang from China, and said that others had even established relations with imperialists or engaged in sectarian activities under the instigation of imperialists.²⁹ Wang Enmao warned against "rightists" within the Party who had secretly supported national independence movements, and admitted that clandestine support for the former (pro-Soviet) "Eastern Turkestan Republic" still existed.³⁰ He explained that these elements had all been encouraged by the Hungarian events of 1956.

Beginning in late May 1958, several high-ranking minority cadres and Party members were publicly denounced as local nationalists and dismissed, demoted, suspended, or directed to undertake ideological remodeling. The most notable individuals who were attacked included Saifulaev, M. Iminov, A. Aixia, Aishihaiti, Jiaheda, A. Bitungbayefu, and Xiayimaerdan,³¹ all of whom were known associates of the pro-Soviet Yili group. Leading minority elements within the Party and government organs in Urumqi, Kazgar, the Kizil-su Zhou, and the Yili Zhou were also attacked as local nationalists.³² Significantly, these areas were located where Soviet influence was formerly the most pronounced, and a large proportion of the individuals exposed there had probably retained pro-Soviet sentiments. Many other minority leaders and cadres were also accused of having committed serious errors connected with local nationalism, and were dealt with according to the seriousness of their crimes and the degree of their repentiveness.

During the course of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) in Xinjiang from 1958 to 1960, the main emphasis on Party-building and cadre recruitment was on "red" rather than "expert" cadres, especially among the minority nationalities. To a large degree, the antilocal nationalist struggle had been a successful first step toward eliminating most of the pro-Soviet elements in Xinjiang. As a result, it had paved the way for the introduction of the GLF and

its radical political and socio-economic policies. The GLF and commune drive was essentially a Chinese model of revolutionary development initiated by Mao throughout all of China. As such, it diverged from both Soviet theory and practice, and constituted an attempt to break away from the Soviet path to Communism by emphasizing China's unique historical conditions.

The main targets throughout the 1956-60 period included individuals considered to be local nationalist elements in the region, especially the Uighurs and Kazakhs who had constituted the pro-Soviet leadership of the former "Eastern Turkestan Republic" in the Yili area. The Party dealt harshly with all those who had voiced opposition to CCP (and Han rule), desired independence, or advocated "nationalization." Those elements who represented local nationalist interests, stressed Xinjiang's special conditions and peculiarities, or advocated Soviet-style policies were increasingly exposed, isolated, and eliminated. It was, however, impossible to rid the region completely of pro-Soviet/local nationalist sentiments, and as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated further it was only natural that Soviet propaganda and subversion among Xinjiang's indigenous peoples should increase proportionately.

During the period, moreover, Party organs were established in nearly all basic-level units, including those in the pastoral areas. The Party sought to purify its ranks by branding all suspected opponents to Chinese rule as local nationalists, rightist conservatives, unreformed, degenerate, and corrupt landlords and rich peasants, or bourgeois-reactionary and criminal elements. It purged or subjected them to intense ideological remodeling. All cadres were given an ideological and political education, with at least 80 percent of the region's cadre force being transferred to the basic levels for varying lengths of time to participate in manual labor.³³ A large number of new Party members and cadres were fostered throughout the period. Significantly, the veteran Han PLA 1st F.A. group in Xinjiang headed by Wang Enmao was virtually unaffected by the various rectification movements launched in the region throughout the period. Likewise, Saifudin's position in the regional Party hierarchy remained unchanged, as he increasingly became the Party's spokesman among the non-Han groups.

THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT, 1961-65

In the wake of the GLF, the Party authorities

in Xinjiang took a more gradualist, moderate line toward the minority cadres in general. Their political consciousness and working ability were to be heightened slowly, since many of them were said to be still unable to cope with the progress of events. Their performance during the GLF, like that of their Han counterparts, was generally found to be inadequate. They had lacked the necessary managerial, accounting, and technical skills required for radical, rapid socialization. There were also indications that the whole GLF and commune program went beyond the limits of socialization and economic reorganization (as embodied in the Soviet model) acceptable to many of Xinjiang's minority cadres and masses. The GLF itself had resulted in serious socio-economic dislocations, and these, in turn, led to incipient unrest in the region.

By 1961, cadres were warned to report facts faithfully and to transmit the opinions and needs of the masses. The role of Han cadres was not to be belittled, but generally speaking they were not considered to be as good as cadres of the same nationality of the local people in learning the situation and uniting with the masses.³⁵ Furthermore, it was said to be necessary to continue to consider the nationality of a cadre, since the unique characteristics of each nationality would continue to exist for a very long historical period. Saifudin later added, however, that the ideological level and the work capacity of the minority cadres compared with the demands of the Party and the development of various undertakings were still not high enough.³⁶ Minority cadres, therefore, were to undertake self-remolding and welcome the help of Han cadres. They were to be resolute in their support of the CCP and Chairman Mao, their steadfast patriotism and defense of the Chinese People's Republic, their zealous adherence to nationality solidarity with the Han people as the mainstay, and their thorough devotion to the road of socialism and communism.

Following the unrest among the minorities in the Yili area along the Sino-Soviet border in 1962, the drive against "modern revisionism" was intensified throughout Xinjiang. Minority cadres and functionaries were once again scrutinized for pro-Soviet sentiments and anti-CCP, anti-Han inclinations. The class struggle was said to be "Acute and complicated," and often clothed in the nationalities problems of the region. Moreover, the struggle there was interwoven with ethnic and religious problems and the international class struggle.

Rather than calling them local nationalists, those opposed to CCP rule were labelled as "reactionary elements" or "revisionists." The latter terms were presumably intended to be somewhat more palatable to the people of Xinjiang, where local nationalism and pro-Soviet feelings might have been viewed by many as a virtue. In fact, the antirevisionist struggle in Xinjiang was mainly directed against those local nationalist elements among the minorities who were suspected of retaining separatist ambitions or who looked to the Soviet model for inspiration.

In 1963, the general policy of the Party toward cadres, while affected by many side issues, was aimed mainly at the stabilization of internal ranks and unity. According to one unconfirmed report in early February 1964, some 400 cadres and workers, presumably minority nationals, were arrested in the Yili Zhou for sympathizing with the Soviet Union.³⁷ A number of high-ranking minority figures in Xinjiang were either purged, demoted, or were noted as missing in 1964-65. Among those missing was Burhan, president of the China Islamic Association and chairman of the XUAR CPPCC. This was quite significant considering the important role he had played in foreign affairs as a member of numerous Chinese delegations overseas.³⁸ Jiakeloufu, a Uighur who had been affiliated with the Yili group prior to liberation, was apparently arrested by the authorities and relieved of his post in the XUAR CPPCC. Several minority nationality deputies from Xinjiang to the Third NPC were also reportedly dismissed during the same period as "reactionary elements" or "revisionists," including Anwar Hanbaba (an Uzbek), Jiagulin (a Kazakh), Seyliman, Kedebay, and Hakim Sherif.

Beginning in 1962, Mao advocated increased political and ideological study and class struggle in the Socialist Education Movement (SEM). His goal was to prevent further drift toward capitalism, bureaucratism, and modern revisionism in China which had resulted from the more moderate policies advocated by Liu Shaoqi. These had included the reintroduction of limited private enterprise, material incentives, and technological training, as well as commune re-trenchment, during the post-GLF period. The more moderate policies of Liu, which sought normative, gradual development, brought about economic recovery following the general dislocations caused by the GLF in Xinjiang. As relative prosperity returned, minority tensions decreased and Soviet propaganda broadsides against the "exploitive and colonialist-type" Han policies in Xinjiang were defused.

Based upon his perception of the region's needs and problems, including internal unity and stability, national defense, and economic development, Wang Enmao tended to emphasize the line of Liu rather than that of Mao. He did, however, realize that raising ideological and political consciousness in Xinjiang was an important method of mobilizing the masses, maintaining a commitment to the Chinese revolutionary model, and aiding in the integration of Xinjiang with the PRC. Wang, felt, nonetheless, that too much class struggle could lead to undesirable consequences.

The basic emphasis of Party and cadre policies in Xinjiang by 1965 was upon fostering Communist cadres with ability and skills (first) and ideological virtue (second) from among the workers, the poor and lower-middle peasants and herdsmen, other working people, and the revolutionary intellectuals of the various nationalities. Cadres were to possess a high degree of consciousness, loyalty to the Party and China, and a capability of keeping in close touch with the masses. As Saifudin pointed out, the Party was fully mindful of the characteristics of Xinjiang as a nationalities area and was paying great attention to the ethnic origin of the cadres.³⁹ A few local nationalists, however, were still opposed to the Marxist-Leninist line, and were advocating that the Party be built according to the origin of the nationalities, he added. They were apparently opposing the "communization" of the cadres under the pretext of keeping their national identity. Victory in Party-building and socialist undertakings, he said, could only be gained by relying on the thought of Chairman Mao and opposing the corrosion of local nationalism, modern revisionism, capitalism, and other anti-Marxist-Leninist ideologies.

For the most part, Saifudin's statements had the appearance of being ritual obeisance to the prevailing line of the SEM. There was, nonetheless, a very strong suggestion that those who opposed the Party and China would find themselves on the wrong side of the political fence. For example, Saifudin recalled that the minority nationality Party members and cadres recruited and fostered by the Party in the preceding sixteen years had undergone various kinds of steeling and tests.⁴⁰ During the SEM, the Party organs at all levels were to receive more profound course of education, "steeling," and transformation. He added that thousands upon thousands of new activists were to emerge among the masses of workers and peasants to become the reserve forces of the

party and cadres. The implication was that the regional Party was directing the movement primarily at the local peoples rather than among its own members.

Significantly, Wang Enmao stated that the winning of all achievements in Xinjiang was, in the final analysis, a great victory for the nationalities policy of the Party, and Party's general line of building socialism, and (lastly) the thought of Chairman Mao.⁴¹ Wang implied that as far as the political and ideological consciousness of the minorities in Xinjiang was concerned, they were expected to be loyal to the Party and China. He reiterated that although ethnic origin should never be considered as the only criterion in recruiting cadres, attention should nevertheless be paid to fostering and promoting Party member cadres among the minorities.

Wang repeated that it was necessary to persist in the criterion that cadres were to have both ability and virtue, regardless of their nationality. However, he stated that it was important that all cadres "hold high the great red banner of the thought of Mao Zedong" and integrate it with the concrete situation of Xinjiang:

The Xinjiang minority nationalities region is similar to the Han areas in many respects, but it also has many dissimilar characteristics. When carrying out work in Xinjiang, it is necessary to conduct investigation and research and concretely analyse and take care of the characteristics of the minority nationalities before the thought of Mao Zedong can really be integrated with the concrete situation, and the lines, guiding principles and policies of the Party can be better implemented. This is precisely what we have done.⁴² (Italics mine.)

In tone, this sounded very much like a rebuttal to charges that the Xinjiang leadership had been neglecting the class struggle and ideological policies advocated by Mao. In fact, it amounted to a defense of policy adaptation and flexibility by the Xinjiang authorities under Wang, who justified it on the grounds that there were special conditions and peculiarities accruing to the revolutionary experience in the region.

Thus, a notable trend in Party-building and cadre recruitment policies implemented by Wang

throughout the pre-1966 period was their very close connection with minority policies. By the end of the period, Wang's experience in the border region had led him to view extremist policies of both the "right" and the "left" variety with disfavor. He must have felt that while it was imperative to build a reliable Party and cadre force in the region (with the Han nationality predominating), it had to be achieved in such a way as not to upset the sensitive balance of nationality relations in the border region. His moderate policies, therefore, were based upon a guarded toleration and cautious respect of the special conditions and peculiarities accruing to Xinjiang and its indigenous non-Han peoples.

7. Military Policies, 1949-66

THE MILITARY AS A COMBAT FORCE

Although the telegrams of "peaceful surrender" tendered to the Communists by Tao Zhiyue and Burhan prevented large-scale resistance to the advancing units of the PLA, opposition to the creation of CCP rule, or to any Han rulers by some Xinjiang natives made the transition somewhat difficult. The task of singling out and eliminating active opposition in the province naturally fell to the PLA. The targets of attack included: a small portion of the GMD troops of the Xinjiang Garrison Command who had refused to abide by the terms of surrender in September 1949; local native bands, such as the group of Kazakhs led by Osman Bator; a small group of White Russians; members of reactionary secret societies; and "all sorts of bandit and subversive espionage elements and organizations who use the reactionary doctrines of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism to establish anti-Communist and anti-Soviet bases of operation in support of imperialism and the Chiang-clique."¹

Throughout 1950-51, units of the PLA sought to eliminate the remaining counterrevolutionary elements in Xinjiang. For example, Li Zidang and Chen Gungfu, former commanders of the GMD 65th Brigade and 533rd Regiment of the GMD 178th Division in Xinjiang, were captured and publicly executed for instigating a part of their troops to resist the entry of the PLA.² In May 1951, Osman Bator was caught and executed in Qinghai province after undertaking, according to CCP accounts, continued looting and attacks against the PLA in collusion with the Chiang-clique and with the aid of the American Consul-General in Urumqi.³

With the political demise of Osman Bator, the CCP publicly proclaimed that organized resistance and counterrevolutionary activities had generally been quelled in the province. Subsequently, however, numerous Chinese media reports indicated that such

activities continued in some areas of Xinjiang for several years. In fact, the subsequent launching of campaigns to suppress both "active" and "hidden" counterrevolutionary elements⁴ by the Party and PLA during the early 1950s seems to substantiate the numerous rumors of continued resistance in the province. Burhan, who was retained as chairman of the Xinjiang Provincial People's Government (XJPPG) after liberation, announced over Urumqi Radio on January 1, 1952, that some 120,000 enemies of the people had been liquidated by the Communists in Xinjiang since 1949.⁵ Another report more conservatively, but more accurately, claimed that by March 1954 some 30,000 "active counterrevolutionaries and local bandits" had been eliminated in Xinjiang with the assistance of the PLA.⁶

The PLA's role in suppressing active counter-revolutionaries and achieving public security in Xinjiang during the early post-liberation period established as a major trend in military policy the maintenance of a high level of combat readiness and efficiency. This trend continued in the 1960s when it became necessary to defend the borders from external threats and maintain increased vigilance against minority unrest. The need for combat-readiness required a system of regularized military training, which promoted the growth and perpetuation of professionalism within the regional military establishment. During the early 1950s, moreover, when Sino-Soviet cooperation was at its height, Soviet advice and training procedures contributed to the maintenance and extension of a modern, professional military organization.

The military's role in public security continued to be emphasized by the regional authorities during the mid-1950s:

We must strengthen our work in social security, and be vigilant against the sabotage activities of the counterrevolutionaries. A large number of counterrevolutionaries have been wiped out, but there are still many counterrevolutionaries in hiding who have not been totally suppressed. In some areas, there are still constantly reported cases of counterrevolutionaries spreading rumors, carrying out sabotage activities, and indulging in various crimes.⁷

The continuing stress on public security by the military was justified by Urumqi on the ground that not all habitual criminals had been disposed of, and that former GMD officials and landlords had retained their

reactionary stance following imprisonment or reform through labor.

The fact that the Party was still encountering opposition in Xinjiang was indicated in December 1954, when the authorities claimed that a large-scale insurrection by "bourgeois nationalist elements" in Hetian had to be suppressed by units of the PLA.⁸ The incident may well have been caused by some individual soldiers who had infringed upon the interests of the masses or had not respected the customs and habits of the minority nationalities.⁹ In August 1955, Xinjiang Daily disclosed that the Public Security Department of the Xinjiang PCC had uncovered a "counterrevolutionary espionage organization" which was linked to the "China Democratic Party" in Shandong.¹⁰ Its leaders were said to be former GMD functionaries who had calumniated the Party's leadership, incited backward elements against the government, spread reactionary rumors, stolen weapons, and committed arson after joining the PCC in the early 1950s. Later that year, more alleged counterrevolutionaries were arrested in various parts of southern Xinjiang, almost all of whom were minority nationals,¹¹ including landlords, former police officials, militia leaders, and government workers of the pre-1949 "puppet" regime. Their crimes were cited as planning to attack cadres and steal weapons, seeking revenge against peasants, posting reactionary slogans, murdering and beating revolutionary workers, stealing State secrets, embezzling State funds, and spreading rumors and undertaking sabotage activities while posing as religious workers. In all probability, the various elements labelled as counterrevolutionaries constituted those people whom the Party simply wanted to be rid of.

Throughout the first half decade of CCP rule in Xinjiang, therefore, the military maintained a rather high degree of vigilance and played a very active role in eliminating anti-Communist opposition. The main targets appeared to have been mostly elements from among both the indigenous minorities and the Han nationality who served under the former GMD regime in Xinjiang. While one objective was the outright suppression of these groups, the military also undertook efforts to reform them through corrective labor.

THE MILITARY AS A POLITICAL FORCE

Beginning in 1956-57, in conjunction with the "Hundred Flowers Movement" and the subsequent anti-rightist/antilocal nationalist campaign, regional military policy was affected by the swing to a more

radical line throughout China. For example, during the antirightist rectification campaign in Xinjiang several reports noted that serious sectarianism had occurred within the Xinjiang PCC. In May 1957, a rectification campaign was launched within the Xinjiang PCC. Minority nationality cadres in the region had pointed out that some Han PCC cadres did not respect them, that some PCC departments did not have any minority cadres at all, that the customs and traditions of the indigenous peoples were not respected by the PCC, and that many leading military cadres did not pay attention to the training of minority cadres.¹²

In August 1957, Xinjiang Daily proclaimed that the "victory of rebuffing the rightists in the PCC" had been achieved.¹³ It was subsequently revealed that up to mid-October 4,757 criminal cases had been solved in the PCC, and that 55.62 percent of these cases had involved robbery and larceny and 22.15 percent had involved corruption.¹⁴ A month later, Zhang Zhonghan announced that over 16,700 cadres in the PCC or 62 percent of the total, were to be transferred from higher level organs to take part in productive labor at the basic levels.¹⁵

The xiafang of over half of the PCC's cadre force indicated that a rather widespread campaign had been launched to demote some of the former GMD army men, as well as some veteran PLA-men and resettled Han. The references to serious sectarianism implied that a sizeable proportion of the PCC's membership had not been completely reformed ideologically. Although there is no documentation available on the extent of organized resistance within the PCC, the sources suggest that groups were covertly formed which may have been associated with counterrevolutionary organizations like the "National Unity Party" or the "Chinese Worker-Peasant Party" that had been uncovered in the region late in 1957. It is likely that in the later stages of the campaign within the PCC those elements who had been influenced by Soviet advisors were also singled out for criticism and further remolding.

The rectification campaign within the military and PCC organs of Xinjiang highlighted another important trend in military policy, namely political-ideological transformation through reform and study. For example, considering the diverse composition of the PCC's membership, the Party had found it necessary to launch penetrating ideological reform campaigns within the PCC. As a result, many former GMD military and administrative personnel had been assigned to the corrective labor program within the

PCC. Moreover, the military and the PCC played an important role in various political reform movements among the masses by sending out work teams to the local areas to provide guidance, control, propaganda, and indoctrination. On the whole, military training and ideological study and reform were considered to be complementary to one another in the process of achieving political authority and control. A heightened sense of political-ideological consciousness through study or, if necessary, through outright coercion, was deemed to be important in achieving commitment and strengthening morale. However, the maintenance of a balance between military training and ideological study within the military of Xinjiang was likely considered to be the correct course in light of the many special problems accruing to the region. A stress on one or the other would conceivably upset this balance and result in undesirable consequences. Too much emphasis on military training might lead to political-ideological stagnation and even conservatism, while too much stress on political-ideological study might lead to the weakening of public security and national defense capabilities. It can be assumed from the materials available that the Xinjiang military authorities came to be interested in maintaining just such a balance between military training and political-ideological study by the 1960s.

THE MILITARY AS A WORK FORCE

The military in China was always considered by Mao to be a work force, as well as a political force and a fighting force.¹⁶ In other words, it was to carry out production tasks, as well as socio-political reform tasks and military tasks. In theory, the military was at all times to be controlled by the Party and to serve the people. In addition to its military and political roles, then, the military in Xinjiang, as in other parts of China (but perhaps to a greater extent), played a significant and rather extensive role in construction and production. In fact, because of its long-term involvement in economic undertakings in Xinjiang, the Xinjiang PCC must have developed attitudes which were somewhat "economist" in nature. The use of work points and wages and the stress on technological innovations became interwoven in the fabric of the PCC. For example, by late 1960, when the GLF and commune drive was being slowed due to socio-economic dislocations, there were said to be some PCC comrades who had wrongly advocated increasing manpower to solve problems of production and labor. The more correct solution was said to be that of

raising labor productivity, especially on the agricultural front. Technical innovation, mechanization, and automation were cited as being important methods of raising labor productivity and manpower availability.¹⁷

By 1965, this tendency was fairly well entrenched in the PCC, despite the fact that the authorities continuously pointed out that the PCC had always adhered to the concepts of hard struggle, self-sacrifice, and self-reliance associated with the "Spirit of Nanniwan." Moreover, the troops assigned to production and construction in Xinjiang had quite literally put down roots in the region and thus had a stake in its economic development.

THE "MILITARY LINE" VS. THE "POLITICAL LINE" IN THE XJMR DURING THE GLF

At the height of the GLF in Xinjiang from 1958 to 1960, great emphasis was publicly placed upon political-ideological training within the military. The concepts of "adhering to the mass line" and "putting politics in command" were given wide publicity. Veteran officers were told to strengthen their contacts with the soldiers and the masses, practice democracy, and adhere to the principle of collective leadership. For example, militia-building was promoted during the GLF as a "mass-line" method to promote egalitarianism and break down bureaucratism and professionalism, heighten public security and national defense, and mobilize the people for large-scale production and construction tasks in Xinjiang. The militia was designed to be essentially a popular, paramilitary organization more responsive to the Party, rather than a professional military body.

On the whole, the Xinjiang military authorities exhibited little enthusiasm for the militia-building campaign. Wang Enmao, in particular, must have felt that the militia concept simply did not fit the needs or the realities of Xinjiang. Although the militia was described as "an armed force of the masses,"¹⁸ it was actually nothing of the kind in Xinjiang. Only the members of the "core militia," those relatively few Party cadres, activists, and demobilized soldiers with untainted proletarian or poor peasant backgrounds were entrusted with arms--and then only when on duty and supervised by professional military cadres. Moreover, the regional PLA controlled the militia command structure, its guidance and training, its weapons, and its ideological indoctrination.¹⁹ The regional military leaders were obviously reluctant to arm the local population, especially the non-Han peoples. To a large degree, furthermore, the

Han-dominated Xinjiang PCC already constituted a more reliable militia-type organization.

While some egalitarianism and democracy undoubtedly occurred in the XJMR during the GLF, the regional authorities exhibited an unwillingness to go too far in the direction of egalitarianism and democracy. They must have considered it more important to maintain discipline and command since the minority population in the region was subject to Soviet influence and sabotage. In fact, the hierarchical system of military ranks which had been adopted in 1955 was maintained.

Most important, however, was that the ideologically oriented policies of the GLF simply came into conflict with the need to increase national defense and public security through military training and modernization just as Sino-Soviet relations were deteriorating and minority discontent was on the rise. As a result, intensive political-ideological study among the troops in Xinjiang was soon subordinated again to the needs of internal security and border defense and the attention paid to radical ideological policies diminished accordingly.

THE RESURGENCE OF POLITICS WITHIN THE MILITARY

During the early 1960s the post-GLF trend of de-emphasizing politics and ideology in the military of Xinjiang continued. This trend was accelerated when Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated to the point of armed hostilities along the border in Xinjiang. Top priority was placed on military preparedness, troop strength was continuously built up, the settlement of Han from China Proper was intensified, a new highway and railroad network was completed within Xinjiang and between Urumqi and Lanzhou by 1961, and emphasis was placed on economic development and modernization.

Events in Peking, however, were to have a great impact on military policy. Following the purge of Peng Dehuai in 1959, the new Minister of National Defense Lin Biao and Mao undertook measures to counter pro-Soviet influence and attack the overemphasis on military training, professionalism, and modernization within the PLA. By the time Lin had replaced Peng, the role of the political commissar had been downgraded to the point where unit commanders were so indifferent to their political responsibilities that Party branch committees were said to be absent in about 7,000 PLA companies throughout China.²⁰ New regulations were therefore instituted by Lin giving wider powers to the political commissars so as to tighten Party (and Maoist)

control over the military. These regulations gave top priority to "redness" over "expertness" and to egalitarianism within the ranks of the PLA.

These measures reflected a deepening cleavage within the Central Party and military organs between a group headed by Mao and Lin and a group led by Liu Shaoqi, Peng, and Lo Ruiqing. Evidently, Mao had been unable to control the direction of the more moderate post-GLF socio-economic policies advocated by the Liu faction, and feared that capitalist restorationism, bureaucratism, and revisionism were endangering the revolution in China. This had led Mao to seek a base of support within the military for his more radical policies that stressed revolutionary élan and ideological purity.

By mid-1961, Lin had largely succeeded in building up the power of the political commissars within the PLA. Soon thereafter, new conditions for "Five-Good Fighters" were implemented that emphasized the cultivation of political thought over the acquisition of military techniques. Beginning in 1962, the Socialist Education Movement (SEM) was intensified by the Mao-Lin group within the military, and efforts were made to bring about an ideological resurgence. In early 1963, the "Twelve Articles of Basic Experiences in the Building of Companies" flatly stated that work in political thinking was the key to building strong PLA companies. Article four pointed out that only when the function of the Party branch committee was adequately developed could the policies of the Party (i.e., Mao) and the orders and directives of superiors be carried out and could unity and the fulfillment of all tasks for which the company was responsible be discharged.

In December 1963, Mao called for the Party to learn from the PLA, thus indicating that he felt the military had become a faithful revolutionary ally. The implication was that Mao had largely succeeded in creating an alliance with the political commissars against those elements within the Party and military who were adhering to the "revisionist line." As the "Learn from the PLA Movement" was reaching its peak in China during early 1964, the commissars began to infiltrate traditional Party and civilian agencies in large numbers, and "political departments" modelled on those within the PLA were established in various economic enterprises. Moreover, in May 1965, the system of military ranks dating from 1955 was abolished. The abolition of PLA ranks and the earlier measures carried out by the Mao-Lin group evidently met with some opposition. This was clearly implied by He Long later in the year when he refuted

the arguments of "those whose heads are crammed full of foreign [i.e., Soviet] doctrines . . . and military thought."²³ He added that some elements within the military had opposed Mao's line on army-building, the strengthening of the absolute leadership of the Party over the PLA, and the movement for democracy and the "mass line." The "resistance of conventional notions and habits," He warned, were to be resolutely opposed.

While military training for combat-readiness was still viewed as an important task by the Mao-Lin group, it was now deemed to be a task of secondary importance to political-ideological work. The tone of these Mao-Lin military policies was anti-"expert" and antiprofessional, and it was clear that those elements in the Central Party and military hierarchy who leaned in the direction of professionalism, conventional tactics, and technical modernization in military affairs (similar to the Soviet military practice) were being criticized and purged.

In Xinjiang, the campaign to deprofessionalize and reindoctrinate the military was also unfolded, but was mitigated by the existence of internal security problems and border tensions. The XJMR authorities were concerned about the defense of the frontier, potential unrest among the minorities, and the safeguarding the region's strategic natural resources and nascent nuclear test facilities at Lop Nor. Therefore, the attempts to increase political controls and indoctrination during the various Maoist-inspired campaigns in the XJMR probably had less of an impact than elsewhere in China.

It is significant that Wang Enmao, as both the Party and military leader of the XJMR, was in a position to direct policies in a way which he felt would best suit the needs and problems of the region. He could, and apparently did, choose to pay what amounted to ritual obeisance to much of the Maoist line of revolutionary class struggle and ideological resurgence during the SEM and "Learn from the PLA Movement," while undertaking measures that would maintain military training for national defense and public security. In effect, Wang felt that a high state of ideological consciousness was necessary, both among the military and Party members and the masses, but that an excessive, overly zealous ideological stance was not in Xinjiang's best interests since it might undermine defense and security capabilities and arouse the sensitivities of the minority peoples.

For example, Wang only needed to point out the lingering problems among some of the nationalities

of Xinjiang and the continuing efforts of the Soviets to meddle in regional affairs since the 1962 Yili Crisis as justifications for maintaining a low posture on ideologically based policies and for pursuing a more positive stance on economic development and military preparedness. In 1963, moreover, a degree of dissatisfaction was indicated within some units of the military in Xinjiang who resented being stationed in the distant frontier region, disliked the intensified ideological remolding, and complained about the lingering food and material shortages. According to Taiwan sources, a PLA battalion defected to the Soviets in early August 1963.²⁴ The defecting unit was described as being from the 4th Agricultural Division of the Xinjiang PCC, which was partly composed of former GMD soldiers as well as PLA veterans who had been stationed in Xinjiang since 1956 under the command of Xie Yongzhen, a former mayor of Peking.

The go-slow attitude of Wang Enmao in unfolding the SEM in Xinjiang, especially among the troops stationed there, was indirectly attacked by the more radical elements of the Cultural Section of the XJMR Political Department on August 1, 1965 in a lengthy article entitled "Let a Large Number of Warrior-Writers Grow Up."²⁵ The article attacked complacency and creeping bureaucratism among the army staff. While it praised the military officers of Xinjiang for their tradition of attaching importance to the militant role of art and literature, it criticized the fact that only two articles had been written by Xinjiang soldiers since the PLA General Political Department had launched its call in 1963 for articles from the soldiers. The gradualness of the movement in Xinjiang was censured, and the fact that the majority of the "amateur creative writers" were ordinary office cadres who "had not gone deep into the midst of life to experience the many difficulties and fiery struggles" of the rank-and-file was criticized.

As a partial concession to the prevailing Maoist attention to ideological resurgence and the mass-line philosophy, the Xinjiang authorities made some efforts to publicly support the renewed emphasis on militia-building in early 1965. Xinjiang Daily, for example, stated that

It is also necessary to implement further . . . Chairman Mao's instructions on putting the work of the people's militia on a solid basis organizationally, politically and militarily. It is

essential to strengthen class education among the people's militia so that they would dare to fight and win. We must always put politics in command and learn from the PLA.²⁶

It is doubtful, however, that the regional military leaders had any more of a desire to arm the people with weapons than they had in the militia-building campaign during the GLF.

Until mid-1965, it was apparent that the Mao-Lin group had managed to maintain at least a delicate balance between political and professional requirements within most of the PLA. With the escalation of the Vietnam conflict, however, this balance was upset.²⁷ Using the Vietnam conflict as yet another justification, the Mao-Lin group further intensified its efforts to instill renewed revolutionary vigor into the masses of China. To counter this move, the Liu faction attempted to defuse some of the more radical aspects of the movement by sending out cadres to control its scope and content. Even within the PLA itself there was a growing split over the degree of emphasis which should be placed upon the intensification of ideological consciousness among the more professional-minded commanders and the ideologically oriented political commissars who had been largely installed or promoted by the Mao-Lin faction. In the developing political-ideological struggle, however, many high-ranking PLA commanders, including Wang Enmao, were evidently prepared to go along with Mao's increasing emphasis on ideological resurgence so long as the PLA was used as a model but was not compelled to take an active part in the struggle.

By late 1965, Wang's stance, in particular, seemed to be that of promoting the political-ideological line of the Mao-Lin group to the extent that it would not jeopardize the aims of security, unity, and economic growth in Xinjiang. He, like others, thus faced the dilemma of promoting policies that would best suit these priorities, but that also did not overlook the more radical priorities set by Mao. To an extent, therefore Wang's public statements of adherence to the emerging emphasis on Mao-thought as the guiding principle for the development of socialism in China and its applicability to Xinjiang can be seen as being rather superficial. For example, the major policy inclinations of the Xinjiang leadership, and the military's role in them can be clearly seen in the following 1965 description of the Xinjiang PCC:

[It is] a production brigade as well as a work and combat group. In the past sixteen years it has played the exemplary role of being a shock force in the development of economic construction in the autonomous region. It has consistently preserved the organization of the PLA by coordinating labor and combat-readiness, in this way significantly contributing toward consolidating national defense and safeguarding the cause of socialist construction in Xinjiang.²⁸ (Italics mine).

The evidence thus strongly suggests that Wang continued to be more concerned with defense and economic issues than with those of a purely ideological nature, although he did publicly voice his adherence to the Maoist line. Beneath his largely symbolic and ritualistic rhetoric, then, Wang felt that the border region's various problems required more than the mere application of ideology.

8. Policies Toward the Minority Nationalities, 1949-66

The problem of the national minorities in Xinjiang has been a crucial and continuing concern of the CCP since 1949.¹ The question of how to deal with the indigenous non-Han peoples of the region, and their differing languages, habits, customs, and beliefs, was intricately tied to nearly every important CCP policy which sought to achieve Xinjiang's integration with the People's Republic. Due to the historical legacies of anti-Han sentiment among the natives and the periodic intervention by foreign powers (especially the Russians) in Xinjiang affairs, the CCP was compelled to take into consideration the various special problems and unique characteristics accruing to the region and its people after liberation. Subsequent policies toward the minorities, in fact, largely revolved around the question of the extent to which the peculiarities of the minorities should be recognized and respected in formulating and implementing policies which aimed at their eventual assimilation.

MINORITY POLICIES IN XINJIANG, 1949-56

During the early 1950s, CCP policies toward the national minorities in Xinjiang primarily sought to overcome anti-Communist and anti-Han sentiments. While the most reactionary elements, especially those who advocated separatism based upon religious (primarily Islamic) and linguistic differences from the Han, were dealt with severely, the Party adopted a fairly tolerant and moderate policy based upon the united front concept of gradual reform and transformation of indigenous groups and their ideologies through patient and generally non-coercive means. The phenomenon of local nationalism was nonetheless attacked, and all leading minority elements who might have retained any anti-Communist or anti-Han feelings were either subjected to intense remolding or were purged. In 1951, for example, Saifudin stated that

. . . from now on, China's nationality problems enter a new historical stage . . . The minority race problems are no longer concerned with the struggle for freedom and equality from the pan-racialists, . . . but rather how to safeguard and build the fatherland and how to shake off the yoke of feudal exploitation.²

Generally, the Party initially undertook a cautious policy toward Islam in Xinjiang, fearing that radical (or what might appear to the local people as radical) policies might arouse the sensitivities of the minorities and fuel old antagonisms between the Han and non-Han peoples. For example, the Party, through the creation of various mass organizations under the united front, infiltrated deeply into the masses, promoted mass participation under Party control, observed and guided their activities, and carried out propaganda and education on its various programs and policies. The influential position of the Muslim clergy in particular was slowly undermined and co-opted by the Party through the China Islamic Association. A number of religious institutions were closed, some of the land and property of the mosques--the wagf--was confiscated, and the People's Courts took over the judicial functions of the qadi in both civil and criminal matters.

In order to overcome the traditional anti-Han feelings of the minorities in Xinjiang, the Party publicly adopted a strong stance against the attitude of "Great Hanism." As a 1951 report pointed out:

. . . it is, however, not possible to declare that all traces of hate, misunderstanding, and distrust have been erased from the midst of the Northwestern nationalities. These, being the result of long years of historical development, are not to be eradicated in any short length of time. Consequently, hereafter it is . . . [necessary] to rectify the mistaken tendency towards a narrow interpretation of nationalism among the national minorities, in particular to rectify the tendency towards 'great nationalism' prevalent among the Han cadres.³

However, three years later Wang Enmao revealed that the attitude of inequality among the various nationalities of Xinjiang had perpetuated discriminatory practices, especially between the Han and non-Han groups.⁴ While he traced this phenomenon to the

attitude of "Great Hanism," Wang also scored those among the ethnic minorities who "were still seeking to undermine unity by distorting the spirit of religious freedom, fabricating rumors, inciting people, sabotaging production, and violating judicial rights under the name of religion."

Throughout the early 1950s, then, Han cadres were told to respect the customs and habits of the minorities in Xinjiang and to listen to the opinions of their non-Han counterparts. "Commandism" and the use of coercive measures by Han cadres were strictly forbidden, and they were directed to pay attention to local conditions and peculiarities when implementing the Party's policies. During the establishment of regional autonomy in 1954-55, however, the campaign against religion was stepped up throughout Xinjiang. Burhan was quoted as saying, for example, that

Individual counterrevolutionary elements have infiltrated into Islam, and putting on the cloak of religion, are carrying out counterrevolutionary activities . . . [including] all sorts of rumor-mongering, sabotage, and deception of the masses in an attempt to undermine our revolutionary unity. Consequently, only 'legal' religious activities will be permitted by the People's Government.⁵

Shortly thereafter, an Enlarged CCP Conference in the Yili Zhou described the Party's nationalities policy as being gradual and prudent, but at the same time called for the deepening of education and propaganda on nationalities' unity and equality.⁶ The democratic elements of the religious circles and the pastoral areas were told to strive to strengthen their ideological stance. Burhan revealed later that several acts of sabotage had been undertaken in Xinjiang by "overthrown landlords and bad elements who had behind religion" during the preparatory period of autonomy.⁷ The implication was that many of the minorities were opposed to Xinjiang becoming an autonomous region under a unitary Chinese state, and felt that the province should constitute a nominally independent republic under a federated Chinese state, as in the Soviet Union.⁸

Burhan also publicly pointed out that the main task of the Party on the nationality question during the transition period was

. . . to consolidate the unity of the fatherland and the solidarity among the nationalities in a common effort to build up the big family of the great fatherland and to safeguard, within this big family, the equality of all rights of the nationalities and to effect the autonomy of the nationality regions as well as to coordinate, in the development of the common enterprise of the fatherland, with the construction of the fatherland and develop in gradual stages[*italics mine*], the government, economy, and culture of various nationalities to enable the backward nationalities to get into the ranks of the advanced nationalities in a transition toward a socialist society.⁹

In this process, he added, the sincere and selfless help extended by the Han people should be all the more warmly welcomed by Xinjiang's nationalities, since the Han people had gone through a long period of revolutionary training and experience.

RADICAL MINORITY POLICIES, 1956-60

Beginning in 1956, the Party introduced firm measures in the cultural field which were aimed at changing the traditional customs of the minorities and overcoming the power of Islam. In August of that year, a conference was held in Urumqi which decided upon the adoption of a slightly modified Cyrillic alphabet as the written script for the Uighurs, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz.¹⁰ The script reform was undertaken with Soviet advice in the form of specially-invited experts from the Kazakh-speaking areas of the Soviet Union. It was anticipated that the reforms would allow the minorities to learn modern science (especially that of the Soviet Union) more effectively, and would erode the old Muslim religious teachings written in Arabic which were considered to be unsuitable for modern needs (and communism). By adopting a unified Cyrillic alphabet, moreover, a major step would be taken toward the elimination of illiteracy and the barriers that had divided the ethnic groups for centuries.

Thus, toward the end of 1956, there were indications that the Party was beginning to swing away from the basically moderate nationalities policies of the previous period. In addition to the script reforms, the cooperativization campaign was intensified and socialist reforms were stepped up in the pastoral areas. This "socialist upsurge" of 1956-57 apparently brought about increased resis-

tance within Xinjiang, which was said to be "very complicated and acute."¹¹ On September 23, 1956, for example, Xinjiang Daily revealed that counter-revolutionary elements, taking nationality and religious issues as a pretext, had incited some backward masses to carry out uprisings at Hetian and Muyu.¹² The rioters had reportedly attacked troops engaged in agricultural production, "killing and wounding scores of our cadres, comrades, and soldiers." It claimed, however, that during a mass meeting of some 50,000 persons, the prosecution of the organizers of the incident, who were said to be primarily Uighurs, had been abandoned and they were all released after re-education.

For the next five years, until late 1960, the Party's nationalities policies became increasingly radical. During the "Hundred Flowers Movement" and the subsequent antilocal nationalist rectification campaign, especially, the previous toleration and respect for minority customs and habits and regard for the special conditions and peculiarities of Xinjiang was reversed. This radical trend reached a peak during the GLF in Xinjiang, when the Party sought to bring about the rapid assimilation ("fusion") of the non-Han peoples and their culture with the Han people of China. Policies formulated for the Han areas of China were applied with but little alteration in the region. As the CCP increasingly swung away from the Soviet model of achieving socialism, pro-Soviet minority elements and Soviet influence among Xinjiang's inhabitants were singled out for criticism and elimination.

In late November 1957, the authorities charged many minority intellectuals of being "nationality chauvinists" who had agitated the masses and slandered the Party's nationalities policy.¹³ Persons within the Xinjiang Islamic Association were subsequently criticized for placing their individual religious interests above those of the State.¹⁴ Certain minority elements had also spoken in favor of linguistic independence and had shown a reluctance to learn Chinese.¹⁵ The Xinjiang PCC had been vilified by some minorities, who claimed that these "Han colonialists" were making a mess of Xinjiang.¹⁶ In reference to the antilocal nationalist struggle that was being waged in Xinjiang a writer for the Guangming ribao in Peking proclaimed that the nationalities question should always be subject to the basic interests of the proletarian revolution, and that this meant fusion, not separatism.¹⁷

By mid-1958, it was apparent that the Xinjiang

authorities were meeting with minority resistance over the new radical nationalities policies, including language reform. There were also indications that some minority elements were clinging to a pro-Soviet stance and that the Soviet Union itself may have been encouraging minority intractability. Saifudin, for example, indicated that some local nationalists were mistakenly "holding tight the old, traditional culture" without changing.¹⁸ They were said to be neglecting the culture of the Han people and were relegating it to a secondary place; opposing the transformation of their traditional culture, including the incorporation of new contents; and attacking the Party and socialism under the pretext of national feelings and national self-respect in their art and literature.

Prior to 1958, the Party had generally refrained from overt policies against the Muslim institutions, such as complete land confiscation, public condemnation of "Islamic internationalism," and prohibitions against religious ceremonies and education. In August 1958, however, People's Daily proclaimed that war was declared against all backward customs which stood in the way of progress and were an obstacle or hindrance to the development of production.¹⁹ It emphasized that only the evil religious customs were being eliminated and that this would bring about an ever-increasing convergence of China's various nationalities. Significantly, two months earlier Peking had announced new drafts for the reform of the Uighur, Kazakh, Mongol, Sibo, and Kirghiz scripts based upon the Latin alphabet.²⁰

Throughout 1959, there were indications that the Xinjiang authorities were beginning to moderate the more radical aspects of their nationalities policy due to the socio-economic dislocations caused by the GLF and the rise of minority tensions and potential Soviet meddling. In August, Lu Jianren wrote that the nationalities problem in Xinjiang was a class problem, and that the unity of the nationalities was to be equated with the best interests of China, that is, the Han people.²¹ But, he added that the Party would continue to unite with and transform the intellectuals, upper strata, and religious circles of all nationalities and would give importance to the characteristics and customs of the different nationalities.

As a result of a combination of factors, including the radical, assimilationist nationalities policy of the Party, the socio-economic problems caused by the GLF in the region, the growing influx of Han

from China Proper, the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations, and, possibly, the side effects of the Tibetan revolt,²² several minority uprisings were reported in Xinjiang during 1958-59. One such disturbance occurred at Wusu in September that was crushed by local units of the PLA. Another took place at Yining in early November that resulted in a large number of Han deaths.²³ In Hetian, some 10,000 youths were said to have attacked a local prison, freeing some 600 inmates, killing fifty prison officials, and seizing stocks of grain. Depots were burned and communications facilities were harrassed. According to one source, large military reinforcements were required to put down the uprising, which presumably lasted for nearly two months and was prolonged by Soviet support.²⁴ Various other reports of unrest in the region implied the possibility of Soviet encouragement to "rightists who were merely dancing to the music played by imperialists and the national elements who had betrayed their motherland."²⁵

In March 1960, Xinjiang Daily published a lengthy speech delivered by Saifudin the previous December, which justified the promulgation of the new draft plan of reforming the Uighur and Kazakh scripts.²⁶ The new scripts were to be based upon the Han language phoneticization system, which used the Latin alphabet as its foundation and incorporated vocabulary from the Han language. Saifudin said that it was impossible for the national minorities to rely on their own languages to develop their culture, science, and techniques at a rapid pace. In explaining and justifying the reforms, Saifudin repeatedly spoke of fusion and assimilation and the fact that no nationality could develop independently.²⁷ Some local nationalists, he said, had resisted the reforms by refusing to absorb any new technical terms from the Han language and by advocating the absorption of words from the languages of foreign countries (i.e., the Soviet Union).

Two days later, Jiakeluofu, XUAR Language Reform Committee Chairman, explained that the 1956 decision concerning the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in reforming the minority scripts had been experimental, temporary, and transitional.²⁸ "Based upon current practical work and objective conditions," he added, "we have found that what is most suitable for us is not the Slav alphabet but the Latin alphabet." The new program was based upon considerations of national unity and common interests within China, and the final objective in language reform was that

of gradually making the Han language the common language of social intercourse.

An underlying motive of the script reform was the Party's desire to break the hold of Islam on the local peoples, especially the youth, and thus to bring about sinification. By implication, the historical and cultural heritage of the national minorities was to be relegated to a museum and replaced by socialism and the thought of Mao Zedong. The substitution of the Latin for the Cyrillic alphabet, moreover, reflected the Party's continuing drive to eliminate Soviet influence in the region and cut off the indigenous peoples from their kinsmen on the other side of the Sino-Soviet border. The subsequent unfolding of the new language reform program, however, was noticeably gradual and cautious as a result of lingering unrest within the region and growing Soviet agitation among a portion of the minorities.

"MODERATION" IN THE MINORITY POLICIES, 1960-65

By late 1960, the trend toward moderation in the nationalities policy intensified in Xinjiang. The nationalities problem was said to have been fundamentally solved as a class problem, but it was noted that a small section of the people still clung to local nationalist feelings and favored the preservation of national characteristics.²⁹ Fusion was still considered to be inevitable, but would be attained gradually and would retain the characteristics of each nationality, albeit with those of the Han people being the ones principally retained. All national forms, customs, and habits that were unfavorable to socialist construction and national development (along Chinese lines) were to be actively reformed. In other words, the basic goal of the Party's policy remained that of gradually suppressing the identity of the minorities and thus bringing about their fusion with the Han people. However, the more drastic measures of the 1957-60 period, when nationality customs and habits were harshly extirpated and pro-Soviet influence was opposed, gave way to a more moderate approach by 1962. Once again the peculiarities of the minorities were respected, or at least tolerated, with the exception of any remnant tendencies toward separatism and pro-Soviet sentiments. The GLF policy of all nationalities advancing together on the road to socialism in China had proven to be untenable since the gap between the Han and non-Han peoples had tended to widen rather than become narrower, for reasons that will be more fully dis-

cussed below. As a result, the concept of fusion between the nationalities was increasingly referred to as a long-term historical process.

In early 1962, the Xinjiang press made repeated calls for selective toleration, and even cultivation, of the customs and peculiarities of the minorities. Forceful assimilation or extirpation of nationality differences was publicly denounced, and the cadres and masses were told to respect such differences. Renewed prominence was given to the role of the regional Party's United Front Work Department. More emphasis was placed on the concept that there was a community of interest among members of a given nationality with comparatively less reference to class. Lu Jianren summarized this concept by saying that

. . . there exists a contradiction of class exploitation between the upper level and working people of each nationality . . . but, most of the upper-level people are anti-imperialist and patriotic. The policy of long-term unity between the Party and the upper-level people will continue, and cooperation, consultation, participation, and constant political education will characterize this relationship.³⁰

In fact, the masses were to be persuaded to make the necessary compromises with the upper-level people in order to enhance unity and cooperation, and the upper-level and religious elements were given assurances that their livelihood and political status would be properly arranged. Lu warned, nonetheless, that all counterrevolutionary elements who sought protection under the cloak of religion would be eliminated.

On June 3 1962, People's Daily clearly defined the new minorities policy which had emerged:

. . . nationalities work must be genuinely done well, adhering to the thought of Mao Zedong . . . in the stage of socialist revolution In this stage, each nationality still has all its national characteristics: it is necessary, therefore, to pay attention to these characteristics, recognizing the distinctiveness of the various nationalities and the long-term nature of these differences; to study and analyze correctly the peculiarities of the area and the economy of each national minority; clearly to recognize, with respect to the national minor-

ities, the relationship between the religious question and the national question; and to genuinely respect the rights of equality and autonomy of the national minorities.³¹

Emphasis, then was placed on the evolutionary change of the minorities.

While the new trend toward moderation in the nationalities policies was still unfolding, serious problems broke out along the Sino-Soviet frontier in the Yili Zhou of Xinjiang. From 1958 to early 1962, tensions between the Han and non-Han peoples had grown rapidly in the region. Socio-economic dislocations resulting from the GLF and commune drive had led to food rationing and the shipment of food-grains to China Proper, causing a large number of frontier peoples to cross the Sino-Soviet border in search of food and refuge. Ethnic and religious animosities, long extant in the region, and the indigenous peoples' general dislike of the communes, regimentation, and the increasing influx of Han immigrants, led to widespread disaffection. With the deepening of the Sino-Soviet split, suspected pro-Soviet minority elements were persecuted and some were put into "re-education camps." As late as 1961, pro-Soviet Muslims agitated among the local population and Moscow aimed propaganda broadcasts at the region from Soviet Central Asia, telling about the better life of the minorities on the other side of the border and emphasizing ethnic bonds.

By early 1962, although the Soviet consular personnel stationed in the region remained officially aloof in these matters, they nonetheless began surreptitiously to issue antedated Soviet passports to minority nationals.³² Similar Soviet passports were reportedly being sold on the black market.³³ Increasing numbers of "legal" travellers therefore began to cross the border into Kazakhstan, where they were resettled on collective farms. The emigrés, who were primarily Kazakhs, but also included Uighurs and other Muslim elements, were generally composed of two types of people: Soviet-oriented, or anti-Han, intellectuals; and herdsmen and peasants who felt that there were material benefits to be gained by moving.

Initially, the Xinjiang Party authorities tried to stop the growing exodus by administrative and propaganda methods but ultimately failed. On May 26, they ordered the border with the Soviet Union closed and demanded that the Soviets return all refugees who did not have proper documents. Three

days later, on May 29, "several tens-of-thousands of Kazakhs and Uighurs" gathered in the main square of Yining to demonstrate against the Chinese closure of the border. A riot ensued, during which offices were sacked, papers were burnt, and Chinese and minority employees were bound and dragged to the Party headquarters where they were beaten.³⁴ Troops finally dispersed the rioters by gunfire, and at least a dozen people were killed. Some of the demonstrators fled to the Soviet consulate in Yining and requested aid but were refused. Although the Soviet Union apparently agreed to turn back all new refugees following this incident, in early July the Soviet consulate in Yining was ordered closed, as was the Urumqi consulate later that month.

By the time the crisis subsided in the late summer, some 62,000 people had fled Xinjiang. Although the incident had incensed the local population and similar riots were reported elsewhere in the region, which caused production problems, the seriousness of the situation was lessened somewhat by the earlier retrenchment measures in the commune movement, relaxation in the radical economic policies of the GLF period, and the strategic retreat in the Party's nationalities policy. The most significant result, in the end, was the complete exclusion of direct Soviet involvement in Xinjiang, especially in the Yili Zhou. The border was closed and further militarized, the population along it was largely relocated, Sino-Soviet trade in Xinjiang dropped sharply, and the planned railway link between Urumqi and Aktogai on the Soviet border was left uncompleted. The decision to launch the GLF in Xinjiang had been partially based upon a Chinese determination to exploit the natural resources of the border region for China to the increasing exclusion of Soviet interests and to eliminate pro-Soviet influence among the region's minorities. The Yili crisis of 1962 resulted in the culmination of these drives and represented the virtual conclusion of the people's revolution in the Yili Zhou.³⁵ Chinese control in the Yili Zhou, which had so long been a pro-Soviet stronghold on Chinese soil, was thenceforth unquestionable.

This did not mean that pro-Soviet or anti-Han sentiments had been completely eliminated within Xinjiang. One of the obvious results of the Yili crisis was that from 1963 on the Soviet Union intensified its anti-CCP propaganda broadcasts from across the frontier. The Soviet press and radio was full of vivid reports about concentration camps in

Xinjiang, the persecution of "Soviet citizens" and minority leaders, and armed repression of the minorities. A number of the authors and commentators of the Soviet-based propaganda machine claimed to be minority emigrés who had fled the region earlier. One of them was Zunin Taipov, a Soviet-educated Kazakh who had participated in the Yili rebellion of 1944, and later became a major-general in the PLA (the 5th Army Corps) and a vice-chief of staff of the XJMR. He fled to the Soviet Union in 1962 where he became the head of an alleged 60,000-man guerrilla army of minority refugees from Xinjiang sponsored by the Soviets at Alma Ata. Another was Bukhara Tychkabaev, a Kazakh poet and writer who had been the editor of Flag of Revolution in the Yili area in 1944 and later became an assistant to the director of the XUAR Department of Culture. A third was Balkash Bafin, a Kazakh who had held the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the PLA in Xinjiang.³⁶

From 1963, the Xinjiang authorities made pronounced efforts to counter Soviet propaganda by emphasizing the Party's concern for the minorities' livelihood and economic prosperity. They publicly stated that the Party would take into consideration the special needs and characteristics of the minority nationalities of Xinjiang, and even proclaimed that the local peoples were to be allowed the use of their own written and spoken languages and that their customs and habits were to be respected. On the other hand, the minorities were told to heighten their political consciousness and revolutionary vigilance, unreservedly oppose all criminal activities and plots of imperialists, foreign reactionary cliques and modern revisionists, and engage themselves in a ruthless struggle against internal and foreign class enemies.³⁷

While the official policy of appeasement toward the nationalities continued to be voiced in Xinjiang, efforts were made to wage a slow campaign of class struggle in late 1963. During the next year, a discernible change took place in the Party's nationalities policy. The masses were increasingly told not to forget the class struggle, since a small number of people had not yet undergone socialist remolding and tended to turn to the capitalist road whenever there was an opportunity. It was pointed out that the pressure from foreign imperialism and the existence of bourgeois influence at home constituted the social source of revisionist ideas in the Party. While waging a struggle against the foreign and domestic class enemies, vigilance and

resolute opposition was to be maintained against various opportunist ideological tendencies within the Party.³⁸ By implication, then, the Party Center was attacking those cadres within the Party who supported a moderate nationalities policy which advocated a just regard for individual national characteristics.

A renewed campaign to attack religion, which was said to be "spiritually poisoning" millions of laboring masses, was launched in 1964 during the Mao-Lin group's drive to intensify the SEM. As one Party leader stated:

. . . the nationality problem within China was a part of general revolutionary problems, and its solution was possible only by internal democratic and socialist revolution and the extermination of all exploiting classes and counterrevolutionary elements. The cause of nationality problems is . . . the capitalist-imperialist system of exploitation based upon the private ownership of the means of production.³⁹

He also asserted that some local nationalist elements had recently "cooperated wildly with foreign reactionaries and revolutionaries," while pretending to be the defenders of the rights of the nationalities. In some border regions, he added, new conflicts had arisen with "modern revisionists who incited a great number of people to flee abroad."

The new line advocated that while the culture and economy of the nationalities was to be developed to the same level as that of the Han over a long period of time, the process was not to be considered merely cultural and economic but political as well. It was deemed to be wrong to overemphasize nationality peculiarities, to depend upon the nationality upper classes to reform themselves, or to solicit the reactionary elements for support. All "vacillating minority elements" were to receive a thorough education and remolding under the united front according to the thoughts of Chairman Mao. The "surrenderist and capitulationist" tendencies in the nationalities policy were to be purged.⁴⁰

Part and parcel of the Party's minority policy by 1965 was to apply socialist education and class struggle to China's nationalities in cultural forms understood by them. Thus, the bitter medicine of merging all nationalities, with the ultimate dis-

appearance of their individual characteristics, had not been abandoned, it had merely been postponed. Doses of ideology were to be administered in "sugar-coated pills" by means of art and literature.⁴¹ Furthermore, religion was to be separated (isolated) from the State, all illegal religious activities were to be prohibited, and religious leaders were to be induced to take a patriotic stand against imperialism and modern revisionism and to intensify their own remolding through active participation in socialist construction tasks.

MINORITY POLICIES IN XINJIANG ON THE EVE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The nationalities policy which emerged in 1964-65 was distinctly tougher than that of the preceding few years, and in many respects it was similar to the policy advocated during the GLF period. On the one hand, the Party stepped up propaganda attention to the minority areas, emphasizing material progress and general solidarity. On the other hand, it launched a concurrent campaign against counterrevolutionary and revisionist activities among the nationalities. In Xinjiang, the authorities undertook further measures to secure the Sino-Soviet border and eliminate suspect minority leaders.⁴² Village mosques were closed, and "guided worship" was inaugurated under Party cadres.⁴³ But the regional authorities under Wang Enmao did not want to go too far in the direction of wholesale repression. They must have felt that it was necessary, for reasons of internal socio-economic stability, to launch a resolute drive against minority opposition and Soviet influence in the region. Realizing that national defense was of crucial importance, however, Wang felt that it was necessary to recognize the special conditions and unique characteristics of Xinjiang and its peoples in the implementation of policy. After all, Xinjiang's domestic situation was intimately tied to, and often complicated by, the international situation characterized by the Sino-Soviet split. The problem, in Wang's view, was how to formulate realistic, practical policies among the minorities which took regional characteristics and peculiarities into consideration, but which did not lead to the growth of separatist feelings among the minorities that might undermine the goal of Xinjiang's integration with China. From the end of the GLF to the outset of the Cultural Revolution Wang increasingly endeavored to subtly adjust minority policies to fit the realities of Xinjiang

as he perceived them from his long experience in the region. It can be said that he began to assert his own stamp policies in Xinjiang after years of adhering strictly to the directives emanating from the Party leadership in Peking.

In late 1965, He Long, speaking in Urumqi, clearly described the position to which Wang and the Xinjiang leadership adhered:

. . . the nationalities problem is, in essence, a class problem, whose solution remains a revolutionary matter. At the same time, national unity requires that the characteristics of the nationalities be taken into consideration, that their written and spoken languages, customs, and habits be respected, that the Party's united front policy and the policy of religious freedom be carried out correctly, and that the relations between all nationalities be handled properly.⁴⁴ (*Italics mine*).

He, like Wang Enmao and Saifudin, stressed that the major goal in Xinjiang by late 1965 was unity.

While it was claimed that it had been possible to unite more than 95 percent of the people of all nationalities in Xinjiang by late 1965, it was admitted that the negative effects of protracted national estrangement left over by history could not be neglected. "Great-nation chauvinism" and local nationalism were still obstacles to unity. A few recalcitrant local nationalists, working in collusion with landlords, rich peasants, and counter-revolutionaries at home, and leaning toward revisionism abroad, were said to have been actively undermining nationalities unity, splitting the unification of China, opposing socialism, and attempting to restore the reactionary classes.⁴⁵ These elements, moreover, were covertly taking advantage of the complicated nature of Xinjiang's situation, and were misleading or deceiving the masses to wage struggle under the cloak of safeguarding the interests of the local peoples. This was probably meant as a warning to those minorities who might have expected too much in the way of policy liberalization.

As Wang Enmao himself summarized,

Xinjiang is a minority nationalities region and is economically and culturally backward. In order to build socialism, to change the economic and social backwardness in Xinjiang, to catch up with the level of economic and cul-

tural development in the Han areas, to eliminate gradually [italics mine] nationalities' differences, and win victory in the socialist construction and pass over to communism together with the rest of the people throughout the country, it is necessary to carry out the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution.⁴⁶

He went on to say that the frontier defenses must be strengthened, and that it was not enough to overcome the sabotage of the class enemy at home alone but that the invasion of the class enemy from abroad must also be crushed. Wang, in what appeared to be a defense of his policies in Xinjiang, claimed that "we have always firmly implemented the general line of the Party and developed the . . . building of socialism in the autonomous region in a big way." He then said that "if we did not firmly implement the general line of the Party and wage a resolute struggle against the right opportunists, socialist construction would not have been developed . . . on so large a scale as it is today."⁴⁷

By the end of 1965, the Xinjiang leadership obviously faced a dilemma in dealing with the regional minority nationalities. It had to be concerned with maintaining stability and security in a frontier region inhabited by so many non-Han peoples in order to ultimately integrate Xinjiang fully with China Proper. Especially critical were the region's strategic resources and its location along the border with the Soviet Union. Policies which outwardly recognized and respected the special characteristics and habits of the minority nationalities (but not their right of self-determination) were therefore necessary, if only to provide the Party with a counterweight to the heavy barrage of Soviet propaganda from across the frontier. On the other hand, Party policies, such as colonizing Xinjiang with Han elements and promoting new written languages among the nationalities, were designed to undercut gradually the very ethnic and cultural uniqueness which the Party outwardly promised to safeguard among the minorities. Through such policies, moreover, the Party sought to cut the nationalities off from their own historical past that had been so dominated by Islam and isolate them from their kinsmen in Soviet Central Asia.

The underlying goal of the Xinjiang leadership, like that of the central authorities, consistently remained that of eventually assimilating the various

nationalities with the Han people of China, and only the pace and methodology involved in this process brought about differing policy perspectives in Urumqi and Peking by late 1965. Wang felt that it was imperative to maintain actively the facade of regional autonomy for Xinjiang's nationalities and to recognize their peculiarities and the region's special characteristics while at the same time adopting measures that would gradually take them, and the territory they inhabited, unquestionably Chinese. A more moderate and cautious approach to the minorities was seen as justifiable on the grounds that a more radical or repressive approach would only rekindle nationality unrest and encourage Soviet intrigue.

At the same time, Wang had to pay attention to the prevailing Maoist line in Peking, which advocated intensifying class struggle and ideological purity as a counter against revisionist, bureaucratic, and capitalist tendencies. Wang was obliged to outwardly support the drive toward ideological resurgence and purification, including the leftist swing in minorities policies, if only to prevent himself and his Xinjiang colleagues from being criticized by the Mao-Lin group for neglecting the class struggle. Wang needed only to look at the fate of Li Weihan, who was removed as director of the Party's United Front Work Department in 1965 for his "surrenderist mistakes" in dealing with the nationalities question, to see what could happen if outright deviation from the Maoist line occurred.⁴⁸ This dilemma, then, was to be of no little significance during subsequent years when the Cultural Revolution highlighted the differing perspectives on policies which best suited the "continuing revolution" in China as a whole, and in Xinjiang in particular.

9. Agricultural Policies, 1949-66

The Party's major goal in the development of Xinjiang's comparatively backward economy after 1949 was to transform it into a more modern, socialist economy. Economic development was designed to achieve both regional self-sufficiency and integration with the national economy of China. It was necessary, therefore to reorient Xinjiang's economy away from the towns lying along the Sino-Soviet border, such as Yining and Kazgar, first toward Urumqi and ultimately toward China Proper. In a large measure, this was to be achieved by building a transportation network within the region centered at Urumqi and constructing a railroad link between the provincial capital and China Proper.

THE 1949-57 PERIOD

The CCP had come to power in China largely on its record, and promises, of carrying out basic socio-economic reforms in town and countryside. During the early 1950s, the Party undertook agrarian reform partially as a device to fulfil its earlier promises and partially as a method to stimulate the productiveness of the peasants and bring about rural economic stability and recovery after years of internal civil warfare. The agrarian reform campaign, furthermore, was a socio-political device designed to expose, attack, and eliminate the exploitive local landlord elements and introduce Party authority at the basic levels in the countryside. According to Liu Shaoqi, the basic aim of agrarian reform in China was "not purely one of relieving the poor peasants," however.¹ It was designed to set free the rural productive forces, that is, to free the rural laborers, land, and other means of production from "the shackles of the feudal ownership system" of the landlord class in order to develop agricultural production and to clear the path for China's industrialization.² Ostensibly, the landlords in general were to be deprived of their landholdings and abolished as a social class, but not physically

eliminated. They were to be allocated a share of land and other means of production so that they could make a living and reform themselves through their own labor. Liu said that it was even possible that, after undergoing long-term reform through labor, the landlords could become "new men." For the minority of landlords who were adjudged to be guilty of "heinous and gross crimes," and thus branded as "local despots," sentences of imprisonment or death were to be considered.

In late 1950, the peasants in some areas of Xinjiang began what was described as a "universal class struggle against criminal landlord elements."³ In fact, this was probably a largely spontaneous and premature movement resulting from some peasants' reading of the initial propaganda issued by the Party authorities before practical measures for its organization and implementation were worked out. In part, it may have also been the result of pressures placed upon the peasantry by the authorities to pay more taxes in grain. Whatever the causes, violence and excesses occurred, some of which took on the form of ethnic and religious vendettas among the various local groups, especially between the non-Han and Han nationals. Measures were therefore taken to bring the movement under control, including the assignment of PLA work teams to the basic levels. These teams, in cooperation with personnel from the provincial judicial organs, propagandized the Party's correct land reform policy, organized the masses into peasant's associations, led the masses in public trials of local landlords, aided in the reduction of rents and the confiscation and redistribution of land and property, and assisted in the establishment of trial mutual-aid teams (MAT's) in selected areas of Xinjiang throughout 1951.⁴ PLA work teams also gained a large measure of control by fixing water rights and prices in the rural areas.

The Xinjiang authorities also provided aid to the masses in the form of loans, seeds, equipment, reclaimed land, manpower, and technical assistance through the army production and construction units. This provided for a large measure of Han direction and control over the rural areas and allowed the authorities to increase stability and bring about more rational development. Priority in the regime's material aid program went to those peasants who correctly followed the Party's policies and were "getting organized." For those areas where peasants were either experiencing difficulties or were show-

ing reluctance, the authorities concentrated on sending in larger numbers of political and technical personnel to deal with the problems. In addition, propaganda directed at the native and religious elites in the province was intensified, as in May 1951, when a mass meeting of some 3,000 mullahs from the forty-six mosques in Urumqi was held to elicit their pledge of support for the Party and the land reform campaign.

By late 1951, the provincial authorities had laid the foundations for a more coordinated land reform campaign throughout Xinjiang. In an experimental rent reduction and antilandlord campaign it had launched earlier in 146 villages,⁶ the Party had rectified and strengthened the peasant's associations, cultivated local minority cadres and activists, intensified education on nationalities' unity, and propagated the Party's policies at the basic levels. The main errors uncovered in the movement had included: inadequate attention paid by the leadership cadres to the campaign and their failure to assess and control it; the lack of overall planning and supervision in some localities; the poor treatment of some people, who were struck or arrested because they did not understand the Party's policy nor its implementation; and "Han chauvinism" and "leftist spirit." The authorities called for a narrowing of the campaign according to local circumstances, and for guided struggle based upon legal processes and deeper education among both the cadres and masses. Coercive measures were not to be applied, although the people were also told that any idea of a completely peaceful land reform was wrong.

As land reform in the rural areas of Xinjiang was intensified during 1952-53, the Party warned that it was imperative to maintain limits on the attacks against the landlords since it was so easy to produce "extreme leftist actions."⁷ Stress was placed upon implementing policies according to the concrete situation of the local areas, and although the campaign was to be under Han guidance, minority cadres were to take an active part in the work.⁸ The policy of preserving the rich peasant economy and the freedom of religious beliefs was patiently explained, a reasonable amount of land was left to the mosques, and businesses owned by landlords were not confiscated, yet.⁹

According to the various land surveys undertaken in Xinjiang by the peasant's associations by late 1953, the poorest two-thirds of the population had only one-fifth of the agricultural land. Esti-

mated figures for land ownership in the oases at that time are as follows:

Table 9.1
Land "Ownership" in Xinjiang's Oases, 1953.

| Class | Land Owned (in mou) | % Oases Population | % Oases Lands |
|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|
| Landlords | 39 and over | 2.17 | 21.0 |
| Rich peasants | 20-39 | 1.15 | 7.0 |
| Middle Peasants | 8-19 | 28.0 | 37.0 |
| Poor Peasants | 3-7 | 40.0 | 17.0 |
| Wage laborers | 3 or less | 20.0 | 2.18 |
| Others (unclassified) | | 8.62 | 15.82 |

Sources: Various Reports in XJRB and RMRB.

Based upon these land surveys, the regional authorities proposed that over 80 percent of the peasants were to receive some land, with most of it going to the 60 percent who were poor and landless. While the "despotic" landlord elements, who constituted less than 1 percent of the population, were stripped of all land and property, forced to confess their sins publicly, and either imprisoned or liquidated, those landlords and rich peasants who escaped such judgment were allowed to retain the lands that they were actively tilling themselves as well as their houses and tools.

Resistance was encountered during the early stages of the land reform movement in Xinjiang largely as a result of poor policy execution. The Party, for example, was unable to build up the poor peasants and wage laborers as the nucleus of the movement in some areas as had been planned. Instead, middle peasants had led the poor peasants, who in turn led the wage laborers.¹⁰ Some peasants were sympathetic to the landlords during confiscation and refused to accept the redistributed land. A few cadres, therefore, resorted to force and "commandism" in dealing with the masses, and this had resulted in "many hard feelings."¹¹

As land reform was concluded in some localities in 1953, immediate steps were taken to encourage the peasants to organize themselves into MAT's, initially on a seasonal basis and eventually on a permanent basis. Once permanent MAT's were organized and consolidated, a number would then merge into lower-stage agricultural producer's cooperatives (APC's).

Like the MAT's the lower-stage APC's constituted semi-socialist rural organizations on the road to complete socialist cooperation, or higher-stage APC's. In the lower-stage APC's, which consisted of between five and ten MAT's, landholdings were pooled, boundary markers destroyed, and the entire holding of all households were cultivated as a single farm with the members paid according to shares. The higher-stage APC's, which were to be composed of no less than 100 households, were to be fully socialist collectives in which the members were paid as wage laborers according to work points, and all land, tools, and animals were to be owned by the collective (including private plots).

In Xinjiang, the land reform campaign progressed slower than elsewhere in China and suffered many setbacks. By the end of 1953, for instance, the estimated 95,000-plus MAT's were consolidated and readjusted into 51,600 MAT's (of which 5,100 were of a permanent type). Only ten lower-stage APC's had been established.¹² Altogether, about 34 percent of the peasants had been organized in the province by the end of 1953, compared to 45 percent in the whole Northwest region. Presumably, the movement toward cooperativization had been too rapid and not in accordance with objective conditions. There had also been a lack of trained and reliable cadres in some areas. In fact, the 1953 figures for food grain production showed no increase over the previous year, being about 1.6 million tonnes¹³ (see Table 9.2). As but one measure taken to spur production and organization in the rural areas, the army production and construction units in Xinjiang were told to act as "shock troops" in influencing the masses to see the advantages of collective production.¹⁴

In February 1954, the Xinjiang Agrarian Reform Committee was officially dissolved with the avowed "victorious conclusion" of the land reform campaign in fifty-seven xian, three shi, and over 1,500 xiang.¹⁵ It was announced that in 990 xian some 3,168,317 mou had been confiscated from landlords, and another 1,197,731 mou had been requisitioned during the campaign.¹⁶ These lands had been distributed among some 450,000 poor and landless peasant households, with each receiving about 2.3 mou of land. In 1959, however, Saifudin revealed that the final figures included 7,370,000 mou confiscated and redistributed to over 650,000 households.¹⁷

In August 1954 it was announced that over 30 percent of the peasants in Xinjiang's rural areas had been organized into 58,773 MAT's, 5 percent of

Table 9.2
Agricultural Production In Xinjiang, 1949-65

| Year | Foodgrains (millions of tonnes) | Foodgrain Area. (millions of mou) | Oil Seeds (1,000's of tonnes) | Cotton (1,000's of tonnes) | Total Cultivated Area (millions of mou) | Total Irrigated Area (millions of mou) | Livestock (million of head) |
|------|---------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|--|-----------------------------------|
| 1949 | 1.1 | 14.0 | 37.5 | 4.9 | 18.1 | 16.12 | 11.8 |
| 1950 | 1.3 | 15.0 | -- | 6.0- 7.8 | 18.79 | 16.81 | -- |
| 1951 | 1.5 | 17.24 | -- | 9.5 | 20.08 | 18.1 | -- |
| 1952 | 1.6 | 17.2 | -- | 14.5- 15.9 | 23.82 | 19.55 | 14.0 |
| 1953 | 1.6 | 17.54 | -- | 15.0- 16.4 | 23.4 | 20.43 | 15.8 |
| 1954 | 1.82 | 20.99 | 69.61 | 16.0- 16.9 | 23.1 | 20.99 | 17.1 |
| 1955 | 1.91 | 19.13 | 69.0 | 26.7- 27.8 | 25.52 | 21.5- 23.0 | 17.1- 18.0 |
| 1956 | 1.93 | 19.0 | 70.77 | 57.5 | 27.87 | 23.32 | 18.02 |
| 1957 | 2.03 | 20.27 | 72.6 | 48.5- 51.0 | 30.22 | 25.77 | 20.47 |
| 1958 | 3.07 (revised) | -- | 75.5 | 57.5 | 30.0- 36.17 | 32.38 | 22.23 |
| 1959 | 3.48 | 20.45 | 101.17 | 68.4 | 36.1 | 33.6 | 24.98 |
| 1960 | 3.3 | -- | 125.0 | 73.5 | -- | 30.0 | 25.0 |
| 1961 | 2.2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 31.4 | -- |
| 1963 | -- | -- | -- | 34.3- 39.2 | -- | 26.0 | -- |
| 1964 | 2.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 25.96 |
| 1965 | 3.3- 3.4 | 26.0- 28.0 | -- | 49.0- 57.9 | 36.0- 40.0 | -- | 25.4- 27.0 |

Sources: Compiled by the author from various Mainland China sources.

which were said to be permanent.¹⁸ Shortly thereafter, some 51,000 cadres were either assigned to or trained for coop work, 34,400 of whom were minority nationals. Capitalist and backward tendencies were criticized as having obstructed the movement, however, and the regional authorities directed a more careful, steady progress that gave adequate consideration to the concrete characteristics of the nationalities in matters of politics, culture, customs and habits. Negative publicity was given to methods used in Han areas, which were mechanically applied to Xinjiang.¹⁹ Agricultural production in

1954, however, increased only slightly due to natural disasters, such as flooding in the Yili area, and continued resistance to cooperativization.

In early 1955, Wang Enmao pointed out that the greatest defects in the provincial mutual-aid and cooperativization movement had included the failure to transfer leadership cadres to the agricultural front, rightist conservatism, "commandism," and the erroneous assessment of conditions and class struggle in the villages.²⁰ The socialist transformation movement was said to be lagging behind objective possibilities. Wang said that only 45.62 percent of the peasants had been organized into MAT's or APC's. By the end of the summer, however, the total increased under pressure from the Party center to speed up cooperativization throughout China. There were then 75,215 MAT's (28.33 percent permanent) with over 63 percent of the peasants as members. Nearly 50,000 peasant households (or slightly over 5 percent) were in 1,702 lower-stage APC's.²¹

Throughout the early 1950s, agriculture was designed to pay for industrialization in China, following the Soviet example.²² This had been confirmed by the First Five-Year Plan, which was implemented throughout the country in 1953. But the harvests of 1953-54 were inadequate, and, while land reform may have been a political success, the system of small peasant ownership had not sufficiently expanded production. Moreover, rich peasants and conservatives had retained much influence in the countryside and still constituted an obstacle to collectivization. With the Plan well under way by late 1955, more agricultural growth was urgently needed. Therefore, prompted by a better harvest that was said to be the result of the increased organization of the peasantry, and in accordance with central instructions, in late 1955 plans for agricultural cooperativization in Xinjiang were revised upward no less than three times by the regional authorities.²³ By the end of the year, 6,110 lower-stage APC's had been established for over 20 percent of the peasant households. This encouraged the regional leaders to further increase the pace of cooperativization so that by the end of 1956 there would be 8,500 lower-stage APC's in the region. The Party ordered the realization of complete agrarian semi-socialist cooperativization by 1958, and the achievement of "basic" (between 70 and 80 percent) socialist cooperativization by 1959. According to this scheme, by which the region would reach the

goal of "basic" socialist cooperativization about two years earlier than originally planned, Xinjiang would have to "run fast" in order to catch up with the rest of China regardless of local conditions, which may have dictated a more gradual and moderate pace of development.²⁴

In his July 1956 work report to the First XUAR CCP Congress, Wang disclosed that the number of APC's had reached 10,781 in the region.²⁵ Although Wang called for a steady advance and consolidation so as to complete lower-stage APC's and "basically" complete higher-stage APC's during the winter and spring of 1956-57, and reach full higher-stage cooperativization in 1957, he alluded to several continuing problems in the regional campaign. There was, in fact, a note of caution in his words which implied the possibility of more moderate policies. For example, he cited the special problems and unique conditions existing in Xinjiang which had made the adoption of different work styles necessary in the period of democratic reform in the region as a whole, and in the pastoral areas in particular. Among these were a series of counterrevolutionary disturbances in Hetian and other districts which had to be suppressed, nationality and religious problems which had caused delays in the land reform movement and in the preparation for local and regional autonomy, conservatism among some cadres who had overestimated difficulties and underestimated favorable conditions, and impetuosity and rashness on the part of Han cadres.

By September 1956, the cooperativization movement had slowed significantly, and instructions were issued to resolve contradictions among the state interests, collective interests, and personal interests in the coops.²⁶ The principles of voluntariness and mutual benefit were to be practiced, and the cadres' ideological style was to be rectified so as to overcome "commandism" and bureaucratism. In December, cadres were again chastized for not analysing the situation in the countryside or listening to the opinions of the masses in conjunction with coop readjustments.²⁷ While it is known that the coops were continuing to experience internal problems due to peasant dissatisfaction, it is likely that outside events also encouraged a slow-down in cooperativization. Khrushchev's attack of Stalin's "cult of personality" earlier in the year gave Chinese exponents of collective leadership live ammunition to use against Mao's personal sanction of rapid socialization. The Hungarian up-

rising also contributed to this trend. As a result, in September 1956 the Eighth Party Congress, much to Mao's dissatisfaction, decided on a more gradual process of cooperativization that made the timing of the movement more flexible, forbade the use of coercion, and stressed material benefits for the peasants.

Throughout 1957, agricultural cooperativization in Xinjiang made more steady progress under the prevailing conditions of liberalization. The continued stress on the Soviet model, however, resulted in highly unbalanced economic development, and gains in industry were not matched in agriculture. The 1959 food grain target of 2.3 million tonnes, for example, was not fulfilled, as production amounted to only slightly over 2 million tonnes.²⁸ Cooperativization, furthermore, had not brought about the total abolition of private property in the countryside, nor had it prevented the growth of a bureaucratic apparatus of cadres at the village level. Beginning in May 1957, moreover, the "Hundred Flowers Movement" brought forth a torrent of criticisms about the cooperativization movement and about the Party's elitism and separation from the masses.

THE GLF IN XINJIANG, 1958-60

During the antirightist/antilocal nationalist campaign of 1957-58, Mao moved against those who advocated a moderate economic policy which proceeded at the peasants' own pace. Bureaucratism, "spontaneous capitalism,"²⁹ and separatist tendencies among the minorities were resolutely attacked in Xinjiang. In early 1958, for example, the regional press claimed that 85 percent of the APC's were going through "blooming and contending."³⁰ It was admitted that the coops were facing greater difficulties than those in the interior regions, and that the "bourgeois ideology of lawless landlords and rich and upper-middle peasants" was prevalent. Already, in late August 1957, the regional authorities had announced the closure of the free grain market and introduced a system of rationing under state control which was based upon household units within the coops.³¹ This measure was ostensibly taken to combat hoarding and speculation.

During 1958, there was a significant increase in attention to ideological problems as the socialist education campaign was intensified. In early June, Wang and Saifudin relayed the Party Central Committee's decision on formally publicizing the "general line for socialist construction in China"

(the Great Leap Forward, or GLF).³² According to the GLF economic policies, heavy emphasis was to be placed upon mass participation, ideological incentives, and self-reliance. Wang Enmao noted that the GLF in Xinjiang was to be an effort to

. . . build the region into an industrial and cotton-growing base within ten years. By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, total value of industrial output is to exceed that of agriculture. This target is unshakable and must be achieved . . . and to do so, we must rely on our own efforts, . . . build our own base of heavy industry, specially iron and steel, machine-building, power, petroleum and coal.³³

A month later, he added that with the completion of the Xin-Lan Railway and the GLF in Xinjiang it would be possible to undertake large-scale industrial production.³⁴ But, he pointed out, agriculture must achieve a greater leap forward in order to meet the demands of such a large-scale industrial development. Since the results of agricultural production were far behind those achieved in the advanced areas of China, greater efforts were needed in order to achieve better results. Wang told the Party cadres to seriously see to it that production targets were fulfilled, if not surpassed, and to implement the philosophy of "one year's surplus for every two years of farming."

Beginning in late July 1958, the Xinjiang authorities launched an attack against conservative thinking, complacency, and the attitude that Xinjiang was backward or special.³⁵ Following the Central Committee's decision in late August to establish rural communes and deepen the socialist education campaign, Party committees in Xinjiang began making preparations for the establishment of 102 trial communes in the agricultural xiang.³⁶

Throughout September, the authorities undertook measures to deal with recalcitrant landlords, rich peasants, and other elements who were opposing the communes.³⁷ They warned against the belief that class struggle was no longer necessary, since the landlords and rich peasants still existed as individuals despite the fact that they had been eliminated as an economic class. There were indications that the commune movement was having problems because it was being developed too rapidly and propaganda had not been carried out well. The leadership

admitted that it was inevitable that some peoples were not accustomed to certain features of the communes, that misunderstandings and doubts still existed, that capitalist ideology remained comparatively serious, that there were still some problems in low operational and managerial levels caused by the lack of experience, and that a little confusion in the members' livelihood still existed.³⁸

On September 30, it was announced some 625,000 rural households, or 59.3 percent of the total, were in the communes, whose average size was placed at 1,607 households.³⁹ Thus approximately 389 communes had been set up. By the end of 1958, there were 451 communes in Xinjiang, containing 93 percent of the peasants in the rural areas and 70 percent of the herdsmen in the pastoral areas.⁴⁰ Within the communes, the peasants were assigned to the building of crude "backyard furnaces" for iron production, and other labor intensive capital construction projects, such as land reclamation and water conservancy. Some 17,000 small commune run factories were also established to promote self-sufficiency.⁴¹ As a result, a significant amount of labor was diverted from the agricultural front to other enterprises.

By late 1958, there were already signs that the commune drive was experiencing serious difficulties in Xinjiang, especially among the minorities who were upset with the whole GLF program which they saw as a fanatical scheme to apply Chinese methods and policies to a basically non-Han region where local conditions were quite different. The regional press spoke of elements who were still spreading rumors, slandering the Party cadres, sabotaging production, encouraging the masses to withdraw from the communes, secretly selling or slaughtering animals, and engaging in speculation and illegal trade. "Spontaneous capitalism" was reportedly infecting a significant proportion of the poor peasants, many of whom were apathetic about collective production but enthusiastic about sideline production. The masses were also showing discontent with grain and cotton rationing and were accusing the Party of being nothing more than a new landlord. These various problems were said to be seriously contributing to socio-economic dislocation within Xinjiang.⁴²

In December 1958, only three months after the launching of the commune movement, a resolution was passed by the Central Committee which made it clear that the transition from socialism to communism in China was quite a long and complicated process.⁴³ As a result, the commune drive was slowed down, re-

forms ("readjustments") were undertaken in the existing communes, improvements were ordered in their financial and trade organs, and more attention was to be paid to the members' living conditions.⁴⁴ Cadres were ordered to promote a realistic workstyle, and Party leaders were sent to the communes to assume command over the work of readjustment and consolidation.

The initial production figures released by the authorities for 1958 indicated a very high rate of growth, but as figures were later to show the cadres had been overly zealous in their production reports and, in many cases, had padded the figures to show the overfulfillment of targets set by the regional authorities. The 1958 figures were, in fact, revised downward twice, in April 1959 and again in August 1959 (see Table 9.3).

Table 9.3
Initial and Revised 1958 Agricultural Production Figures for Xinjiang.

| | 1/59 Figures ^a | 4/59 Figures ^b | 8/59 Figures ^c |
|------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Foodgrains | 3.4 million tonnes | 3.2 million tonnes | 3.0+ million tonnes |
| Cotton | 82,000 tonnes | 73,500 tonnes | 57,500-60,000 tonnes |
| Oil Seeds | 92,500 tonnes | - | 75,500-76,000 tonnes |

^aNCNA, Urumqi, January 12, 1959.

^bSaifudin, "Achievements in Xinjiang Province," speech to First Session, Second NPC on April 23, 1959, NCNA, Peking April 23, 1959.

^cSaifudin, "Report on the Readjustment of Principal Targets Set in the 1959 National Economic Plan of the XUAR and Unfolding the Movement for Production Increase and Economy," XJRB, September 5, 1959.

In early 1959, a renewed emphasis was placed on subsidiary occupations and sideline production so as to increase food and livestock production. Once again, local conditions, resources, manpower, demand, and need were to be recognized when implementing economic policies within Xinjiang. The cadres were criticized for adhering to blind beliefs and arrogance, and a movement was begun to purify their ranks. The readjustment and consolidation of the communes and the concurrent rectification campaign, however,

proceeded slowly throughout the year, thus necessitating a second commune overhaul campaign in late 1959. As Saifudin pointed out,

. . . since last year, a kind of rightist idea has grown among a portion of the masses and a small number of rural cadres who proved susceptible to the influence of the landlords and rich and upper-middle peasants who doubted the achievements of the GLF and spread pessimistic views among the masses.⁴⁵

In August, the regional authorities made the production brigades the basic units of accounting within the communes, with the production teams also having a share of this responsibility.⁴⁶ It was thus evident that the various dislocations caused by the GLF were necessitating retrenchment so as to increase agricultural production and restore stability.

The extent of the food grain crisis was made quite apparent in early 1960 by the intensive propaganda on the economical use of grain throughout Xinjiang. A Xinjiang Daily editorial, for example, pointed out,

. . . we must realize that our past experience has shown that Xinjiang was not well-off before in grains and that the quantity each person can get is not much . . . and we are not yet free of the ravages of natural calamities. Instead of leading a better life now, life must be led in a way as if we were still poor, so that more grain can be stored for the state--this is the first requirement.⁴⁷

In the commune mess halls, coarse grains were being mixed with fine grains. Leadership cadres at all levels were instructed to spend at least four months each year in the production brigades and to undertake manual labor for at least one month per year. First secretaries of district, zhou and xian Party committees were directed to visit the basic levels in the communes for a minimum of two months each year. Spring sowing in Xinjiang was started earlier than normal in 1960, and grain was planted wherever possible.⁴⁸ All spheres within the economy were told to give increased support to agriculture.

In mid-June, Wang Enmao indicated that the grain shortage was most critical in northern Xinjiang, and that it was necessary to ship grain from the south to those areas along the route of the Xin-

Lan Railway.⁴⁹ To accomplish this, he called for the construction or improvement of highways between the Tarim and Dzungarian basins. Priority was also given to developing agricultural production along the route of the railway, and over 1,500 cadres in ten work teams from the highest regional organs were sent to various localities in eastern Dzungaria to take command of some 100 communes.⁵⁰

By late 1960, the regional authorities claimed that production was stabilizing "precisely because we have adopted forms and methods suited to the concrete conditions of our region . . ." ⁵¹ This amounted to a tacit admission that the implementation of the universalistic policies of the GLF throughout China had neglected local conditions and peculiarities, and had thus been unrealistic. By this time, it was clear that the trend toward moderation and retrenchment in the GLF policies was well-established in Xinjiang.

RETRENCHMENT, 1961-65

In January 1961, the Central Committee issued new economic guidelines designed to increase China's grain production. These were echoed in the Xinjiang press, which advocated that policies and actions be based on reality and local conditions.⁵² Specialized technical research in agriculture was stepped up, and emphasis was increasingly placed on modern techniques and mechanization. In March, Peking promulgated new regulations concerning the communes which banned coercive measures, discouraged mass-line industrial undertakings in the communes (such as "backyard furnaces"), allowed for the suspension of mess halls, stipulated that the brigades could allot up to 5 percent of their arable land to the peasants as private plots, and prohibited commune authorities from interfering in family sideline production and private property.⁵³

Of particular importance was the fact that, in Xinjiang, the attempts to extend a Xinjiang PCC model of collectivization among the masses of the region had proven to be unrealistic by 1961. Although the PCC had been almost continuously cited as a model to be emulated in the process of socialist transformation and construction since its founding in 1954, the GLF had shown that the gap between the PCC and the more backward masses in terms of technology and skills was very wide. With the establishment of communes, the peasants were to undertake many tasks and responsibilities similar to those which the PCC alone had long undertaken. These

included large-scale land reclamation and water conservancy construction, the operation of local industries, building and transportation construction, as well as agricultural and animal husbandry production. The masses were to combine their traditional methods of production with the more modern, scientific methods of production utilized by the PCC. They were to follow the PCC's example of "hard struggle and self-sacrifice" in collective labor that stressed the regimented, disciplined use of manpower. But, as early as 1959-60, it was clear that the peasants were both unwilling and unable to handle these functions, and that the organizational model of the PCC had largely failed in serving as a realistic example in commune-building.

This is not to say that the PCC model had failed to contribute anything positive to the communes or the peasants. It did stimulate collectivization, up to a point, and it did contribute to the modernization of the local agrarian economy. By 1961, however, the PCC remained a basically modern and technologically oriented socialist enterprise, while the communes had largely reverted to semi-socialist enterprises with a comparatively lesser (although improved) degree of technological capability. Many of the PCC-type undertakings attempted within the communes during the GLF were either abandoned or drastically cut back until such a time as conditions were ripe for their gradual reintroduction. In other words, it had been shown, for the interim at least, that the PCC alone was able to carry out those multiple economic and other undertakings for which the masses were as yet largely unprepared to pursue.

As for the Xinjiang PCC itself, although it had retreated on some of its large-scale reclamation and cultivation activities by 1961, it was said to be cultivating about one-third of Xinjiang's farmland, or nearly 11 million mou.⁵⁴ Cultivation on PCC lands was over 60 percent mechanized. Its major crops included foodgrains, in which the PCC was self-sufficient, and economic crops, such as cotton, sugar beets, hemp, and silk. The PCC's cotton output constituted over one-half of the regional total.

By the end of 1961, there were 146 large, mechanized state farms operated by the Xinjiang PCC, and another twenty-plus PCC livestock ranches.⁵⁵ Approximately two-thirds of these farms and ranches had been established since the outset of the GLF in 1958. There were also seventy-four local state farms operated by the civilian authorities in the region. Thus, there was a total of some 243 state farms and ranches

in Xinjiang by late 1961, although some sources claimed that the number may have been as high as 373 somewhat earlier.⁵⁶ It is possible that the number of farms had, in fact, been greater during the latter stages of the GLF, but that some of them had been abandoned or reincorporated into existing farms wherever conditions had proven to be marginal or construction infeasible. Also, some PCC farms were known to have been turned over to the communes. The areas in which the greatest amount of expansion in the number of state farms occurred after 1958 included the Manass River areas around Shihezi, the Yili River Valley and the surrounding pastoral areas, the area along the route of the railroad from Urumqi to Hami, the northern Tarim Basin in the vicinity of Aksu, and the areas near the Kazgar and Hetian oases. Table 9.4 provides a more detailed summary of the conditions of the Xinjiang PCC from 1949 to 1965.

In early 1962, further commune retrenchment occurred when the central authorities made the production teams the basic units of ownership, distribution, and accounting within the communes. Science and technology, private and basic-level ownership, material incentives, and attention to local conditions increasingly predominated over ideology, egalitarianism in distribution, and collective ownership by the people. Since the winter of 1958, the various Central Committee conferences had sought for a reconciliation of central policies and local responses. This had been accompanied by a growing debate between those who, like Mao, favored revolutionary transformation and others, like Liu Shaoqi, who advocated more moderate and rational development. Accordingly, in Xinjiang, as in China generally, the principal task was to increase grain production.⁵⁷ Large-scale heavy industrial development was to be discouraged, unless it served agriculture and was feasible in terms of local conditions and needs, and more daily necessities were to be made available to the masses.

In August 1962, the Beidaihe Work Conference of the Central Committee institutionalized the various changes in the functions and internal structure of the communes which had been made since 1959. While the outward form of the communes remained unchanged, the size of the communes in China had been (or was being) reduced by as much as two-thirds, to an average of 1,600 households. In the three-level ownership system (commune, production brigade, and production team) that was evolving, the commune merely replaced the old unit of local government,

Table 9.4

Conditions of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps,
1950-65.

| Year | Estim. Mou Cultivated by PCC (in 100,000's) | Total State Farms in XJ ^a /PCC Farms ^b | Estimated PCC Membership |
|------|--|---|-----------------------------|
| 1950 | 840 | 6(?) / | 96,500 - 110,000 |
| 1951 | 978 | | |
| 1952 | 1,602 | | |
| 1953 | 888 | | |
| 1954 | 858-867 | | 200,000+ |
| 1955 | 1,680-1,700 | /30 ^b | |
| 1956 | 1,730 | | 300,000 |
| 1957 | -- | 102/ | |
| 1958 | -- | /74. | |
| 1959 | 9,950 | | |
| 1960 | 10,000-10,300 | | 500,000 |
| 1961 | 11,000 | 297/146-182 | |
| 1962 | -- | /200 | |
| 1963 | 10,980 | 373 ^c / | |
| 1965 | 10,000+ | 373/243 | |

^aIncluding agricultural and livestock farms operated by PCC and local state-owned agricultural and livestock farms.

^bAgricultural and livestock farms operated by PCC only.

^cMZTJ, Nos. 10-11 (1963), cited in SCMM, No. 400 (October-November, 1965), pp. 1-4.

Sources: Compiled by the author from various reports in the China Mainland press and radio. See also, Yakovlev, op. cit., pp. 144-52; and Zhang, "The Establishment and Expansion . . .," pp. 12-34.

the xian. The production brigade, which was equivalent to the former higher-stage APC, contained an average of 170 households. It owned some farm tools and facilities and was responsible for public security and militia. The production team, made up of an average of twenty households, corresponded to the old lower-stage APC. It owned virtually all of the necessary means of production, land, and animals, was responsible for organizing production upon receipt of the annual plans from the xian administration, and was the basic accounting unit.

Commune reorganization essentially represented the re-emergence of the bifurcation between state and society. The decentralization of decision-making functions and ownership clearly indicated that a commune with 5,000 households could not ef-

fectively carry out the unified planning and direction of so many diverse functions in an administrative area that contained so many varying local conditions. The attempts to integrate the numerous multiple undertakings within the communes proved to be infeasible. The collectivization of all land, tools, and animals, the abolition of free markets, and the egalitarian system of distribution were not well received by the peasants and herdsman, who resented being transformed into rural laborers without material compensation.

The communique of the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Party Central Committee on September 28 conceded that the transition from capitalism to communism in China would last scores of years or even longer. Mao, however, while in fact bowing to the necessity of granting more freedoms and incentives to the masses, called for a renewed class struggle through the SEM in order to arrest the trend toward the further extension of private enterprise and material incentives. The debate over policies at the center between Mao and Liu continued to intensify for the next three years.

The Maoist policy line in agriculture was exemplified in 1963, when Mao hailed the Dazhai Brigade as an heroic agricultural model which should be emulated universally by the peasants of China. The Dazhai Brigade had abandoned private plots altogether and had adopted a system of distribution based upon work performance compared to model performance, and involving collective judgment on the political activism of each member. While this system was more in line with the Maoist philosophy, it did not receive wide acceptance among the peasants, who remained firmly attached to the work point system and material incentives. It can be assumed that since material incentives and private enterprise (however limited) had been largely responsible for agrarian recovery in the early 1960s, the bulk of Party leaders, including Wang Enmao, were not too enthusiastic about adopting the Dazhai model in practice. One might well imagine that Wang, in particular, felt that in economic prosperity there was less chance for unrest or resistance among the peasantry, the bulk of whom were non-Han.

Yet another avowedly Maoist policy was unfolded in late 1964, when "Poor and Lower-Middle Peasant's Associations" were established throughout China, including Xinjiang. The ostensible purposes of the new associations, which harkened back to the peasant's associations organized during the land reform

campaign of the early 1950s, were to promote class struggle at the brigade and commune levels in the countryside, keep an independent check on lower-level cadres, and create a transmission belt by which policy directives could elicit a mass response. As such, the associations were designed to serve as an auxiliary unit in supervising the commune management committees. When the chairmen of the various provincial associations were announced, however, they were nearly all first secretaries of the Party. The permanent organizations were also dominated by leading provincial Party figures, while the majority of subprovincial association leaders were the heads of production brigades, accountants, and other Party functionaries. In other words, provincial and lower-level officials apparently captured control of an organization intended to supervise them.⁵⁸ Moreover, Liu Shaoqi also dispatched work teams from higher levels to the basic levels and reshuffled local Party organs in an attempt to block both the new associations and the SEM.⁵⁹

From 1962 to 1965, a slow recovery took place in agriculture in Xinjiang, due largely to the implementation of the moderate policies described above. Productivity was also raised by consolidating and levelling smaller plots into larger plots of land so as to accommodate machinery,⁶⁰ training technical personnel who could, in turn, train the peasants in advanced techniques, using new seeds and chemical fertilizers, and giving due regard to local agricultural conditions and needs. While the extension of the cultivated acreage (largely through reclamation) was considered to be an important device in raising agricultural output, more emphasis was placed on raising per-mou yields in the region. Most of the lands which were reclaimed in the early 1960s, moreover, were located in Dzungaria, especially along the railroad, where population growth and urbanization was then the greatest.

The agricultural situation in Xinjiang by the end of 1964 showed some signs of improvement. Wang's review of the region's economic situation rather cautiously referred to

. . . all-round development in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and fishery; general production increase in grain, cotton, oil-bearing crops, and livestock; . . . prosperity on the market; and further improvement of the people's livelihood.⁶¹

He added that natural calamities had been overcome, and an all-round bumper harvest in agriculture and animal husbandry had been achieved. There were indications, however, that while the wheat crop had increased substantially over the previous year, autumn grains, cotton, and oil-seeds had shown little increase. Other reports confirmed that a rather uneven growth in agricultural output was being experienced when they claimed that the total grain output for the region in 1964 had increased by some 100 percent over that of 1949 (being about 2.5 million tonnes),⁶² while output of cotton had only increased by some two times, being about 14,700 tonnes.⁶³

The agricultural figures reported in late 1965, on the other hand, indicated a marked increase in foodgrain production to over 3.3 million tonnes.⁶⁴ Much of this increase can be traced to the fact that while the cultivated acreage remained about the same as that of 1964,⁶⁵ or 36 million mou, the acreage sown to grains was substantially larger, being between 26 and 28 million mou. In addition, the application of rational field management and scientific and technical methods, as well as good weather, may have also brought about better harvests. Cotton output approached the 1958-59 levels, as figures ranging between 49,000 and 66,750 tonnes were reported.

By late 1965, there were reported to be 243 state farms in Xinjiang, or 8.9 percent of the 2,011 state farms in all of China.⁶⁶ Of these, the Xinjiang PCC was operating 149 agricultural farms and twenty modern livestock ranches. The PCC was lauded for its achievements since liberation in conducting scientific research on a comprehensive scale in agriculture.⁶⁷ It had developed new, high-yield seed strains which were more adaptable than previous ones to Xinjiang's climate and soils, and had introduced new commercial crops, such as sugar beets. Besides supplying Xinjiang with much needed agricultural commodities, the PCC was also shipping produce to ten other provinces in China. Wang Enmao pointed out that it was necessary to support the further development of the PCC since it had become such an important component of the region's economy.⁶⁸

In summary, the production declines in Xinjiang's agriculture following the GLF began to reverse in 1962-63 as a result of the Party's policy of emphasizing agriculture, especially foodgrain production, rather than rapid industrialization. The critical nature of the situation had led the

regime to dip into foodgrain reserves in an attempt to maintain subsistence levels. At the height of the economic crisis in the early 1960s, the Party authorities had made a virtual retreat from the policy of developing modern heavy industry, and had emphasized instead the policy of industry serving agriculture. The reintroduction of material incentives, limited private ownership and free rural markets among the peasantry, and the various changes in the organization and management of the communes had also contributed to agrarian recovery.

As economic recovery began in late 1962, the diversification of crops was once again promoted on a limited scale in Xinjiang, and increased attention was given to the development of economic crops. In 1964-65, with the growing emphasis on local capital construction, numerous indications that rural foodgrain reserves were once again being accumulated, and signs that allocations to the nonagrarian sector of the economy (such as light industry) were on the rise, the authorities evidently felt that the worst of the crisis had passed. By late 1965, Xinjiang's agriculture had generally recovered from the setbacks it had encountered during the GLF period. Nonetheless, the regional leadership continued to emphasize "agriculture as the foundation, and foodgrain as the key," and cadres were warned against complacency and formalism. The Party leaders, in fact, directed all personnel to pay more attention to production work among the commune members.⁶⁹

10. Pastoral Policies, 1949-66

Of the various pastoral groups in Xinjiang, the Kazakhs, who inhabit the pasturelands of the Dzungarian Basin, are by far the most numerous and the most important. In fact, the bulk of information available in the regional media concerns this group. While the distinctiveness of the other pastoral groups, such as the Tadzhiks, Kirghiz, and Mongols, cannot be denied, the Kazakhs are representative of Xinjiang's pastoralists. Thus, the focus here will primarily be on this group.

MODERATE PASTORAL POLICIES, 1949-57

Throughout the 1949-65 period, the Party spoke only of herdsmen and herd-owners among the Kazakhs when, in fact, their traditional social structure and economy was organized on the basis of the aul, or extended family, and the uru, or clans, which were composed of a number of aul. The uru customarily included all blood relatives who traced their lineage to a common male ancestor. Normally the uru was coextensive with a winter encampment that broke up in the springtime into its constituent aul. The Kazakh uru often included several hundred yurts (felt tents) belonging to the member aul. Each uru had a chief who was subordinate to a Khan ruling over the horde, or group of uru.

The Kazakh uru was historically a cooperative economic unit. All aul within the uru had some claim to the livestock, and the pastures were collectively held by the uru. For the most part there was no private ownership of land or animals among the Kazakh nomads, and their economy was not organized on an individual basis. Although there were rich and poor aul (and uru), with the poorest aul often working for the richer ones or turning to agriculture, the traditional socio-economic pattern of the Kazakhs remained basically unchanged by 1949.

Following the liberation of Xinjiang virtually no radical reforms, including those associated with the land reform campaign, were undertaken in Xin-

jiang's pastoral areas. Instead, the Party adopted a policy of "no struggle, no division, no classification of classes, and mutual benefit to both herds-men and herd-owners" among the highly independent-minded pastoral population.¹ The stage of pacification and democratic reform in the pastoral areas was scheduled to last well into 1955, as military work teams, army production and construction units, and active PLA units carried out a gradual consolidation of power for the Party among the herdsmen. The gradual, moderate policies of the Party were based partially on the fear of disturbing the foundations of Xinjiang-Soviet trade, which was then largely in livestock products. During 1951, for example, when land reform was being radically unfolded in the agricultural areas of the province, some herd-owners in the pastoral areas began scattering or killing their livestock in anticipation of similar reforms in their areas.² The regime therefore publicized that the pastoral areas were to be excluded from the campaign altogether, and that future reforms there would only be undertaken when the working foundation was better consolidated, the conditions were ripe, and the masses themselves were willing to cooperate.

In the meantime, army production and construction units went to the pastoral areas and set up livestock ranches and breeding stations, and encouraged the establishment of joint state-private animal husbandry enterprises. These were to provide the means whereby democratic reforms and gradual socialization could be introduced among the herdsmen. In addition, it was hoped that the more advanced technological and scientific methods and facilities brought in by the army units would win over the herdsmen by providing a vehicle for increasing animal husbandry production and efficiency, thus showing the material advantages of socialist enterprise. During the various "campaigns of patriotic livestock increase and preservation" that were launched in the pastoral areas during the early 1950s, for instance, Party and army cadres were sent out in work teams to educate the herdsmen in scientific techniques and management, supervise the storing of grain and fodder, organize predator extermination teams, arrange labor agreements between the herdsmen and herd-owners, and settle disputes over grazing lands. The authorities also provided substantial loans, relief funds, and subsidies to the herdsmen.³ By late 1954, the livestock increase on the state ranches of the Xinjiang PCC was said to be

twenty times that of 1949, which was evidence of the obvious advantages of a modern, collectivized economy.⁴

The provincial authorities also organized army work teams in the pastoral areas to persuade the herdsmen to settle down.⁵ The herdsmen were promised amnesty for past errors, enticed with relief funds, grain and livestock grants, and given letters from relatives and ethnic kinsmen encouraging them to settle down. By late 1954, some 25,000 pastoral people had been settled in the Altai District.⁶ The army units built them winter settlement quarters and provided them with technical advice, medical care, and mobile primary schools. Shortly thereafter, plans were formulated for the experimental and conditional implementation of mutual-aid and cooperation in the pastoral areas on a voluntary basis according to the herdsmens' level of consciousness where conditions were suitable. Cadres were told to make systematic plans that aimed neither too high nor too low and to carry out active but cautious indoctrination among the herdsmen. The herdsmen were to be slowly led to recognize the advantages of socialist transformation. As Xinjiang Daily pointed out:

If we do not recognize . . . the fact that the people of all nationalities in Xinjiang must proceed to a socialist society as the rest of the people, we would commit a serious error. Likewise, we would make a serious error if, in effecting socialist reform, we do not take into consideration the concrete conditions of Xinjiang and pay full attention to the characteristics of the development of the various nationalities.⁷

By the end of 1954, the total number of livestock in Xinjiang was said to be slightly over 17.1 million, a 7.47 percent increase over 1952, and 42 percent over the 1949 total.⁸ Of this total, about 10 million head were sheep. The estimated wool production that year was 68 percent higher than in 1949. The only available figure for the production value of animal husbandry was 106,097,600 yuan, or 15.51 percent of the gross value of all production in Xinjiang in 1952.⁹

On September 30, 1955, Saifudin was quoted as saying that

. . . the leadership in the production of the

nomad people is still not strong, work in surveying the grasslands and in the cultivation of the grasslands has not been sufficient, the management and administration of the industrial enterprises and state ranches have not been what they should be¹⁰

He thus implied that efforts to bring about the socialization of animal husbandry should be intensified since progress was much too slow. Although the Party's policy remained the same, he claimed, measures were to be taken to induce the stock-breeders to accept more efficient methods of production. Thereafter, the herdsmen were more actively led and organized to adopt scientific breeding techniques and inoculations to prevent animal disease. By the end of the year, there were 2,000-odd pastoral MAT's in the region, containing 10 percent of the pastoral households. About 300 of these were said to be permanent.¹¹ They were organized on the unit of the aul. In addition to the pastoral MAT's, nine trial pastoral cooperatives had been established in Xinjiang by the end of 1955,¹² and there were ninety-five Xinjiang PCC livestock ranches.

Generally, the pastoral coops were organized on the unit of the uru. There was little expropriation of land or animals since the uru already constituted a collective economic unit. The coops were established at permanent sites on the winter grounds of the uru, under the supervision of Xinjiang PCC units. The basic pattern of cooperativization among the pastoralists found the poorer aul and uru being settled and organized into coops, and the richer aul and uru being absorbed into joint state-private livestock ranches. For the most part, pastoral coops were then to be combined with either the existing Uighur, Han, or Sibo agricultural communities or with the reclamation farms of the Xinjiang PCC in a higher form of cooperativization.

Some six months after Mao's directive of July 1955 ordering an increase in the pace of cooperativization, reforms in the pastoral areas of Xinjiang were stepped up. Up to this time, virtually no land reform or cooperativization had occurred in the region's pastoral areas, as the above figures show.¹³ The intensification of socialist reforms in Xinjiang's pastoral areas in early 1956 chiefly involved the organization of more pastoral MAT's. This policy was presumably designed more to prevent the herdsmen from falling further behind the peasants in

the agricultural areas on the road to socialism than to bring about a catching-up. By mid-1956, the regional authorities claimed that substantial gains had been made in the organization of the herdsmen in Xinjiang. Forty percent of the region's pastoral households had joined MAT's, and 300 pastoral coops had been formed. Xinjiang, however, still lagged far behind China's leading pastoral region, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, where about 73 percent of the herdsmen had been organized into MAT's.

In June 1956, Wang Enmao explained the reasons for Xinjiang's slow progress:

... in the pastoral areas [of Xinjiang], the reforms took a longer time to complete. By suppressing the disturbances of bandits, consolidating political security, reforming the old power, establishing and strengthening the people's power, and setting up the Party and NDYL organizations and training local cadres, we promoted socialist transformation. Policies beneficial to both herdsmen and herd-owners were conducted in the pastoral areas, peaceful reforming methods were used, . . . and lenient treatment of the herd-owners whose political position was not lowered . . . caused a smooth transformation.¹⁴

Wang, in acknowledgment of these conditions, disclosed that further socialist transformation was to begin in the region's pastoral areas in the autumn of 1956, and lower-stage coops and joint state-private enterprises were to be established beginning in 1958. In 1959, higher-stage pastoral cooperativization was to be "basically completed" and the joint state-private enterprises were to be transformed into state enterprises. The socialist transformation of animal husbandry was scheduled for completion in 1960.

By the autumn of 1956, however, there was evidence of continued resistance to the intensification of cooperativization in the pastoral areas. At the Eighth Party Congress in September, Ulanfu conveyed the Party's policy of undertaking pastoral reforms gradually and peacefully. Cadres were told not to renounce force and to adhere to the policy of "no struggle, no division, no classification of classes, and mutual benefit to both herdsmen and herd-owners." Liu Shaoqi added that in regions where democratic and socialist reforms were yet to be carried out,

steps should be taken gradually, the will of the minority nationalities and their leaders respected, and peaceful consultation and religious freedom maintained.

The general liberalization of pastoral policies which followed was, for the most part, the result of various problems which had cropped up in the herding areas during the previous year. There had been an inadequate, uneven, or delayed unfolding of penetrating education and propaganda among the pastoralists which had caused anxiety and misunderstanding, the slaughter of herds, and the phenomenon of collective migration among herd-owners in the predominantly agricultural areas who had their herds under trust in the pastoral areas.¹⁵ As a result, herd-owners were reassured that the Party would cooperate with them on a long-term basis, adopt a patient attitude, and would not impose any restrictions or political discrimination if they did not want to join the coops immediately. Party organs in the pastoral areas held forums, mass meetings, and interviews with the herd-owners, tribal leaders, and religious personnel to explain policies, relieve their worries, and guide them to adopt proper attitudes toward transformation. Propaganda teams were also trained and education was given to the children and relatives of the herd-owners and local leaders so as to gain their positive support.

By February 1957, the more moderate policies implemented in the pastoral areas of Xinjiang had brought approximately one-fourth of the pastoral households into lower-stage pastoral coops.¹⁶ By November, the total increased to 46 percent in 1,078 coops.¹⁷ Over 40 percent of the herd-owners had joined seventy-six joint state-private livestock ranches since mid-1956. In addition, transportation and supply-and-marketing coops had been established on a trial basis in some pastoral areas in 1957.

During the 1949-57 period, the Party had generally adopted gradual and moderate policies in Xinjiang's pastoral areas. The traditional leadership of the tribal pastoral groups, and the active counterrevolutionaries among them, had largely been pacified, neutralized, or liquidated by the PLA as of 1953. Among the majority of the herdsmen the Party had relied primarily upon patient indoctrination, persuasion, and enticement to bring about reform. Whenever peaceful methods did not bring about compliance, however, more direct or coercive measures were used, as in the campaign to settle a

portion of the more calcitrant nomadic groups. Beginning in 1955, the pastoralists were organized into units, such as the MAT's, coops, and joint state-private livestock ranches, that were more amenable to control, unified planning, and rational development. The Xinjiang PCC ranches exemplified the real advantages of modern, collectivized units which would bring the herdsmen a more prosperous life. Moreover, the PCC provided the capital, tools, materiel, Han labor and skills, and organizational and managerial expertise needed to bring about the gradual transformation of the grasslands. These, and other inducements, including health care, education, and permanent shelters, were offered to the pastoralists by the PCC in an effort to gain their participation in socialist transformation. For the most part, the policies of the 1949-57 period had brought stability, relative prosperity and increased Party (and Han) authority in Xinjiang's pastoral areas.

THE GLF IN THE PASTORAL AREAS, 1958-60

When communes were established elsewhere in Xinjiang in the autumn of 1958, the transition from lower-stage to higher-stage pastoral coops was concurrently undertaken in the herding areas. In the joint state-private livestock ranches, the original method of allowing the herdsmen and herd-owners to share profits was replaced by the practice of requiring the herd-owners to turn over their livestock to the ranches at fixed prices on which a standard rate of interest was to be paid. This move was to signal the transition to state-owned livestock ranches under the system of "ownership by the whole people."¹⁸

In early 1959, Xinjiang Daily reported that the regional Party committee had decided

. . . that the development of animal husbandry should take the same direction as agriculture, that is, it should proceed from the cooperative stage to the stage of people's communes. But, as the cooperativization of animal husbandry was comparatively late, conditions in the pastoral areas were more complicated, and work in these areas was less developed, the tempo of transformation into communes could be slower and more time might be allowed, but the transformation must nevertheless be carried out.¹⁹

It was admitted that there was no tight grip on pas-

toral production and that many placed lacked the necessary preconditions for conversion to communes. As late as June, cadres were still being exhorted to complete the cooperativization movement in the pastoral areas, and were reminded that in their work they should fully heed the different features of farming and herding and advance carefully as conditions permitted.²⁰

The formation of pastoral communes was gradually undertaken in Xinjiang during the spring of 1959. In the Yili Zhou, the formation of pastoral communes was promoted at a comparatively rapid pace. By June, there were reported to be over 140 agricultural and pastoral communes, as well as eighty-five joint state-private livestock ranches, in the zhou.²¹ Once established, the pastoral communes selected settlement points for all of the nomadic herdsmen, as in the Altai area where resettlement villages were built in 150 locations for some 80,000 Kazakhs.²² In fact, Peking issued instructions forbidding some 2 million herdsmen in Xinjiang, Gansu, and Qinghai to travel freely, and requiring them to settle down in the designated areas. Although the commune movement was carried out expeditiously in the Yili Zhou, there was some opposition from Han peasants (including demobilized PLA soldiers and their dependents who had been given land) and from some peasants of the minority nationalities.

It would seem that the term "pastoral commune," as used by the Xinjiang authorities throughout the early GLF, was simply applied to those localities where the herdsmen had settled and had begun cooperativization. During the early stages of the commune movement, the bulk of the herdsmen were induced by various methods to declare their acceptance of the communes in principle, and an organizational framework was then gradually developed. In this phase, however, the Party was handicapped by its own organizational weakness at the local levels. This necessitated not only the strengthening of basic Party organs by the transferral of additional personnel, but also the use of personnel from the Xinjiang PCC to a rather higher degree than elsewhere in order to provide direction and control over the movement.

The tone of gradualism in the pastoral areas was virtually reversed in November 1959 following the regional Party committee's decision to undertake a second commune overhaul movement in conjunction with intensified socialist education.²³ One of the basic aims of this decision was to overcome various

problems that had cropped up in the pastoral areas, especially in the Yili Zhou. As one analyst has pointed out, the formation of true pastoral communes in the Yili Zhou really only began with this movement.²⁴ The important results that later emerged from the commune drive there included the virtual destruction of the ethnic herding groups by their incorporation into the multi-nationality communes and their reduction to a position of dependence upon the Chinese state.²⁵ For example, the communal mess halls that were established in the winter of 1959-60 served as an important device in achieving the herdsmens' compliance. When combined with the Party's policy of settling the herdsmen, regulatory measures such as these rapidly transformed the nomadic pastoralists into mere laborers and undercut their ethnic uniqueness. As Wang Enmao stated in February 1960, "the communes are of great significance to the minorities of Xinjiang in that they are yet another step which will eventually lead to the blending of all nationalities."²⁶

Of the utmost significance was the establishment of urban people's communes in the Yili Zhou during the spring of 1960. In early May, some eleven residents' committees formed the first urban commune in Yining, and by the end of that month the authorities claimed that the entire zhou had been communized.²⁷ The importance of the urban commune movement in the Yili Zhou was that it virtually completed the process of the area's integration with Xinjiang, and China. For nearly all of the first decade of CCP rule in Xinjiang, the Party had been obliged to tolerate the perpetuation of the pro-Soviet minority intellectuals who were associated with the former "Eastern Turkestan Republic" as the nominal leaders in the towns of the zhou. Moreover, the CCP had been compelled by circumstances to develop the zhou essentially as an appendage of the Soviet economy, given the fact that virtually all of its exports went to Russia. At the same time, however, the Party went about gradually consolidating a massive political apparatus for eventually controlling the zhou. This process began in the rural areas, where the Party sought to build a base of power through its gradual and moderate policies toward the herdsmen who were placed under the tutelage of the Xinjiang PCC. The rural and pastoral state farms and ranches of the PCC provided the organizational form, technological means, and political-military strength to bring about the consolidation of Party rule in the countryside of the zhou.²⁸

The nomads were increasingly enticed or pressured to settle, pastoral communes were organized, and basic-level Party organs were strengthened following the purge, or reform, of pro-Soviet and local nationalist elements among the minorities during the 1957-58 period.

By the late 1950s the Party's strategy of surrounding and isolating the cities of the zhou, where Soviet influence had been so strong, had largely succeeded. The stage had thereby been set for the elimination of pro-Soviet influence prior to the establishment of urban communes in the zhou. By mid-1960, with the formation of urban communes, the zhou lost its political and economic distinctiveness in all but name, the Soviets found themselves increasingly excluded, and the whole area became re-oriented to Urumqi and Peking.

RETRENCHMENT IN THE PASTORAL AREAS, 1961-65

When the GLF and commune drive in Xinjiang bogged down in 1960, there were indications that socio-economic dislocations were providing increasingly fertile soil for minority unrest within the region. As the grain crisis grew serious in the agricultural areas, the authorities apparently decided to put some of the grasslands under the plow. In mid-1961, for example, one report from the Yili Zhou related how agricultural production was being aided by the participation of Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Mongol herdsmen who, having been helped by commune members of the Uighur, Sibo and Han nationalities with long experience in agricultural production, were "incessantly improving their techniques of agricultural production."²⁹ It appeared that the herdsmen did not relish the idea of their pastures being turned into farmlands. Moreover, since the GLF and commune drive was itself a drastic divergence from the Soviet model, which was probably considered by many of the local herdsmen to be the maximum level of acceptable socialization, the Party had presumably gone a long way toward arousing their sensitivities. As mentioned above, there were reported cases involving the scattering or slaughtering of herds during the commune movement. The depth of discontent among a portion of the herdsmen in the Yili Zhou was probably best exemplified by the "Yili Crisis" of 1962, when large numbers of minority pastoralists joined in the exodus to the Soviet Union.³⁰

Although the regional authorities continually described the "happy and prosperous" life of the

herdsmen in pastoral communes from late 1962 to the end of 1965,³¹ there were indications that retrenchment in the pastoral areas occurred much as it did in the agricultural areas. Presumably, the pastoral communes remained as nominal enterprises, while in fact they constituted nothing more than lower-stage or higher-stage coops located near the various settlement points.³² Moreover, the evidence suggests that material incentives and limited uru (or aul) ownership of part of the herds and tools were once again allowed among the pastoralists. In 1963, for instance, the authorities endeavored to provide more supplies and necessities to the herdsmen. Special arrangements were made for supplying the herdsmen in the Altai, Boertala, Yili, and Kizilsu areas with substantial quantities of foodstuffs, fodder, woolen blankets, fur coats, and "household articles." In the Altai area alone, the regional commerce department provided them with eighty-five tonnes of food-grains and over 380,000 meters of cotton cloth.

There was also a noticeable emphasis on paying attention to the local conditions and special characteristics of the pastoral areas during the period. Zhang Shigong, Party First Secretary in the Yili Zhou, noted in late 1964 that the solidarity and prosperity of the zhou had resulted from the Party's correct policies that had been implemented according to the realities and characteristics of the local people and local conditions.³³ He emphasized that more prudent and firm guidelines had been adopted in the socialist transformation of agriculture than in animal husbandry, where more lenient measures and a longer period of transition were allowed.

The authorities did, however, publicly call for increased vigilance against sabotage activities conducted by class enemies at home and abroad, including "bourgeois nationalists." One source claimed that elements of the "Krushchev revisionist clique" had been creating constant border incidents and had been attempting to disrupt production work in the region's border areas in late 1964.³⁴ While there were obviously serious problems along the Sino-Soviet border in Xinjiang, which undoubtedly involved a portion of the region's herdsmen, the Party authorities took advantage of the Soviet menace and used it to an extent, as a smokescreen for its own earlier mistakes. To a degree the Soviet Union became a scapegoat for Xinjiang's problems, and the Soviet threat was increasingly used as a means of raising the people's vigilance against an external danger so as to direct their attention away from

domestic dislocations.

By late 1965, the Xinjiang authorities had basically returned to the more moderate and gradual policies of the pre-GLF period in the pastoral areas. As a result of these more liberal and moderate policies, livestock production showed definite signs of recovery in 1964-65. The 1964 livestock total of 25.96 million head indicated that the herds had at least equalled those of 1959-60. A significant increase was revealed for 1965, when livestock reportedly totalled well over 27 million head. In a sense, however, the radical policies of the GLF period had served their purposes, since the pastoralists had been largely settled, pro-Soviet elements had been extirpated, firm Party (and Han) authority had been established in those areas where Soviet proclivities had previously remained, and the pastoral areas centered on Yining had been reoriented away from the Soviet Union both politically and economically. Wang Enmao must have felt that, with these goals basically achieved, further policies should aim at preserving stability, security, and economic growth among the pastoralists. This necessitated the return to relatively cautious and patient policies based on a recognition of the peculiarities of the local peoples and local conditions in the pastoral areas of Xinjiang.

11. Policies in Industry and Commerce, 1949-66

THE PERIOD OF RECOVERY AND THE SOVIET MODEL, 1949-57

Xinjiang's nascent industry and commerce, like the rest of the provincial economy, were in a shambles when the CCP took power. The Party's primary concern in the early post-liberation years, therefore, was to bring about stability and recovery by overcoming inflation, unifying the currency, getting the labor force back to work, repairing transportation facilities, encouraging trade, and placing the industrial and commercial sectors under increasing state control and management.

The Party's initial policies were largely practical in nature, recognizing that in some sectors of industry and commerce moderation was necessary. A degree of private enterprise, therefore, was initially maintained among the merchant and business circles as the gradual consolidation of state control was carried out. By late 1951, for example, the authorities had put a stop to the issuance of bank notes by the former Yili regime and had unified the currency of the province with the renmin bi (people's currency).¹ Concurrently, Shanghai banks began to foster trade with the remote province by providing letters-of-credit to cover the value of cargo sent to Xinjiang.² The Xinjiang Provincial Trading Company had earlier been taken over as a state-owned monopoly, and had begun to purchase local products for the provincial market and for export.

Trade with the Soviet Union, which primarily involved the export of provincial livestock products in exchange for heavy industrial and agricultural machinery, transportation and communications equipment, and medical and veterinary supplies, grew rapidly. In fact, the Soviet Union retained its pre-1949 position as Xinjiang's number one import-export trade partner. In addition, a high degree of Soviet involvement in the provincial economy was exemplified by the creation of the Sino-Soviet joint

stock companies in petroleum and non-ferrous metals in the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty. According to this agreement, Moscow sent technical and managerial experts, modern machinery, and equipment into Xinjiang, while the Chinese provided the bulk of the manpower.

Despite this seemingly unfavorable arrangement, which saw the renewed penetration of the Soviet Union into the provincial economy and the continued flow of Xinjiang's products to the West, the long-term benefits the Party derived from Soviet involvement in the development of Xinjiang's economy were perceived as outweighing the negative factors. First, China lacked the capital, materiel, and expertise to develop the potential wealth of Xinjiang independently.³ Second, the CCP was provided with the initial political, ideological, and, indirectly, military backing it needed among the natives in Xinjiang at a time when the new regime was at its most vulnerable and when the need for peaceful reconstruction was of the utmost importance. The Sino-Soviet alliance had provided the Party with an acceptable rationale for Chinese entry into the Yili area with a minimum of resistance from the non-Han (and anti-Han) minority elements there. To a large extent, therefore, the Party brought about the beginnings of a technological and industrial transformation in Xinjiang by the effective utilization of modern theories and machines emanating from Russia. The CCP, combining this technological knowledge with Han labor, and using the political support of its Soviet ally, was able to begin surmounting Xinjiang's natural (and human) obstacles and create the conditions which would ultimately lead to the province's integration with the People's Republic.

Throughout the 1950s, on the other hand, Peking poured large sums of capital investments into Xinjiang. In fact, the provincial regime was wholly dependent on central economic subsidies.⁴ From 1949 to 1958, for example, Saifudin claimed that the central authorities had contributed 1,629,928,000 yuan (1952 prices) out of a total of 2,552,412,000 yuan invested in cultural and educational development, administrative expenses, and economic development in Xinjiang.⁵ Of the total central subsidies, 1,320,273,000 yuan had gone to local capital construction. In addition, the central authorities had provided skilled Han labor and materiel aid to the province. During the same period, the local revenues paid into the state treasury had amounted to only 134,937,000 yuan, and only 20 percent of

of the profits of the various state-owned enterprises in Xinjiang were retained by the state.

During the early years of CCP rule in Xinjiang, whatever was lacking in the way of capital was made up for by intensive labor, the use of traditional methods, the utilization of materiel on hand, on-the-spot innovations, and efforts to achieve self-sufficiency through self-sacrifice under conditions of hardship (often including cuts in wages, food, and housing). For example, the limited profits of the army farms and enterprises were either poured back as investment capital to improve production or went to the state for other expenses.

By 1953, the army construction units, aided by the arrival of several thousand skilled laborers from China Proper and by assistance from the Soviet Union, had modernized the dozen or so existing handicraft-type industries and had constructed a number of new basic industries in the province. Some of these were turned over to the local civilian authorities during the year.⁶ The army units had also restored the old transportation network and were constructing new highways centered on Urumqi. The gross value of industrial production, which had been 81 million yuan (1952 prices) in 1949, had increased to 169 million yuan by the end of 1952 (see Table 11.1). Of this total, handicraft production was valued at 130 million yuan. A year later, the total volume of industrial output was said to be thirty-six times greater than that of 1949.⁷

In 1954, Zhang Bangying cited economic construction in Xinjiang as being a long-term task which was new to the people:

. . . the economic heritage left behind by old (semi-feudal and semi-colonial) China is pitifully small. We have just begun, and we lack experience. We must study, learn from the Soviet Union, . . . and free ourselves from arrogance and hastiness.⁸

He called for strengthened leadership and management work in industry, economy in the use of materials, and the "keypoint" investigation (exploration) of natural resources.⁹ Because of Xinjiang's isolation from China Proper, he added, special importance was to be attached to local handicraft production that was beneficial to the state and to the people's livelihood. Due to concern with social reform measures during the previous few years, not enough attention had been paid to the handicraft industry.

Table 11.1

Industrial Production in Xinjiang, 1949-65 (in million of yuan at 1952 constant prices).

| | 1949 | 1952 | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | 1959 | 1965 |
|---------------------------|--------|--------|-------|------|--------|--------|---------|
| Xinjiang, Modern Industry | 6 | 39 | 200 | 288 | 375 | 1,329* | |
| % Gross Value All Output | 1.53 | 5.71 | 11.36 | 20.0 | 27.7 | 42.5 | 50.0 |
| Xinjiang, Handicrafts | 75 | 130 | | | 71 | | |
| Xinjiang, G.V.I.O. | 81 | 169 | | | 446 | | 636 |
| China, G.V.I.O. | 14,020 | 34,330 | | | 78,390 | | 153,194 |

* In 1959 prices.

Sources: Compiled by the author from various reports in the Xinjiang and China Mainland press, and radio and from Robert M. Field, Nicholas R. Lardy, and John P. Emerson, A Reconstruction of the Gross Value of Industrial Output by Province in the People's Republic of China, 1949-73, Foreign Economic Report, No. 7 (Washington D.C.: United States Department of Commerce, July 1975), pp. 9, 22, and 33.

Beginning in 1954, the provincial authorities began the socialist transformation of industry and commerce. Coops were organized in the handicraft industry and supply-and-marketing coops were set up in the finance, trade, communication, and transportation spheres, as well as in industry. The old production relationships, operational modes, and system of capitalist ownership were to be transformed. In giving priority to the increase of state-owned economic enterprises and replacing all non-socialist ownership systems, the policy of "restricting and transforming" was to be implemented. But, considering the province's backward industrial and commercial situation, it was conceded that it was not yet possible to conduct such work in the same manner as in the Han areas. The concrete conditions of the nationalities were different, therefore the steps and methods for socialist transformation would be different. The ultimate goal of the minorities entering into socialism with the Han

people was nevertheless said to be unchanged, and the people of Xinjiang were to realize that the Soviet Union of the present was their future.

By the end of 1954, ninety-five "leading organizations" and 318 basic-level supply-and-marketing coops had been established in Xinjiang after conquering many difficulties.¹⁰ Sixty-four new factories had been built in the province since 1949, and there were over 60,000 handicraft enterprises and workshops, four-fifths of which were devoted to the production of consumer goods. The gross value of output by Xinjiang's modern industry increased to slightly over 11 percent of the province's gross output value.¹¹

Despite these accomplishments, the Party's attempts to restrict and abolish private enterprise by such means as controlling resources, fixing prices and regulating the purchase and sale of commodities, monopolizing transportation facilities, and setting up labor organizations under its control,¹² had resulted in various problems. Wang Enmao, for instance, declared that overall arrangements for the systematic transformation of capitalist commerce in 1954 had been inadequate, that propaganda had been insufficient, and that "commandism" by cadres had led to the underfulfillment of annual targets in purchasing and marketing.¹³

In mid-1955, the regional authorities criticized the fact that only 45 percent of the annual planned purchase and only 38 percent of the annual planned sale of commodities had been met.¹⁴ Blame was placed upon poor organization and the failure fully to use the privately-operated enterprises. There had been excessively tight controls over the sources of supply, narrow limitations placed upon the area of wholesale distribution, and the phenomenon of blindly transporting goods. As a result of uneven market controls, tense relations had been created between state-operated and private businesses. The Party, therefore, ordered that all adventurous and hasty attitudes were to be prevented in the work of transforming private commerce. But, at the same time, it went about eliminating individuals who were clinging to bourgeois ideas and behaviour and dismissed personnel who were guilty of corruption and waste. The socialist transformation of industry and commerce was thereby pushed ahead, so that by early 1956 the authorities could claim that all businesses in Urumqi had been converted to joint state-private ownership.¹⁵

Of the greatest significance to Xinjiang's

economy was the transferral of complete ownership to China of the two joint-stock companies in Xinjiang by the Soviet Union on the last day of 1954. Xinjiang Daily later pointed out the importance of Soviet aid to Xinjiang's industrial growth by saying:

During the past five years, Xinjiang's modern industry has developed rapidly, thanks to the selfless hard work of the local PLA units, the generous assistance of the Soviet Union, and the enthusiastic support of the people of the whole nation In the suburbs of Urumqi, giant factories have been built--including the Xinjiang Non-Ferrous Metals Company . . . and the Xinjiang Petroleum Company [both formerly joint Sino-Soviet enterprises], the 'August First' Iron and Steel Plant, the Xinjiang Machinery Plant, the 'October' Motor Car Repair Shop, the Xinjiang Cement Factory, the Urumqi Automatic Electric Plant, the 'July First' Textile Factory, and the 'August First' Flour Mill--as well as the Hetian Silk Filature Factory; . . . more than ninety factories for tractor repair, oil-processing, rice-hulling, cotton-ginning, and coal mining belonging to the various production units of the Xinjiang PCC; and over a dozen factories built by the provincial trade department to process skins, furs and intestines for exclusive export to the Soviet Union.¹⁶

The handing over of the Soviet's shares in the joint-stock companies, it said, was further proof that the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union was "sincere and disinterested."

The Party also claimed that the building of modern industry in such an economically and culturally backward province as Xinjiang had not been easy. One problem had been the fact that since most of the Han cadres did not understand the language of the minorities, they were compelled to teach by making hand gestures and patiently repeating instructions until the minority workers understood. Apparently, some of the Soviet advisors, presumably minorities themselves, had aided in the teaching of such workers. By 1955, there were about 37,000 skilled workers (including 10,000 industrial laborers) in Xinjiang, one-third of whom were minority nationals. Handicraft workers numbered 110,000.

Throughout the early 1950s, Soviet theory and practice was followed in the development of Xin-

jiang's economy. This was illustrated in July 1955 when Saifudin revealed the economic targets for the region in the First Five-Year Plan.¹⁷ As might be expected, the plan's major emphasis was placed upon the rapid development of industry, with agriculture paying the way. For instance, Xinjiang's industrial output value was to reach 292,758,500 yuan by the end of 1957, or 649 percent over 1952, while that of agriculture was to reach 587,195,200 yuan, or an increase of 45.5 percent over 1952. In terms of their share of the region's gross value of production modern industry was to rise from 5.71 percent to 22.6 percent, while agriculture was to decrease from 58.97 percent to 45.4 percent.

By 1956, however, it was apparent that agricultural production was simply not keeping pace with the needs of large-scale industrial growth. Poor harvests and problems in the agrarian cooperativization movement had produced less growth in the rural sector than anticipated, despite various reform and retrenchment measures.¹⁸ As explained above, efforts were made in 1955-56 to intensify agrarian cooperativization with the goal of increasing production levels through more efficient management, planning, and utilization of available resources. In July, Wang announced that the socialist transformation of handicrafts, capitalist industries, and commerce had gained a decisive, but not a final victory.¹⁹ Plans were presented for completing handicraft cooperativization in 1958 and the socialist transformation of private industry and commerce by the end of 1958.

There were indications in Wang's report that the socialist upsurge had not brought about an economic upswing as anticipated, and his remarks implied that moderation in policy was even then taking place. He proposed, for example, that throughout the period of transformation, a lenient, cooperative policy of mutual benefit toward private industry and business was to be followed. The conversion of too many handicraftsmen earlier in the year, he pointed out, had led to difficulties in their lives and had negatively influenced the supply of various goods. Moreover, the tendency of crowding out private industry and commerce had hurt production.

As a result of the Party's decision to moderate the cooperativization movement in the autumn of 1956, the socialist transformation of industry and commerce progressed slowly throughout the following year.²⁰ By mid-1957, there were nine state trading enterprises at the regional level, seventy-eight at the district, zhou and shi levels, and 645 at the

xian level, as well as some 400 travelling shops.²¹ There were also some 400 industrial enterprises in the region. Production of major heavy industrial commodities in the region during 1957 included 17,230 tonnes of iron, 14,640 tonnes of steel, 94,000 tonnes of petroleum, and 860,000 tonnes of coal. These commodities were especially crucial in light of the plans to build the Xin-Lan Railroad. Although industrial output value had increased substantially over 1952, agricultural production continued to lag behind proposed targets. It was admitted, for example, that even though 1957 was to be a year of high estimated revenues, Xinjiang would still have to rely on the state for a larger than usual subsidy.

INDUSTRY DURING THE GLF, 1958-61

In 1958, following the antilocal nationalist campaign in Xinjiang, the GLF was launched amid growing ideological fervor inspired by Mao. The radical policies of the GLF were based upon Mao's belief that bureaucratism and capitalism in China had not been completely extirpated, and had, in fact, grown to a serious extent. The chief causes of these phenomena, he felt, could be traced to the Soviet model, which had proven to be inapplicable to the Chinese scene. The ideology and methodology of the GLF were notable for the divergence from both Soviet theory and practice. In fact, the concept of self-reliance, which was central to the movement implied that China, under Mao's leadership, was breaking away from the Soviet model. As a result, the GLF was accompanied by the concurrent deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, and in Xinjiang efforts to eliminate pro-Soviet elements and undermine Soviet influence continued.

In industry, there was a movement toward local initiative in planning and production, and the use of both native and foreign (modern and traditional) modes of production. This was best exemplified by the creation of small-scale, mass-operated industries within the communes throughout Xinjiang, such as the "backyard blast furnaces." While these local industries were partially designed to achieve basic-level self-sufficiency, they were also designed to serve the regional and national drives toward industrialization. While agricultural production was to be greatly expanded through the formation of communes, agriculture was primarily designed to support the rapid development of industry. The use of intensive labor was to make up for Xinjiang's lack of machinery and investment capital.

At the beginning of the GLF, the region's factories, mines, and enterprises adopted production targets similar to those in the interior provinces as their goals, and adopted their advanced experiences to improve management and technological operation. In August 1958, Wang said that Xinjiang's investments in capital construction in 1959 would double those of 1958, and that all levels were to fulfill targets and support industry during the remainder of the year.²² He called for the production of no less than 56,000 tonnes of iron and 30,000 tonnes of steel by the end of the year. Within the following two or three years, the combined output of iron and steel was to be raised to over 1 million tonnes. All departments were to develop the machine-building industry and communications and transportation, with railroad building as the main task.

In early September, Zhu De, who was on a 20-day inspection trip in the region, revealed that iron and steel production and machine-building had not yet assumed the position of "commanders" because the "vanguards" of communications, transportation, and electricity were not yet ready.²³ All levels were instructed to build highways, and the masses were to prepare roadbeds for the railroad while the State supplied steel rails. Industries catering to local needs, such as light industries producing consumer goods, building materials, and processed goods, were to be encouraged, but at the same time industries which satisfied national needs were to be developed, including petroleum, non-ferrous and rare metals, iron and steel, textiles, and coal. By implication, then, Xinjiang was to strive to produce those heavy industrial commodities which it had formerly been dependent on obtaining from the Soviet Union.

During 1958, large-scale commercial petroleum production began at Karamai, with Soviet aid, and the Karamai oilfields were detached from the Yili Zhou and made a municipality under direct regional administration. Between 330,000 and 350,000 tonnes of crude oil were produced by these and other wells in the region during 1958. Several large and medium-sized electric plants were built or expanded during the year at Urumqi, Kazgar, Hetian, and Aksu, and another 192 smaller hydro-electric stations were constructed. The "August First" Iron and Steel Mill in Urumqi was expanded by the addition of fifty blast furnaces and some thirty steel converters, so that by October about 18,500 tonnes of pig iron and 11,000 tonnes of steel had been produced. The 90,000 "backyard furnaces" and local workshops had

turned out 4,000 tonnes of virtually unusable scrap. The final 1958 iron output in Xinjiang was 182,000 tonnes, 30,000 of which was produced by modern methods. Steel production reached 35,649 tonnes, over 26,000 of which was produced by foreign methods.²⁴ Thus, the production of quality iron and steel in the region during 1958 failed to reach the targets set earlier by Wang. Much of what was produced by "backyard furnaces" was useless for machine-building or railroad construction.

Although 1,166 modern factories of various types were either in operation, being expanded, or under construction in the region by the end of 1958, industrial production generally failed to meet projected targets. The major reason for this was the fact that agricultural production simply continued to drag along at a slower pace than projected. This had required additional central subsidies for capital construction in the region. As Saifudin disclosed, from 1949 to mid-1958, 75.6 percent of the total investments in basic capital construction in Xinjiang had been supplied by Peking. During that period, a 13,980 million yuan deficit in the regional budget had been made good by central loans and subsidies, one-half of which had been for 1958 alone.²⁵ Another major reason for increased central aid was to rely less on Soviet aid. It is interesting to note that the regional press gave wide publicity to state aid, while virtually no mention was made of the aid and assistance provided by the Soviets.

Two key highways were improved between Urumqi-Kuerle and Kazgar-Tash Kurghan in 1958, primarily by army engineering units. Many other roads were improved or constructed as well. The whole highway construction program was designed to tie all areas within the region to Urumqi. The Xin-Lan Railroad, on which surveys had begun in 1955, reached 160 kilometers east of Hami by the end of the year. Construction was slow thereafter, however, due largely to the shortage of steel rails, which were being produced in Urumqi. Nevertheless, the immense strategic value of the new highway network centered on Urumqi and the extension of the Xin-Lan Railroad from China Proper toward the regional capital cannot be overemphasized. Increasingly, the transportation network bound the whole region to Urumqi internally, and tied the region to China in the east externally. As construction progressed, the transportation, economic, and political center of gravity shifted to the regional capital and much

of the former importance of the cities of Kazgar and Yining lying along the Sino-Soviet border was eroded. The transportation network, especially the railroad, was to provide a means for strengthening the security of Xinjiang and its valuable natural resources by giving the Chinese an easier and more efficient way to ship goods, equipment, Han settlers, and troops into the region from the east. It would also provide an outlet for Xinjiang's raw materials and products to China Proper. Overall, the railroad constituted a very important step in the integration of Xinjiang with the rest of the People's Republic.

As a result of commune readjustments and a slowing-down of the GLF throughout China in 1959-60, increased emphasis was generally paid to the development of agricultural production and less stress was placed upon rapid heavy industrialization. Funds allocated to large-scale capital construction were decreased, and there was increased pressure for industry to support agriculture. While the same tendencies were denoted in Xinjiang, there were indications that the regional authorities viewed the situation somewhat differently than elsewhere in China, until early 1961 at any rate. Although the regional authorities were compelled by various local circumstances, including a shortage of foodgrain in the region, to undertake economic retrenchment and increase their attention to agricultural production, the significance they attached to the building of the Xin-Lan Railroad presumably led them to continue pushing hard for industrial development to support this project. Even in agriculture, emphasis was placed upon developing production in Dzungaria along the route of the railroad. Once the railroad arrived at Urumqi in early 1961, the authorities could be expected to devote more energy to supporting agriculture and less to the development of heavy industry.

As an indication that policies in Xinjiang did follow such a pattern during 1959-60, the regional Party organ Xinjiang Red Flag published an article in late 1959 (at the same time as further commune retrenchments were being carried out in the region) which attacked the argument by some of the region's inhabitants that industry had crowded-out agriculture.²⁶ The article exclaimed that "we don't carry out industrial development for the sake of industrial development. . . even though priority is given to the development of heavy industry." It conceded that raw materials, capital, and equipment could be partially devoted to the production of farm implements

once the necessary commodities were set aside for heavy industry at the regional level. The commune-run industrial enterprises, rather than the larger modern factories in Xinjiang, were to be almost wholly responsible for serving the needs of farming and animal husbandry production.

The authorities were still complaining about under fulfillment of iron and steel production by the end of 1959, which might account for the continued stress they put on heavy industry in light of the critical need to support railroad construction. Both iron and steel were between one-half to one-third of the annual production targets.²⁷ Despite the comparatively lower industrial production than planned, industry's share in the gross value of all production by 1960 in Xinjiang reached over 40 percent.²⁸

In 1960, the regional leadership claimed that due to the development of industry and an increasing urban population in northern Xinjiang caused by the effects of the Xin-Lan Railroad, the total need for grains was greater than ever before.²⁹ Great concern was indicated about the apparent breakdown of transportation between the grain producing areas of the Tarim Basin and the grain-poor areas of Dzungaria. Construction on the railroad was to be hastened so as to relieve the agrarian economy at an earlier date. In fact, as railroad construction approached Urumqi, increasing emphasis was given to the simultaneous development of both light and heavy industries. All spheres in the economy were instructed to render more support to agriculture, and increasing numbers of workers were to be released for front-line agricultural production work. By late 1960, factories at all levels were producing and repairing farm tools, fertilizers and insecticides, and were establishing connections with the communes and state farms. Mechanization and technical training was being supplied on an increasing basis to the agrarian sector. In the interim, however, Wang had reiterated the policy whereby the needs and demands for grain and other agricultural and raw materials necessary for the development of industry in the region were to be met first.³⁰ Agriculture in northern Xinjiang was to continue to be given priority in development, especially in those areas along the railroad, in order to speed the growth of industry centered around Urumqi.

INDUSTRIAL RETRENCHMENT, 1961-65

When the Xin-Lan Railroad arrived at Urumqi in

early 1961, emphasis was shifted from heavy industry and capital construction to consumer goods and agricultural production. This signalled the end to the GLF in Xinjiang, and the beginning of a period of true retrenchment and moderation in the regional economy. Gradually, centralized planning and administration in industry was reintroduced at all levels, and the mass-line method of economic production was deemphasized. Reliance on modern, technological theories and practices largely displaced reliance on traditional, ideologically inspired theories and practices. The "backyard furnaces" were all but abandoned, and local industrial enterprises began concentrating on those goods which would suit local needs, including agriculture and people's livelihood. Little else is known about factory organization in Xinjiang during this period. Considering Xinjiang's strategic location and resources, however, the regional authorities probably had maintained a higher degree of control over the region's economy during the GLF than elsewhere in China. Local economic initiative, beyond achieving self-sufficiency, was presumably limited by the regional objectives of building the railroad and attaining Xinjiang's integration with China Proper to the increasing exclusion of Soviet presence and influence. With the arrival of the railroad, and the establishment of the foundations for a modern, diversified industrial base in the region, the Xinjiang authorities had largely achieved their major goals in the GLF. By developing heavy industry and transportation, military security and capability had been enhanced, dependence upon the Soviet Union had been altered, and the region had been more firmly tied to China. Once these goals were met, the regime must have felt that it was crucial to retreat somewhat on the industrial front so as to solve the dislocations resulting from the GLF in the agricultural sphere.

In late 1963, it was revealed that Xinjiang's factories were producing over 1,000 types of industrial products, and their output in two and one-half days was said to be equal to the total output in one year prior to 1949.³¹ This indicated a substantial diversification of industry and an increasing reliance on light industries in the region. For example, the output of light industry recorded an annual average increase of 27 percent from 1958 to 1963. Small and medium-sized factories were producing cotton, woolen, and silk textiles, leather-goods, glass and enamel ware, paper and matches, soap, batteries, salt, refined sugar, fruit and

wines, meat, and processed dairy products.³²

By late 1965, the authorities claimed that there were more than 550 modern factories in Xinjiang, 160 of which were devoted to food processing, cotton and woolen textiles, vegetable oils, and other consumer goods. The output value of the region's modern industries was reported to have increased to over 78 percent of Xinjiang's total industrial output value. There were nearly 50,000 minority nationality industrial and transport workers out of a total of over 200,000. The Xinjiang PCC, in particular, was cited for its contributions to the region's industrial growth, and was hailed as a

. . . technological force (italics mine) of tens of thousands of workers who are contributing significantly toward broadening the field of building engineering . . . , and the servicing and manufacturing of building machinery.³³

In addition, great publicity was given to the thriving industrial city of Shihezi, which the PCC had established beginning in 1950.³⁴

In late 1965, the Xinjiang authorities reiterated that the regional policy was to regard "agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor."³⁵ All spheres were actively serving agricultural and livestock production, and the rural villages continued to constitute the principle markets for industrial goods. The overall economic situation was said to be prosperous. The annual income per capita had increased by three times that of the early post-liberation period, and the total rural and urban savings deposits had grown by 280 percent, for example.

While the regional leaders viewed economic prosperity among the minorities of Xinjiang as being the key to unity, stability, and security (and they envisioned economic development as being basically a gradual process of modernization), they publicly stated that the victories scored in the economic sphere did not signify the end of class struggle. As a partial concession to the radical Maoist line in 1965, Saifudin warned that it was imperative to oppose both "left" and "right" tendencies.³⁶ Rightist thinking, which he said was more manifest and dangerous, failed adequately to recognize the seriousness of the class struggle, underrated the disruptive activities of the class enemy, and failed to maintain vigilance against the danger of "peaceful evolution." Some people, he conceded, were

guilty of stressing production and construction while neglecting revolution. Wang added that if the roots of capitalism and feudalism were not thoroughly extirpated, it would be basically impossible to "develop" the economy and culture of the various nationalities.³⁷

These statements indicated that the regional leaders were attempting to walk a rather thin middle line in the Mao-Liu policy debate. While there was an obvious tendency to favor continuing the moderate approach to economic development in Xinjiang, there was also a notable trend to voice support for the radical line of Mao. Wang was presumably as concerned as was Mao over the existence of capitalist and revisionist tendencies, but probably saw them as a necessary evil for the present and the immediate future. While Wang and Mao both agreed as to the goals of economic development, Wang favored a more developmental approach that recognized regional peculiarities and special conditions that would lessen the chances of potential minority unrest and the threat from the Soviets. Therefore, Wang's views regarding the timing and methodology to be adopted in reaching these goals, which were based upon Xinjiang's integration with China, were different from Mao's. It is not inconceivable, then, that the publicity given by the regional authorities to attacking rightist thinking was largely a device to placate Mao, and, in fact, constituted ritual lip-service. By all indications, in late 1965 Wang was seeking to prevent further capitalist backsliding, while at the same time trying to control the more radical aspects of the Maoist-inspired ideological resurgence--both of which he felt would lead to problems in the border region. In essence, Wang's efforts can be viewed as a balancing act between the more extreme policies of both the "right" and "left."

SUMMARY

In terms of overall policy patterns in Xinjiang from 1949 to 1965, the major goals of the regional CCP leadership under Wang Enmao and those of the authorities in Peking were identical. Both had sought to achieve Party, and Han, control and authority in the border region, and bring about the necessary conditions for Xinjiang's ultimate political, socio-economic, and cultural integration with the rest of the People's Republic of China.

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, rather well-defined periods of policy had emerged in Xinjiang.

Normative periods of moderate, developmental, and economist-oriented policies (such as 1949-56) alternated with more radical, revolutionary, and ideologically oriented policies (such as the GLF). To a very large measure, these fluctuations were caused by the vicissitudes of political leadership and policy orientation in Peking. During the early 1960s in particular, the power struggle and debate over policies within the Central Committee between those who, like Liu Shaoqi, advocated a developmental approach to socialism and communism in China and those who, like Mao Zedong, supported a more radical ideologically oriented strategy became increasingly intense. This struggle often led to anxiety, confusion, or debate at the subcentral levels throughout China. Like many of his counterparts elsewhere in the country, Wang Enmao was frequently compelled to make a decision as to which of these two policy lines to follow in Xinjiang.

Because of Xinjiang's strategic importance, ethnic peculiarities, and socio-economic conditions, it was only natural that the post-liberation Communist leadership under Wang should stress those policies that were viewed as being most relevant to these conditions in achieving Xinjiang's integration with the rest of China. Perhaps this was the reason why nearly every major policy decision made by Wang prior to the Cultural Revolution had been tempered by his continued concern with the nationalities problem, as well as by a desire to achieve national security in Xinjiang (vis a vis the Soviet Union) and the region's economic integration with the rest of China (as, for example, with the construction of the Xin-Lan Railway by 1961).

During the course of his long tenure in Xinjiang, and his practical, on-the-spot experience in the region, Wang tended to acquire rather parochial viewpoints in his perceptions of priorities among various local, regional, and national policies. While always remaining firmly committed to the region's ultimate integration with China, he had realized that policy style and implementation in Xinjiang was complicated by regional conditions and needs, and thus required a large degree of flexibility and moderation. Moreover, it was evident that what Wang (and by implication Peking) had often wanted to do in this region, which remained so vulnerable to Soviet influence, was different from what he was compelled by circumstances to do. Nonetheless, while the socialist revolution in Xinjiang had both developed at a slower pace and

had lagged behind the Han areas of China Proper, it was notable that Xinjiang's integration had been basically achieved by Wang as of 1966.

On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Wang showed a strong preference for those gradual, moderate, and developmental policies that had characterized the previous normative periods. He tended to favor the maintenance of the moderate trend largely because the central policy-making process inclined to take into account the diversity among regions in China (and between Han and non-Han areas as well) and specify policies accordingly. His view of those radical policies that were more universalistic and less attentive to local conditions or problems was generally not enthusiastic. This is not to say that Wang considered ideological consciousness to be unimportant, nor is it to be implied that his Party rule was not firm. He did, however, show a definite inclination to support only those radical policies that he felt contributed to national security, internal stability and unity, and economic prosperity in Xinjiang.

Most significantly, Wang's policy stance in late 1965 was at odds with that of Mao, who was setting the wheels in motion for the radical campaign of ideological resurgence and Party rectification that would shake China and Xinjiang for the rest of the decade. Wang faced the increasing dilemma of supporting policies whose content and implementation would be practical and flexible enough to suit regional conditions and problems while at the same time would not diverge completely from the emerging Maoist policy picture for all of China. Of crucial importance was the fact that Wang's experience in Xinjiang had led him to realize that many policies that were formulated by Peking for universal application throughout all of China were simply not relevant or feasible in the border region. Mao, for his position in Peking, did not understand (or did not agree with) this.

Part 4
The Cultural Revolution
in Xinjiang, 1966-69

12. The Initial Stages of the GPCR in Xinjiang

As the Cultural Revolution gained momentum throughout China, it increasingly drew attention away from all other issues. Following the Party Central Committee's August 8, 1966 decision launching the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (GPCR) in China, Xinjiang in particular was caught up more and more in the turmoil which came to characterize this massive struggle. The Maoist-inspired GPCR was both a radical campaign to rectify the Party of all revisionist, capitalist, and bureaucratic tendencies so as to create a truly proletarian culture and a gigantic struggle for power. Under the name of the GPCR, Mao sought to rid the CCP of all elements who resisted his authority and, thus, his more revolutionary policy line. While the GPCR was a national phenomenon, many aspects of the movement in Xinjiang proved to be quite significant.

From late 1966 to mid-1969, Xinjiang lapsed into a state of virtual anarchy as the well-entrenched power base of Wang Enmao was confronted with growing criticisms and attacks by radical young Red Guards who had been spurred into action largely by leftist elements from China Proper. During this period, less attention was paid in the regional media to such standard issues as agriculture, animal husbandry, and industrial production, finance and trade, and transportation and communications. Initially, little was also said about the Soviet revisionists, as concern with ideology, politics, and other domestic events associated with the GPCR grew in importance.

The GPCR in Xinjiang came to basically constitute a power struggle between the long-dominant regional leadership of Wang Enmao and the Mao-Lin Biao faction in Peking that was largely played out by Han actors. From all indications, the debate over policy line was virtually subsumed in and used as but one rationalization for the larger issue of power struggle in Xinjiang throughout this

period. Because of the extraordinary emphasis placed upon political events in the Chinese media, which itself was altered immensely during this period, a discussion of socio-economic policies and developments will be deferred until the coverage of the slow restoration of order and stability in 1969 when more data became available.

THE GPCR "CONTAINED" BY WANG ENMAO

As but one indication that the emerging radical, ideologically oriented Maoist trend was having its effects in Xinjiang during early 1966, it was reported that over 90 percent of the youths in the Xinjiang PCC, who were described as the "young revolutionary successors from all parts of China" (and who probably comprised the majority of that organization's membership) were studying and applying Chairman Mao's writings flexibly on a regular and persistent basis.¹ They were, however, receiving this political education and "tempering" from the veterans of the PCC, some of whom were reformed GMD-men. It might be expected, therefore, that the veterans were indoctrinating these youths through study and manual labor according to their own personal experiences and views of local conditions. It was reported, for example, that many of the youths had arrived in the region with great enthusiasm and high political consciousness, but as soon as they came in touch with reality some of them had various kinds of ideological problems, were discontent with assigned duties, and were skeptical about their future in the region.² With the large-scale influx of educated Han youths from China Proper, the "generation gap" within the Xinjiang PCC had widened significantly. In recognition of the common view that youths were generally susceptible to radical trends and could be easily mobilized around "causes," the regional authorities probably saw the portents of potential unrest among the younger generation in Xinjiang. The youths had, moreover, brought with them many values and habits which differed greatly from those of the indigenous minorities and the veteran Han cadres who had long served in Xinjiang. It was not inconceivable, therefore, that the values and habits of these youths would foster misunderstandings and disagreements with the regional leadership over regional policies. It is also undeniable that the majority of the youths were not always pleased with the fact that they were being "tempered" through practical struggle (labor) in the most difficult circumstances under conditions of hardship through-

out Xinjiang.

On May 7, 1966, Mao reiterated and expanded upon his pre-GPCR line of politicizing the PLA. He directed the commanders and fighters of the PLA, as well as workers, peasants, students, and Party and government personnel at all levels, to become versed in politics, military affairs, and culture. They were instructed to criticize the bourgeoisie and become "new communist human beings" with proletarian consciousness. Every field was to be turned into a "great school of revolutionization." Military cadres, in particular, were told to resolutely oppose the tendency to engage solely in military affairs, specialized work, and techniques, while neglecting politics and ideology.³ Throughout 1966, in other words, the military of China was increasingly established as a model of revolutionary purity which was to be emulated by all members of Chinese society. As one source pointed out:

We must never concentrate, like the revisionist countries, on material things alone . . . it would lead inevitably to retrogression and to the restoration of capitalism.

All comrades in our PLA, first and foremost the leading cadres at all levels, must temper and steel themselves and pass the test . . . We must utterly destroy the old ideas, culture, customs, and habits [the "four-old's"] of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes...⁴

The more radical ideologues around Mao and Lin Biao wanted the PLA as a whole to play a very active role in the emerging GPCR. But generally speaking, the regional commanders, who were also often the first political commissars (like Wang), opted for a more passive role based upon such considerations as national security and internal stability. Within the central military organs, however, the Mao-Lin group stepped up its attacks against professionalism and specialization, concurrently merging them with increasingly radical attacks on revisionism, capitalism and bureaucratism within the Party.

By mid-1966, the campaign against intellectuals had escalated into a literary and art rectification campaign. Among the initial targets had been Wu Han, a vice-mayor of Peking under Peng Zhen, who had been under attack since the previous November for writing the anti-Party (that is, anti-Mao) play "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office." This play can be interpreted as an allegorical attempt to criticize

Mao for his sacking of Peng Dehuai as minister of national defense in 1959. Thereafter, other leading Party figures were ousted from office for "bourgeois tendencies." These included: Deng Tuo, director and former editor of People's Daily; the director of the Peking Party Committee's Propaganda Department, Li Ji; and the President of Peking University, Lu Bing.

The fact that a struggle was unfolding at the top level of Party apparatus was confirmed by a Politburo meeting in May when it was announced that Peng Zhen had been dismissed and Li Xuefeng had been appointed to fill his Party and government posts in Peking. At that time, a new 18-member Cultural Revolution Group was set up under direct control of the Party Standing Committee, with Chen Boda as its head. In early June, the schools of China were closed, ostensibly to remold the educational system according to the thought of Mao. These developments allowed the Mao-Lin group to capture control of Peking and establish a base for the expansion of the GPCR throughout China.

On June 19, Urumqi Radio hailed the removal of Beng Gang from his posts as Jiaotong University President and Party Secretary in Xi-an. The station vowed that all "monsters and freaks" in Xinjiang would be wiped out and that the GPCR would be carried out to its end. It pledged to struggle resolutely against the "four-old's" by using the thought of Mao as a revolutionary guide. The following day, the regional radio station criticized Wang Lifu, vice-chairman of the Xinjiang Cultural Association, and Wang Guling, an editor of Xinjiang Literature, for suppressing the publication of Mao's poems and revising the writings and speeches of both Mao and Wang Enmao.⁵ A week later, a Xinjiang Daily editorial exclaimed that the GPCR was "unfolding in the region like a tempestuous storm, exposing the representatives of the bourgeoisie who had wormed their way into the Party, wiping out all monsters and freaks, and eliminating old ideology, culture, customs, and habits." It went on to say that

During the proletarian cultural revolution, in order to expel all the representatives of the bourgeoisie who are still in hiding in the Party, to discern fragrant flowers from poisonous weeds, to enhance the political consciousness of the masses, and to unite them with the central forces, . . . we will find an ever-increasing need for the weapon of Mao

Zedong's thought.

We must lead and organize [*italics mine*] the masses of workers, peasants, soldiers, and revolutionary cadres and intellectuals to engage in the creative study and application of Chairman Mao's works⁶

The newspaper thus implied that the regional authorities were guiding the movement from above and controlling its scope and content. While they were outwardly maintaining a correct revolutionary stance and were publicly adopting the radical jargon of the Maoist ideologues, it was quite apparent that the Xinjiang leaders were limiting their attacks to lower echelon Party leaders whom they viewed as being "sacrificial lambs." Their attacks against the "four-old's," revisionism, capitalism and bureaucratism in Xinjiang took on the form of a renewed campaign to intensify the reform of the national minorities and undermine any lingering pro-Soviet influences among them. In so doing, however, the authorities proceeded cautiously out of fear of arousing the minorities' sensitivities and fertilizing the seeds of unrest.

In early June, for instance, the regional authorities revealed that there had been an acute and complicated class struggle during the phase of popularizing the new Uighur and Kazakh written languages since 1963.⁷ The Party leadership, in fact, argued that it had continuously promoted class struggle among the minorities throughout the period, but that it had nonetheless encountered problems in its efforts to transform minority culture and traditions. It was admitted that

. . . a handful of monsters and goblins, including modern revisionists, diehard local nationalists, landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists, had carried out subversive and undermining activities in every possible way.

Under the pretext of opposing the popularization of the new Uighur-Kazakh languages, they had attacked the leadership of the Party. . . and undermined the unity of all the nationalities.⁸

With the coming of the GPCR in China, the minority nationalities seemingly constituted a natural target of attack in Peking's campaign against the "four-old's." As might be expected, the Maoist

leadership denounced the former nationalities policy which stressed the recognition and respect of the special characteristics and peculiarities of the minority peoples as being a bourgeois reactionary line.

Throughout the subsequent course of the GPCR in Xinjiang, little was publicly said about what was happening among the minorities in the border region. For the most part, the radical Red Guard attacks were focused on the "surrenderist" policy line advocated by Wang and others in nationality affairs rather than on the minorities themselves. Although there were to be scattered reports of radical attacks on the minority peoples and their customs, habits, and beliefs, it is likely that Peking constrained the radicals when it appeared that such excesses threatened to arouse the sensitivities of the predominantly non-Han population of Xinjiang and enhance the possibilities of Soviet meddling. Inevitably, the various dislocative effects of the GPCR in Xinjiang did bring about a notable increase in minority restiveness in the strategic border region, a factor which Wang could point to in calling for the cessation of radical GPCR policies and activities during his subsequent negotiations with the Mao-Lin leadership in Peking.

On August 8, 1966, the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Party Central Committee, which was attended by many young revolutionary masses (Red Guards) invited by Mao, adopted the Sixteen-Point Decision on the Cultural Revolution. This decision amounted to a radical battle plan to change the mental outlook and revolutionize the whole of Chinese society, strike down the "four-old's" and the exploiting classes who had "staged a comeback," rectify those in authority within the Party who were taking the capitalist road, and eliminate all anti-Party, anti-socialist, and rightist elements and tendencies. The masses were told not to be afraid of disorder in their efforts to crush the opposition, and were told to learn revolution by making revolution. Perhaps the most significant point of this decision was the fact that the Party was virtually dismissed as being suitable for reforming itself.

Regional response to the decision came two days later when Urumqi Radio announced that Liu Xiaowu, deputy director of XUAR CCP Propaganda Department, had been purged as an "anti-Party, bourgeois element" who had wormed his way into the Party and used his position to spread many poisonous ideas and attack Mao's thought.⁹ Zhang Dongyue, who held a

"leading position" at Xinjiang University, was also dismissed for alleged local nationalist and revisionist tendencies.¹⁰ To further show Peking it was adhering to the principles of the decision, the regional leadership exclaimed that the revolutionary masses in Xinjiang would strive whole-heartedly in the ideological struggle to strike down and wipe out all capitalist and revisionist ideas, as well as any local nationalist sentiments which had been "secretly planted" there.

Over a million Red Guards, who were primarily composed of middle school students or above from worker or poor and lower-middle peasant families and from revolutionary cadres and soldiers, were reviewed by Mao and Lin Biao at a mass rally in Tiananmen Square in Peking on August 18. The official list of top Party leaders present at the rally indicated that Lin had replaced Liu Shaoqi as Mao's second-in-command and heir-apparent. The August 18 rally in Peking launched the Red Guard movement on a vast scale throughout China, and Party leaders at all levels were increasingly subjected to criticism and attack. As events were soon to prove, the August 18 rally was of critical importance to the GPCR within Xinjiang.

The August 18 rally was celebrated at a mass gathering in Urumqi attended by Wang Enmao and other regional Party leaders. Reportedly, however, Wang did not address the meeting.¹¹ His silence likely meant that he had considerable reservations about the necessity of the radical young Red Guards. He must have been well aware of the excesses that were taking place elsewhere, and could see that many of his peers in other provinces were being violently criticized, dragged out, and humiliated. His silence could also be viewed as a wait-and-see attitude whereby he would base his words and actions upon the situation as it developed further.

By all indications, Wang, much like Liu and Deng Xiaoping, had tried to keep a lid on the struggle as it developed in the region by organizing work teams to guide and control the more radical, or potentially radical, elements. His rationale probably went beyond a desire for self-preservation, and it is not unrealistic to assume that Wang was sincerely concerned with the potentially disruptive and dislocative effects of the GPCR on the region's delicate nationality relations, its strategic role in national defense along the Sino-Soviet border, its crucial natural resources, and its vulnerable economy.

Until late August 1966, the individuals who had

been criticized or purged in Xinjiang appeared to have been expendables offered by Wang as "sacrificial lambs" to placate the Peking radicals and satisfy their concern with his revolutionary stance, or to deflect criticisms and attacks aimed at himself or his close comrades-in-arms. During the last weeks of August, moreover, the Red Guard movement in Xinjiang was strictly a regional affair confined generally to Urumqi and other major cities. The regional Red Guards were composed of students and teachers from the secondary schools and institutions of higher learning, as well as "revolutionary cadres and workers."¹² Their activities continued to be directed by the regional authorities against the generally defined evils of the "four-old's."¹³ Rallies were held, big-character posters were written, shop and street names which "reeked of feudalism, capitalism, and revisionism" were replaced with new revolutionary names, and "bourgeois-style clothes and hair styles" were vilified. One poster put up by Red Guards in Urumqi rather vaguely declared:

Let the bourgeois 'authorities' who have long monopolized the stage take panic; let them get out. The historic current through which the workers, peasants, and soldiers will dominate the stage cannot be checked. It is inevitable that we workers, peasants, and soldiers will occupy the socialist stage.¹⁴

Significantly, it made no mention whatsoever of the regional Party leadership as a target of struggle. Thus, by late August Xinjiang had all the superficial trappings of the more radical campaign elsewhere in China, but in fact it was a regional affair firmly controlled by the very authorities who were earlier designated by Mao for rectification throughout the country.

GPCR "UNLEASHED" IN XINJIANG

Until late August 1966, Wang Enmao had managed to isolate Xinjiang from the more radical aspects of the GPCR. To a large measure, he would continue to strive for moderation in the border region after that date, and would attempt to keep the excesses associated with the campaign in China Proper from overflowing into Xinjiang. In these efforts, he was to be only partially successful.

The spark that ignited unrest and chaos in Xinjiang occurred on August 26, when a group of radical

Peking Red Guards arrived in Urumqi on the Xin-Lan Railroad.¹⁵ Upon their arrival at Xinjiang University, the radicals apparently discovered that there had been no previous struggle at all, and that the same pre-GPCR leaders were still in power there. The Red Guards were further incensed when a regional Party Secretary, Wu Guang, treated them in a condescending manner and offered them comfortable accommodations at a reception center. This thinly disguised attempt to create conditions whereby the regional Party authorities could control the movements of the Red Guards in Urumqi was greeted with the response that the young rebels had not come to Xinjiang for a friendly visit and they would not be "bought-out" by hospitality.

The Peking Red Guards eventually split up and went to various middle schools in Urumqi. After investigation, they reportedly found that some students at Middle School No. 1 had been seriously repressed and branded as counterrevolutionaries for writing posters critical of the regional Party committee. They called Xinjiang an "independent kingdom," and openly criticized Wang for refusing to withdraw the work teams from the region's schools, organs, and enterprises. Instead, "liaison personnel" had been sent out by the authorities to play the role of the work teams.¹⁶ Wang, who was confronted with these charges, flatly denied that work teams had been sent to guide the regional Red Guards. Pro-Wang cadres attacked the radicals as being "rightists" from Peking who had come to the region to make trouble. The radicals then wrote posters calling upon the masses to "Bombard Wang" and support the middle school students who were in rebellion.

As the climate of confrontation intensified, Wang spoke at a rally on September 2, pledging to follow Mao's teachings, support the GPCR, and welcome criticisms.¹⁷ He extended a warm welcome to the Red Guards from Peking, but asked that they struggle by reasoning rather than by force. This apparently did not placate the Peking Red Guards, who returned to Wang's headquarters on the following day accompanied by a handful of Xinjiang radicals to protest the acts of intimidation they had been subjected to after their arrival. When Wang failed to receive them, they announced that they would initiate a hunger strike, and were apparently joined by 200-300 Xinjiang students.¹⁸ Despite harassment, the Red Guards sent out teams to lecture and recruit, and mounted an intensive poster campaign

against Wang. Throughout the night of September 3, the radicals were joined by additional revolutionary youths.

On the morning of the third day of demonstrations, Wang met with the whole group and told them to call off their demonstration and correct their erroneous stance. Without entering into debate with them, he returned to his office, and the Red Guards give up their vigil. The regional authorities then mounted their own poster campaign accusing the Red Guards of being the sons and daughters of capitalists and landlords.

The "September 3 Incident," as these events were subsequently labelled, had lifted the lid off the struggle against the regional Party authorities and Wang Enmao. The incident revealed that Wang had indeed been criticized prior to the arrival of the Peking Red Guards, but had sent out "liaison personnel" to guide and control the Xinjiang radicals, and had even resorted to outright repression in some cases. Prompted by the radical youths from Peking, nonetheless, an indigenous radical Red Guard movement began to surface in Xinjiang following the incident. The Party authorities countered this trend by forming loyal Red Guard groups of their own to oppose the radicals.

On September 9, the Preparatory Committee of the Urumqi General Headquarters of Revolutionary Rebels and Red Guards was established.¹⁹ The initial meeting of this organization was attended by Lu Xuebin, an alternate secretary of the XUAR CCP Committee, and He Jiachan, chief of staff of the XJMR. Lu urged the Red Guards in Xinjiang to learn in all earnestness from the PLA, and emphasized that they were to train and temper themselves. His tone was not altogether radical, and the fact that he represented the regional Party authorities was quite apparent. For example, he pointed out that the task of the organization was to continue to organize, merge, unify, and handle matters concerning the Red Guards in Xinjiang under centralized Party control. This clearly implied that the Wang leadership wanted to gather the increasingly diverse Red Guard factions together in a single body and thereby control the more radical local rebels who had been set in motion by the Peking group.

Another tactic apparently employed by Wang was to mobilize the military units under his XJMR command and assign them to the surrounding agricultural areas. This measure was, in part, designed to assure that production would not be unduly upset if

the influence of the GPCR spread down to the grass-roots levels. It is likely that it was also undertaken by Wang in the hope of isolating the radical movement in the cities, especially Urumqi.

As for the frontline PLA troops technically under central command that were stationed in the region primarily as border defense units, they remained basically neutral in the growing political struggle in Xinjiang. They did, however, begin to increase their activities in the economic sphere so as to insure that production would not be endangered by the GPCR activities. These units were actively helping commune members in those areas along the Sino-Soviet border in harvesting. Since the majority of the inhabitants in these areas were minorities who were very susceptible to Soviet propaganda and influence, it can be assumed that the role of these PLA border defense units was also one of public security and control.²⁰ Thus, the border defense units of the PLA in Xinjiang were maintaining their role as guarantors of national defense and security, and were also assuming additional responsibilities in the regional economy.

At this stage in the GPCR in Xinjiang, both those troops under Wang's direct command and the frontline PLA units appeared to be in agreement as to the importance of maintaining national defense, security, and stability in the border region--factors which they mutually saw as being threatened by the potential turbulence caused by radical and conservative Red Guard confrontations.

The nascent radical Red Guard movement in Xinjiang was given a further boost when, on September 16, another 400 Peking Red Guards arrived in Urumqi "to exchange revolutionary experiences" with their local counterparts.²¹ A Xinjiang Daily editorial eulogized the newly-arrived Peking Red Guards by saying:

We heartily welcome and support you . . . The masses of the autonomous region are together with you in exposing and criticizing all monsters and the black gang which opposes the Party, socialism, and Mao Zedong's thought. We will concentrate our force on the handful of extremely reactionary, (antiproletarian) revolutionaries, and those in positions of power within the Party who are taking the capitalist road, and wage struggles against them until they are hit hard, pulled down, and completely discredited.

Let us unite closely . . . support each other, and carry out well the proletarian cultural revolution in the region. Your strict rules of organization and discipline deserve to be carefully studied by us. At present, the situation of this revolution here is very favorable.²² (Italics mine).

The newspaper, then representing the interests of the regional Party establishment, called upon the new arrivals to maintain discipline and obey the local authorities.

Within a week, however, it was apparent that the regional authorities had failed to restrain the re-inforced radicals. A "protest telegram" reportedly sent from Urumqi to the Maoist stronghold in Peking by the radicals called upon the people of China to support their efforts to strike down the "native emperor" of the "small kingdom of Xinjiang," Wang Enmao.²³ It reported that some 5,500 "revolutionary little generals" from seven Red Guard organizations in Peking had arrived in Urumqi during mid-September. The telegram vaguely traced the oppression of the radicals in Xinjiang since early September, claiming that Wang had ordered some loyal PLA units to bloodily suppress their activities. Radicals, it claimed, had been beaten, kicked, and intimidated by Wang's "worker security guards," and reactionaries had posted slogans saying "Drive the Rascals Who Destroy the Socialist Revolution Out of the Sacred Northwestern Areas!"

The telegram, the authenticity of which (like so many of the various Red Guard publications) has not been verified, probably exaggerated the numbers of Peking Red Guards in the region. It did, however, provide further testimony of the repressive actions which Wang had taken earlier against the radicals. It also indicated there may have been a liaison network effectively operating between Xinjiang and Peking. Obviously, the events then transpiring in the region were well-known in the Chinese capital. Thus, the communications between the radicals in Xinjiang and their counterparts in Peking was a very significant development, since virtually all of the region's media and telecommunications facilities had been tightly controlled by Wang up to that point. It must be assumed, however, that most information was carried back and forth personally by the radicals.

It is known, for example, that in early October some of the Peking Red Guards who had been in Xin-

jiang since early September returned to the capital to report on the regional situation. They were received by representatives of Premier Zhou Enlai, who told them that the whole idea of fighting against the bourgeois reactionary line was correct, but that they must be careful of bad people who might take advantage of the situation in the border areas to create chaos.²⁴ The young radicals were told to beware of "wolves in sheep's clothing" in Xinjiang who might use the movement for their own ends, including local nationalists and those elements influenced by Soviet revisionism. These words denoted a concern on the part of the central authorities about developing the GPCR in a cautious manner in the strategically important border region. They also implied, however, that there were capitalist-roaders in the regional Party committee who should be criticized or struck down. But, Wang's name was not specifically mentioned in this context.

The National Day celebrations held in Urumqi on October 1, were dominated by Wang, Lu Jianren, and other leading members of regional elite.²⁵ Saifudin, however, was in Peking attending similar ceremonial functions.²⁶ Thus, while the regional elite was not all together in Xinjiang on this important occasion, it is notable that the old regional leadership was active, and intact. It was apparent that Wang himself, although he had been roundly criticized and denounced by radical Red Guards in both Xinjiang and Peking, continued to hold power within the region and was supported by nearly all of the military units stationed there--including the veterans of the Xinjiang PCC who were singled out for special praise by Wang.

This is not to say that Wang's radical opposition was not gaining momentum in Xinjiang, however. The anti-Wang elements proclaimed that the Xinjiang students had been awakened in large numbers, and they instituted a barrage of vituperation against him. According to one source, the radicals put up a poster claiming that various nationalist and religious elements as well as counterrevolutionaries were opposing the GPCR in Xinjiang.²⁷ The poster also said that the latest decisions of the Central Committee were not being carried out and that the "Sixteen-Points" were being violated. An anti-Wang poster in Peking called for the immediate reorganization of the Xinjiang Party and the removal of Wang. It also attacked various members of Wang's ruling group, including Wang Haolin, editor-in-chief of Xinjiang Daily. Pro-Wang Red Guards put up rival posters

asserting that the chief cause of disorder in the region was the Red Guards from outside of Xinjiang who had maneuvered to provoke an "Hungarian-style" uprising. These various posters thus indicated that Wang's efforts to maintain unity with the radical elements and control their activities had never gotten off the ground.

Throughout October, increasing factionalism occurred among the Red Guard elements in Xinjiang, and the regional authorities lost an increasingly greater share of their ability to control the movement. The radicals in Xinjiang, with the backing of their Peking visitors, expanded from a handful of persons to a large counter-current against Wang. Their attacks against the more conservative pro-Wang Red Guard groups increased in intensity. The loyalists of the Urumqi General Headquarters of Revolutionary Rebels and Red Guards, with whom the radicals had refused to align themselves earlier, remained under the indirect control of Wang.²⁸ Their organization began to be identified as the Red First Headquarters as efforts by the radicals to break through the "white terror" and create their own organization made progress. Finally, on October 27, the Xinjiang Red Guard Revolutionary Headquarters, hereafter cited as the Red Second Headquarters, was formally established in Urumqi. Its radical members promised to "hit hard, pull down, and completely discredit" those in authority within the regional Party who were taking the capitalist-road.²⁹

Thus, by November 1966, two large Red Guard organizations, one radical and anti-Wang and the other conservative and pro-Wang, had been established in Xinjiang. A myriad of smaller Red Guard groups aligned with one or the other of these two organizations was subsequently set up throughout the region. From early November, both of the major Red Guard factions in Xinjiang sought to expand their base of support. A prime target in this recruitment was the large group of youths in the Xinjiang PCC. Within a matter of weeks, the radicals apparently succeeded in penetrating some of the conservative strongholds in the state farms under the PCC.³⁰

The degree of factionalism in Xinjiang was highlighted on November 28, when the rival Red Guard factions held separate rallies to hail Mao's eighth review of Red Guards in Peking. Urumqi Radio's report about the two rallies is interesting because it sheds some light on the goals of both factions. For example, the Red Second Headquarters adopted the following message of greetings to Mao:

We are resolved to make thorough criticism against the bourgeois reactionary line and wipe out completely its influence in the autonomous region.

At present, the move to eliminate completely the influence of the bourgeois reactionary line in the autonomous region has met with considerable resistance, as some people, . . . are resolutely supporting the bourgeois reactionary line in a covert manner. This kind of resistance comes mainly from those in power who have sneaked into the Party and are taking the capitalist-road. The resistance is strong and the situation of the struggle is most complicated. It is possible that a counterattack or even many counterattacks will take place.³¹ (Italics mine.)

The Red First Headquarters, however drafted the following message:

We will resolutely imbue our younger generation with your ideology so that it will be carried on from generation to generation. Under your leadership our mass movement has grown in strength and won victories and the people have obtained everything they want.

At present, we must intensify our firepower, resolutely criticize the bourgeois reactionary line and wipe out its influence . . . We will follow your teachings, concern ourselves with the affairs of our country, and resolutely carry out the great proletarian cultural revolution.³² (Italics mine.)

On the one hand, the message of the Red Second Headquarters was more radical in tone. It claimed that there had been strong resistance against the GPCR by those in the regional Party who were taking the capitalist road, protecting the black counter-revolutionary banner, and supporting the bourgeois reactionary line in a covert manner. The struggle was said to be most complicated, and a counterattack or many counterattacks were predicted. The implications, therefore, were clear--Wang Enmao was being attacked in all but name. On the other hand, the message of the Red First Headquarters only vaguely referred to the bourgeois reactionary line, but did not mention capitalist-roaders in the re-

gional Party, nor did it speak of resistance to the GPCR there. It paid what amounted to ritual lip-service to Mao's thought and made the expected statements of support for the campaign. The people, it implied, were happy and prosperous, and the GPCR had served its purposes. In so many words, the message pointed out that some of the activities undertaken by the young radicals in the name of Mao's thought were counterrevolutionary. It hinted that the Party would continue in its efforts to bring the radicals into line by "imbuing" them with "correct" ideology.

During the last weeks of 1966, there were several reports of Red Guard attacks against the national minorities and their customs and habits in Xinjiang. One source claimed that the radicals had thoroughly criticized the feudal religious practices of the region's Muslims. Mosques were reportedly closed down, religious services and holidays were either obstructed or prohibited, and Islamic scriptures and nationality historical writings were burned.³³ The Soviets verified such activities by reporting that Red Guards had torn down mosques and covered Muslim clergymen with paint and paraded them through the streets.³⁴

Since Wang was at that time preparing to visit Peking, ostensibly to participate in the preparations for the New Year's celebration,³⁵ he could obviously point to the dangers of such radical Red Guard activities among the indigenous minorities. Upon his arrival in the Chinese capital in mid-December, it is likely that Wang held high-level meetings with members of the Central Committee concerning the GPCR in Xinjiang. He evidently spent some time attending Mao-study sessions, and there were indications that he was compelled to respond to the various radical Red Guard criticisms of his handling of the movement and its supporters in the region.³⁶ Undoubtedly, Wang must have felt that his negotiating position in Peking was a strong one, based upon the fact that his power base in Xinjiang had, up to that point, been virtually unaffected by the radical attempts to strike it down.

Coincidental with Wang's departure from Xinjiang and his stay in Peking, however, the radicals stepped up their attacks on the regional Party leadership. Anti-Wang demonstrations and hunger strikes occurred in Kazgar and Urumqi that were said to have been put down by local armed forces units.³⁷ Significantly, some of the demonstrators against the regional authorities were youths belonging to the Xinjiang PCC. Radical influence among many of the educated

youths within the PCC increased dramatically in late December. These youths, a large proportion of whom had been rusticated to Xinjiang from Shanghai, must have begun to see the spreading unrest of the GPCR in the region as an opportunity to redress their grievances against the veteran regional Party and PCC leaders who had been responsible for their assignment to productive labor and ideological remodeling under rather harsh conditions in Xinjiang. For example, a violent clash took place at Shihezi on December 25 between radical Red Guards and veterans of the PCC who had formed a conservative, pro-Wang organization called the Xinjiang Military Region Production and Construction Corps "August First" Field Army Swearing to Defend the Thought of Mao Zedong to the Death (hereafter referred to as the PCC August First Field Army).³⁹ Reportedly, the radicals at Shihezi had been aided by a certain "2nd Mechanized Corps of the PLA" stationed in the area.⁴⁰ Evidently a truce was finally imposed on the two factions, but tensions remained at a critical level thereafter. The incident, however, indicated that some military units were beginning to support the radicals against Wang.

The increasing turmoil in Xinjiang during Wang's absence was also accompanied by a growing trend among the rusticated youths in the PCC to return to their homes in Shanghai and elsewhere in China Proper. Some of the youths who streamed back to Shanghai may have been abetted in their escape by the veteran regional Party authorities and PCC leaders who did not want potential Red Guards in their midst.⁴¹ Some of the returned Shanghai youths later claimed that they had been unjustly banished from Xinjiang by the Party and PCC leadership, while others asserted that they had gone to the municipality voluntarily so as to "exchange revolutionary experiences" and participate in the GPCR there.⁴² Whatever their reasons for leaving Xinjiang, once the youths returned illegally to their homes they lacked residence permits, ration coupons, and the various other documents required by the authorities there. They generally became an additional burden in their home areas, and were increasingly viewed as unwelcome guests. Since they could only survive by stealing, black-marketeering, and engaging in other shady activities, they contributed further to the instability in such places as Shanghai. As a result, the authorities, who were besieged with problems of their own, began calling upon the returned youths to "fight their way back to Xinjiang."

13. The "Revolutionary Seizure of Power from Below" in Xinjiang

Until late 1966, Wang Enmao had maintained a fair degree of control over the more radical aspects of the GPCR in Xinjiang and he had largely succeeded in countering the radical Red Guard attempts to strike down his regional power base. When he journeyed to Peking he must have felt that the situation in Xinjiang was well in hand, and that the power of the radicals was not serious enough to warrant his personal presence in Urumqi. As the events of early 1967 were to prove, however, the radical tide in Xinjiang increased dramatically during his absence and violent clashes between the radical and loyalist factions grew to the point of throwing the whole region into anarchy. These events, furthermore, were given impetus by developments in the Chinese capital.

THE RADICAL UPSURGE

In December 1966, the Cultural Revolution Group in Peking had issued directions calling upon the Red Guards throughout China to attack the Party machine and replace it by a "revolutionary seizure of power from below" modelled on the Paris Commune of 1871. The first successful power seizure occurred in Shanghai in mid-January, and disruption elsewhere in China followed as Red Guards attempted to emulate the example of Shanghai. Thus, an even more radical and chaotic phase of the GPCR began.

On January 10, a Urumqi Radio broadcast provided interesting insights on the reactions of the various Red Guard factions in Xinjiang to the Shanghai power seizure. First, it quoted the radicals who had criticized

. . . a handful of those in authority within the Party who are taking the capitalist road and those who are stubbornly propagating the bourgeois reactionary line under the pretext of taking a firm hold of production have

slandered us by saying we have sabotaged production. We deny this and we have broken their pressure against us. We will make revolution and rise in rebellion despite their dirty tricks!¹

The radio said that the Red Second Headquarters and the Xinjiang Red Guard Revolutionary Rebel Liaison Committee, both radical organizations, had sworn to deal a "telling blow" to the "evil wind of economism perpetrated by the bourgeois reactionaries in the region" and resolutely follow the Shanghai example.

The broadcast noted that the Red First Headquarters had hailed the Shanghai power seizure as a mobilization order. It had called upon its members to go to the factories and rural areas, join the workers and peasants, and learn from them. In fact, the intention of the Red First Headquarters was to seize power before their radical opponents could do so. It was apparent that the regional Party authorities, through their loyalist followers, were seeking to agitate among the workers and peasants so as to gain their support against the radicals. There were also indications that the pro-Wang faction encouraged the workers and peasants to seek higher wages and better living conditions through strikes. This strategy evidently had little success, however, as "provisional revolutionary committees" were reportedly established in various factories and communes in the Yili and Urumqi areas following radical power seizure attempts.²

On January 11, the PLA Cultural Revolution Group was reorganized by the Maoist faction in Peking.³ The intent of this move was to pack the new group with radicals, such as Jiang Qing, place it under the command of Lin Biao, and raise its activism in support of the leftist forces. Subsequent directives were issued forbidding all persons and organizations to attack the organs of the PLA.⁴ Local Party committees were ordered to transfer temporarily their important archives and documents to military organs. This was to be done to ensure the safety of the Party and state secrets and the normal transmission of documents and communiqués within the Party. The PLA was to be responsible for guarding local radio stations, prisons, warehouses, roads and bridges, and it was enjoined not to instigate the masses to encircle, attack, occupy, or sabotage such facilities. Warnings were made, however, against some local Party committees that might use this as a pretext to move documents for the purge of the rev-

olutionary masses (radicals) into the care of the military.

On January 23, the Mao-Lin faction in Peking ordered the PLA to intervene actively and directly in the GPCR and give resolute support to the revolutionary masses of the left in seizing power.⁵ The so-called "noninvolvement" of the PLA was said to be false, since it was already involved in the struggle long ago. All past and current directives contrary to the PLA's involvement in the GPCR were declared null and void. Moreover, it was reiterated that the PLA must not serve as an "air-raid shelter" for the handful of Party power-holders taking the capitalist road. The army was to send out troops to support the genuine leftists in their struggles to seize power, and to resolutely suppress all counter-revolutionary elements who opposed the struggle.

PLA intervention was also sanctioned in order to maintain production in the developing atmosphere of confusion and factionalism which had arisen from violent Red Guard clashes in industrial organs and in the countryside and from the increasing absenteeism brought about by revolutionary liaison around the country. The PLA virtually filled the vacuum left behind as the Party organizations were torn down. Key institutions and installations were to come under direct military control, but this did not necessarily lead to the imposition of physical control by the PLA over all the administrative functions which were formerly exercised by the Party or government. Generally, the PLA commanders remained firmly committed to the goals of national unity and national defense, and to the principle of Party control over the military. In this context, therefore, the military's role might have provided a much needed sense of stability, direction, and authority which had been lacking in previous months throughout much of the country. The military commanders, however, had to walk a very narrow line between the restoration of order and the avoidance of drastic measures which might again bring on charges of stifling revolutionary activities.

The active intervention of the PLA in the GPCR tended to crystallize the split between the professionally minded commanders and the political commissars. At times, various pressures were to compel the military commanders to either ignore or disobey the central leadership's orders for the sake of maintaining unity and security. In most cases, military commanders tended to back the least extreme and most malleable of the many Red Guard groups simply in the

best interests of maintaining order and stability. This was especially true in the border regions, such as Xinjiang, which were populated by minority nationalities and vulnerable to Soviet influence. There, the local units of the PLA could be expected to support their commanders in opposing anything which was perceived to be a threat to external or internal security. Long incumbent as Party First Secretary, commander and political commissar in Xinjiang, Wang in particular must have been concerned with maintaining the precariously balanced Han-minority relations and protecting the law and order he and his colleagues had so tediously imposed during the years since liberation in Xinjiang.

While Wang was in Peking, a general purge of the central military command was undertaken, largely by Lin Biao, which was to have some important future effects on Wang's position in Xinjiang. On January 17, for example, Marshal He Long was denounced by Red Guards in Peking as the behind-the-scenes boss of Lo Ruiqing and a member of Peng Zhen's anti-Party group.⁶ It was alleged that He had tried to build up a loyal power base in Tibet, Sichuan, and Xinjiang--all of which had been areas where the GPCR had met with considerable resistance. A few days later, Wang Enmao also came under attack as an old associate of He's.⁷

With the demise of He, and the earlier purge of Peng, there were signs that the PLA 1st F.A. faction and its base of power in the Northwest were being subjected to intensified attack and "invasion" by Lin Biao and his PLA 4th F.A. faction. As later events were to show, Lin managed to disperse a significant number of his loyal PLA 4th F.A. followers into the PLA 1st F.A. base, including Xinjiang. It would be too simplistic, however, to say that these developments merely constituted a struggle for supremacy between the various field army loyalty systems, since there were numerous cases of individuals crossing over field army, institutional, and functional lines in support of or opposition to the Mao-Lin coalition. At any rate, the purge of Peng and He had the effect of substantially weakening Wang Enmao's support in Peking.

The situation in Xinjiang became very confusing and chaotic following the announcement of the PLA's active and direct intervention in the GPCR. Both the radicals and the loyalists in the region must have interpreted the military's new role as supporting their ambitions. For their part, the radicals viewed the PLA's orders to "support-the-left" as a

sanction for their efforts to seize power from the regional Party authorities. The pro-Wang faction, however, saw the military, which in Xinjiang was virtually controlled by Wang himself, as a stabilizing force against the excesses of their radical opponents. To a great extent, the military itself was not sure which faction to support, and inevitably a debate emerged within the regional and frontline PLA units concerning the most "correct" course of action.

The Xinjiang General Headquarters for the Revolutionary Seizure of Power (the name adopted by the radical Second Headquarters during the power seizure movement of early 1967) claimed that Party, political, financial and cultural powers had been taken over from the Xinjiang Party Committee and People's Council and their counterparts in Urumqi Municipality on January 25, and that a production committee had been set up.⁸ Presumably, the radical Red Guards, backed by at least some units of the PLA, had managed to seize power in the Urumqi area. Although unconfirmed, the radical tone of both Xinjiang Daily and Urumqi Radio indicated that radical forces had succeeded in gaining control over the regional media in Urumqi as well. The fact that the power seizures were claimed, but not officially recognized by the Party Center, leads to the speculation that the radicals had only gained footholds in the regional capital while the rest of Xinjiang remained under the control of Wang who was backed by all but one (unknown) division of the Xinjiang PCC.⁹

THE SHIHEZI INCIDENT

On January 26, a bloody clash took place at Shihezi, where a large proportion of the 100,000 educated Shanghai youths in Xinjiang had been assigned to the PCC. According to a mimeographed handbill by radical Red Guards in Xinjiang dated January 30, the armed suppression of the rebels who had risen to seize power in Shihezi was a "long-planned and premeditated counter-revolutionary action" undertaken by Wang and his loyalist followers.¹⁰ A tentative reconstruction of the "Shihezi Incident" based upon various Red Guard accounts suggests that it began on the evening of January 25 when radicals of the August First Agricultural Institute attempted to seize power in a textile factory and arrested several veteran PCC officers. The next morning, the conservative PCC August First Field Army sent in ten truckloads of armed troops. They were joined by the Independent Regiment of the PCC, which helped encircle the rad-

icals. The radicals were then shot and grenaded, and "scores of persons were killed and more than 500 were reported missing."¹¹ A number of bystanders, including women and children, were among the casualties. A bus was also stopped by the loyalists and ten young passengers were shot on the spot. The conservatives rounded up a large number of the radical young rebels at Shihezi, and sent them off to detention camps.¹² They then set up a blockade around Shihezi and cut off all telephone communications.

During the height of the violence at Shihezi, similar incidents against radical Red Guards who attempted to seize power were reported at Karamai under the PCC 4th Agricultural Division, at Mosowan under the PCC 8th Agricultural Division, and at Dushanzi. The conservatives of the PCC also attacked radical strongholds in Urumqi, and street fighting broke out there. The conservatives managed to briefly commandeer a dozen tanks against the radicals in Urumqi.

Radical Red Guard propaganda claimed that the behind-the-scenes director of the incident was Wang Enmao, who at the time of the fighting was in Peking, along with Ding Sheng. Wang's confidants in carrying out the repression at Shihezi were said to have included Pei Zhouyu, third political commissar of the Xinjiang PCC, and Xu Guangda, commander of the Independent Regiment there. The latter was said to have proclaimed that "we will fight to the bitter end in spite of losing our heads . . . we shall kill all the rebels within three days, and build a new Xinjiang by slaughter."¹³

After the outbreak of violence at Shihezi, the radical Red Guards demanded that the XJMR authorities take action to suppress the conservatives, but their request was initially ignored. For example, Zuo Qi, a deputy political commissar of the XJMR, kept his troops entrenched, and Xu Guoxian, vice-commander of the XJMR, went to Shihezi to listen to their grievances but apparently did nothing to solve the problem. Xu, who had previously been praised by the radicals, reportedly failed to express his stance, refused to support their actions, and even "connived to bring down the wrath of the hooligans on their heads."¹⁴ A cavalry platoon leader was then sent by the XJMR to investigate conditions, but was turned back by the blockading conservative troops. On January 27, the XJMR again sent representatives to hold talks between the opposing factions at Shihezi, and proposed that all arms should be temporarily turned over to the XJMR.

Finally, troops stationed in the region under

Peking's command engaged the conservatives.¹⁵ These troops managed to disperse the conservative forces from Shihezi on January 28-29, and capture some twenty leaders of the PCC August First Field Army.¹⁶ Some of the PCC August First Field Army and other conservative elements retreated from Shihezi to the Nanshan range, seizing stocks of food, ammunition, and other strategic goods as they departed. The Hong Kong Star reported on January 30 that fighting was continuing in the region, and that Zhou Enlai had ordered representatives from both sides to negotiate a truce. Instead, however, the conservatives never showed up. According to the radical Red Guard propaganda in Peking, some forty-one radical rebel groups of the Xinjiang PCC had set up a Revolutionary Headquarters in Urumqi as the conservatives were being dispersed.

In Peking, both Wang Enmao and Ding Sheng were sought by radical Red Guards to demand that measures be taken to restore order in Xinjiang. When Wang was finally confronted by the radicals he told them that "talks" were being held between the two factions. One source reported that the radicals, not satisfied with Wang's remarks, then appealed to Lin Biao for help in ending the repression in Xinjiang.¹⁷ Seeking to avenge their comrades in Xinjiang, radicals in Peking raided the Ministry of State Farms and Land Reclamation and placed some sixty officials under arrest, including the minister, Wang Zhen.¹⁸ At the same time, Zhang Zhonghan, second political commissar of the Xinjiang PCC and concurrently a vice-minister under Wang Zhen, came under attack. Throughout the spring of 1967, the radicals in both Peking and Xinjiang carried out heavy attacks against the ministry, which was closely linked with Wang and the PCC, but conservative Red Guards attempted to counter the activities and propaganda of the leftists.¹⁹

The "Shihezi Incident" had been significant in pointing out the seriousness of the situation in the frontier region, including the fact that soldiers were fighting soldiers in support of one or another of the two major factions. A sense of emergency was revealed by the central authorities on January 28, when the Military Affairs Committee issued a directive calling the the GPCR to be carried out "stage-by-stage and group-by-group" in those military regions which constituted the "first line of defense against imperialism and modern revisionism," including Xinjiang.²⁰ While the directive pointed out that in the "new stage" of class struggle the PLA was charged with supporting the revolutionary left and

defending the GPCR, it ordered that the GPCR was to be postponed²¹ for the time being due to the fact that the "imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries were itching for stronger action" against China. These military regions were told to stabilize themselves in order to safeguard national defense. The GPCR was only to be reactivated in the military regions upon orders from the Military Affairs Committee.

The obvious concern over instability in Xinjiang was also echoed by Zhou Enlai, who issued a four-point directive on the situation there on January 31. The directive stated that: (1) All sides were to cease fire; (2) A Central Committee investigation team was to be sent to the region; (3) Members of counterrevolutionary organizations were to be arrested peacefully and there was to be no shooting; and (4) Wang Enmao was to return to Xinjiang as soon as possible.²² Unconfirmed reports reaching Hong Kong on January 31 indicated that Wang pointed out the potential dangers to the nuclear facilities at Lop Nor from "external agents" or "domestic opponents" if the radicals continued their power seizure activities in the region. The implication was that Wang may have threatened to seize control of these installations himself if the radicals were not controlled by the central authorities. Whether such threats were made, or implied, Wang obviously could have used the potential dangers of both minority unrest and Soviet meddling in Xinjiang as strong bargaining points in his negotiations with Peking. Moreover, he was in a relatively strong position since he retained considerable military support within Xinjiang. There was strong evidence, at any rate, that Wang had told Peking (in so many words) that he would not permit any further purges or reprisals against the Party authorities in Xinjiang and had insisted that officials who had already been struck down be reinstated.²³

Wang returned to Xinjiang on Zhou's orders in early February. However, his greeting at Urumqi was not all that friendly. For example, on February 3 Urumqi Radio dedicated a lengthy broadcast commemorating the "September 3 Incident."²⁴ The radio called the incident an historic testimony to the heroic young revolutionaries who "dared to pull an emperor off his horse at the risk of their lives." It went on to say:

We commemorate 'September 3' because it raised the curtain on the struggle between the two

roads in the Cultural Revolution in the autonomous region. There were two great banners in the 'September 3' Incident. One was the Great Red Banner of the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao . . . The other was the great black banner of the bourgeois reactionary line held high by the handful of those in authority . . . taking the capitalist road . . . in the region's Party Committee.

In these five months the situation of the Cultural Revolution in the autonomous region has completely changed. We recall how the Party committee of the autonomous region at first openly imposed 'white terror' on the revolutionary young fighters and masses who dared to make revolution . . . The handful of those within the Party who were taking the capitalist road were dragged forth one after another for public display, and every one of them was stripped of political power.²⁵

At the present time, it added, the rebels were seizing power in an all-out attack on the regional Party, but "the resistance was stiff." The radio concluded with a call to the revolutionaries to conquer "particularism, small group mentality, splittism, sectarianism, ultra-democracy, subjectivism, individualism, departmentalism, and other erroneous trends."

Further evidence of moderation was implied two days later, when an urgent appeal was issued on behalf of revolutionary poor and lower-middle class peasants that admitted there was still a strong movement underway to create disorder, sow discord, and undermine the "great alliance" in Xinjiang.²⁶ It was admitted that there had been attempts to mislead the masses by local nationalists who "colluded with rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists in the countryside, and ultra-reactionary Moslem leaders in the religious circles." Xinjiang Daily took up Mao's call for "grasping revolution and stimulating production" in an effort to channel the movement along more constructive lines and restore a modicum of normality.²⁷ Increasing emphasis was placed upon the role of the PLA in Xinjiang as the mainstay of the proletarian dictatorship, and measures were undertaken to punish all elements who had perpetrated bloody incidents, broken laws, undermined national security, or impeded production.²⁸

Apparently undaunted, however, the radicals nonetheless continued some of their activities as a

warning of what would befall anyone who persisted in outright opposition to the GPCR in Xinjiang. On February 11, for example, seven "counter-revolutionaries" were denounced at a 40,000-strong rally held by the radicals in Urumqi People's Square, and were then paraded throughout the city streets.²⁹ A handbill posted by radicals in Peking, furthermore, complained that their colleagues in the Xinjiang PCC were still being suppressed by cadres with a GMD background.³⁰

On the same day, it was disclosed that bloody clashes again occurred in Xinjiang. According to the radicals' own reports, this "February 11 Incident" began some nine days earlier when they had struggled against He Jiachan, chief of staff of the XJMR, in violation, so it appears, of the Central Committee's general ban on struggle against PLA officers.³¹ He was subjected to struggle on at least two occasions and was forced to "wear a high hat and bow down" to the young rebels. After his release, He reported his rough handling by the radicals to Zhang Xiqin, vice-commander of the XJMR and a close colleague of Wang, and accused them of stealing state secrets. Zhang and He then issued orders to have the radicals arrested, and Zuo Qi was told to implement the orders. Zuo refused to carry out the arrests, and expressed his support of the radicals' actions. He was evidently incensed by the fact that the arrest list had been lengthened considerably to include individuals who had not participated in the attacks on He. On February 11, Xing Yuanlin, another vice-commander of the XJMR, took up He's cause and dispatched loyal troops to arrest the radicals. After a brief, but bloody confrontation, Xing's troops dragged the radicals away and locked them up.

Zuo Qi protested this action and condemned He Jiachan, Zhang Xiqin, and Xing Yuanlin in a "telegram" to the Military Affairs Committee. He also appeared at a rally held by the radical Red Guards in Urumqi, where he publicly supported their revolutionary stance. Wang Enmao, however, intercepted Zuo's message and promptly reprimanded him for acting contrary to standard operating procedures. Wang called He Jiachan a "revolutionary military cadre who had acted properly" in the whole affair. The significance of the "February 11 Incident," beyond the fact that it revealed continued factional violence in Xinjiang, was that it signaled the defection of at least one prominent regional military leader with long ties to Wang Enmao to the side of the radicals, namely Zuo Qi.

14. Counter-Currents and Conflict in Xinjiang

PEKING'S "STRATEGIC RETREAT"

On February 11, 1967, Peking issued a "Twelve-Point Regulation" which placed the XJMR in direct control of the GPCR movement within the Xinjiang PCC.¹ The regulation stated that the PCC was not an ordinary force for land reclamation but a production force equipped with arms. Situated in the border area on the frontline of struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism, it was shouldering the heavy task of guarding the frontier. At the moment, the regulation pointed out, the GPCR had entered a "new stage" of general class struggle. To meet the needs of the new situation of class struggle and war preparedness, the central authorities therefore decided that it was imperative that military control be exercised over the Xinjiang PCC by the XJMR during the GPCR.

Those provisions of the regulation which were to have the most impact on later developments within Xinjiang, including the position of Wang Enmao, are summarized as follows: (1) no revolutionary mass organizations or individuals in Xinjiang were allowed to intervene in or establish links with the Xinjiang PCC; (2) the Cultural Revolution Group of the PCC was placed under the direct leadership of the XJMR Cultural Revolution Group; (3) the mass organizations in the PCC were placed under the leadership of Party committees; (4) the mass organizations were to retain the right to criticize and make recommendations to the leadership of their own units, but not the right to supervise them; (5) all teachers, students, workers, cadres, and youths in the PCC, without exception, were forbidden to exchange revolutionary experiences outside of their own units or during their working hours; (6) only where power had been usurped by capitalist-roaders, was power to be recaptured, and then only upon approval from the Party committees at higher levels; (7) where power had been seized, such power seizures

were to be given validity only after investigation and confirmation by higher authority; (8) all "three-anti elements" (anti-Party, anti-socialism, and anti-Mao thought) were to be dealt with according to the relevant regulations of the central authorities at a later date; (9) all armed forces of the PCC were forbidden to engage in revolutionary activities in order to facilitate war-preparedness; (10) elements who had seized power and stolen arms were to be treated as counterrevolutionaries and arrested; (11) the armed forces of the PCC were placed under the unified leadership and command of the XJMR.

The Central Committee's decision to place the Xinjiang PCC under the direct control of the XJMR constituted a strategic retreat by the Maoists. All of the revolutionary verbiage in the regulation could not hide the fact that Peking had realized the necessity of restraining the radical Red Guards in the sensitive border region--a stance that Wang had taken since the outset of the GPCR. Although the radicals had experienced some degree of success in seizing power in the region, they were being brutally attacked and repressed by the old guard. The decision must have been influenced by the fact that Wang still retained the loyalty of most Party and military organs in Xinjiang, and could conceivably continue to use these forces against any radical elements who tried to challenge his authority or create chaos in the region.

Peking also had to consider the potential dangers involved in promoting widespread unrest and dislocation in the border region. As the factional violence had already led to the phenomenon of soldiers fighting soldiers, the military as a united fighting force against internal or external threats was becoming a fiction. The danger of the Soviets taking advantage of internal chaos and factionalism in the region to foment unrest among the non-Han nationalities was not overlooked by Peking. Wang probably used these fears to bolster his position and bring about stability in the region. For example, there were rumors in mid-February that Guo Peng, a vice-commander of the XJMR and a close confidant of Wang, was "holding talks" with Soviet representatives in Ulan Bator.² While it is doubtful that such talks actually took place, it is not inconceivable that Wang may have nurtured such rumors to strengthen his position in negotiations with the Maoists in Peking. Moreover, at the same time Soviet propaganda broadcasts in Uighur emanating from Tashkent indirectly aided Wang's

cause by describing the hardships of Xinjiang's people and the excesses of the GPCR there.³ The messages stressed the identity of interests between ethnic groups in the Soviet Union and Xinjiang, and emphasized that the grass was greener in Russia. Whether or not a Soviet attack did, in fact, constitute a real danger at the time, the perceived threat of hostilities with the Soviets (or of Soviet meddling among Xinjiang's minorities) was an important determinant in the decision to bring the movement under control there.

An important objective of the decision, therefore, was to contain the recent chaos caused by the GPCR within the Xinjiang PCC and keep it from spreading universally throughout the region, where it would interfere with security, stability, and production. To do this, Peking was compelled to rely on Party and military control, to forbid the exchange of revolutionary experiences, to call in all weapons, and to establish cultural revolution committees composed of revolutionary leading cadres, soldiers and masses. Since Wang headed both the regional Party and military establishments, the Regulation allowed him to retain control over the campaign in Xinjiang. In essence, then, the edict effectively lent support to Wang. Moreover, the regulation tended to favor the retention of those individuals who had been attacked by the radicals as being "three-anti elements." That they were to be dealt with later by the central authorities can be viewed as an admission by Peking that it simply did not yet have the power to dispense with such individuals in Xinjiang.

Evidently, Wang himself was willing to go some way along the revolutionary path by paying lip-service to Maoist policies in order to remain in power. This was indicated in a radical Red Guard handbill on February 17, which claimed that Wang had feigned loyalty and humility to Chairman Mao after his return to Urumqi.⁴ According to this account, which does not seem to be far from the truth, Wang sent a message to the Central Committee some two weeks after his return to Xinjiang claiming that he had accomplished four things: (1) he had convened a regional Party conference to discuss the Party's directives; (2) he had examined his mistaken thoughts three times since his return; (3) he had given resolute support to the radical Red Guards who, he said, were satisfied with his self-examination and self-criticism; and (4) he had attempted to persuade "the majority" (presumably his loyalist followers) to support the GPCR. The hand-

bill called Wang's message a pack of lies concocted by him to gain Mao's confidence.

One of the first indications that the "Twelve-Point Regulation" was being implemented in Xinjiang was the announcement that the Xinjiang Power Seizure General Headquarters had approved of the establishment of a new regional production committee which included thirteen revolutionary leading cadres and eighteen members representing the various revolutionary rebel organizations.⁵ Despite the revolutionary verbiage in the propaganda describing the committee's establishment, its real functions were probably very limited and it constituted merely a ritual gesture by the regional Party authorities. In fact, the radicals indirectly attacked the committee as being a token organization with no real power by claiming that a "handful of rascals vigorously carried out economism at the crucial period of spring farming and production . . . [and] caused large numbers of rural workers to leave their production posts."⁶ The radicals also began attempting to pull supporters away from Wang Enmao by calling upon all truly revolutionary cadres to come forth and wage rebellion. Those cadres who had committed errors were promised an opportunity to correct their mistakes. One such cadre who was held up as an example by the radicals was Ruzi Turdi, a Uighur vice-chairman of the Turfan Xian People's Council, who they claimed had erred in the past, but had come forth to admit his mistakes to the masses and wage rebellion against the regional Party authorities. If true, this signified the first known defection of a leading minority cadre to the Mao-Lin faction.

THE "FEBRUARY ADVERSE CURRENT" IN XINJIANG

During the final days of February 1967, the PLA, which in Xinjiang meant the troops of the XJMR commanded by Wang, increasingly intervened in the GPCR. Because these troops were anxious to maintain internal stability and national security, they tended to deal harshly with the extremist groups wishing to take over the organs of power. Since there were also strong links between the XJMR command and the regional Party authorities, with many leading figures (including Wang himself) holding high positions in each, the inclination was for the military in Xinjiang--undoubtedly prompted by Wang--to support the local Party officials. The policy of the military in Xinjiang was to make use of the existing leading cadres wherever possible, including those who had been guilty of making some mistakes. When many of

these cadres were "rehabilitated" or otherwise allowed to maintain their positions and perform their former duties, it was obviously not to the liking of the radicals. This inevitably led to the military being charged with supporting the bourgeois forces against the Maoist revolution and aiding and abetting what came to be known as the "February Adverse Current." On February 20, for example, the radical Red Guards in Urumqi reportedly began to demand the arrest of those above the rank of company commander who had managed to sneak into the revolutionary mass organizations.⁷

Toward the end of February, Wang once again returned to Peking, accompanied by a delegation of regional military leaders. The delegation was considered to be of sufficient importance to be received by Mao and Lin Biao, and discussions were held concerning the GPCR in Xinjiang. The result of these meetings was the announcement on February 25 that the Central Committee had decided officially to suspend the GPCR in the region.⁸ Apparently, Zhou Enlai justified this decision to the radicals as being a measure to assure that the Soviet revisionists would not be given a chance to lead people astray.⁹ Concurrent with Wang's visit to Peking, however, PLA "support-the-left" units, such as Unit 7335 of the PLA 9th Air Force from Lanzhou, evidently began arriving in Xinjiang.¹⁰ Ostensibly, these PLA units were to act as neutral agents in re-establishing order, stability, and security in the region. However, since they tended to be sympathetic to the radical elements in the region, they were probably sent there by the Mao-Lin faction to support the struggle against Wang and undermine the PLA 1st F.A. power base. Whether or not Wang was informed of the plans to send in such PLA units is not known. It can be speculated, however, that if he was informed of such a move, he must have felt that it was a necessary price to pay for the official suspension of the GPCR in Xinjiang. This probably did not mean that Wang favored the intervention of more "outsiders" in the region, since he likely felt that their presence constituted interference in his domain.

On March 3, "unspecified units" of the PLA in Xinjiang took over control of Urumqi Radio and the regional rediffusion service, and within the following week had assumed authority over the Public Security Bureau and all road, rail, and air transportation facilities as well.¹¹ A Tass report on March 17 claimed that the military had also taken over the

main office of Xinjiang Daily. Wang's return to Urumqi coincided with the establishment of military control over these regional organs. At a mass rally on March 12, Guo Peng hailed Wang as a "faithful follower of Mao" and affirmed that Wang would definitely side with the proletarian revolutionaries and carry the GPCR through to the end.¹² The rally confirmed the fact that Wang's position in Xinjiang remained firm, and that most of the old guard were still in office. It also pointed out that there was great concern about stimulating production in the region, and that the PLA was playing a very active role in this undertaking. A decree on March 17 cancelled the Muslim holiday, Id al-Adha, due to the fact that spring plowing had entered a "critical stage."¹³ This decision, however, which had received State Council ratification, did no more than express the hope that various units would comply with the cancellation of the Muslim celebrations. It suggested that even under the strain of the GPCR the authorities did not want directly to deny religious freedom to the Muslims and thus give them cause for resistance.

At a rally on March 28, Wang, Saifudin, and Guo Peng were all present to hear the PCC August First Field Army, which had been regarded by the radicals as the major counterrevolutionary organization during the "Shihezi Incident," described as a "body of genuine proletarian revolutionaries."¹⁴ This was interesting, since Wang had apparently been ordered earlier by Zhou Enlai to disband the organization.¹⁵ On the same day, radical Red Guard posters in Peking reported continuing strife between the anti-Wang and pro-Wang factions in Xinjiang.¹⁶ These posters also claimed that Zhou Enlai had recognized the Red Second Headquarters in Xinjiang as a "genuine" revolutionary rebel faction, and had met with its leaders in Peking on nine separate occasions. It was obvious that factionalism continued to plague Xinjiang despite military intervention and the earlier decision to officially suspend the GPCR there. In fact, it would appear that the regional authorities under Wang were launching reprisals against the radicals behind the cloak of moderation. In early April this was implied in Zhou's remark that methods of military supervision had been used in eleven provinces and regions, including Xinjiang, where attempted "three-way alliances" had proven to be "immature."¹⁷

In April 1967, the radical elements in Peking intensified their attacks on Liu Shaoqi. They were given encouragement in this new offensive by the brief ascendance of Jiang Qing's radical faction in

Peking. This signalled a nationwide resurgence of radical activities designed to counter the "February Adverse Current." The new offensive was, in part, a reaction to the rehabilitation of many Party cadres previously struck down, and as it intensified throughout China the movement was accompanied by increased factional violence. Even Zhou Enlai himself was briefly attacked in all but name for his support of the more moderate line carried out earlier in the spring.

Despite the attempts by the military leaders of Xinjiang to maintain order, clashes between the two major Red Guard factions (each of which were often supported by military units) increased dramatically throughout the region in May.¹⁸ On the evening of May 7, for example, the office of Xinjiang Daily in Urumqi was the scene of a violent clash between competing Red Guard factions and military units.¹⁹ As a result of the attacks and counterattacks designed to seize power over the newspaper during the following two days, some 100 persons were reportedly injured and the office had to be closed down briefly before it could be reopened by the PLA a few days later. This incident was followed by other bloody confrontations at Karamai, Michuan, Qitai, and elsewhere in Xinjiang.²⁰

The Central Committee's reaction to the radicals' offensive, which was resulting in disorder throughout China but particularly in Xinjiang, was to revert to a more conciliatory policy denouncing efforts to "indiscriminately exclude all and overthrow all." Some radicals came under attack for "playing into the hands" of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. On June 6, a circular order on "Maintaining Law and Order" was issued by Mao which directed the garrison and armed forces units throughout China to promptly and firmly "normalize" all GPCR activities among the masses and bring the struggle-by-force activities undertaken by some troublemakers in the various Red Guard factions under control.²¹ Mao warned that those elements whose activities allowed the class enemy at home and abroad to make disturbances would be arrested and punished severely by the military.

The next day, a Xinjiang Daily editorial supported the policy of struggle-by-reason and declared that recently a sinister wind of struggle-by-force had appeared between units and between mass organizations in some areas of Xinjiang which was serious.²² This sinister wind was said to have affected production, destroyed state property, upset

the orderly process of revolution, and threatened security. The editorial pointed out that in the course of the GPCR it was a normal phenomenon for divergent views and disputes to occur on some questions, even on questions of principle, within the ranks of the revolutionaries. These questions, however, were to be solved only by democratic methods, and not by coercive or repressive actions. It attacked some people who felt that struggle-by-force was a revolutionary deed, when in fact it was "left in form but right in essence."

The official instructions and appeals calling for moderation did not bring about an across the board cease-fire between the opposing factions in Xinjiang, however. Throughout the summer of 1967, the Red Second Headquarters intensified its criticisms of Wang, and called for his immediate overthrow. Two pamphlets printed and circulated in Shanghai during July, which technically speaking were the products of the Maoist press, attacked Wang in text and cartoons.²³ They charged him with giving undue favor to religion at the expense of Mao's thoughts, intriguing with the Soviet Union, emphasizing nationality questions rather than the class struggle and suppressing the revolutionary masses throughout the GPCR. On the other hand, a Taiwan source claimed that during the high-tide of the radicals' offensive earlier in the spring Red Guards in Peking had discussed whether or not to strike down Wang. When asked this question, the Central Committee reportedly replied:

1) since Xinjiang is an antirevisionist [anti-Soviet] front, it should not be made too chaotic; 2) the question of Wang's stance is . . . an internal contradiction of the people, but Wang is essentially a 'good comrade' who should be given more time to carefully consider the problem of antirevisionism in Xinjiang; 3) a good job should be done in 'educating' the Red Second Headquarters.²⁴

The anarchist trends among the Red Guard factions in Xinjiang prompted renewed speculation in Hong Kong that Wang had threatened to seize the Lop Nor nuclear facilities and had ordered military units under his command to take over the Gaimusi Arsenal.²⁵ One source even claimed that Wang and Mao had arrived at an "unofficial truce," whereby Wang would agree to keep off the Chinese nuclear facilities in exchange for Mao's continued public

backing.²⁶ Whether or not such an understanding was actually reached, China detonated her first hydrogen device at the Lop Nor site, thus indicating that the facility was operational and probably had not been taken over by Wang.

In an attempt to hasten the formation of "three-way alliances" (revolutionary committees) in the provinces and end the conflict between radical and conservative groups, Peking sent out high-ranking representatives to negotiate settlements. One such group arrived in Wuhan in late July, but was arrested and detained by PLA units under the command of Chen Zaidao. Zhou Enlai's personal intervention brought about their release, but fighting between radicals and conservatives, both supported by large numbers of PLA-men, continued in the city. On August 1, Peking Radio claimed that the rebellion had been crushed. Following the "Wuhan Revolt," Peking became increasingly disturbed over the attitude of the armed forces. Reports from both Chinese and foreign sources indicated that in August the "Wuhan Revolt" had encouraged the conservatives throughout China to intensify their reprisals against the radicals.

On August 9, therefore, Lin Biao appealed for patience on the part of senior military leaders throughout China. He publicly denounced the political commissars in the PLA and said that the PLA General Political Department had failed. The director of that department, Xiao Hua, was purged and replaced by Yang Chengwu. Within a week, moreover, Wang Li, one of the most outspoken advocates of purging capitalist-roaders in the PLA, also disappeared. Increasingly, the voice of the radicals on the Cultural Revolution Group in Peking was muted by the new trend toward moderation which emerged as a result of the "Wuhan Revolt." Mao had presumably been convinced by the commanders that war preparedness must take priority over internal issues.

On August 15, Yang Chengwu directed the XJMR to release all the arrested members of the Red Second Headquarters, which he tacitly acknowledged as a "revolutionary organization." At the same time he ordered Unit 7335 in Xinjiang to support the revolutionary rebel factions in the region. Essentially, the order issued to Unit 7335 was intended to be a means of restoring stability in the region by putting the radical Red Second Headquarters under its virtual supervision. But, since some of the leaders of Unit 7335 tended to be of radical persuasion themselves, the unit's pronouncements and activities often went beyond those intended by the moderates and ultimately

led to serious conflicts with Wang and his supporters. While Yang's recognition of the organization was likely based partly on a desire to maintain ritual adherence to the Maoist revolutionary line and partly on a wish to control the activities of the 'rebels and overcome anarchism, the radicals interpreted his action and the support of Unit 7335 as approval of their goals and activities in the region.

In early September, the central authorities forbade the seizure of arms, equipment, and other military supplies from the PLA. All revolutionary masses were prohibited from attacking units of the PLA, and the military was authorized to use force to disarm the Red Guards if persuasion failed. On September 5, Jiang Qing publicly admitted that her Cultural Revolution Group lieutenants had erred in advancing the slogan of "dragging out the handful of capitalist-roaders in the PLA." She enjoined the Red Guards not to raid military headquarters or seize arms.²⁷ As a result of these measures, the various military regional authorities proceeded to order the Red Guard groups back to schools and factories, enforced strong discipline against troublemakers, and forcefully dissolved many rebel organizations.

In Xinjiang, there was obvious confusion among the Red Guard groups and military units. The radicals had been encouraged by the earlier directives calling upon the masses to attack the alleged bourgeois reactionaries within the PLA, and had been stimulated by Peking's assumed recognition of the Red Second Headquarters as a genuine revolutionary organization. Wang and the XJMR leaders, on the other hand, must have viewed the latest directives as support for their own position, since armed attacks on the military were now forbidden and the military was authorized to use force in dealing with extremists. In fact, Wang justified his continued suppression of the radicals as being totally in line with the new central policies. In the "conservative backlash" which followed in Xinjiang Wang's reprisals against the radicals resulted in bloody clashes and chaos increased accordingly.

Throughout the autumn of 1967, the radicals publicly proclaimed that a number of people had "fought their way out" from conservative organizations. On September 15, the radicals set up the Xinjiang "September 15" Revolutionary Rebel Liaison Station, and declared their determination to strike down Wang.²⁸ At about the same time, Zuo Qi publicly said that Wang was antagonistic to Mao's revolutionary line and constituted the real obstacle to

the GPCR in Xinjiang.²⁹ Zuo claimed that Wang had tricked the Party Center by calling all who supported him "leftists" and all who opposed him "freaks and monsters." He accused Wang's followers of seizing weapons and using them to bloodily suppress the radicals. Zuo also revealed that there were problems concerning the resumption of classes in Xinjiang, claiming that those students who subscribed to the viewpoint of the Red Second Headquarters suffered beatings when they returned to classes. He exclaimed that Wang should be resolutely struck down, but that

. . . there were those who waiver in opinion as to whether or not Wang can be struck down. They are afraid of difficulties. With self-interest in their minds, they are afraid of the consequences of the failure to strike him down.³⁰

The National Day celebrations held in Urumqi on October 1, 1967 exemplified the factionalism and confusion then extant in Xinjiang. Significantly, New China News Agency carried the account of the regional ceremonies rather than Urumqi Radio or Xinjiang Daily, both of which had been rather silent for several weeks.³¹ This in itself was an indication that the regional situation was very unsettled. NCNA described no less than five separate rallies in Urumqi, each one of which was sponsored by a different faction. The rallies, and the individuals present at each, were held by: (1) the radically oriented A.F. Unit 7335 (Yu Yinglong, Li Chuanqun, and Wang Xiangxiong); (2) the "establishment" of the XJMR and Xinjiang PCC (Wang Enmao, Tao Zhiyue, Zhang Xiqin, Ding Sheng, Pei Zhouyu, Xiong Huang, Caodanuofu, and Tan Kaiyun); (3) the radical, anti-Wang Red Second Headquarters, New Worker's Central Headquarters, and their affiliates (Saifudin extended "festive greetings"); (4) the conservatives of the Red Promotion Association, Xinjiang Worker-Peasant Revolutionary Joint Committee, and other groups linked to the Red First Headquarters (Guo Peng); and (5) the conservatives of the Red Third Headquarters (no names listed).

NCNA pointed out that the people attending these rallies had been told that the situation of the GPCR in Xinjiang was "very fine," which was a rather cautious statement that implied there were problems. Since Xinjiang was situated on the forefront of the antirevisionist struggle, NCNA called for the sharpening of revolutionary vigilance, the strength-

ening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and further consolidation of national unity and solidarity among the nationalities. Peking, therefore, attempted to play down the factionalism and confusion in the region by stressing the need to safeguard internal and external security.

Despite Peking's obvious concern about countering the disorder in Xinjiang throughout the last half of 1967, serious factional clashes continued at such places as Shihezi, Hami, and the Yili Zhou. In the Yili Zhou, especially, the violence had intensified greatly, and the Yili Military District Commander, presumably Zhang Shigong, undertook repressive measures against Red Guard extremists in order to prevent total chaos in the strategic and sensitive border area. There were numerous reports of fighting between border defense units, XJMR troops, and units of the Xinjiang PCC 4th Agricultural Division, as well as between the various mass organizations in the Zhou. Apparently, a rather significant number of military and public security personnel in the Yili Zhou were supporting the radicals, despite large-scale repression by local conservatives. According to one radical report, some of the reactionary Han personnel belonging to "Xinjiang's Million Bandits" (the PCC August First Field Army and the PCC Fourth Field Army) had attempted to flee into Soviet territory for sanctuary.³² They had evidently charged border guard posts at the Yili Bridge several times, but were turned back with "xxx persons killed" and retreated into the mountains.

When soldiers of Unit 7335 occupied various stations along the Xin-Lan Railway between Urumqi and Hami, in accordance with instructions from Zhou Enlai, pro-Wang railroad workers went on strike.³³ Shortly thereafter, conservative Red Guard groups were trucked into Hami and attacked the troops of Unit 7335. They were supported by some 1,500 fully armed soldiers from Urumqi. Reportedly, the conservatives imposed a blockade on Hami and shot down an aircraft belonging to Unit 7335.³⁴ When representatives of A.F. Unit 129 from Lanzhou attempted to relieve their colleagues in Hami by breaking through the blockade, they were turned back.

The gravity of the situation in Hami was recognized by Zhou Enlai, who ordered the XJMR, Xinjiang PCC, and Unit 7335 to immediately form a work group to settle their differences through negotiations. Zhou demanded that all weapons be surrendered and locked up, and that the question of right and wrong in the whole matter settled at a later date. Those

involved reportedly paid little attention to Zhou's orders, and Zhou was compelled to send a second cable with stronger wording. In early December, Wu Faxian, the Air Force Chief of Staff, followed up on Zhou's efforts with a telephone directive to Unit 7335 which pointed out:

(1) You should believe that truth is on your side and support for the Red Second Headquarters is correct, glorious, and great;

(2) You should handle well the relationship with the XJMR, adhere to principles, and pay attention to the proper methods of handling;

(3) You should properly perform the work among the hood-winked masses.³⁵

In a further move to keep air traffic into the region open, the China Civil Aviation Administration sent a cable to the regional Civil Aviation Bureau ordering it to listen to the views of Unit 7335 and support its efforts to keep the transportation network operable. It was quite clear that the central authorities were extremely concerned about the possibility of Xinjiang being completely cut off from the rest of China.

During 1967, it was estimated that more than 600 armed clashes between radicals and conservatives had occurred in Xinjiang.³⁶ Throughout the year, factionalism had spawned increased violence. The virtual anarchy caused by the GPCR in Xinjiang had compelled the Maoist leadership in Peking to officially make a series of strategic retreats in recognition of the potentially serious consequences which the radical campaign could have there. These measures had the effect of lending support to the continued leadership of Wang Enmao, who undertook activities designed to defend his supporters and repress his opponents. Obviously, not all of the violence which occurred in Xinjiang was directly sponsored or promoted by Wang or the radicals. In many cases, individuals and groups acted independently out of self-interest in undertaking personal vendettas, "settling old scores," or striving to save their own skins. At any rate, Wang largely succeeded, both through negotiations with Peking and by the harsh treatment of his regional detractors, in holding onto power during this turbulent period. He continued to be backed by a majority of the regional troops under his command, especially the veterans of the Xinjiang PCC, and by

year's-end it was apparent that virtually all of the old guard was still in power.

There were, however, some indications that the ranks of the pro-Wang elite in Xinjiang were increasingly split by factionalism. Zuo Qi, a long-time colleague of Wang, for example, defected to the radical opposition and demanded Wang's removal from power. The radicals themselves were strengthened by the arrival of Unit 7335, which tended to side with them against the regional Party authorities. Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that some of Wang's military subordinates privately felt that the critical need for unity and stability in the face of potential socio-economic dislocations, minority problems, and Soviet subversion could only be realized if the major obstacle to unity and stability, Wang Enmao was delicately removed. Paradoxically, Wang and his supporters felt that unity and stability could only be restored if the radicals could be eliminated. On the one hand, neither Peking nor the radical forces within Xinjiang had enough power by the end of 1967 to dispense with Wang or his supporters. In part, the central authorities were beset with GPCR problems elsewhere in China, and this general instability precluded any efforts by the Maoist leadership to reach into Xinjiang and pluck Wang out. On the other hand, Wang was likewise unable to extirpate the influence of the radicals in his domain.

15. The Demise of Wang Enmao

At the end of 1967, Wang Enmao journeyed to Peking again accompanied by Saifudin and Guo Peng. While in the national capital Wang attended a number of highly publicized official functions, including a reception for Party and military leaders hosted by Mao on December 31.¹ His presence at such a function indicated that the Central Committee still publicly recognized him as the leader of Xinjiang. The radical Red Second Headquarters, however, claimed that Wang was on trial in Peking, and that their comrades in the Cultural Revolution Group had promised them that his fate would be no better than that of Chen Zaidao.² According to a Taiwan report, Wang had been lured to Peking where he was compelled to attend Mao-study classes and write a self-examination report.³ The implication was that he would eventually "get through the pass" and still be considered a "revolutionary leading cadre." This latter interpretation seems to be closer to the truth, since it is doubtful that Wang was compelled to go to Peking. His power base in Xinjiang, although under increasing stress, was still viable, and he could probably look to support from most of the veterans in the regional Party and military establishment as well as a majority of the troops under his XJMR command. While it is likely that Wang did undertake some rather mild form of study in the capital, possibly as a ritual gesture to placate the Maoist leadership and relieve the pressure of the radical Red Guards in Xinjiang, there were no reliable reports to the effect that he was actually placed under struggle while in the capital.

THE MAOIST "INFILTRATION" OF WANG'S POWER BASE

Despite the apparent correct and cautious treatment of Wang by the authorities in Peking, his visit there was to have an enormous impact on his future in Xinjiang. Taking advantage of Wang's stay in Peking, the Mao-Lin coalition began sending loyal

cadres and military personnel into Xinjiang. Several cadres of the PLA 4th F.A., whose loyalty was to Lin Biao, were assigned by the center to various military posts in the XJMR in a move to undercut (or "infiltrate") Wang's power base in the region. Such individuals included Kong Ruiyun and Wang Zhendong, as well as the pro-Lin Biao element Zeng Ruqing from the PLA 3rd F.A. faction. They were assigned respectively as vice-commander of the XJMR, deputy political commissar of the Xinjiang PCC, and chief of staff of the Xinjiang PCC. Furthermore, Ding Sheng, a vice-commander of the XJMR and the Xinjiang PCC, was transferred to the Canton Military Region shortly thereafter. There were also unconfirmed reports that Peking had given "secret instructions" to Zuo Qi, Wu Guang, and Lu Jianren to lead the region's radicals in an intensified attack upon Wang as a die-hard follower of He Long and an agent of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping in Xinjiang.⁴ If true, these reports indicated that not only had Zuo returned to Xinjiang during Wang's absence, but that two regional Party secretaries, namely Wu and Lu, had also defected to the radicals.

Throughout early 1968, the mood of relative moderation which followed in the aftermath of the "Wuhan Revolt" continued throughout most of China. This mood was exemplified by the creation of sixteen new provincial revolutionary committees, whose chairmen and vice-chairmen were drawn almost entirely from PLA commanders or Party leaders long familiar with the problems of the provinces in which they were to serve. This military-inspired moderate trend (later to be called a "rightist-reversal") constituted a retreat from the more radical phase of mid-1967. The conciliatory tone of the Chinese press was typified by renewed warnings against extreme leftist activities which sought to "cast out and strike down everything."

In Xinjiang, however, violent clashes between opposing Red Guard factions increased in both number and intensity during early 1968. There were indications that the conservatives, including the old Party leadership and the pro-Wang mass organizations, stepped up their reprisals against the radicals while Wang was still in Peking. The Red First Headquarters and its conservative allies in Xinjiang reportedly gained the upper hand against their radical opponents in some parts of the region, prompting counterattacks from the Red Second Headquarters. On January 6, for example, the turmoil in Xinjiang reportedly led to the total disruption of traffic along the

Xin-Lan Railway.⁵ In February, the Red Second Headquarters carried out additional raids on conservative strongholds in Urumqi, and began confiscating the property of several unnamed regional Party leaders.⁶ In retaliation, the conservatives attacked Unit 7335, which had voiced its support of the Red Second Headquarters on several occasions, and seized a small stock of weapons for use against the radicals.⁷ Fierce armed struggles followed in Urumqi, Yining, Hami, Shihezi, and Kazgar.

Such discord obviously made the formation of revolutionary committees in Xinjiang an impossibility. The situation had become acute enough to again demand Zhou Enlai's personal attention, and by late January a temporary truce was being virtually imposed upon the contending factions by the military.⁸ On January 27, for example, the military apparently compelled the two competing Red Guard factions in the region's railway system to form a "three-way alliance" of revolutionary cadres, masses, and soldiers.⁹ The rally celebrating this event was attended by Xing Yuanlin and Li Chuanqun, "leading members" of the XJMR, and Unit 7335, respectively, and Li Jingshan, director of the Xinjiang PCC Political Department. The rally participants pledged to

. . . combat bourgeois and petty bourgeois factionalism . . . destroy self-interest, and remold their world outlook and become 'proletarian revolutionaries who are determined to carry the great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end.'¹⁰

The significance of this event was that it indicated a cooperative (or at least a joint) effort by military leaders within Xinjiang who were formerly opposed to one another. The implication was that both Xing Yuanlin and Li Jingshan had withdrawn their public support from the conservatives, and possibly from Wang as well, and were now advocating the restoration of order in the region. It may well be that they were swayed in this direction by the recently assigned officers of the Mao-Lin faction, Kong Ruiyun, Zeng Ruying, and Wang Zhendong, who had greatly increased their influence within the regional military establishment since their arrival. It was also apparent that the more radical officers of Unit 7335 had moderated their stance so as to gain the cooperation of the former Wang military supporters. There was obviously a deep concern about the effects of continued anarchism, and for this reason

both "bourgeois factionalism" by conservatives and "petty bourgeois factionalism" by radicals were condemned.

A similar, but larger, rally in Urumqi on January 30 confirmed these speculations, when Xing Yuanlin, Caodanuofu, Kong Ruiyun, and Li Chuanqun, all "leading cadres" in the XJMR, joined in stressing the need for a revolutionary great alliance in the region.¹¹ Although the class struggle was said to be acute and complicated," the rally was hailed as marking a good start in bringing about unity between the various factions. In late February, a "great alliance" was formed in the "August First" Iron and Steel Works in Urumqi, and two similar large organizations were forged in the Hami area. In each case, a high percentage of the personnel in these organs were said to be participating in Mao-thought study classes run by army units.¹²

Toward the end of March 1968, the radicals in Peking and elsewhere renewed their drive to counter the drift toward moderation and oppose the "rightist reversal of verdicts." Even Zhou Enlai denounced the new "Adverse Current" and praised Jiang Qing for her unwaivering support of the left.¹³ In mid-April, this was followed by a new official definition of factionalism which said that

The proletariat and the bourgeoisie are in fact two big factions diametrically opposed to each other. We must adhere to the factionalism of the proletarian revolution. This means that we must adhere to . . . the revolutionary spirit of the left.¹⁴

This new definition of factionalism effectively lent support to the radicals' attacks against their opponents throughout China, and violence increased accordingly thereafter.

A prime example of this leftist trend in Xinjiang was the April 30 ransacking of Saifudin's house in Urumqi by a radical middle school faction associated with the Red Second Headquarters. On May 2, Zhou Enlai responded to this incident with a directive transmitted through Zhou Feng, his liaison officer in Urumqi, which read:

(1) The Red Second Headquarters has been doing the wrong thing. The movement has been going on for two years; there must be no more beating, smashing, robbing and confiscation.

(2) The Red Second Headquarters is an important rebel faction in Xinjiang that has been placed in an important position in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the region. Every mistake you have made has been pointed out promptly. You yourselves should rectify such mistakes and must not make mistakes in the future.¹⁵

Zhou's directive also scored the conservative Xinjiang Red Guard Promotion Association which had recently attacked the headquarters of Unit 7335 and seized a large quantity of weapons:

(1) It was wrong to attack the Ninth Air Force Unit 7335.

(2) It was a serious and wrong thing for the Red Guard Promotion Association to seize arms.

(3) All the weapons taken away must be returned within a specified period of time, and none should be kept.

(4) If you refuse to listen to me, I'll notify the whole country. Hereafter, if you do such things again you will go over to the other side and will be punished as counterrevolutionaries.¹⁶

Zhou Enlai's response was interesting for two reasons. First, it was clear that he was personally intervening on Saifudin's behalf following the radicals' attacks on the region's most important minority leader. Zhou's motivation in doing so was probably related to his sincere desire to keep such attacks from spreading universally to all minority cadres and functionaries. Such a phenomenon might have led to increased unrest among the non-Han peoples of the region which could then be further fanned by the Soviets. Also, it is likely that Zhou was attempting to either win-over Saifudin, pull him away from his alliance with Wang Enmao, or set him up as a "revolutionary cadre" who might be used in the future.

Despite his earlier public pronouncements of support for the proletarian revolutionaries, Zhou displayed a continuing concern for stability in Xinjiang so as to maintain national security along the Sino-Soviet border and safeguard the Karamai oilfields and Lop Nor nuclear facilities. His thinking in these matters was undoubtedly influenced by various Soviet maneuvers along the borders, including

the build-up of Russian troop strength, stepped up Soviet infiltration, increased activities by the Soviet-sponsored "Xinjiang minority refugee army" at Alma Ata led by Zunin Taipov, and intensified psychological warfare in the form of propaganda broadcasts from Soviet Central Asia. In May 1968, Lt. General P.I. Zyryanov, commander of the Soviet frontier units, disclosed that skirmishes had taken place all along the Sino-Soviet border from Xinjiang to Manchuria continuously since the outset of the GPCR.¹⁷

On May 20, NCNA reported that Wang Enmao, Guo Peng, and Saifudin had attended a reception held by Mao and Lin Biao for leading Party and military cadres who were in Peking participating in Mao-thought study classes. Shortly thereafter, representatives of the Red Second Headquarters and other radical Xinjiang Red Guard organs in Peking banded together to struggle against Wang and Zhang Xiqin in the capital. Reportedly, some responsible persons of Unit 7335 also participated in the struggle.¹⁸ The struggle against Wang continued throughout June and July in Peking. For unknown reasons, Wang had departed for the capital at a time when the radical offensive against the "rightist reversal" was at its height in Peking. In so doing, he left the only sanctuary where he could have hoped to find much support against the radicals.

Moreover, there were indications that the defection or purge of many of Wang's former supporters in the regional Party and military establishments by mid-1968 had considerably undermined his power base within Xinjiang. While Wang was in Peking, furthermore, the campaign against his remaining regional supporters was intensified, and the struggle against the "rightist-reversal" there was described as being serious and acute.¹⁹

Once in Peking, at any rate, Wang must have found himself in a very hostile, radical environment, and virtually isolated from his followers in Xinjiang who were themselves being increasingly attacked. There were indications, however, that although Wang was subjected to struggle in Peking he may have been spared from excessively degrading and violent treatment by the radicals. The central authorities were becoming increasingly concerned about the excesses of the radicals and the chaos which followed in the wake of their relatively unrestrained activities throughout China. In Xinjiang, in particular, it was feared that Wang's total disgrace might lead to even further violence and dislocation, all to the benefit of the Soviets. Peking, there-

fore, must have felt that Wang should be treated cautiously but firmly.

By mid-July 1968, the central authorities had had enough of the anarchistic activities of the radicals, and in a series of directives authorized the military commanders of the frontline PLA units and military regions to suppress all Red Guard interference with due process.²⁰ Mao himself was finally compelled to intervene personally on behalf of "law and order" on July 28, when he tearfully told young radicals at Peking's Qinghua University that they had "let him down."²¹ He charged them with an unwillingness to unite, a lack of self-discipline, and the use of physical violence. Mao warned that the rival factions throughout China were to be "physically separated" and subjected to "external control." Within forty-eight hours, the nation's first "Worker-Peasant Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team" (hereafter cited as MZDTP Team), which was in reality composed primarily of and led by military men, was dispatched to Qinghua University to exert control and force compliance. These actions constituted the virtual death-knell of the Red Guard movement.

During the emerging tide of antiradicalism, the fate of Wang's opponents in Xinjiang was not much better than that of Wang and his supporters. Shortly after Wang was struggled against in early June, Wu Guang, who had taken up the cause of the leftists in Xinjiang, was reportedly dragged to Peking and branded a "pseudo-revolutionary but a genuine renegade."²² Lu Jianren, who had also turned against Wang in the early days of 1968, was criticized as an agent of Liu Shaoqi in Xinjiang. Zuo Qi, who had sided with the Red Second Headquarters early in the GPCR also fell from grace, although his name still appeared frequently in the press.

Beginning in mid-June, while Wang was still in Peking, central support-the-left PLA units were transferred to Xinjiang.²³ Based largely upon later developments, it is probable that the majority of these troops were under the command of Long Shujin, who had risen through the ranks of Lin Biao's PLA 4th F.A. faction to become the commander of the Hunan Military District by the time the GPCR began. It is likely that no more than one PLA division under Long's command arrived in the region by the end of the summer without their commander who remained in Peking until late August. Within Xinjiang, the pro-Lin Biao officers who had arrived earlier in the year increased their influence dramatically.

During early August, the Chinese press launched

a propaganda campaign against those provincial leaders who had tended to look after their own particularistic interests in disregard of central guidance, or who had refused to carry out "inconvenient" central directives because of special conditions in their own areas.²⁴ On August 5, for example, People's Daily attacked the "theory of many centers," "mountaintopism," and "individualism." Certainly these attacks were aimed at leaders like Wang who had attempted to keep the excesses of the GPCR from causing total chaos in their domain. The radicals themselves did not escape censure by the Peking authorities, who were angered and disappointed by the young Red Guards' lack of discipline.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE XINJIANG REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE

By the end of August, the overall situation in China had stabilized considerably. In Peking, negotiations led by Long Shujin resulted in a compromise settlement which paved the way for the establishment of the Xinjiang Revolutionary Committee. Without the benefit of a preparatory committee, Long managed to get the Xinjiang military, including Wang, and the various Red Guard factions to collaborate in the formation of the regional revolutionary committee. The Xinjiang and Urumqi Municipal Revolutionary Committees were announced in Urumqi on September 5, 1968.²⁵ Among the last provincial-level revolutionary committees to be formed in China, it was obvious that some form of central pressure had been applied to bring about its establishment.

Of the utmost significance was the fact that Long Shujin emerged as the chairman of the Xinjiang Revolutionary Committee (hereafter cited as the XJ Revoly. Cmte.). Long had risen through the ranks of the PLA to become a regimental commander in Lin Biao's Division 115 prior to World War II. By 1963, he had been promoted to Hunan Military District Commander, and was concurrently a member of the Hunan CCP Standing Committee. In the summer of 1967, Long had been attacked by radical Red Guard factions in Changxia for suppressing the GPCR in Hunan during the "January seizure of power," and was subsequently sent to Peking to attend Mao-thought study classes. When the Hunan Revolutionary Committee was established in April 1968, however, Long was made first vice-chairman. Both Jiang Qing and Huang Yongsheng, who was to become PLA Chief of Staff in late 1968, defended Long's appointment. Jiang Qing reportedly said that Long "has made some mistakes but shouldn't

be finished off with one stroke . . . because Hunan needs such a veteran comrade who is familiar with the situation there." Huang Yongsheng declared that "Comrade Long has the courage to shoulder responsibilities; he won't be a double-dealer."²⁶ Presumably, Long had been protected because of his long ties with Lin Biao.

Apparently Long had spent a good deal of time in Peking during the summer months of 1968 studying the situation in Xinjiang in some detail, meeting with both the central authorities and Wang Enmao, and making preparations for his new duties in Urumqi. When Long was transferred to become XJ Revoly. Cmte. Chairman after prolonged negotiations and personal preparations, he personified the emerging central control over the region in lieu of Wang's decline in status. Long's pro-Lin Biao orientation and his old PLA 4th F.A. loyalties heralded the demise of Wang in Xinjiang and the PLA 1st F.A. faction throughout the Northwest.

Wang Enmao and Saifudin, however, both reappeared as vice-chairmen of the XJ Revoly. Cmte. According to the NCNA list of leaders on the new committee, Wang was ranked as third vice-chairman, behind both Guo Peng and Saifudin.²⁷ But, on September 9 Urumqi Radio listed Wang as the first vice-chairman, thus indicating that he continued to command local support and retained substantial influence within the region. In recognition of this fact, Wang was at any rate retained in the regional hierarchy and no final decision had been made against him by Peking.²⁸

Table 15.1

Leadership Composition of the Xinjiang Revolutionary Committee, September 1968.

| Name | Natly. | Background |
|---------------|--------|--------------------------------|
| Chairman | | |
| Long Shujin | Han | Military, 4th F.A. |
| Vice-Chairmen | | |
| Wang Enmao | Han | Military, 1st F.A. |
| Saifudin | Uighur | Party Cadre |
| Guo Peng | Han | Military, 1st F.A. |
| Pei Zhouyu | Han | Military, 2nd F.A. |
| Li Chuanqun | Han | Military, A.F. Unit 7335 |
| Yang Liye | Han | Revoly. Worker |
| Hu Liangcai | Han | Revoly. Worker |
| Zi Ya | Kazakh | Revoly. Masses (Poor Herdsman) |
| Wu Zhulun | Han | Revoly. Masses |

Source: Urumqi Radio, September 9, 1968.

Wang's replacement as titular head of Xinjiang by an "outsider" while in many respects appearing to be a formal change, was a very important event. For over a decade, Wang and Xinjiang had mutually shaped each other's character. He had built up a significant base of regional power in the region, and had maintained the personal loyalty of many troops which had served with him both before and after his move to Xinjiang in late 1949. Wang had largely succeeded during his long tenure as leader of Xinjiang in maintaining Chinese power and authority there despite threats from local nationalists among the non-Han peoples and meddling by the Soviet "revisionists" and Indian "reactionaries". He had attempted to shield and isolate sensitive Xinjiang from the worst excesses of the GPCR by advocating that "socialist legality" rather than "proletarian violence" govern the movement in the border region. When radical intervention by centrally sponsored elements during the GPCR had threatened to undo Wang's handiwork in the region, he countered force with force in an attempt to re-establish stability and relative "normality."

Wang's stance throughout the GPCR, "realistic" or not, did not endear him to Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms" Lin Biao. Moreover, his actions, although based upon principle as well as self-interest, led to continued turmoil and anarchism, and he became the symbol of obstructionism in the eyes of those who promoted the GPCR. His demotion suggests that the central leadership had reservations about entrusting the post of chairman to a man who, in their opinion, might encourage regionalist tendencies in Xinjiang and might fail to unite the various rival groups on account of his previous actions and remaining loyalties. Perhaps the most important aspect of Wang's demotion was that it clearly pointed out Peking's ability to reach into Xinjiang and either discipline or pluck out leaders who were perceived to have set up a virtual "independent kingdom." The ability of Peking to choose leaders in Xinjiang or to send in its own men was a significant step toward the reassertion of central control in Xinjiang and the destruction of Wang's entrenched power base.

The composition of leadership on the new XJ Revoly. Cmte. confirmed the deterioration of the PLA 1st Field Army faction in the regional elite structure, although there were indications of a compromise in the committee's selection. While there were nine vice-chairmen, only two of them

were minority nationals, namely Saifudin and Zi Ya. Including Long, five of the top leaders on the committee were known to be military men, with the remainder consisting of one Party cadre, two revolutionary workers, and two representatives of the revolutionary mass organizations. The top leadership, moreover, remained distinctively Han-dominated and military-oriented. Significantly, Zuo Qi was not given a vice-chairmanship, although he was selected to the Standing Committee and retained his post of deputy political commissar of the XJMR.²⁹ What was most striking was the fact that over half of the top leaders were either individuals who had been in Xinjiang only a short while, or persons who had risen from relative obscurity within the region during the course of the GPCR.

16. Enter the Dragon

THE LONG-WANG COALITION

The establishment of the Xinjiang Revolutionary Committee in 1968 "amidst a storm of class struggle" had been hailed as a great victory for the thought of Chairman Mao and his revolutionary line.¹ But, as Peking admitted, unity in the border region was still very superficial. The problems alluded to were legion, and they obviously constituted serious constraints on policy implementation for the new leadership of Xinjiang. For example, the importance of Xinjiang's strategic location along the Sino-Soviet border was recognized by the Long leadership, which pointed out that the Soviet revisionists had made provocations there.² Urumqi displayed concern about "national splittists" and "persons with illicit relations with foreign countries," presumably among the region's minorities, who had been aroused by the previous excesses of the GPCR. Insufficiently reformed ex-GMD elements, namely some of the "veterans" of the Xinjiang PCC, were also denounced for engaging in sabotage.

In his speech at a rally celebrating the new regional committee, Long Shujin publicly confirmed the existence of continuing turmoil by warning that the class struggle had always been acute in the region, and that the class enemies had put up a desperate struggle by stirring up trouble.³ Some "rightists," Long revealed, were continuing to pose as "leftists" in an attempt to confuse the masses. Long implied that although the GPCR in Xinjiang had entered a new era, the class enemies at home and abroad were still undertaking cunning measures to sabotage the new regional leadership.

The authorities emphasized the crucial need for unity and consolidation in Xinjiang,⁴ and proposed several measures to achieve these goals. First, the mass movement in Mao-thought study was to be deepened, and the "leading groups" in all revolutionary committees were to be further re-educated. Second,

revolutionary committees were to be established at all levels in the region. Third, the policies of rectifying the Party organization, simplifying organizational structures, changing unreasonable rules and regulations, and sending people who worked in offices to lower levels were to be implemented. Fourth, "struggle-criticism-transformation" was to be undertaken in all units on a long-term basis in order to "purify" the class ranks and repudiate the "bourgeois reactionary theory of many centers (anarchism), sectarianism, and mountain-stronghold mentality." Finally, all subversive activities carried out by enemies at home and abroad were to be crushed and the border defenses were to be consolidated.

In essence, these measures constituted a battle plan for the penetration of the various remaining pro-Wang strongholds in the region. They called for the reindoctrination and re-education of the existing cadre force, the purge or xiafang of recalcitrant trouble-makers, the tearing down of the old bureaucratic structures and regulations, and the complete abolition of factionalism. The role of the military (especially the MZDTP Teams) was to be very important in the execution of this plan.

However, hidden behind the mass of verbiage which accompanied the establishment of the XJ Revoly. Cmte., there was caution and restraint indicating that subsurface tensions still plagued the foundling body. The issue of Wang Enmao was not dealt with directly by Long in his speech hailing the new revolutionary committee. He and his colleagues, in fact, refrained from publicly condemning Wang at this juncture. Significantly, both Saifudin and Guo Peng spoke at the rally, but Wang, who was in attendance, evidently said little or nothing at all.

Following the establishment of the XJ Revoly. Cmte., there were increasing references to the dangers of Soviet "socialist imperialism" along the borders. Urumqi Radio, for example, briefly aired local news which contained a heavy barrage of vituperation against Moscow's provocations during the latter half of September.⁵ It remarked that Xinjiang was still laboring under an historical and national difficulty, and that during the GPCR subversive elements had gathered under the banner of local nationalism.

When an Albanian delegation arrived in Urumqi on its way to the National Day celebrations in Peking, Wang Enmao greeted it at the airport and delivered a banquet speech in which he made all of the proper quasi-Maoist statements, attacked the Soviets, and pledged to defend China against any armed invasion

from across the border. Notably, Wang said little else.⁶ To a large pretext, Wang's avowed anti-Soviet stance was apparently being utilized by Long as a device to promote unity under the new revolutionary committee, and as a vehicle to persuade Wang's supporters to follow suit. Presumably, this was one of the main reasons why Wang was not being attacked directly in the regional media.

In early November 1968, following the decision of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Party Central Committee to expel Liu Shaoqi from the Party, a massive campaign was launched throughout China against the "February Adverse Current" of 1967.⁷ The masses were told to beware of elements who were playing "double-dealing tricks." They were also mobilized to expose those who continued to undertake struggle by force and foment factionalism. Clearly, the Long leadership in Xinjiang utilized this campaign in its attempts to further undermine Wang's power base within the region.

While this campaign was gaining momentum, MZDTP Teams were dispatched to all organs, units, and enterprises throughout Xinjiang. By sending the local MZDTP Teams, Long managed to infiltrate a great many pro-Wang organs, including those in the Xinjiang PCC, and substantially undercut his influence by early November. An increasing number of subregional revolutionary committees began to emerge with the aid of the MZDTP Teams, but often only after extremely sharp and complicated class struggles--as in the "August First" Iron and Steel Works and the Sanmin Farm of the Xinjiang PCC.⁸ Significantly, Wang spoke at the rally celebrating the creation of the Sanmin Farm Revolutionary Committee, which was the first state farm in Xinjiang to have established such an organization. On this, and two other similar occasions, Wang reportedly proclaimed that the revolutionary masses should never forget the class struggle and should support the new revolutionary committees. He did not, however, castigate "hidden enemies, renegades, or bourgeois factionalists." Saifudin, speaking at the same rallies, reportedly did so, however.⁹ It appeared, nonetheless, that Wang had given his reluctant sanction to the formation of subregional revolutionary committees, in part because he may have sincerely felt that unity and stability in the face of perceived Soviet threats and minority unrest was imperative. Without Wang's sanction, widespread factional violence would have undoubtedly continued. It may also be that Wang had no other viable alternative, since his support was now on the decline with

Saifudin and many other of his former associates having taken up the cause of the centrally sponsored regional leadership.

There is reason to believe, however, that Long had also gone some distance toward moderation and conciliation in order to gain Wang's cooperation. In a speech at one of the rallies hailing the formation of subregional revolutionary committees, for example, Long had said that there was no fundamental conflict of interest between the two opposing Red Guard factions, but he added that there was a "rightist kind of steadiness," which was so steady that there was no action, and a "leftist kind of relentlessness," which was characterized by indiscriminately striking at random.¹⁰ Thus, Long castigated both the conservative and radical mass organizations for factionalism, and indicated that unity must be attained without further violence.

Of even greater significance than the establishment of revolutionary committees at the subregional levels was the announcement on November 11 that Long had taken over as XJMR Commander, a post which Wang had officially held since 1956.¹¹ Wang retained his post as first political commissar of the XJMR, however, thus indicating that his influence in the XJMR remained a factor of considerable importance.

How this change in command was effected cannot be ascertained with any certainty. Undoubtedly there were pressures which compelled Wang to comply with the change. First, in the view of Peking, Wang's continued presence as commander would hinder any mass organizations and their factional supporters in the military. Unity was deemed essential in light of the perceived threat from the Soviets, the incipient unrest among a portion of the minorities, the strategically important natural resources and nuclear facilities, and the concern for production.

Second, the influx of military "outsiders" into the XJMR increasingly undermined Wang's PLA 1st F.A. faction base of support and tied the regional military command more firmly to the center. Assigned to positions of responsibility within the XJMR were such "outsiders" as Long and Kong Ruiyun of the PLA 4th F.A. faction, and Li Chuanqun of Unit 7335, PLA 9th A.F. Wang's power within the Xinjiang PCC, moreover, was increasingly divided among Kong Ruiyun, Tan Kaiyun, and Zeng Ruying of the Mao-Lin military group, and Pei Zhouyu, a moderate from the PLA 2nd F.A. faction who had been in the region only since 1965. In addition, Zhang Jiecheng, also from the PLA 4th F.A. group, was transferred from Shenyang to replace Tao

Zhiyue as commander of the Xinjiang PCC in the autumn of 1968.¹²

Third, with most of his former Party and military supporters either in disgrace or now in the camp of the new regional leadership under Long, Wang's negotiating position was weakened. Presumably, even Saifudin had been carefully won-over (or neutralized) by the central authorities. Fourth, it is likely that Wang himself was willing to compromise, given the fact that the massive propaganda campaign denouncing the "February Adverse Current" was being intensified.

That the behind-the-scene negotiations between Wang and Long were protracted was implied by the fact that it was not until two months after the establishment of the XJ Revoly. Cmte. that Long was publicly referred to as XJMR Commander. In the resulting compromise, not only was Wang allowed to retain his position of first political commissar of the XJMR, but his old subordinate and ally, Guo Peng, was retained as vice-commander. The compromise was seemingly made more acceptable to Wang since it then appeared that Long advocated the policies of unity, moderation, and leniency in regional affairs--policies which Wang had advocated throughout the GPCR.

The new situation brought about by Wang's demotion did not bring about an overnight restoration of peace and order, however. Some of the most die-hard elements among the old regional Party and military leadership who had violently suppressed radical activities during the GPCR in Xinjiang continued to hold out. In retaliation, radical groups actively sought out conservatives, and numerous clashes were reported throughout the region during the following months. As Wang's power in Xinjiang slowly declined, though, the remaining conservatives were increasingly isolated.

THE FALL OF WANG ENMAO

After mid-November 1968, Wang's name was not mentioned in any press or radio reports emanating from Urumqi or Peking. Moreover, a campaign was concurrently launched attacking Wang in all but name as the "promoter of the 'February Adverse Current'" and the "perpetrator of the evil trend to reverse the correct verdicts on the 'February Adverse Current' in Xinjiang."¹³ The indirect attacks on Wang were preceded by reports describing the creation of several new subregional revolutionary committees amid the storms of class struggle¹⁴ with the aid of the PLA "three-supports and two-military" units.¹⁵ Such rev-

olutionary committees were formed at the "August First" Agricultural College of the Xinjiang PCC in the Shihezi reclamation area, thus signifying that the old base of regional conservatism was being put under the control of moderates.¹⁶ Furthermore, on November 17 it was announced that the regional authorities had formed a new "Regional Congress of Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants and Herdsmen"¹⁷ to replace the existing peasant's associations which had been set up in 1964-65 under Wang's control.

Yet another measure undertaken prior to the indirect attacks on Wang was the dissolution of eight radical and conservative Red Guard organizations on November 20, following a seventeen-day Mao-thought class sponsored by the XJ Revoly. Cmte.¹⁸ Saifudin apparently presided over the signing of a dissolution agreement, which had been prompted by the aid and advice of the PLA. Saifudin condemned the "repeated counter-offensives of the bourgeois reactionaries, the 'February Adverse Current,' and the sinister wind of the previous spring which had tried to protect Liu Shaoqi's headquarters in Xinjiang." Following the formal dissolution of the Red Guard organizations, MZDTP Teams began entering into the region's schools. Shortly thereafter, the first xian-level revolutionary committee in Xinjiang was set up in Urumqi.

Throughout early 1969, reports from Urumqi were unanimous in their condemnation of Wang Enmao in all but name as the personification of all the evils then plaguing the region. Interestingly, however, there was a rather subtle tone on conciliation and leniency toward the members of the various revolutionary mass organizations, whose headquarters had been formally dissolved. The veiled attacks on Wang and the hints of conciliation and leniency tended to underscore the authorities' concern for achieving unity. It can be speculated that, in part, the Long leadership was still trying to persuade (if not compel) some conservative and radical extremists to cease their activities. Repeated calls were made to oppose the "enemy's" subversion and troublemaking and overcome interference from both the "right and extreme left."¹⁹

Although the various reports emanating from Xinjiang and Peking did not reveal specific incidents of armed violence in the region during late 1968, Taiwan sources claimed that bitter factional strife between radicals and conservatives was continuing. They cited "incomplete statistics" whereby some 700 armed clashes had occurred throughout the region

during 1968.²⁰

Although Urumqi Radio claimed that by the end of 1968 some 80 percent of the regiments, farms, and factories of the Xinjiang PCC had established "revolutionary committees" and that similar organizations had been formed in all division-level units of the PCC during early January 1969,²¹ the radio quoted Long to the effect that the situation in the region was "favourable," but that class struggle was still "very serious and complicated."²² Much of the turmoil was likely the result of the conservatives' reactions to the thinly veiled, harsh attacks on Wang. For example, on January 16 the XJ Revoly. Cmte. formed a "workers' provost corps" in the Urumqi area to propogate Mao's thought, patrol the streets and guard the railway and bus stations day and night, and protect the new revolutionary order.²³ A week later, it was announced that the political and cultural revolution committee of the Xinjiang PCC had been established only after repeated and fierce struggles against the "well-entrenched black gang of the 'February Adverse Current.'"²⁴

Throughout January 1969, intensive efforts were made to pull former Wang supporters away from him and rehabilitate them through Mao-thought indoctrination sessions. The first large-scale Mao-study class for leading persons of the two major revolutionary mass factions, leading cadres of the former Xinjiang People's Council, and workers was concluded in mid-January.²⁵ Emphasis in their study was placed upon achieving unity and repudiating the serious errors of the "promoter of the 'February Adverse Current.'" Similar study sessions were held for the personnel of the XJMR later that month.

The continuation and intensification of the indirect attacks on Wang in early 1969, coupled with his continued absence from public functions in Urumqi, indicated that he may have been removed. On January 25, Wang was identified as one of the revolutionary fighters from various parts of the country in attendance at a reception held by Mao in Peking.²⁶ This supported the speculation that Wang had been removed from the Xinjiang political scene, and had possibly been rewarded with face-saving treatment and graceful exile in the national capital. Despite his reappearance in Peking, which may have been allowed so as to allay any violent reactions by his most avid supporters in Xinjiang, the campaign against Wang continued in the region.

With Wang now in Peking, the new regional leadership under Long began to implement measures de-

signed to speed up unity in the region in anticipation of the Ninth Party Congress which was to be held later that spring. For example, in early February the first group of some 2,500 "young intellectuals" in the Urumqi area left for the countryside, where they were to resettle, accept re-education from the poor and lower-middle peasants and herdsmen, and remold their world outlook through productive labor. It was evident from this highly publicized event that the regional authorities were beginning to rid the major urban centers of the former Red Guard elements, especially those who had supported Wang and the old regional Party leadership.

The regional authorities also intensified their revolutionary mass criticism and repudiation campaign within the Xinjiang PCC so as to discredit Wang and his policies. The PCC was ordered to raise its sense of organization and discipline, fight "self" and repudiate revisionism, and overcome anarchism.²⁷ The regional authorities set up a "May 7th" Cadre School at Shihezi for leading cadres of the PCC, who were said to be actively remolding themselves through study, criticism, and productive labor. Throughout 1969, some 500 leading PCC cadres from nine units (presumably PCC divisions) were reported to have gone to this "May 7th" Cadre School.²⁸ Concurrently, increasing numbers of revolutionary committees were established within the PCC during early 1969.

Only after Wang's departure from Xinjiang did the authorities finally manage to successfully promote the large-scale formation of new cultural revolution groups and revolutionary committees within the PCC. Until Wang's removal from the region, the centrally sponsored regime in Urumqi had not dared to tamper with the PCC on a large-scale for fear of provoking even greater violence. Although Wang himself had reluctantly sanctioned the formation of such "revolutionary three-in-one alliances" prior to his disappearance from the regional scene, conservatism still ran high within the PCC and the new regional leadership had been compelled to maintain a rather low profile in carrying out its creeping pacification.

In late February 1969, the XJ Revoly. Cmte. again stressed the need for unity and consolidation and called upon the military to intensify efforts in this direction. The regional authorities warned that

The class struggle does not end with the establishment of the revolutionary committee. Therefore, . . . guard against rumor-mongering, sowing of dissension and discord, instigation of

splittism, inciting of internal clashes among the masses, undermining of relations between the army and the people, undermining of the revolutionary committee, and other sinister plots designed by the class enemy in a vain attempt to overthrow the red political power.²⁹

They also used the continued Soviet threat to Xinjiang to promote unity in the region. It was pointed out, for example, that since Xinjiang was strategically located on the forefront of antirevisionism and anti-imperialism, and its class struggle was very complicated, it was imperative to strengthen national defense along the borders.

The Soviet danger was made all the more real on March 2 1961, when armed clashes occurred between Chinese and Soviet border units at Zhenbao Island on the Ussuri River between Heilongjiang province and the Soviet Far East. The regional response to the border clashes was to point out that Moscow had long undertaken activities to slander, subvert, and undermine China. Long claimed that the Soviets had massed troops all along the borders, conducted subversive and sabotage activities against Xinjiang for a long time, and had launched provocations on an increasingly frequent scale.³⁰ There were also unconfirmed reports from Hong Kong at about the same time that 4,000 Uighurs had staged a revolt against Chinese troops near Yining, with Soviet support, which had resulted in considerable bloodshed.³¹

The border clashes and internal unrest which occurred on the eve of the Ninth Party Congress provide for some interesting speculations. First, although the Soviets and Chinese accused each other of launching the hostilities, it is conceivable that the clashes were conceived by Peking to be limited forays designed to enhance unity for the upcoming Ninth Party Congress. The presumed intention was to focus public attention on the threat of active Soviet intervention, raise the level of patriotism among the masses, and downplay the critical nature of domestic problems and dislocations. It might also be that Peking (especially Lin Biao) was striving to further glorify the role of the PLA as the mainstay and guarantor of the new Party organization then being forged at the center. As events were soon to prove, the Ninth Party Central Committee, and its various subordinate Party organs throughout China, was to be heavily weighted with leading military cadres. If the clashes were prompted for these reasons by Peking, they may have had the unexpected consequence

of stimulating unrest among the minorities along the border, however.

Second, it is not inconceivable that Moscow perpetrated the border hostilities in an attempt to create turmoil and disunity on the eve of the Ninth Party Congress. If the Soviet intention was to undermine the meeting, it apparently failed. However, some of the minorities in Xinjiang may have taken the renewed tensions as an occasion for actively showing their pent-up animosities against the Party for its radical schemes during the GPCR.

Finally, the border confrontations may have simply been spontaneous events prompted by overly zealous PLA soldiers or their Soviet counterparts. The level of tension along the border had been at the flashpoint throughout the 1960s, and the GPCR had certainly not cooled down border tensions. Furthermore, there were indications that some Chinese inhabitants, especially minority nationals, were seeking sanctuary or relief from the political turmoil and socio-economic dislocations of the GPCR in China by crossing the frontier into Russia. This obviously heightened the likelihood of armed Sino-Soviet confrontations.

Whatever their causes, the clashes along the Sino-Soviet border led to an increased emphasis on unity, conciliation, and vigilance throughout the period of the Ninth Party Congress. In Xinjiang, for example, the PLA-dominated MZDTP Teams hastened their efforts to bring about the formation of revolutionary committees in key economic enterprises, such as the Karamai Petroleum Administration and the Xinjiang Mining Bureau.³²

When the April 14 communiqué of the Ninth Party Congress was widely disseminated in Xinjiang, it keynoted the importance of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the new Party organization. The class struggle in Xinjiang, however, was reported to be "very sharp and complicated."³³ "Class enemies" were denounced for opposing Mao's thought, sowing discord among the nationalities, and creating splits in national unity.

The leading comrades from Xinjiang elected to the Ninth Party Central Committee in April 1969 included both Long Shujin and Saifudin as full members,³⁴ and Pei Zhouyu, Hu Liangcai, Ruzi Turdi (a Uighur), and Wang Enmao as alternate members. Four of the six were Han, while two, both Uighurs, were minority nationals. Three were military veterans (Long, Pei and Wang), one was a Party cadre (Saifudin), and two were representatives of the revolu-

tionary workers, peasants, and masses (Hu and Ruzi Turdi). Long had not held a position on the previous Central Committee, while Saifudin was promoted from alternate (ranked forty-fifth of the eighty-nine alternate members) to full membership on the new Central Committee. Neither Pei, Hu, nor Ruzi Turdi had ever held positions on the Central Committee.

Wang Enmao, who had been a full member of the previous Central Committee (ranked ninety-first and last), was demoted to alternate membership on the Ninth Central Committee. Apparently, Wang's presence on the Central Committee was only nominal, being based largely upon Peking's desire to publicly assure his remaining followers in Xinjiang that his fate had not been one of complete degradation. Presumably, Wang's inclusion on the list of Central Committee members and alternates was also designed to imply that he supported the "new order" and that his followers should do the same.

Shortly after the Ninth Party Congress had adjourned, Wang made what was to be his last known public appearance in Peking on May Day. A Hong Kong source reported that Wang had "resigned" from all of his positions in Xinjiang, and that the Mao-Lin group was attempting to conceal his resignation because of growing hostilities along the Sino-Soviet border in Xinjiang.³⁵ In any case, Wang subsequently disappeared from public view, and an important era in the history of Xinjiang came to an end.

REGIONAL POLICIES DURING THE REMOVAL OF WANG ENMAO, 1968-69

With the intensification of the indirect attacks on Wang during his absence from public view in late 1968, the regional media began to assail his pre-GPCR policy stance and publicize new policy initiatives. Due largely to the continued emphasis in the Chinese media on the political struggle and the sub-surface tensions which accompanied it during the period, however, it is difficult to undertake an in-depth analysis of policy trends. Since the bulk of the data then available was largely devoted to economic developments only the most general and tentative conclusions can be made about the social and cultural policies.

While the pre-GPCR policies of Wang had tended to stress a more gradual, moderate, and less ideologically oriented policy line in recognition of the various special conditions and problems accruing to Xinjiang and its peoples, the new regional leadership under Long attempted to introduce more radical

policies in the region as it gained more authority.³⁶ In part, many of Wang's policies had differed from those advocated by Mao, but rarely for any other reason than how to best achieve the region's ultimate integration with the rest of China. Nonetheless, in Mao's view, Wang's policy stance appeared to be "revisionist and deviationist." Many of Wang's avowed policy errors, however, were simply exaggerated (or even invented) to provide more justification for his removal.

The more credible charges levelled against Wang during the winter of 1968-69 included: (1) his repression of the GPCR in the name of stability and production; (2) his support of material incentives, private plots, and work points; (3) his conditional stress on the nationalities question over class struggle; (4) and his "obstruction, distortion, and fabrication" of Mao's orders.³⁷ At the closing meeting of the Enlarged Second Plenary Session of the XJ Revoly. Cmte. in mid-December 1968, Long blamed the fact that Xinjiang was lagging behind other regions on the unnamed "promoter of the 'February Adverse Current' in Xinjiang" (i.e., Wang).³⁸ He disclosed that central instructions were not being carried out in some areas of Xinjiang, and added that Wang's "evil influence" in Xinjiang remained very deep and widespread.

In specifying the policy mistakes made under the "big independent kingdom of the former regional Party committee," the Long leadership implied that it was attempting to introduce more radical policies in Xinjiang that were more in tune with the Mao-Lin line. These policies stressed egalitarianism in distribution, ideological incentives over material incentives, the abolition of private plots, and the extirpation of the "four-old's" within the region. It is important to point out that until late 1968, by which time Wang was rapidly falling from grace, the debate over policies had been almost totally subordinated to the regional power struggle. The Maoist leadership in Peking had been compelled to retreat in its efforts to actively promote more revolutionary policies in the border region due to the protracted struggle against Wang.

To a very large extent the continued political turmoil within Xinjiang hampered the Long regime's efforts to implement its more radical policies throughout 1968-69. Until the centrally sponsored leadership in Urumqi could bring about subregional reconsolidation and unity, its attempts to implement any new policies would be difficult. There were in-

dications that where the new leadership did introduce more radical policies, these only contributed further to continued turmoil and dislocation. At any rate, serious political and socio-economic dislocations did accompany the change in regional leadership, and it was evident that at least some of these problems resulted from the introduction of new radical policies at a time when political turmoil made conditions in Xinjiang already unsettled.

One example of the more radical policy trend which accompanied Wang's removal was the early February 1969 order issued to the Xinjiang PCC which stated that "political work is the lifeline of all economic work."³⁹ All PCC units were told to launch a sustained and penetrating campaign to discredit all revisionist economic systems, including "profits in command," material incentives, and production over ideological study and struggle.

While these radical policies were being promoted, however, there were signs that the regional economy was in trouble. The masses were increasingly called upon to go all out for better results in production and to practice economy. Also, the PLA was directed to give vigorous help in agricultural production. Throughout the spring of 1969, the regional media spoke of sabotage activities by some "unregenerate landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and "rightists" who had engaged in hoarding, stealing, and profiteering activities.⁴⁰ Moreover, policy implementation was reportedly being hindered by some cadres who were paying too much attention to local peculiarities.⁴¹ What is most striking about these reports was their similarity to those which appeared a decade earlier when the GLF in Xinjiang had led to serious socio-economic dislocations.

In late June 1969, the authorities were cautiously predicting only a "good harvest" of wheat, and not an "excellent" or "bumper" crop.⁴² They revealed Xinjiang had suffered a series of natural disasters in the summer and winter of 1968 which had seriously affected the economy. Agricultural production for 1968, in fact, was down by between 10-20 percent compared with 1965. The gross value of industrial output had declined from 800 million yuan in 1966 to 746 million yuan in 1968. No figures are available for 1967.

It is probable that the avowed natural disasters were responsible only in a small measure for the dislocations, however. The more important causes were the cumulative effects of political turmoil and the

new radical policies, both of which had disrupted normal production endeavors. The overwhelming emphasis on the political struggle against Wang and the drive to establish new revolutionary committees and Party organs in Xinjiang had resulted in the serious neglect of economic production and development. For example, there were indications that irrigation and other water conservancy facilities, farm machinery, and transportation facilities were simply not maintained properly. In the urban areas, industrial production suffered setbacks due to Red Guard agitation, job-leaving, and the inability to obtain raw materials from the countryside. Although it has never been confirmed, there is reason to believe that urban food supplies became critical with the production-transportation breakdown in the countryside. This situation was worsened by the large-scale influx of peasants and youths into the cities.

Table 16.1
Industrial Figures for Xinjiang, 1965-72.

| | 1965 | 1966 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
|------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Ind. Prod. Value Index | 100 | 125.7 | 117.3 | 129.0 | 185.8 | 217.3 | 267.3 |
| G.V.I.O.* | 636 | 800 | 746 | 821 | 1,182 | 1,383 | 1,701 |
| China, G.V.I.O.* | 153,194 | 184,078 | 158,786 | 209,416 | 257,427 | 294,420 | 319,609 |

* Millions of yuan at 1952 constant prices.

Source: Field, Lardy, and Emerson, op. cit., pp. 9 and 11.

Another factor that affected agriculture and pastoral production was the apparent dissatisfaction of the peasants and herdsmen with the abolition of their limited private plots and livestock and the attempts to do away with material incentives. They must have been further incensed by the increased emphasis on political-ideological study and the less moderate policies that sought the extirpation of the "four-old's," especially among the non-Han peoples. Taken as a whole, these factors help to explain the underlying causes of the alleged natural disasters, grain hoarding, livestock slaughtering, pilfering of foodgrain reserves, and other economic problems in

Xinjiang during 1968-69.

SUMMARY

When the GPCR began, Wang Enmao had been in firm control of Xinjiang. He had held the top Party and military posts in the region for well over a decade, supported by his old Han comrades from the PLA 1st F. A. who dominated the regional Party, military and government establishments. Moreover, Wang had developed rather parochial attitudes and values as a result of his long tenure in the border region. His policy perceptions had been largely molded by the existence of special conditions and problems accruing to the region and its non-Han, Muslim inhabitants, the tradition of Soviet penetration and influence in Xinjiang, and the wealth of strategic natural resources to be found there. Considering these circumstances, it is not surprising that Wang's reactions to the radical and dislocative aspects of the GPCR had been basically conservative.

Until the autumn of 1966, Wang had managed to keep the excesses of the GPCR from flooding into his domain. In Xinjiang, the movement initially constituted a regional affair played out under the firm direction of Wang by local actors. While local radicals did attack the regional Party committee prior to September 1966, Wang had either deftly deflected their attacks or had offered "sacrificial lambs" from the lower echelons of his regional elite to placate them and their radical counterparts in Peking. While his public statements paid ritual obeisance to the emerging revolutionary line of the leftist forces, his actions often went in the other extreme. He had, for example, sent out work teams to the various organs and enterprises in the region to guide and control the scope and content of the movement. Where this failed, he had resorted to coercion and repression. By adopting the trappings of a truly revolutionary campaign, while actually keeping a firm grasp on the GPCR in Xinjiang, Wang had thus maintained the viability of his regional power base.

However, with the arrival of radical Peking Red Guards in Xinjiang during September 1966, the lid was blasted off the GPCR there, and for the next two years violence intensified. The intervention of the young leftist elements from outside the region who sought to strike down Wang led to increasing factionalism. Although Wang had attempted to counter the growth of radical Red Guard organs by creating his own loyalist Red Guard groups, the Maoist rebels nonetheless managed to penetrate the various strong-

holds of his regional power base. They were especially successful in gaining influence and support among the Han youths in Xinjiang.

In January 1967, the radicals undertook what amounted to a siege against Wang's headquarters and managed to "seize power from below" in some regional organs during the first of four trips he made to Peking. The result of the radicals' attempts to overthrow Wang was virtual anarchy throughout Xinjiang. Significantly, a number of troops stationed in the region began to support the anti-Wang forces at this time, and at least one regional military leader who had long ties with Wang, namely Zuo Qi, defected to the radicals.

In early 1967, the conservatives had struck back at the radicals in Shihezi and elsewhere in response to attempted power seizures. The fighting became so serious that the central authorities feared that widespread turmoil would bring about economic dislocations, minority unrest, and Soviet meddling. Obviously, Wang had pointed out such potential dangers and blamed the radicals for the critical nature of the situation in the border region during his talks with the Maoist leadership in Peking. As a result, the central authorities had made a series of strategic retreats following the "Shihezi Incident." They directed the PLA, primarily the troops under Wang's XJMR command, to intervene actively and directly in the GPCR so as to restore a modicum of order and stability. This was followed by directives placing the Xinjiang PCC under the control of the XJMR and suspending the GPCR in the region. These measures had tended to support Wang's position in the region, since as commander of the XJMR he could rely on almost total military support against the leftists. Not only did Wang undertake reprisals against his opponents, but he managed to protect or rehabilitate many of his colleagues who had been "dragged out" by the radicals earlier. While the overall effect of the "February Adverse Current" was to prolong his leadership and delay the demise of his regional power base, the activities of Wang and his avowed supporters during this "conservative backlash" undoubtedly strengthened the radicals' resolve to settle for nothing less than his complete disgrace and ultimate removal from power.

For the next year, the GPCR had fluctuated wildly between extremism and reaction throughout China. The periodic official shifts in line by the Maoist leadership in Peking from radicalism to moderation were generally met with unofficial responses oppo-

site from those sought by the center. Periods of radical resurgence witnessed increased conservative reaction and repression, and periods of relative moderation were characterized by unrestrained radical attacks on the conservative establishment. Widespread unrest and virtual anarchy went unchecked in the region as pro-Wang forces boodily suppressed all opposition and radical groups launched counter-offensives against the regional leadership.

Two trips made by Wang to Peking, one in the spring of 1967 and the other at the end of that year, had a significant impact on the GPCR and Wang's position in Xinjiang. While Wang was in the national capital for talks with the central authorities, Peking bolstered the region's radical forces (and its own influence) by sending in Unit 7335 of the PLA 9th A.F. from Lanzhou, and infiltrating Wang's military establishment by assigning several pro-Lin Biao military cadres to responsible positions in the XJMR and Xinjiang PCC. Moreover, Wang's visits to Peking coincided with renewed radical offensives against his regional establishment. By early 1968, although Wang continued to be recognized by Peking as leader of Xinjiang, the anti-Wang movement had been strengthened considerably. In fact, an increasing number of his former regional supporters had either been won-over to the opposing side, had defected outright to the radicals, or had taken up a more neutral stance in the hope that factional violence and anarchism could be overcome in lieu of increasing fears of minority unrest and Soviet sabotage. Until mid-1968, however, neither Wang nor his leftist detractors had sufficient power to win a decisive victory, and turmoil continued.

In the early summer of 1968, another radical offensive "caught" Wang when he made his fourth journey to Peking. Throughout the summer, Wang was struggled against by radical Red Guards in the capital, central "support-the-left" PLA units loyal to the Mao-Lin faction were transferred to Xinjiang, and negotiations were begun for the establishment of a regional revolutionary committee. In order to compel the various factions in Xinjiang to cease their violent activities, the military, now including front-line PLA forces under the direct command of Peking as well as regional military units, was given authority to use force if necessary to restore order and bring about unity. By the end of the summer, Wang's position had deteriorated significantly, but so had that of his most radical opponents. Wang still retained substantial backing within Xinjiang, however.

The establishment of the XJ Revoly. Cmte. under the chairmanship of Long Shujin on September 5, 1968 had signified two things. First, it indicated the demise of Wang's status and authority in Xinjiang relative to that of the Maoist center. Second, while it pointed out the deterioration of Wang's regional power base, it also indicated that Peking recognized Wang's continued influence and support within Xinjiang. The composition of the committee, in fact, represented a compromise that was designed to restore a modicum of normality. But, the committee nevertheless constituted a significant step toward Wang's complete removal and the destruction of his power base in Xinjiang.

Several factors had contributed to Wang's demise by the autumn of 1968. First, the radical Red Guards had found Xinjiang to be a natural target in their struggle to eliminate the "old old's" and rectify the entrenched Party-military establishment which had ruled the area under one man's direction virtually since liberation. The radical forces, stimulated by leftist elements from Peking, were increasingly successful in undermining Wang's regional establishment by fertilizing the seeds of discontent among most of the Han youths in Xinjiang. Wang's repression and reprisals only served to intensify their resolve.

Second, the Mao-Lin faction in Peking managed to gradually infiltrate Wang's base with its leftist supporters and undercut his authority. Considering Xinjiang's strategic location along the Sino-Soviet border, its sensitive non-Han population, its valuable resources, and the extent of Wang's own political and military power, Peking was compelled to proceed with caution in undoing Wang's leadership, however. Third, increasing numbers of Wang's supporters were drawn away from him by the central authorities. Many either defected to the radicals or were neutralized. In addition, those Party and military elements in Peking who might have constituted potential allies of Wang were virtually all in disgrace. Increasingly then, Wang and his staunch loyalists in Xinjiang were politically isolated.

Finally, it is likely that Wang's implied (or perceived) hints of Soviet involvement and minority unrest had only temporarily relieved his situation, and had probably made his removal all that much more imperative in the eyes of Mao. Peking must have found it increasingly difficult to live with a leader like Wang who tended to look after his own particularistic interests in virtual disregard of central guidance, or who failed to carry out Mao's directives

because of special conditions in his area. Wang's actions during the previous two years had certainly not endeared him to the Maoist leadership.

The period from September 1968 to May 1969 witnessed the final removal of Wang from the Xinjiang political scene and the gradual ascension of the centrally sponsored leadership in Urumqi dominated by "outsiders" led by Long Shujin. Until late 1968, in recognition of the fact that Wang retained considerable support and influence in regional affairs, a coalition regime operated in Xinjiang under the XJ Revoly. Cmte. that was headed by Long but included Wang. For several months, it was obvious that unity was only superficial and that subsurface tensions continued to plague the new leadership. In fact, behind-the-scenes negotiations and maneuverings between Long and Wang were carried over from the period preceding the formation of the new regional hierarchy. Long and his associates quietly undertook measures to infiltrate Wang's remaining strongholds, and either purge his former subordinates or compel them to align with the new order in Xinjiang.

Wang himself felt that continued factionalism and turmoil only heightened the possibility of Soviet attack and minority unrest within the region. He thus exhibited a willingness to support the new revolutionary committee for the sake of unity and stability. The Long faction in Urumqi profited by Wang's sanction of the new revolutionary committees and his usefulness as an anti-Soviet spokesman. While others like Wang were being harshly criticized in name and purged elsewhere in China at this time, Wang was spared such a fate precisely because of these factors.

In early November 1968, however, Wang's status in Xinjiang changed dramatically when he was replaced as XJMR Commander by Long. Thereafter, Wang was increasingly attacked in all but name as the "promoter of the 'February Adverse Current' in Xinjiang," and his name was not mentioned in any reports from either Urumqi or Peking for several weeks. Concurrently, Long undertook a "creeping pacification and revolutionization" of those regional organs and enterprises which had previously been bases of support for Wang, including the Xinjiang PCC. The old regional Party, government, and military establishments were gradually broken up and their ranks were purified.

Throughout this phase, and well into the months that followed, the dislocations which accompanied the further demise of Wang presented the post-Wang leadership of Xinjiang with a situation whereby unity,

consolidation, and recovery would be a prolonged and difficult process. Furthermore, the renewal of hostilities along the Sino-Soviet border in Xinjiang only further complicated matters. Wang's previous stubborn resistance to the GPCR, his alleged policy deviations, and his apparent failure (or unwillingness) to carry out central directives--all actions he presumably based upon considerations of law and order, in the sensitive, non-Han border region--had not endeared him to Mao or Lin Biao. Simply stated, in the eyes of the Mao-Lin leadership in Peking, Wang came to personify the evil of regionalism and constituted the main obstacle to unity and consolidation within Xinjiang so long as his presence there continued.

It was not until January 1969 that Peking had sufficiently undercut Wang's power base (and his negotiating position) through infiltration and pressure to remove him delicately from Xinjiang. This move was aided by the defection or neutralization of many of Wang's former allies. Following Wang's removal, leaders deemed to be more responsive and sympathetic to the Mao-Lin faction in Peking moved into positions of authority which had been vacated by Wang and his colleagues.

Part 5

Power and Policy in Xinjiang
After Wang Enmao, 1969-77

17. Xinjiang under Long Shujin

Following the removal of Wang Enmao in mid-1969, the search for unity, consolidation, and recovery from the turbulent events of the GPCR in Xinjiang were prolonged and difficult tasks. These tasks were undertaken by no less than three successive regional leadership groups, including: the Mao-Lin sponsored regional regime under Long from 1969 to 1971; a collective leadership under Saifudin and Yang Yong following the "Lin Biao Affair" from late 1971 to 1977; and a new collective leadership which began to emerge in mid 1977 following the death of Chairman Mao and the smashing of the radical "Gang-of-Four."

Throughout the 1969-77 period, the situation in Xinjiang was characterized by many twists-and-turns, and was complicated by continued political turmoil and by old and new "historical difficulties." Sub-surface tension and factionalism lingered at all levels for a long time despite official measures to combat it, and renewed hostilities along the Sino-Soviet border in Xinjiang seriously challenged the regional and central authorities' continuing efforts to realize the completion of the region's integration with China.

Of the utmost significance was the attempt to introduce the more radical, ideologically oriented policies of Mao in Xinjiang as Wang Enmao's influence in regional affairs diminished. These radical policies were both to affect and be affected by the continued instability in Xinjiang. Although the available materials concerning regional policy trends are very limited, it is nonetheless possible to gauge their impact on Xinjiang throughout the period.

In September 1976, almost exactly one year after the XUAR celebrated the twentieth anniversary of its founding, Mao Zedong died in Peking. This event was to have a profound impact on China, and on Xinjiang as well.

THE STRUGGLE FOR UNITY

For two years following the Ninth Party Con-

gress, the Xinjiang leadership under Long Shujin sought to create revolutionary committees in the rest of the region and rebuild Party organs. In May 1969, shortly after the Ninth Party Congress, a Xinjiang Daily editorial mentioned that the class struggle was still very serious and complicated, adding that the main obstacle to unity was "bourgeois factionalism" practiced by a handful of comrades who were interested only in personal gain.¹ It opined that it was normal for diverse ideas to exist within the revolutionary ranks, but that they should be handled by democratic and persuasive measures, rather than by coercion, repression, or other mean actions. Thus, the regional leadership was offering leniency and conciliation to achieve its goal of unity, which was mentioned some sixty-five times in the editorial.

When revolutionary committees were established in the Yili Zhou and Yining in late May, however, the strategically located border area was said to be plagued by Soviet revisionist agents, "national splittists," and elements who had maintained illicit relations with foreign countries.² It was claimed that these elements had resorted to "all kinds of tricks" to sow dissension and discord, create confusion, and undermine unity by taking advantage of religious issues.

From the early summer of 1969, the regional media emphasized that the armed aggression and subversive activities by the Soviets were the main dangers confronting Xinjiang. The issues of Tsarist imperialism, the unequal treaties and China's loss of vast tracts of territory to Russia, the Russian intervention in the Yili area in 1871, and the Soviet-inspired exodus of minority nationals in the Yili and Tacheng areas in 1962 were vividly resurrected.³ Xinjiang Daily reported that full preparations were being undertaken in the region against the launching of a "big war" by Moscow, and accused the Soviets of recruiting elements from the various nationalities in Xinjiang to gather political, military, economic, and cultural information.⁴

On June 13, Urumqi Radio charged that Soviet troops had intruded into the western part of Yumin xian in Dzungaria, killing a Chinese herdsman and kidnapping a Chinese herdsman.⁵ Moscow replied that a group of Chinese soldiers had secretly crossed the border to support a shepherd who had penetrated some 400 yards into Soviet territory, and that the herdsman was killed when the Russian frontier guards were "forced to return fire in self-defense."⁶ It is probable that the incident had occurred when Chinese

troops attempted to turn back or pursue persons who had been influenced by Soviet propaganda to seek refuge and "the better life" on the other side of the border. The report tended to confirm the earlier speculation that some individuals had fled across the frontier to the Soviet Union.

The Chinese press subsequently disclosed that during April and May the Soviets had intruded into the Tacheng, Yumin, and Khabaho areas of Xinjiang on four occasions, causing interference in production activities.⁷ On one occasion, "large numbers" of Russian troops supported by tanks had penetrated seven kilometers into Chinese territory. Moreover, Soviet aircraft had reportedly made some fifty overflights of Xinjiang and Heilongjiang during the same period. Throughout the summer, tension remained high along the border in Xinjiang, and on August 13 the Chinese claimed that several hundred Soviet troops, backed by helicopters, tanks, and artillery, had crossed into Yumin xian again, killing and wounding many Chinese frontier guards.⁸

Faced with these purported acts of armed aggression by the Soviets, the regional authorities called upon the people of Xinjiang to unite as one, and

. . . purify the class ranks by thoroughly ferreting out the handful of renegades, enemy agents, the absolutely unrepentant capitalist-roaders, national splittists, and elements who have illicit connections with foreign countries, who, under the cloak of religion, are colluding with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique.⁹

While the regional leadership may have taken advantage of the border tensions to clamp down on alleged pro-Soviet and local nationalist elements by imposing virtual martial law, the available evidence indicates that the minorities were generally treated with caution in an effort to achieve unity and solidarity.

For example, one source stated that the target of attack must be narrowed and more people helped through education. It was strictly forbidden to extort confessions and leniency was to be exercised in dealing with elements who confessed their crimes.¹⁰ It was said that although over 90 percent of the cadres in Xinjiang were good, severe punishment would be given to those who refused to change their reactionary stance.

By calling for struggle and criticism to be

carried out with reason and not with coercion or force, the authorities implied that they realized the necessity to rehabilitate administrative-political cadres to assist in the running of the government. The emphasis on Party control and the combined threats from the Soviets and from internal enemies made it even more imperative that the military be able to concentrate its efforts on national defense and public security.

As but one indication that unification was proceeding under these conditions, it was announced that twelve of the thirteen special districts, autonomous zhou, and municipalities and fifty-one of the eighty-one xian in Xinjiang had formed revolutionary committees by the summer of 1969.¹¹ Shortly thereafter, the regional authorities stepped up their drive to rebuild Party organs and re-educate leading cadres. In addition, more MZDTP Teams were dispatched to the troubled rural and pastoral areas of Xinjiang.

In response to the border incidents, the Central Committee issued a directive on August 28 which was designed to strengthen frontier security, promote domestic unity, and bring about economic stabilization.¹² It demanded the complete elimination of factional strife and anarchistic tendencies in the face of continued hostilities along the Sino-Soviet border. The directive called for the immediate and unconditional implementation of several measures. First, the troops stationed along the border were to stick closely to their posts, obey and execute orders, abide by discipline, and make thorough preparations for war. It forbade all soldiers from travelling to exchange revolutionary experience. No one was allowed to attack the PLA, or loot its weapons, vehicles, and other equipment. Those who did not adhere to these regulations were to be regarded as counterrevolutionaries and punished severely. Second, all factional armed struggle was to be stopped, armed struggle posts disbanded, and all weapons confiscated. Any resistance would be encircled by the PLA and force would be used to achieve compliance. Furthermore, all mass organizations were to be dissolved. Third, the army was to protect transportation and communications facilities and see to it that all persons who left their production and work posts return to their former units. Finally, the military was to aid in resolutely suppressing the "counterrevolutionaries" who conspired with foreign countries, planned to escape, disturbed social order, seized national property, disrupted production, com-

mitted murder or arson, and utilized the poison of religious superstition to create rebellion.¹³

The directive implied that at least a portion of the minority nationalities had been susceptible to Soviet propaganda and subversive activities. The repeated calls to launch struggle-criticism-transformation in the rural and pastoral areas suggests that opposition was taking place under the cloak of religion. It is also probable that some of the minorities were reacting to the more radical policies of the new centrally sponsored regional leadership.¹⁴ Moreover, there were indications that continuing economic dislocations contributed to the minorities' discontent.

The document also suggested that unrest could be traced to continuing struggle between the former radical and conservative Red Guard factions, and "unreformed rightists and traitors" within the Xinjiang PCC (many of whom had been the staunch supporters of Wang Enmao). Evidently, even unity and discipline within the army ranks was not strong. Notably, in this document the Central Committee sanctioned the use of force in disbanding all factional organs, confiscating all weapons, and protecting all key enterprises.

On the first anniversary of the establishment of the Xinjiang Revoly. Cmte., Long repeated the importance of striving for unity in the region, and warned that

We have won a great victory, but the defeated class will still struggle. This class still exists. Therefore, we cannot speak of a final victory. Not even for decades. We must not slacken our vigilance . . . a handful of enemies will still wage a last-ditch struggle against us.¹⁵

The next day, a Xinjiang Daily editorial added:

Over the past year, the struggle between a capitalist comeback and a countercapitalist comeback, waged by the masses of revolutionary people against the class enemy and centered on the basic factor, the question of the revolutionary committee--the political power of the proletariat--has been very sharp and acute.¹⁶

Both statements virtually confirmed that there had been a sharp struggle between the various political factions over control of the new subregional revolu-

tionary committees.

In mid-September, the regional authorities vigorously stepped up the campaign to send young intellectuals (former Red Guards) to the countryside, forever.¹⁷ The vast majority of the educated youths were said to be good, but were still affected by the "evil influence of the counterrevolutionary revisionist line in education" and tended to vacillate ideologically. By late November, some 70,000 educated youths in Xinjiang had been permanently resettled in the rural and pastoral areas.¹⁸

During late 1969 and early 1970, the correctness of emancipating cadres through penetrating revolutionary mass criticism was also emphasized. Cadres were to be helped in correcting their mistakes through re-education. Both new and veteran cadres were ordered to raise their ideological consciousness, eliminate their bureaucratic work-styles, participate in collective productive labor, and transform old customs and habits. Some representatives on revolutionary committees were criticized for seeking unity while neglecting the ideological struggle, while others were charged with putting too much emphasis on struggle. It was thus implied that the regional authorities were continuing to have problems with factionalism.¹⁹

To combat factionalism and violence, all PLA units in Xinjiang were ordered to organize MZDTP Teams and dispatch them throughout the region in 1970. On two occasions, MZDTP Teams dealt harshly with some elements who had stirred up trouble and spread rumors in the Jiangshan Commune and the "August First" Iron and Steel Works.²⁰ In mid-1970, however, there was at least one report of a MZDTP Team which was not following instructions. Some members of the Team were alleged to have talked about serving the people but in reality had adopted the "mountain-stronghold and small-group mentalities and were not genuine communists."²¹

The universal establishment of basic-level revolutionary committees in Xinjiang was brought to a conclusion during early 1971. A significant trend common to most of these new committees was the re-emergence of Party branches, which were set up largely with the help of local PLA units. From June 15 to July 6, a Party consolidation conference sponsored by the XJ Revoly. Cmte. decided that it was imperative to place ideological consolidation first and to regard organizational consolidation as an extension in subsequent efforts to re-establish Party organs.²²

Finally, on September 15, 1970, Urumqi Radio

announced that the Michuan and Fugang xian Party committees had been "born in the storms of class struggle after repeated mass criticism and purification." These were the first xian Party committees to be established in Xinjiang under the 1969 Party constitution. During the remaining months of 1970, the campaign to rebuild the Party in Xinjiang was intensified, especially within the Xinjiang PCC and among the national minorities.²³ The campaign was obviously aided by the sending of another 30,000-plus young intellectuals to the countryside. There were indications that the movement of youths had experienced difficulties and setbacks as it was undertaken, however.²⁴

In early 1971, Saifudin stated that there was still active opposition to the Party in Xinjiang:

. . . we must strongly criticize the counter-revolutionary line pushed by Liu Shaoqi and his agents in Xinjiang, Wu Guang, Lu Jianren, Zhang Zhonghan, Iminov, and Burhan. We must deal relentless blows at the handful of active counterrevolutionaries.²⁵ (*Italics mine.*)

Cadres were warned about becoming complacent, haughty, bureaucratic, and individualistic. Significantly, one PLA "support-the-left" unit under the XJMR had reportedly thought that because of its long revolutionary experience it could get by without studying philosophy. It had used the pressure of work as an excuse in this matter, and had adhered to a "purely military viewpoint."²⁶ The implication of these reports was that some elements were still actively obstructing unity under the new regional regime. Moreover, there was even the hint of Wang Enmao's lingering influence among a portion of the regional troops.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECOND XUAR PARTY COMMITTEE

Throughout the spring of 1971, the XJ Revoly. Cmte. called on leaders at all levels to further intensify the struggle-criticism-transformation campaign in order to overcome the "right-deviationist attitude" of relaxing efforts in the drive to consolidate the Party. Factionalism continued in some units and reappeared in others.²⁷ The Michuan xian Party committee was one of the units which had experienced such problems. As the regional radio station queried:

. . . should one give prominence to politics or

to work? Should one continue vigorously to grasp class struggle or just devote oneself to production? Should one adhere to the mass-line or have everything decided by a few people? Should one rely on one's own effort or depend on higher levels for help? Should one continue the revolution or remain where one is?²⁸

Coming on the eve of the establishment of the new regional Party committee, these problems were clearly the result of factional jockeying for representation in that body.

More than two years after the Ninth Party Congress, the Second XUAR Party Committee was established in Urumqi on May 8, 1971.²⁹ Sixty-seven full members and twenty-three alternate members were elected to form the regional Party committee, and seventeen members were chosen to constitute the Standing Committee. Long Shujin became first secretary, while Saifudin, Xiao Siming, Liu Xing, and Song Zhihe were made secretaries. Two of the five top-ranking Party leaders were military cadres (Long and Xiao), while the others were veteran Party cadres. Saifudin was the only "insider" and the only minority national of the five.

Of the other twelve members on the Xinjiang Party Standing Committee, the most notable figures included Caodanuofu (a Uighur), Zhang Shigong, and Zhang Jiecheng, all of whom were military cadres. Both Caodanuofu and Zhang Shigong had been criticized by radicals during the course of the GPCR and subsequently rehabilitated. Zhang, a member of the PLA 1st F.A. faction, had formerly been Party First Secretary and political commissar in the strategically located Yili Zhou. Zhang Jiecheng, whose background was in the PLA 4th F.A., had been Xinjiang PCC Commander since late 1968.

By mid-1971, the composition of the Xinjiang Revolutionary Committee had undergone several significant changes since its inception in September, 1968. Long Shujin remained as chairman, but the vice-chairmanships had increased from nine to fourteen. Half of the new vice-chairmen were either recent arrivals in Xinjiang or individuals who had been promoted within the region. One vice-chairman, Zheng Jianhua, was of unknown origin. Missing were Wang Enmao, who had been removed from Xinjiang in mid-1969, and Guo Peng, who had been transferred to the Lanzhou Military Region a year later. Significantly, both were military veterans of the PLA 1st F.C. faction. Saifudin was promoted into Wang's position as

first vice-chairman, while Xiao Siming was apparently brought in from the PLA "5th" (Central) F.A. base in Peking to fill Guo's position (see Table 17.1).

Table 17.1

Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the Xinjiang Revolutionary Committee, Mid-1971.

| Position | Name | Natly. | Background |
|---------------|---------------------------|--------|------------------------------------|
| Chairman | *Long Shujin ^a | Han | |
| Vice-Chairman | *Saifudin ^a | Uighur | |
| " | Xiao Siming | Han | |
| " | Lin Xing | Han | |
| " | *Pei Zhouyu | Han | Military; 2nd F.A. |
| " | Hu Liangcai | Han | "Revolutionary Worker" |
| " | Li Chuanqun | Han | Military; 9th A.F., Unit 7335 |
| " | Yang Liye | Han | "Revolutionary Worker" |
| " | Ruzi Turdi | Uighur | Poor Peasant from Turfan |
| " | Zi Ya | Kazakh | Poor Herdsman |
| " | Song Zhihe | Han | |
| " | *Tan Kaiyun | Han | Military; 4th F.A. (from Liaoning) |
| " | Kong Ruiyun | Han | Military; 4th F.A. (from Qingdao) |
| " | Zheng Jianhua | Han | Unknown |
| " | Wu Zhulun | Han | "Revolutionary Masses" |

* Criticized by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution.

^a Full Member, 9th CCP Central Committee (April 1969).

^b Alternate Member, 9th CCP Central Committee (April 1969).

Sources: Compiled by the author from various China Mainland and Western sources.

Similar changes had also occurred in the top echelons of both the XJMR and the Xinjiang PCC by mid-1971. "Outsiders" virtually dominated the top military posts in Xinjiang. Especially notable was the high proportion of military cadres from Lin Biao's PLA 4th F.A. faction, including Long Shujin, Zhang Jiecheng, Kong Ruiyun, Lo Rong, and Tan Kaiyun. Also active were the radical military cadres of Unit 7335 of the PLA 9th A.F.

Following Wang Enmao's departure from the region, Zhang Zimin apparently took over as acting political commissar of the XJMR. Although Zhang's background is not well known, he was presumably affiliated with the PLA 4th F.A. faction, too. As an apparent concession to the PLA 1st F.A. group which had long dominated the regional military establishment, Xu Guoxian emerged as first vice-commander under Long. The great extent of the PLA 1st F.A.

faction's demise, nonetheless, was reflected by the fact that besides Xu, only Zuo Qi, who had defected to the radicals early in the GPCR, and Tao Jinchu retained high positions in the XJMR or Xinjiang PCC. Also significant was the fact that only two minority nationals held nominal positions of importance in the regional military structure, namely Saifudin as a vice-commander and Caodanuofu as a deputy political commissar. This merely underlined the fact that Peking wanted to maintain Han predominance in the border military region (see Table 17.2).

By mid-1971, however, there were indications that a subtle balancing of field army representation was begun in Xinjiang. In part, this trend must have reflected Mao's own feeling that no one field army system should become entrenched in any area, especially in a strategic region like Xinjiang. The long domination of Xinjiang by Wang Enmao and his PLA 1st F.A. colleagues was a phenomenon that Mao did not want to see repeated.

The most important factor which influenced this balancing was the development of serious differences between Mao and Lin Biao in Peking dating from the Lushan Plenum of the Ninth Party Central Committee in August 1970. At that time, Lin reportedly made a speech without first consulting Mao which called for a provision in the Party Constitution re-establishing a State Chairmanship. Mao had earlier expressed explicit objections to the re-establishment of such a position, which had last been held by Liu Shaoqi. Lin was clearly campaigning for the position himself, since it would have allowed him to consolidate his power over the entire government bureaucracy. At any rate, from late 1970 Mao maneuvered to break up Lin's central power base and undermine his position in the rest of China.

Considering the large number of "unknown" military "outsiders" who took up high-ranking posts in the XJMR during late 1970-early 1971, it is highly probable that Mao began infiltrating the region with potential supporters against the pro-Lin group there. While at least some of the new faces who appeared among the XJMR leadership were possibly pro-Lin elements, there is reason to believe that the majority had no long-standing ties to Lin. For example, Du Hailin, Lai Gongxun, Li Changlin, Lu Jingxun, Wu Fazhi, Xiao Siming, and Zhou Jiuyun were assigned to high-ranking military posts in the XJMR and the Xinjiang PCC. They came primarily from the PLA 2nd F. A. and PLA "5th" F.A. bases. Xiao Siming, from the PLA "5th" F.A. base, became particularly active, and

Table 17.2
Leadership of the XJMR and Xinjiang PCC in 1971.

| Position | Name | Natly | Background |
|--------------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------|
| XJMR | | | |
| Cmdr | *Long Shujin ^a | Han | 4th F.A. |
| V-Cmdr | *Xu Guoxian | Han | 1st F.A. |
| V-Cmdr | *Saifudin ^a | Uighur | 1st F.A./Yili Gp. |
| V-Cmdr | Zhang Jiecheng | Han | 4th F.A. |
| V-Cmdr | Du Hailin | Han | 2nd F.A. |
| V-Cmdr | Kong Ruiyun | Han | 4th F.A. |
| V-Cmdr | Lai Gongxun | Han | 2nd F.A.? |
| V-Cmdr | Li Changlin | Han | 2nd F.A. |
| V-Cmdr | Lu Jingxuan | Han | Unknown; "Outsider" |
| V-Cmdr | Wu Fazhi | Han | Unknown; "Outsider" |
| V-Cmdr | Lo Rong? | Han | 4th F.A. |
| Pol Cmsr | Zhang Zimin? | Han | Unknown; "Outsider" |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Xiao Siming | Han | 5th F.A. |
| D. Pol Cmsr | *Pei Zhouyu | Han | 2nd F.A. |
| D. Pol Cmsr | *Caodanufu | Uighur | 1st F.A./Yili Gp. |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Zeng Ruqing | Han | 3rd F.A. |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Hu Huazhu | Han | Unknown; "Outsider" |
| D. Pol Cmsr | *Tan Kaiyun | Han | 4th F.A. |
| D. Pol Cmsr | *Zuo Qi? | Han | 1st F.A. |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Lo Rong | Han | |
| Xinjiang PCC | | | |
| Cmdr | Zhang Jiecheng | Han | |
| V-Cmdr | Kong Ruiyun | Han | |
| V-Cmdr | Du Hailin | Han | |
| V-Cmdr | Yang Zhengsheng | Han | Unknown; "Outsider" |
| V-Cmdr | *Tao Jinchu? | Han | 1st F.A. |
| Pol Cmsr | Pei Zhouyu | Han | |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Zeng Ruqing | Han | |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Zhou Jiuyin | Han | Unknown; "Outsider" |
| AF Unit 7335 | | | |
| Cmdr | Wu Shengkai | Han | Unknown |
| Pol Cmsr | Li Chuanqun | Han | Unknown |

* Criticized by Red Guards during the PCR.

^a Full Mem., 9th CCP Central Committee (April 1969).

^b Alt. Mem., 9th CCP Central Committee.

Sources: Chu, op. cit., pp. 11-12; and reports from various China Mainland sources.

soon emerged as the first deputy political commissar of the XJMR.

By mid-1971, the centrally sponsored leadership in Xinjiang had seemingly consolidated its authority in the border region under Long Shujin. A new Party, military, and government structure had been built up with great care, but not without serious setbacks along the way, including the border clashes with the Soviets, renewed minority unrest, and continued factional violence. Nevertheless, through "conciliation and compromise" as much as through firmness and force, Long and his regional colleagues had managed to bring about a relatively unified and stable atmosphere in Xinjiang.

Of the utmost importance was the fact that the overwhelming dominance of the PLA 1st F.A. faction in Xinjiang had been broken, and it now played a much reduced, participatory role under the centrally dominated regional leadership. Virtually all of the top Party, military, and government positions were taken over by "outsiders." The basically martial nature of the regional elite was continued, and the virtual Han monopoly of all positions of authority within the border region had been carried over from the previous two decades of CCP rule.

POLICY RADICALIZATION UNDER LONG SHUJIN

Economic Policies

As political turmoil in Xinjiang slowly decreased under Long's leadership, the regional media claimed that the economic situation was steadily improving. While there were signs that the regional authorities continued their efforts to promote the more radical policies of Mao in Xinjiang, it was obvious that they had been compelled by the foodgrain crisis of 1968-69 to do so cautiously. Much publicity was given to the policy of "making agriculture the foundation and industry the leading factor." By August 1969, the regional media were proclaiming that agricultural production for most of Xinjiang was about 20 percent higher than that of the previous year.³⁰ The 1969 harvest of the Xinjiang PCC was said to be a "good" one, with grain production being 30 percent above 1968.³¹ These reports, however, implied that regional agricultural production was still showing the ill-effects of earlier political turmoil and continuing subsurface tensions. In mid-1970, for example, the recurring problems in agricultural production evidently required the continued large-scale support of military units in harvesting and grain procurement.³² The regional authorities were very

conservative in their appraisal of the 1970 harvest, saying that it was only "relatively good" and "promising."³³

By early 1971, foodgrain production in the Urumqi and surrounding areas was said to have surpassed that of 1970 by over 25 percent thanks to the fact that all spheres had given support to agriculture. Livestock and foodgrain totals for the Xinjiang PCC in 1970 were proclaimed to be higher than all previous records, thus implying that outputs by the Han-dominated organization had returned to the 1966 levels. Despite these optimistic reports, however, both livestock and agricultural production in Xinjiang were still experiencing mixed results. While recovery was apparently being achieved in some agricultural units and areas, other units (such as the communes) were still having problems.

Amid the various reports of growing agricultural stability by early 1971, there were hints that problems were being experienced as a result of the radical policies which had been introduced by the new regional leadership earlier. For instance, it was disclosed that 1,300 cadres and soldiers of the Xinjiang PCC Agricultural 4th Division in the Yili Zhou had been organized into MZDTP Teams and sent to over sixty communes, state farms and ranches, and various xian-level units to strengthen the movement to crush "counterrevolutionaries and oppose corruption, theft, speculation, extravagance, and waste."³⁴ These problems can be largely traced to the peasants' dissatisfaction with the more radical economic policies promoted by the Long regime, including the drive to eliminate material incentives and to limited private ownership. The peasants must have also been unhappy about the increased time they were required to devote to ideological study during the busy farming season.

Throughout the 1969-71 period, very little was said about industrial policies in Xinjiang. There were some very general references to the Party's drive to "put politics in command of the factories" and its emphasis on promoting "self-reliance." The authorities were compelled by agricultural declines to emphasize the development of local industries at the basic levels throughout 1970-71, especially those which would best serve the needs of agriculture and people's livelihood. The emphasis on local industries was also based upon Peking's desire to decentralize the regional industrial complex due to the threat of Soviet attack.

By the end of 1969, there were signs of industrial recovery. The gross value of industrial output

in the region was estimated to be 821 million yuan, an increase of some 75 million yuan over 1968. The gross value of industrial output by the Xinjiang PCC was claimed to be 29 percent over that of 1965.³⁵

Throughout 1970, the masses were told to make an all-out effort to realize a "great leap forward" in the industrial and agricultural spheres. The "learn from Dajing" campaign was intensified, and there was much propaganda about self-reliance, plain living, hard struggle, doing away with superstition, and liberating thinking. At year's-end, the Xinjiang PCC reportedly had increased its output of various industrial products by 4.7 to 219 percent over 1969, including steel, coal, coke, cement, machine tools, cotton and woolen cloth, dried milk, and chemicals.³⁶ The gross value of PCC industrial output was said to be the highest on record, while that for Urumqi was claimed to have been 44 percent higher than 1969. The gross value of industrial output for all of Xinjiang was placed at 1,182 million yuan.³⁷

Nationalities Policy

Throughout the GPCR in Xinjiang, nationalities affairs had been an important focus of criticism. Although there were scattered reports of Red Guard attacks against the "four old's" among the region's minorities, the Maoist leadership in Peking had been very careful in its treatment of the indigenous ethnic groups. Generally, however, the radical Red Guards in Xinjiang had been more concerned with the attitudes of Wang and his colleagues toward the conduct of nationalities policy rather than with the minorities themselves. It will be recalled, for example, that Lu Jianren, who had long been involved in the Party's minority nationality work in Xinjiang as director of the UFWD, was one of the regional leaders attacked and subsequently purged during the GPCR. Presumably, Lu's crime had been his "capitulationism" in the form of supporting the more moderate handling of the nationalities question. Also, reports of factional fighting in Xinjiang had concerned groups of Han, and there were no confirmed instances of large-scale, organized resistance by the minorities nor any repetition of the 1962 mass exodus to the Soviet Union.

With the continued turmoil and dislocations caused by the GPCR, the demise of Wang, and the introduction of new radical policies, however, there was a noticeable trend toward minority restiveness. When hostilities broke out along the Sino-Soviet border, one of the contributing factors was the flight

of non-Han elements from troubled Xinjiang and the Soviets' willingness to provide sanctuary or encouragement to them. Also, it is likely that pro-Soviet propaganda and agitation within Xinjiang had found some degree of receptiveness. In early 1970, the regional leadership therefore undertook what amounted to a purge of those leading elements who had reputedly maintained "illicit relations" with the Soviets or had exhibited "splittist sentiments." Among those who had fallen, or were to fall, for such alleged crimes were Burhan, M. Iminov, and Aisihaiti.

Throughout 1970, minority nationality functionaries from the intellectual and cultural spheres were gathered together by the regional authorities for intensive mass criticism and indoctrination sessions. The class struggle in these spheres was reported to have become quite intense due to the large amount of "poison" which had been spread by the social-imperialists in Xinjiang. Likewise, the old educational system, teaching methods and principles that were similarly "infected" came under attack in 1970, and the class struggle in education was also said to be acute.³⁹ Some cadres were accused of viewing the revolution in education as a tender topic that could only proceed at a slow pace. The ranks of the teachers and staff, therefore, were duly "purified."

At the end of 1970, the regional authorities held a conference to prepare for a renewed campaign to promote the implementation of script reforms in the Uighur and Kazakh languages.⁴⁰ The participants were urged to carry out the 1965 decision which had adopted a slightly modified Latin alphabet and the incorporation of certain Han language terms. It was admitted, however, that struggle still existed in the reform of the scripts. The people of Xinjiang were told to eliminate the remaining influence of social-imperialism on "old ideas and old customs."

The various radical minority policies implemented by the Long leadership were designed primarily to combat pro-Soviet and local nationalist tendencies among the region's population. While there may have been some efforts to maintain a focus of attack on only those aspects of the minority customs and habits which had retained either pro-Soviet or pro-Islamic (i.e., anti-Han) tendencies, it is likely that when the policies were put into practice excesses did occur. There were rather conflicting indications as to the nature of the regional leadership's line toward the minorities by 1971. On the one hand, they may have simply been publicly mouthing the more revolutionary jargon of the radical minor-

ity policies in order to placate Peking, while in practice seeking to limit the scope and intent of the policies within a rather narrow framework. On the other hand, the Urumqi authorities continued publicly to attack the concept that the Party's policies should only be implemented according to local conditions and peculiarities. Whatever the intentions, or characteristics, of the minority policies implemented by the regional regime, the most important factor was how the minorities perceived them. At least a portion of the non-Han people of Xinjiang exhibited distinct disfavor with the more radical aspects of the Party's minorities policy.

From the available data on socio-economic policies during this period it can be concluded that Long's regional leadership did attempt to introduce policies that were more in tune with the radical line of the Mao-Lin faction in Peking. A notable trend toward more universalistic policies similar to those of the GLF period, that emphasized politics and ideology can be detected. Less attention was given to formulating and implementing policies according to the special conditions and peculiarities accruing to Xinjiang. Ideological incentives were stressed over material incentives, limited private ownership was curtailed, egalitarianism in economic distribution was promoted over the system of work points, and efforts were made to eliminate the "four-old's." Overall, there was a definite hardening of socio-economic policies.

The policy line of Long brought mixed results. While sporadic recovery occurred in the economy, largely as a result of declining political turmoil, there were signs that the region continued to experience subsurface tensions and dislocations. The rise of minority restiveness, problems within the communes, and serious agricultural production declines can be largely traced to the radical policies that were inaugurated as political stability was still being sought by the new leadership.

18. The Lin Biao Affair and Xinjiang, 1971-73

Beginning in the autumn of 1971, only a few months after the establishment of the Second Xinjiang CCP Committee, China was shaken by the shocks of the "Lin Biao Affair." The various events associated with the political struggle in Peking between Mao and Lin, which had begun in late 1970, were to constitute an important turning-point for China, and for Xinjiang in particular. In the aftermath of the incident, Xinjiang was to experience a second major change in leadership and was to enter into a new period of policy retrenchment characterized by moderation and gradualism.

THE LIN BIAO AFFAIR AND ITS EFFECTS IN XINJIANG

During the summer of 1971, the Chinese media began making subtle references to a "new trend" in China's class struggle. Although there was no public discussion of the growing split between Mao and Lin, there were indications that the two leaders had indeed parted ways. Mao indirectly attacked Lin by criticizing and removing elements who were loyal Lin supporters in the Chinese capital, moving pro-Mao troops into Peking, and assigning reliable military cadres to high-ranking posts throughout China so as to undermine Lin's authority in the provinces. These developments, coupled with Lin's absence from public functions in Peking, indicated that a confrontation between Mao and Lin was brewing. In October-November 1971, the national and regional media was replete with statements about the importance of distinguishing between "genuine and sham Marxism."¹ A Urumqi Radio broadcast of November 20 spoke of "new and old revisionists, bourgeois adventurists and schemers, and political swindlers who resorted to counterrevolutionary double-dealing acts" in an attempt to sabotage the revolution. It condemned those who claimed to be "humble little commoners but in actuality were big schemers bent on creating splittism."

Even though Lin Biao was not mentioned by name

in these reports, he was obviously the target of attack. According to a number of top secret Party documents captured and released by Taiwan authorities in 1972, most of which were corroborated by subsequent reports from the official Mainland press, Lin and a number of high-ranking Party and military colleagues had attempted a military coup against Mao in September 1971.² The coup plan, designated "Project 571" (which in Chinese is a homonym for armed uprising), was drafted in late March 1971. The plan called for a three-stage action to strike in the Shanghai-Nanjing area; extend control to Peking and Canton; and assassinate Mao on September 12 by bombing the train carrying him on an inspection tour between Shanghai and Hangzhou.

The plot to blow up Mao's train was revealed to Zhou Enlai by Lin's own daughter in time to prevent the assassination. At 2:30 a.m. on September 13, Chinese Air Force Trident jet number 256 crashed near Undur Khan, Mongolia killing all nine persons aboard, including Lin Biao, his wife, and his son. Apparently, Lin had attempted to flee to the Soviet Union after his plot had been uncovered. All other flights in China were promptly grounded for fifty-eight hours, all military leaves were cancelled, and suspected conspirators were arrested. Moreover, the traditional National Day celebrations on October 1, 1971 were cancelled, and magazines and books containing Lin's picture or writings were recalled from bookstores.

From the latter part of 1971, the campaign against Lin Biao intensified. Although not mentioned by name, Lin's crimes were listed as: (1) promoting the supremacy of the PLA and using it as a base of power for his own ambitions; (2) encouraging the arrogance and insubordination of the PLA and over-emphasizing political training and indoctrination in the PLA in order to turn it into a "cultural army"; (3) defying Mao's Party leadership and plotting an armed coup against Mao and the Party; (4) attempting to undermine and split the unity of the people, the Party, and the PLA; and (5) maintaining illicit relations with foreign countries, specifically the Soviets whose support he sought for his attempted coup. While the Maoist leadership vehemently attacked Lin's various policy deviations in subsequent statements, it was quite apparent that underlying the mass of verbiage the real issue centered on the political power struggle between Lin and Mao.

The fall of Lin Biao signaled an impending purge of his supporters and those elements whose loyalties

to Mao might be suspect. Since Long Shujin had risen through the ranks of Lin's PLA 4th F.A. faction, and since Xinjiang was considered to be of great strategic importance, it was only natural that Long's position in the region would be questioned by the Maoist leadership.³ Long's removal from power in Xinjiang, while seemingly inevitable, was not immediate, however. He continued to make public appearances on an increasingly irregular basis throughout the first half of 1972.

Prior to removing Long, Mao undertook measures to undercut the power of the pro-Lin faction in Xinjiang, probably with the memory of how difficult it had previously been to extract Wang Enmao from the sensitive border region and undercut his factional power base. One device that was used to pave the way for Long's removal was the transferral of new personnel to Xinjiang who had little or no loyalty to Lin Biao. This process had probably begun in late 1970-early 1971 with the appearance of several new faces in the regional hierarchy. During the next year, additional "outsiders" from the PLA 2nd F.A. and PLA "5th" F.A. bases arrived in the region to assume high-ranking posts. Included in this group were: Liu Faxiu, who was made a vice-commander of the XJMR; Yang Zongsheng, who became a vice-commander of the Xinjiang PCC; and He Linzhao, Jiang Lindong, Zheng Jianhua, and Hu Huazhu, who were assigned to positions on the regional Party or revolutionary committees.

Also notable was the fact that several pro-Lin leaders in Xinjiang were absent from public functions throughout 1972. These included Tan Kaiyun, Li Qingquan, Kong Ruiyun, and Zeng Ruqing. This does not mean that all high-ranking elements who had links with the Lin faction were removed. In fact, it appears that the Mao-Zhou coalition against Lin was reinforced by military leaders who had crossed over factional and institutional lines to align themselves against Lin.⁴

By June 1972, Long Shujin's name had disappeared from the regional media altogether. He was not mentioned as having attended the regional ceremonies marking the anniversaries of the founding of the Party on July 1, the PLA on August 1, or the People's Republic of China on October 1. Significantly, these were all functions at which he would normally have appeared.⁵ What emerged with Long's demise was an interim collective leadership in Xinjiang. Long's Party and revolutionary committee duties were increasingly taken over by Saifudin and Xiao Siming,

who had been commander of the Hebei Military District and vice-chairman of the Tianjin Municipal Revolutionary Committee prior to his arrival in Xinjiang. Most of Long's responsibilities as XJMR Commander were assumed by Xu Guoxian, a veteran of the PLA 1st F.A. faction who had been criticized earlier by Red Guards.

THE EMERGENCE OF A COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

The anti-Lin Biao campaign was subsequently continued throughout China as the "movement to criticize revisionism and rectify work style."⁶ During this movement the PLA was told to heighten its efforts to "learn from the people," discipline and military training in the PLA were emphasized, the "theory of Mao's genius" which had been promoted by Lin was attacked, and the Party's unified leadership and dominance over military affairs was stressed.

In late 1971, for example, a militia-building movement had begun in Xinjiang which was designed to transfer some of the security and control responsibilities of the PLA units to the paramilitary organs at the local levels. All militia work was to be actively handled by the people's armed forces departments of the communes, ranches, factories, and enterprises under the unified leadership of the Party committees and branches. The ranking secretaries of the Party organs within the communes personally assumed the position of political commissars of the militia regiments.⁷

While the large-scale building of people's militia units can be viewed partially as a response to the Soviet threat, it can also be seen as an attempt to create a paramilitary network for public security and control at the local levels under the firm control of Party organs. In essence, the militia-building movement represented a Maoist drive to undermine Lin's military power base.

As efforts were made to diminish the political power and authority of the military,⁸ a concurrent movement was undertaken to rehabilitate cadres who had been placed under struggle by radical Red Guards earlier. Even as the "Lin Biao Affair" was unfolding in mid-1971, it was reported that over 4,000 cadres had been remolded through ideological study and productive labor at the various "May 7th" Cadre Schools in Xinjiang.⁹ In March 1972, the Urumqi "May 7th" Cadre School claimed that over 200 of its students had returned to their former posts early in the year.¹⁰ Some 120 of these cadres were said to be from leading posts in the Party, government or-

gans, factories, mines, and schools, that is, from those organs and institutions which had largely fallen under military control and supervision during the period of the pro-Lin faction's predominance in Xinjiang.

On September 23, 1972, Saifudin said that much work had been done in speeding up the rehabilitation of cadres and using their experience and service, but he called for further efforts to "liberate and use" cadres and strengthen the leading groups at all levels.¹¹ Saifudin warned that it was crucial for the cadres to strengthen discipline, observe rules, remain at their work or production posts, oppose anarchism, and remain modest and prudent. Two days later, Saifudin added that it was necessary to avoid becoming entangled in the historical problems of the GPCR in Xinjiang.¹² In carrying out the anti-Lin Biao campaign it was necessary to link it with realities in Xinjiang. Saifudin was saying, in essence, that in continuing the movement in the region it was absolutely forbidden to regenerate factional strife. He thus implied that it should not be used as a cloak behind which the former Red Guard elements might strive to make a comeback. Of no little significance was the fact that in calling for the campaign to be linked with the realities of Xinjiang, Saifudin suggested that there was then a trend toward policy retrenchment and moderation which took into account the special conditions of the region.

By late 1972, increasing numbers of rehabilitated cadres were being assigned to leading positions within Xinjiang that had been vacated by pro-Lin elements or had gone unfilled since the fall of Wang Enmao. Besides Xu Guoxian, the more prominent cadres of the PLA 1st F.A. faction who were rehabilitated included Xing Yuanlin, Tao Jinchu, Li Zhaoming, Zhang Shigong, and Lin Bomin. Xing and Tao were brought back as vice-commander of the XJMR and vice-commander of the Xinjiang PCC, respectively. Li Zhaoming was made a vice-chairman of the XJ Revoly. Cmte. Zhang Shigong, whose rehabilitation began in 1970 after a period of remolding through study, self-criticism, and labor, was promoted to secretary on the Xinjiang Party Committee in 1972. Lin Bomin, an alternate secretary on the previous regional Party committee and director of its propaganda department, reappeared in his former positions by late 1972.

A factor that continued to the smooth change-over in the regional leadership and muted any factional violence that might have otherwise accompanied it was the resettlement of additional educated

youths (former Red Guards) in the countryside. By the end of 1972, 200,000 educated youths had been "sent-down" from the region's urban centers since the movement began three years earlier.¹³ More than 24,000 such youngsters had been resettled from Urumqi, while the total in the Yili Zhou was 21,000.¹⁴

Between 1971 and 1973, new Party committees were successively re-established at the subregional levels in Xinjiang. The limited data available on these new committees indicated a trend toward Han dominance of the top positions, and a tendency for the local Party committee leaders to be of mixed civilian-military origin.

In mid-1973, Saifudin was officially promoted to fill the vacated posts of Xinjiang Party First Secretary, XJ Revoly. Cmte. Chairman, and political commissar of the XJMR. Concurrently, Yang Yong was transferred from his post as first vice-commander of the Shenyang Military Region to become XJMR Commander, Party Second Secretary, and first vice-chairman of the XJ Revoly. Cmte. Xiao Siming was promoted to Party Third Secretary, second vice-chairman of the XJ Revoly. Cmte., and second political commissar of the XJMR.¹⁵

Other individuals promoted in the region included three Uighurs. Two of them, Timur Dawamad and Caodanuofu, had held high positions in the regional elite prior to the GPCR. Respectively, they had assumed the posts of vice-chairman of the XJ Revoly. Cmte. and alternate secretary of the Xinjiang Party Committee by 1973. Simaiyi Aimaiti, whose background in Xinjiang is not known, emerged as a secretary on the regional Party committee. Table 18.1 provides a listing and background of the known Party, government, and military leaders of Xinjiang as of late 1973.

The appointment of both a Second and Third Party Secretary in Xinjiang, which was unique among the twenty-nine provincial administrative units in China, strongly implied that the leadership of Xinjiang was to remain collective in nature. Although Saifudin's continued presence in the regional hierarchy since 1949 is a fascinating story in itself, it is doubtful that he was given full power to govern the strategic border region since he was a minority national and had been a member of the CPSU prior to 1949. His longevity in the regional elite was based upon several factors. First, he had proven to be a good communist and his actions and words had nearly always been correct, especially on the issue of integrating Xinjiang with China Proper. Second, he had

constituted a model of minority compliance to the rule of the CCP, and had symbolized at least a degree of non-Han representation within the higher ranks of the Party. Third, his power base in Xinjiang was virtually nil, and he had exhibited no remaining factional loyalties within the region (i.e., to the former pro-Soviet Yili group or to Wang Enmao).

Yang Yong's appointment to Xinjiang was the culmination of his re-emergence from disgrace and dismissal in 1966, when he had been commander of the Peking PLA units. Yang's background was complicated by a brief association with Lin Biao during his early military career. Technically, however, Yang was affiliated with the PLA 2nd F.A. faction. He had been commander of the Air Force units under the Southwest Military Region, commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea, and a deputy chief of staff of the PLA. His experience in modern warfare and his knowledge of the border regions was probably instrumental in his assignment to Xinjiang.

The new collective leadership that had emerged in the autumn of 1973 was not dominated by any one all-powerful individual, nor was it monopolized by a single factional group. Although the Xinjiang elite still included a rather high percentage of military cadres, it was a civilian Party cadre who now nominally headed it. Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the new regional leadership was that it constituted a carefully balanced composite of "insiders" and "outsiders," old and new cadres, military and civilian elements, and, superficially at least, non-Han as well as Han nationals. To a large measure, a system of "checks-and-balances" was built into the leadership group. On the whole, then, the new regional elite was more responsive to central authority and control as a result.

POLICY RETRENCHMENT AND MODERATION IN XINJIANG

Economic Policies

After the fall of Lin Biao and the demise of Long Shujin in Xinjiang, a trend toward policy moderation and retrenchment developed rather rapidly under the new collective regional leadership. For example, the main emphasis of the Fourth Five-Year Economic Plan that was implemented in early 1971 prior to Lin's attempted coup emphasized the rural economy, increasing agricultural mechanization, strengthening provincial level economic autonomy and local self-reliance, and intensifying the twin campaigns of emulating Dazhai in agriculture and Dajing in industry. However, by mid-1971, the

Table 18.1

Xinjiang Leadership in the Autumn of 1973.

| Position | Name | Natly. | Background |
|------------------------|--------------------------|--------|---------------------|
| 2nd XUAR CCP Cmte | | | |
| 1st Secy | *Saifudin ^{a,b} | Uig. | Party; 1st F.A. |
| 2nd Secy | *Yang Yong ^b | Han | PLA; 4th F.A. |
| 3rd Secy | Xiao Siming | Han | PLA; 5th F.A. |
| Secy | Liu Xing | Han | Worker; 2nd F.A.? |
| Secy | Simaiyi Aimaiti | Uig. | Party; "Insider" |
| Secy | He Linzhao | Han | PLA? "Outsider" |
| Secy | Song Zhihe | Han | Party; 3rd F.A. |
| Secy | *Zhang Shigong | Han | PLA; 1st F.A. |
| Alt. Secy | *Lin Bomin | Han | Party? 1st F.A. |
| Alt. Secy | *Caodanuofu | Uig. | PLA; 1st F.A. |
| Xinjiang Revoly. Cmte. | | | |
| Chm | Saifudin | | |
| V-Chm | Yang Yong | | |
| V-Chm | Xiao Siming | | |
| V-Chm | Liu Xing | | |
| V-Chm | Song Zhihe | | |
| V-Chm | *Pei Zhouyu ^c | Han | PLA; 2nd F.A. |
| V-Chm | Hu Liangcai ^c | Han | Worker; "Insider" |
| V-Chm | Yang Liye | Han | Worker; "Insider" |
| V-Chm | Ruzi Turdi ^c | Uig. | Peasant; "Insider" |
| V-Chm | Zheng Jianhua | Han | Unknown |
| V-Chm | Zu Ya | Kaz. | Herdsman; "Insider" |
| V-Chm | Li Chuanqun | Han | PLA; A.F. Unit 7335 |
| V-Chm | *Li Zhaoming | Han | PLA; 1st F.A. |
| V-Chm | *Tan Kaiyun? | Han | PLA; 4th F.A. |
| V-Chm | Wu Zhulun? | Han | Masses; "Insider" |
| V-Chm | *Timur Dawamad? | Uig. | Party; "Insider" |
| Mass Organizations | | | |
| Secy XJ CYL | Nuerdiyefu | Uig. | Unknown; "Insider" |
| Chm Trade Union | Hu Liangcai | | |
| Chm Women's Fed. | Aimu (f) | Uig. | Wife of Saifudin |
| XJMR | | | |
| Cmdr | Yang Yong | | |
| V-Cmdr | *Xu Guoxian | Han | 1st F.A. |
| V-Cmdr | Saifudin | | |
| V-Cmdr | Lai Gongxun | Han | 2nd F.A.? |
| V-Cmdr | Zhang Jiecheng | Han | 4th F.A. |
| V-Cmdr | Lu Jingxuan | Han | Unknown; "Outsider" |
| V-Cmdr | Li Changlin | Han | 2nd F.A. |

Table 18.1 (cont.)

| Position | Name | Natly. | Background |
|--------------|-------------------------|--------|---------------------|
| XJMR | | | |
| V-Commander | Lo Rong | Han | 4th F.A. |
| V-Commander | Liu Faxiu | Han | Unknown; "Outsider" |
| V-Commander | Kong Ruiyun | Han | 4th F.A. |
| V-Commander | Xing Yuanlin | Han | 2nd F.A./1st F.A. |
| V-Commander | Du Hailin? ^c | Han | 2nd F.A./1st F.A. |
| Pol Cmsr | Saifudin | | |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Xiao Siming | | |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Pei Zhouyu | | |
| D. Pol Cmsr | He Linzhao | | |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Caodanuofu | | |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Zeng Ruqing | Han | 3rd F.A. |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Hu Huazhu | Han | Unknown; "Outsider" |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Lo Rong | | |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Tan Kaiyun | | |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Jiang Lindong | Han | Unknown; "Outsider" |
| Xinjiang PCC | | | |
| Commander | Zhang Jiecheng | | |
| V-Commander | Yang Zengsheng | Han | 1st F.A. |
| V-Commander | Du Hailin | | |
| V-Commander | Kong Ruiyun | | |
| V-Commander | Tao Jinchu | Han | 1st F.A. |
| Pol Cmsr | Pei Zhouyu | | |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Zhou Jiuyin | Han | Unknown; "Outsider" |
| D. Pol Cmsr | Zeng Ruqing | | |

* Criticized by Red Guards during the GPCR.

^a Alt. Mem., 10th CCP Politburo (August 1973).

^b Full Mem., 10th CCP Central Committee.

^c Alt. Mem., 10th CCP Central Committee.

Sources: Chu, op. cit., pp. 11-12; NCNA, Urumqi, July 3, 1973; CNS, No. 472 (June 21, 1973); CNS, No. 474 (July 5, 1973); CNS, No. 477 (July 26, 1973); CNS, No. 480 (August 16, 1973); CNS, No. 490 (October 24, 1973); and Urumqi Radio, September 30, 1973.

the Dazhai and Dajing models were somewhat de-emphasized by the regional media amidst revelations that problems still existed in production. According to one report, some localities had failed to take enough care in spring farming and production, while others had achieved little because plans were simply not carried out.¹⁶ It revealed that there was a shortage of agricultural supplies due to the mismanagement of transportation facilities. As a result, the regional leadership called for the resolute implementation of "taking grain as the key link," increasing production in the cultivated fields, and expanding the cultivated acreage.¹⁷ While the blame for poor production was officially placed on natural disasters during 1970, it was more likely that the stress on ideological incentives had been largely responsible for the setbacks.

To cope with the continuing problems in agricultural production, the authorities made what amounted to a tactical retreat in late 1971. On July 11, for instance, Urumqi Radio disclosed that the correct implementation of the Party's rural policies included:

. . . persisting in the principle that ownership by the production team is the basic form in the three-level system of ownership of the means of production in the people's commune . . . It is necessary to draw a distinction between the capitalist tendencies shown in sideline production and the proper family sideline occupations. Under the condition that the development of the collective economy is insured and enjoys absolute superiority, the commune members may be allowed to have limited private plots and livestock, and engage in family sideline occupations that are proper. With regard to the distribution of incomes, . . . it is necessary to pay equal attention to the interests of the State, the collective, and the individual . . . and to persist in the socialist principle of 'from each according to his ability; to each according to his needs' . . .¹⁸
(Italics mine.)

Significantly, the Party sanctioned the return to limited capitalism in the countryside, including private plots and livestock, sideline production and free rural markets, material incentives, and the distribution of income according to the work point system. Also notable was the retrenchment of the system

of ownership from the commune level to the production brigade level.¹⁹ These measures essentially constituted an admission by the Maoist leadership that agricultural production and development had shown little advance under the more ideologically oriented policies that did not recognize Xinjiang's peculiarities.

Under these conditions of retrenchment and liberalization, Xinjiang's agricultural output was reported to be showing a general increase and its pastures were said to be thriving by the end of 1971.²⁰ One source claimed that the region's per capita grain production had increased to 1,473 jin by mid-1971.²¹ As of April 1973, some 12 million mou was being sown to wheat, maize, barley, cotton, and edible oil crops in Xinjiang, or 2.3 million mou more than 1972.²²

Xinjiang's industrial output showed substantial growth during the 1971-73 period. This growth can be attributed to several factors. First, as agricultural and raw materials production stabilized, industrial production made corresponding strides ahead. This process was also aided by the increased emphasis placed upon industry serving agriculture. Second, there were indications that more and more of the regional industrial labor force was being put back to work. For example, the 1968 and 1970 official figures on industrial workers were the same--500,000. By late 1973, however, the total had jumped to 720,000, 160,000 of whom were minority nationals. Third, the creation of some 400 new medium/small industrial enterprises serving local needs after 1969 had likewise contributed to expansion in the industrial sector. Fourth, the return to non-ideological incentives in the factories probably spurred the workers to produce more.

The few available industrial production figures for the 1971-73 period confirmed that growth had been significant. In the first seven months of 1971, for instance, the region's industrial output reportedly increased by 17 percent over the corresponding period of 1970.²³ Crude oil production was up by 20.9 percent, and processed oil had risen by 8.9 percent between October 1970 and September 1971. Coal output was cited as being thirty-two times that of 1949. The gross value of industrial output in Xinjiang at the end of 1971 was claimed to be 400 times greater than that of the early post-liberation period.²⁴ The gross value of industrial output for 1971 was estimated to be 1,383 million yuan, and that for 1972 to be 1,701 million yuan.

Nationalities and Cultural Policies

Throughout the 1971-73 period, the Party's nationalities and cultural policies became less radical and more moderate in tone. A note of gradualism and selected toleration marked the leadership's cautious approach to the non-Han peoples of Xinjiang. Despite this general moderation of policies, however, some traces of the more radical policies of the 1969-71 period remained.

One such ideologically oriented policy that was outwardly retained from the preceding period was the selection of students for entry into the region's higher educational institutions. Prior to the reopening of Xinjiang's colleges in August 1972,²⁵ a recruitment and selection process was undertaken throughout the region which consisted of voluntary application, recommendation by the masses, approval by the leadership, and re-examination by the schools. Priority was given to selecting students from among the workers, peasants and soldiers whose levels of ideological consciousness were comparatively high and who had had two or three years of practical work experience. The length of matriculation for graduation was shortened, and graduates were required to return to productive labor after their studies. Prior to the reopening of the colleges, the mental outlook of all teachers was thoroughly remolded.

The same general line was followed in the region's primary and secondary schools. By early 1972, for example, some 80 percent of the region's primary and middle schools in the rural and pastoral areas were reportedly being operated by poor and lower-middle peasants and herdsmen.²⁶ A July 1973 report claimed that there were 10,051 primary schools and 854 middle schools in the region, and that the total school enrollment had increased by over 35 percent since 1965.²⁷

Thus, while the reopening of Xinjiang's schools and colleges indicated a return to normality, especially with the former Red Guards now being back in class or resettled permanently in the countryside, what emerged was a new "revolutionary" educational system which was more democratically run and oriented toward serving the masses. To a large degree, the educational system of Xinjiang as of 1973 tended not to emphasize technical and intellectual studies per se, and stressed instead more practical education, labor, and political indoctrination. The "mass-line" approach that was followed in the educational sphere was also used in the region's system of health

care for the people. The health care system stressed preventative medicine and combined both modern and traditional medical practices. By 1972, for instance, Xinjiang had between 3,000-5,000 "barefoot doctors" (paramedics) who had been trained primarily by military personnel.

Another trend which continued from the GPCR period in Xinjiang was Peking's efforts to counter any remaining pro-Soviet influence and local nationalist sentiments among the non-Han peoples. In late 1971, for example, it was disclosed that mobile primary schools were again being operated on a large-scale in the rural and pastoral areas of Xinjiang, presumably in the Yili Zhou in particular.²⁹ In addition, some 179 classes for the new Uighur and Kazakh written scripts were being run in the region's communes. These measures were obviously intended to be devices to cut the regional minorities off from both Soviet influence and their own Islamic past.

19. The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region: Twenty Years and After

The nature of Chinese politics following the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973 was extremely complex and often fluctuated between radical and moderate phases imperceptibly. The most crucial event has undoubtedly been the death of Chairman Mao in Peking on September 9, 1976.¹ With his passing, China emerged into a new era fraught with many uncertainties, including those associated with the key issues of leadership and policy orientation. It was only natural that these developments would have a significant impact on power, policy and integration in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which celebrated its twentieth anniversary in 1975.

A SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL SINCE 1973

Following the Tenth Party Congress, Chinese politics was marked by efforts of the Party to reassert its control and authority over the PLA, the rehabilitation of leading cadres who had been purged during the GPCR, and a tendency to swing away from radical policy initiatives. These trends were generally not received well by the radicals within the Party leadership, including Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan, who increasingly feared that "retrogression and restoration" was negating all that they had accomplished during the preceding decade. For the radicals, the "thermidorian reaction" to the GPCR constituted not only a betrayal of the revolutionary goals of the GPCR but also posed a serious threat to their own political raison d'être.

To counter this moderate drift, the radicals launched the "Anti-Lin Biao and Confucius Campaign" in late 1973. The main objective of this movement was to foster support for a more positive retrospective view of the GPCR and protect the changes which it had engendered. In this regard, the slogan of "going against the tide" was emphasized by the

radicals in an attempt to defend the GPCR and its "new-born things."²

The most important plank in the "platform" of the radicals by 1974 was without question the promotion of young cadres rather than the rehabilitation of veteran cadres like Deng Xiaoping, who had reappeared in April 1973. To the radicals, the reinstatement of large numbers of veteran officials entailed not only the squeezing out of the younger, less experienced cadres who had emerged since the beginning of the GPCR, but also tended to undermine the legitimacy of the GPCR, exacerbate the drift toward conservatism, and thus symbolize the "restoration of the old." The attack on a slogan of Confucius (which Lin Biao had allegedly coopted)--"revive states that are extinct, restore families whose line of succession has been broken, and call to office those who have fallen into obscurity"--was unmistakably directed against the rehabilitation of veteran cadres.³ In early 1974, veiled criticisms were even levelled against Zhou Enlai in a brief three-week poster campaign for his failure to protect the GPCR reforms.

By the autumn of 1974, Zhou and the moderates had managed to contain the radical offensive and strengthen their position.⁴ Despite continued radical criticisms, unity and discipline were strengthened and the scope of the movement of "going against the tide" was narrowed by placing the "Anti-Lin Biao and Confucius Campaign" under the direction of Party committees at all levels.

In January 1975, the Second Plenum of the Tenth Party Central Committee and the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) were held. While these meetings indicated that the more normative policies advocated by Zhou were in the ascendent, it was clear that there was growing controversy on the key issues of leadership and programs. It was at this time that Deng Xiaoping seemingly solidified his political comeback, with the apparent sponsorship of the ailing Zhou, emerging as Party Vice-Chairman, senior vice-premier of the State Council, and PLA Chief of Staff. Deng's earlier reappearance had probably not been without Mao's concurrence, as implied by a People's Daily editorial of October 4, 1976 which stated that "Chairman Mao had saved him and gave him a chance to resume work."⁵ However, Deng's subsequent rapid rise within the Party leadership did not meet with the approval of Mao or the radicals. Nonetheless, for the next year he served as the de facto premier and was widely regarded as Zhou's likely hand-picked

successor.

Zhou Enlai's report to the Fourth NPC laid emphasis on economic development.⁶ He reiterated Mao's words at the previous NPC that to "accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology before the end of the century" a ten-year plan as well as a five-year plan and annual plans should be drawn up. Zhou also cited Mao's words "to rely mainly on our own efforts while making external assistance subsidiary... and to learn from the good experience of other countries and study their bad experiences." Thus, the stress was to be placed upon a relative rather than an absolute application of the principle of self-reliance. Articles 7 and 9 of the National Constitution adopted on January 17 guaranteed the right of peasants to farm private plots and engage in sideline production, reaffirmed the principle of income distribution according to labor, and insured the freedom of demonstration and strike.⁷ The theme of unity, drawn from Mao's "three directives" of unity, class struggle, and production, was also stressed by Zhou, who called for a "revolutionary united front which includes all patriotic democratic parties and personages in all walks of life."

The reaffirmation of policies that fall into the category of "material incentives" or "bourgeois rights" did not go unchallenged by the radicals, who launched several campaigns against them throughout 1975. With the death of Zhou Enlai on January 8, 1976, there began a definite "turn to the left" in Chinese politics. It was probably this event more than any other which set off the power struggle at the central level which was to last nearly a year. Zhou's death removed whatever constraints Mao and the radicals may have felt previously, and enabled them to point their spearhead directly at his "protege". Immediately after delivering the eulogy at Zhou's memorial service on January 15, Deng came under attack in all but name for incorrectly evaluating the lessons of the GPCR and committing the cardinal sin of putting unity and production on a par with class struggle.⁸

That Deng's position was in serious doubt was apparent in the floodtide of criticisms which were levelled against "the same old capitalist-roaders who were subjected to criticisms during the GPCR but refused to show any repentance."⁹ On February 7, Hua Guofeng was named acting premier, and shortly thereafter a full-fledged public campaign against the as yet unnamed Deng was unfolded.¹⁰

On April 4-5, during the Qingming Festival, massive violent demonstrations occurred in Peking's Tiananmen Square following the removal of wreaths and placards placed at the Revolutionary Martyrs' Monument in commemoration of Zhou. Apparently, the demonstrators had also posted signs criticizing Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, and even Mao himself. The Tiananmen demonstrations brought a swift and predictable reaction as PLA and militia troops dispersed the participants. The incident had all the earmarks of a spontaneous movement in support of Zhou's policies and, by implication, of Deng's position as his successor. Whatever the causes were, it is quite plausible that the demonstrations were, in the end, manipulated by those opposed to Deng. On April 7, the Politburo named Hua Guofeng premier and first vice-chairman of the Party and dismissed Deng from all leadership posts (although he retained his Party membership).

Significantly, however, the Politburo decision of April 7 had stopped short of endorsing attacks on other "capitalist-roaders." The radicals were largely unsuccessful in their attempts to widen the anti-Deng struggle into a full-fledged "anti-rightist campaign," and their momentum gradually waned by mid-summer 1976. In the first place, there was considerable sentiment among Party and PLA leaders for the modernization programs advocated by Zhou and Deng. Secondly, as Mao's health deteriorated, the radicals may have found it difficult to convince the cadres that the campaign was still under Mao's personal leadership. Thirdly, the huge earthquake in the Tangshan-Tianjin area on July 28 dealt the whole movement a crushing blow, and turned all attention toward relief work and economic construction. These conditions tended to enhance the role of administrators and the PLA.

On September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong died in Peking, and behind-the-scenes maneuvering for his mantle began immediately. A joint People's Daily, Hongqi, and Liberation Army Daily editorial of September 16 echoed the radical's position in unveiling a "new" Mao instruction adjuring the Chinese people to "act according to the principles laid down." Two days later, Hua Guofeng's speech at Mao's memorial service did not note this "final instruction," but reiterated Mao's dictum "to practice Marxism, and not revisionism; unite, and don't split; be open and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire."¹¹

On October 7, the Central Committee appointed Hua Party Chairman and head of its Military Affairs

Commission, but made no official announcement until two weeks later. On the same date, the radical "Gang of Four" (Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan) were arrested for allegedly plotting to assassinate Hua, carrying out a coup d'etat, forging Mao's will, and fabricating his last words. Shortly thereafter, other radicals were arrested, including Mao Yuanxin (Mao's nephew), and mass demonstrations were held to condemn the "Gang" including one in their former "stronghold" at Shanghai.

While Hua's move against the radicals may have been in response to a coup attempt from the "left," it is not implausible that his action, which was backed by Ye Jianying and other PLA leaders, constituted a pre-emptive maneuver against the "Gang." With Mao's death the radicals' cause was dealt a staggering blow, and their opponents certainly took advantage of this factor. The Hua leadership took great pains to legitimize its "victory" on the grounds of Mao's written statement to Hua on April 30, 1976 that "with you in charge, I'm at ease."¹² A joint People's Daily, Hongqi, and Liberation Army Daily editorial of October 25 indicated that the Hua leadership had gained control over the propaganda organs from the radicals by stating that Mao had become aware "long ago" of the conspiratorial activities of the "Gang," and had "severely criticized and educated them again and again." As early as July 1974, it revealed, Mao had warned them: "You'd better take care; don't form a small faction of four people."

Beginning in November 1976, efforts were made to restore Zhou's public image and focus in on the importance of actively developing economic production and modernization and improving the material and cultural life of the people. The "Gang of Four" was accused of using the 1974 "Anti-Lin Biao and Confucius Campaign" to attack the late premier and, by implication, his more moderate policies. That Hua was determined to establish a policy line based upon economic development was illustrated by his speech at the Second National Conference on Learning from Dazhai on December 25. He then endorsed a 1956 speech by Mao entitled "On the Ten Great Relationships" which focused on the "mobilizing of all positive factors, both inside and outside the Party, both at home and abroad, both direct and indirect, and build China into a powerful socialist country."¹³

In mid-January 1977, a ten-day poster campaign in Peking revealed mass support for the disgraced Deng Xiaoping who, it was felt, would be reinstated

as premier. Although the posters were methodically cleared away by the authorities, the close parallels between the policy speeches of Hua and those previously advanced by Zhou and Deng exhibited marked similarity. There were differences in opinion within the Party on Deng's status, however. Moreover, not everyone was happy about the shift toward moderation. One indication of this was the spat of disturbances among radically inclined workers in Zhengzhou, Henan and Baoding, Hebei which required PLA intervention to keep the railways running.

By mid-summer 1977, however, the rehabilitation of Deng was virtually beyond doubt in principle. At the Third Plenum of the Tenth Central Committee in late July a resolution was passed restoring Deng to the posts of Party Vice-Chairman, PLA Chief of Staff, and vice-chairman of the Military Affairs Commission. The plenum also resolved to expel the "Gang of Four" from the Party.

The Eleventh Party Congress held from August 12 to 18 confirmed the leadership and policy changes undertaken since the death of Mao. Emphasis was placed on a moderate and pragmatic approach to politics and economic development, and the themes of unity, discipline, and stability were underlined. Hua announced that with the smashing of the "Gang" the GPCR was officially at an end.¹⁴ The campaign to uncover "sworn followers" of the "Gang" and to stamp out its influence throughout China, however, was said to be a crucial continuing task. In fact, the movement was about to enter a third, more intensified stage following a year of factional turmoil in some localities.

In the new Politburo elected at the Eleventh Party Congress, there was no place for ideologues or for purely symbolic representatives of the revolutionary masses. It was dominated by veteran Party and military figures, including Hua, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Wang Dongxing.

THE XUAR AFTER TWENTY YEARS

The celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region on October 1, 1975 was held during the period of relative moderation prior to Zhou Enlai's death. Saifudin and Yang Yong were both on hand to host a delegation from Peking led by Vice-Premier Chen Xilian. The occasion was used primarily to stress the need for stability and unity in the region and to warn against the Soviet threat.

A speech delivered by Chen at a Urumqi rally,

for example, began by emphasizing the maintenance of a high level of vigilance and combat readiness in Xinjiang against potential Soviet aggression. He stressed the army's role as a fighting force, a work team, and a production team. His concern was echoed by a People's Daily editorial of September 30, 1975 which warned that the main danger facing Xinjiang came from the Soviet Union which "practices big-Russian national chauvinism at home and perpetrates social-imperialism, aggression, subversion and splitting activities abroad." It called for resolute blows at a "handful of national splittist elements and counterrevolutionaries under the cloak of religion who throw themselves into the arms of the Soviet revisionists."¹⁵

Speaking on the need for internal security, Saifudin warned that "telling blows" would be meted out to the class enemies who interfere and undermine stability and unity with bourgeois factionalism. He added that

... there remain weaknesses and shortcomings in our work in Xinjiang. We are still far from meeting the requirements set by Chairman Mao and the Party Center. The situation is pressing.¹⁶

Chen Xilian also emphasized the need for economic production and development in Xinjiang, which he felt was essential for social and political stability. He commented that "only a preliminary foundation" had been created for industry and agriculture in Xinjiang.¹⁷ He made it very clear that for the region to achieve "still better results" and bring about modernization in industry, agriculture, science and technology within this century a "painstaking struggle" lay ahead. He spoke of doing economic work well, increasing the people's prosperity, and solidifying the material foundation for opposing Soviet subversion. Industrial development was to be oriented toward serving agriculture, which remained the priority task. The manufacture of farm machines was to be chiefly undertaken by localities, with State support being secondary. In the future, these localities were to become self-sufficient in their manufacture industry.

Xinjiang Daily, on September 27, criticized "those who think that the development of Xinjiang is the business of the central government and feel that there is no need for fully mobilizing local resources and energies." Saifudin also spoke against people who stressed Xinjiang's "backwardness and peculiar

situation" and thus considered it impossible to use self-reliance in carrying out economic construction in the region. He said

... in no way do we rule out aid when we stress self-reliance, but economic construction must be on the basis of self-reliance. At no time shall we foster the ideas of the lazy and cowardly just because of the availability of state aid.¹⁸

It is interesting to note that both Saifudin and Chen put such a heavy emphasis on the concepts of self-reliance and self-sufficiency (which were key planks in the platform of Mao and the radicals). While both may have adopted a more radical tone on economic development merely to assuage the leftists, it is noteworthy that Saifudin in particular also took a similar stance on other important policy issues. Saifudin's remarks aside, it was probably apparent to all Party leaders that a wide gap in the degree of development between Xinjiang and the Han areas of China still existed. The region's strategic importance made it imperative for Peking to pay considerable attention to modernization programs there, even if local initiative was not forthcoming.

This fact was reflected by the publicity given to the vast amount of state aid which Xinjiang had received, both in material and manpower terms, since liberation. An NCNA report from Urumqi on September 27, for example, stated that Xinjiang not only kept all local revenues for its own use, but also got huge subsidies from the central authorities.¹⁹ From 1955 through 1974, these central subsidies accounted for as much as 53 percent of Xinjiang's total revenue. State investments in Xinjiang's capital construction in 1974 alone, it said, were more than five times the 1955 total. Undoubtedly, the degree of economic growth and modernization in Xinjiang was in a large measure due to the enormous amount of state assistance provided to the region after 1949.

Although factional disturbances and natural disasters in 1975-76 may have had some impact on production levels in Xinjiang, the estimates for the period that are given in Table 19.1 can be compared to earlier achievements so as to obtain a tentative indication of growth.

In his October 1975 speeches, Saifudin placed a good deal of stress upon the need to study revolutionary theory. He spoke of firmly and unflinchingly relying on the masses and adhering to the revolutionary struggle.²⁰ Only by conscientiously

studying and grasping the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he remarked, would it be possible to understand the characteristics and laws concerning class struggle "and remain sober-minded in the acute and complex struggle" between the two lines. Saifudin called for "daring above everything else" in dealing blows against all unhealthy tendencies and exercising a dictatorship over the bourgeoisie. He warned that "we should never neglect the study of revolutionary theory, no matter where we are, how busy we are, or how difficult our tasks." He did add, however, that while attention must be paid to political and ideological work, the tendency of fearing to lead production and management work must also be corrected.

Table 19.1
Estimates of Economic Production in Xinjiang, 1975-76.

| Type | 1975 | 1976 |
|---|-----------------|-------------|
| Foodgrains (millions of tonnes) | 3.82 | 3.8 - 3.9 |
| Arable/Cultivated Acreage (millions of mou) | 48.23 | - - |
| Irrigated Acreage (millions of mou) | 40.3 | - - |
| % Acreage Mechanized | 57.8 | - - |
| Livestock (millions of head) | 26.51 - 27.9 | 28.10 29.57 |
| Gross Value of Industrial Output | 5+ x 1955 | - - |
| Ind. % of Gross Value All Output | 85 (1949 = 2.9) | - - |
| Gross Value Ind. & Agric. Output | 3 x 1955 | - - |
| Ind. Units Added Since 1965 | 900+ | - - |
| Refines Petroleum Capacity (tonnes) | - - | 500,000 |
| Electricity Output | 3+ x 1965 | - - |

Sources: Compiled by the author from various reports by XJRB, Urumqi Radio, and the China Mainland press and radio.

On the crucial issue of policies toward the national minorities, Saifudin reiterated that the "nationality struggle, in the final analysis, is a question of class struggle." He explained that

We must understand fully the class nature of the nationality question, carry out in-depth re-education on the Party's nationality policy and oppose bourgeois nationalism, including Han chauvinism and local nationalism. We must criticize national secessionism and encourage

people of all nationalities to respect each other, learn from each other, help each other, and work to promote nationality unity.²¹

He later added that while fully observing the common law of class struggle, it was necessary to pay close attention to the "special characteristics of work" in areas inhabited by minority peoples. If this was not done, "leftist mistakes" could be made.²²

In one of Chen Xilian's speeches,²³ he implied that there had been some dissent among the Muslim community of Xinjiang, possibly due to the official ban on religious observances and Peking's attempts at cultural reforms.²⁴ He cited the constitutional right of freedom of religious belief and non-belief for all patriotic and law-abiding peoples, but warned that tough measures would be taken against "the handful of class enemies who engage in restoration and undermining activities under the cloak of religion."

In late 1975, several new faces appeared in the regional leadership (see Table 19.2). Zheng San-sheng was brought in from the Peking Military Region as first vice-commander of the XJMR in early 1976 replacing Xu Guoxian. Guo Linxiang, formerly a political commissar in the PLA General Logistics Department, assumed Xiao Siming's post of political commissar in late 1975. Appearing as deputy political commissars were Li Gang (formerly a Peking Garrison Vice-Commander), Wei Yuzhu (ex-deputy director of the Canton Military Region Political Department), and Yan Jinsheng (previously a political commissar in the Sha'anxi Military District).

Two minority nationality cadres were promoted to higher positions within the regional elite. Simaiyi Aimaiti (Ismayil Aymat), a Uighur, was elevated to political commissar of the XJMR. He also held the posts of secretary of the regional Party committee and vice-chairman of the XJ Revoly. Cmte. A Kazakh by the name of Jianabuer (Janabil) became a deputy secretary of the Xinjiang Party Committee and a vice-chairman of the XJ Revoly. Cmte.

Assumedly, the Han component in the regional Party remained at over 50 percent, which meant that the ratio of Han to non-Han members continued to be higher than the Han nationality's share in the regional population (which was reported to be 40 percent of a total of over 10 million people).²⁵ The media did emphasize the large minority component in the Party organs at the subregional levels. It was claimed that 65 percent of the members of Party

committees at all levels in Xinjiang were minority nationals.²⁶ Ten of fifteen administrative districts and autonomous zhou were said to have minority cadres as heads of Party and government leading bodies.²⁷ Virtually all key positions in the regional Party organs, however, continued to be held by Han cadres, and even where minority elements were nominally ranked above their Han subordinates, it is likely that de facto power remained with the latter.

During the radical upsurge of 1976, publicity was given to the rapid rise in the numbers of youth (including ex-Red Guards) in the Party committees of various localities in Xinjiang. In some areas, the youth component was said to have increased by over 40 percent compared to 1975.²⁸ In all probability, however, veteran cadres continued to dominate the subregional Party bodies, and with the fall of the "Gang" the numbers of youth presumably declined.

Total cadre figures for Xinjiang are as tenuous as those for Party membership. There were reports that over 50 percent of the members of people's congresses and revolutionary committees in the region were minority nationals, and that 60 percent of Xinjiang's deputies to the Fourth NPC and the Tenth Party Congress were non-Han elements.²⁹ It was said in October 1976 that among leading cadres at various levels in the region, over 55 percent were minority cadres promoted to their positions during the GPCR.³⁰ One report, however, claimed that minority cadres accounted for only 40 percent of the regional total, which, if true, represented a startling drop from the early 1960s when nearly 60 percent of all cadres were non-Han.³¹ Another official source implied that minority cadres numbered only 73,000-84,000 in late 1975, which was much lower than the 1965 total of 106,000.³² Even Chen Xilian expressed concern that Xinjiang needed "more and more" cadres, doctors, engineers, scientists and technicians of the minority nationalities.³³

XINJIANG AFTER THE DEATH OF MAO.

On October 12, 1976, Urumqi Radio announced that the XJ Revoly. Cmte. supported the new central leadership under Hua Guofeng and would resolutely struggle against anyone who practiced revisionism and splittism or engaged in conspiracies. It warned against any statements or actions that were harmful to unity, and called for increased discipline. Similar support was pledged by the regional Party and military authorities at a meeting in Urumqi on

Table 19.2
The Xinjiang Elite, 1975-78.

| | 1975-76 | 1977-78 |
|----------------------|-----------------------|---|
| XUAR CCP CMTE | | |
| 1st Secy | Saifudin (Uig) | ^{1,2} Saifudin?/ ² Wang Feng 1/78 |
| 2nd Secy | Yang Yong | ² Yang Yong#/ ² Wang Feng* 7/77 |
| 3rd Secy | Xiao Siming# | ² Liu Chen* 7/77 |
| Secy | Song Zhihe | Song Zhihe |
| Secy | Liu Xing# | Zhang Shigong |
| Secy | Zhang Shigong | ² Simaiyi Aimaiti |
| Secy | Simaiyi Aimaiti (Uig) | He Linzhao |
| Secy | He Linzhao | |
| Dpty Secy | | ³ Jianabuer |
| Dpty Secy | | Li Yunhe |
| Stdg Cmte Mem | Jianabuer (Kaz) | Caodanuofu |
| Stdg Cmte Mem | Li Yunhe | Lin Bomin |
| Stdg Cmte Mem | Caodanuofu (Uig) | |
| Stdg Cmte Mem | Lin Bomin | |
| Stdg Cmte Mem | Cai Yuming? | |
| XUAR REV CMTE | | |
| Chm | Saifudin | Saifudin?/Wang Feng 1/78 |
| V-Chm | Yang Yong | Yang Yong/Wang Feng* 7/77 |
| V-Chm | Xiao Siming# | Song Zhihe |
| V-Chm | Liu Xing# | Simaiyi Aimaiti |
| V-Chm | Song Zhihe | Jianabuer |
| V-Chm | Simaiyi Aimaiti | Pei Zhouyu |
| V-Chm | Jianabuer | Li Chuanqun? |
| V-Chm | Pei Zhouyu | Yang Liye |
| V-Chm | Li Chuanqun | ³ Hu Liangcai |
| V-Chm | Yang Liye | Zu Ya |
| V-Chm | Hu Liangcai | Zheng Jianhua |
| V-Chm | Zu Ya | Li Zhaoming |
| V-Chm | Zheng Jianhua | Wu Zhulun |
| V-Chm | Li Zhaoming | ³ Ruzi Turdi |
| V-Chm | Wu Zhulun | Li Yunhe? |
| V-Chm | Ruzi Turdi | |
| XJMR | | |
| Cmdr | Yang Yong | Yang Yong#/ ³ Liu Chen* 7/77 |
| 1st V-Cmdr | Xu Guoxian# | ³ Zheng Sansheng* 2/76 |
| V-Cmdr | Saifudin | Saifudin? |
| V-Cmdr | Lai Gongxun | Lai Gongxun |
| V-Cmdr | Zheng Jiecheng | Zhang Jiecheng |
| V-Cmdr | Lu Jingxuan | Lu Jingxuan? |
| V-Cmdr | Lo Rong | Lo Rong? |

Table 19.2 (cont.)

| | 1975-76 | 1977-78 |
|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|
| XJMR | | |
| V-Cmdr | Li Changlin | Li Changlin |
| V-Cmdr | Liu Faxiu | Liu Faxiu |
| V-Cmdr | Kong Ruiyun | Kong Ruiyun? |
| V-Cmdr | Du Hailin? | Du Hailin? |
| V-Cmdr | He Xunhe | He Xunhe? |
| V-Cmdr | Han Xiaoxue | Han Xiaoxue? |
| V-Cmdr | Tan Yulin* | Tan Yulin |
| V-Cmdr | Li Chuanqun | Li Gang? |
| V-Cmdr | Hu Huazhu | Hu Huazhu |
| 1st Pol Cmsr | Saifudin | Saifudin?/Wang Feng 1/78 |
| 2nd Pol Cmsr | Xiao Siming# | Wang Fent* 7/77 |
| Pol Cmsr | Guo Linxiang* 10/75 | Guo Linxiang |
| Pol Cmsr | Simaiyi Aimaiti | Simaiyi Aimaiti |
| Dpty Pol Cmsr | Hu Huazhu | Hu Huazhu |
| Dpty Pol Cmsr | Pei Zhouyu | Pei Zhouyu? |
| Dpty Pol Cmsr | Caodanuofu | Caodanuofu |
| Dpty Pol Cmsr | He Linzhao | He Linzhao |
| Dpty Pol Cmsr | Jiang Lindong | Yan Jinsheng |
| Dpty Pol Cmsr | Yan Jinsheng | Wei Yuzhu |
| Dpty Pol Cmsr | Wei Yuzhu | Li Gang |
| Dpty Pol Cmsr | Li Gang | |
| Cmdr So XJ MD | Zheng Zhiwen | |
| Cmdr AF Unit 7335 | Wu Shengkai | Wu Shengkai? |
| Pol Cmsr AF 7335 | (Zhang Bangxian)? | |
| Rsp Pers AF 7335 | Li Chuanqun? | |
| Rsp Pers AF 7335 | Chen Shangming | Chen Shangming? |
| XINJIANG PCC | | |
| Cmdr | Zhang Jiecheng | Zhang Jiecheng? |
| V-Cmdr | Kong Ruiyun | Kong Ruiyun? |
| V-Cmdr | Du Hailin | Du Hailin |
| Pol Cmsr | Pei Zhouyu | Pei Zhouyu |
| Dpty Pol Cmsr | Zhou Jiuyun | Zhou Juiyin |
| Dpty Pol Cmsr | Zeng Ruqing | Zeng Ruqing? |

- 1 Alt Mem, 11th CCP Politburo
 2 Mem, 11th CCP Central Cmte
 3 Alt Mem, 11th CCP Central Cmte
 # Transferred from Xinjiang

- * Transferred to Xinjiang
 Promoted
 ? Position/status unknown

Sources: Compiled by the author from China Mainland reports.

October 21.³⁴ At a rally on the following day, Saifudin urged that the "Gang's" poisonous influence in Xinjiang be eliminated.³⁵

Attacks on followers of the "Gang" in Xinjiang were begun in late October. A radically inclined leader of A.F. Unit 7335, Li Chuanqun, was notably absent at an anti-"Gang" meeting held by that unit in early November and had probably been purged.³⁶ Shortly thereafter, the tone of Xinjiang Daily articles indicated that radical elements had been removed from that organ. On November 7, the newspaper called for tough measures against the "Gang's" followers and "anyone who engaged in beating, smashing, and looting."³⁷ A week later, it demanded that leading members at various levels take a clearcut stand, but not "get entangled in settling old scores."³⁸

On December 15, the regional leadership held a meeting to intensify the campaign against the "Gang."³⁹ Saifudin noted that the "Gang" had "stretched its sinister hands into Xinjiang through various means," and stressed that bourgeois factionalism should be guarded against. To prevent factionalism from interfering in production activities, the regional authorities called for the maintenance of rational rules and regulations in all spheres of work and organized work teams to be sent out to various organs and enterprises to enforce them.⁴⁰ That factional problems nonetheless persisted into early 1977 was shown when Urumqi Radio stated that

On the eve of its collapse, the 'Gang of Four' sent its henchmen into the Xinjiang PLA units to hold discussion meetings everywhere in a vigorous attempt to expose what it called 'capitalist-roaders' in the armed forces. The 'Gang of Four' also extended its tentacles into the regional militia units and tried to pry them away from the military subdistricts.⁴¹

In February, both the Xinjiang and Urumqi Party Committees felt compelled to take further measures against disruptive elements, and did so by dispatching "urban work groups" with a total membership of some 1,000 cadres, workers and soldiers to various industrial, commercial and communications enterprises.⁴² There was obviously the fear that factional disturbances might lead to serious breakdowns in production and transportation, as well as upset the always sensitive nature of Han-minority relations. In fact, there were reports of "class enemies who are carrying out sabotage activities" and

"elements who are engaged in corruption, theft, and speculation." These were said to have led to shortages of chemical fertilizers, insecticides, and farm machinery.⁴³ On April 13, it was announced that an unnamed follower of the "Gang" in the region's leading public security organ had been arrested.⁴⁴

In early May, the regional media again complained about the lack of depth and uniformity in the campaign against the "Gang." One article commented that

... the leading comrades of some units still fail to understand the nature and significance of this struggle. Fraught with worry, they are taking a 'wait-and-see' attitude. They have failed to fully mobilize the masses to expose and criticize those people and activities connected with the 'Gang of Four.' In their units, the movement is listless and the masses are greatly displeased. We must be particularly aware that the pernicious influence of the 'Gang' is deep in Xinjiang and its harm is great. We must exert great efforts for a long time in order to deeply and systematically discredit them.⁴⁵

On May 4, two unnamed vice-chairmen of the XJ Revoly. Cmte. were attacked as "close followers" of the "Gang" and presumably removed from office.⁴⁶ At a mass rally of 100,000 people in Urumqi on May 20, the two purged vice-chairmen, one of whom was probably Li Chuanqun, were accused of forming their own group in Xinjiang to attack Party and PLA leaders and instigate work stoppages.⁴⁷ It was claimed that the regional Party authorities had tried repeatedly to get them to admit their mistakes, but that they had refused to repent. A few days later, public attacks were made against "some persons in Urumqi who followed the 'Gang' by poking their noses into literary and art circles doing great harm."⁴⁸ A purge of several followers of the "Gang" was also carried out in the Kazgar District in late May.⁴⁹

With the intensification of the campaign against the "Gang" in mid-1977, the regional authorities sought to rectify the cadre ranks of all radical elements. On June 11, the XJMR "May 7th" Cadre School opened its second class, presumably to "re-educate" some of those cadres who had been linked with the "Gang."⁵⁰

Of particular interest during this period were the attacks made upon the "Gang's" meddling in mi-

nority policies. On March 16, for instance, an article in People's Daily by the "Theory Study Group of the Xinjiang Party Committee" said that the "Gang," instead of respecting the right to autonomy and the customs and habits of the minority nationalities had suppressed their right to run their own affairs. The people of Xinjiang were said to be "cheering without restraint" for their removal. The "Gang" was accused of sabotaging the Party's policy on the minorities and of denying the "special needs with regard to their work and well-being." The "Gang" was excoriated for obstructing the production of special goods for the minorities by saying that they were "tinged with flavors of feudalism, capitalism and revisionism."⁵¹ Jiang Qing was quoted as having said that the minority nationalities were no better than "foreign invaders and aliens" and that their songs and dances had an "outlandish flavor."⁵² She apparently added: "What is so special about your tiny Xinjiang. I despise you!"

The regional authorities emphasized that henceforth it was necessary to respect the customs and habits of the minorities, attach importance to the use of their spoken and written languages, and give full play to the finer aspects of their culture.

In late July 1977, Yang Yong was transferred to Peking and replaced as XJMR Commander by Liu Chen, who also became third secretary of the regional Party committee. Wang Feng was brought into Xinjiang to fill Yang's posts of second secretary of the Xinjiang CCP Committee and first vice-chairman of the XJ Revoly. Cmte. In addition, Wang was made political commissar of the XJMR.

Liu Chen had accompanied Lin Biao to northeast China in 1945, where he served as the Jilin-Heilongjiang Military Region Commander. In 1952, he was made commander of the Air Force units in the Northeast Military Region at Mukden, and from there directed Chinese air operations in Korea. In November 1957, he was a member of the military delegation led by Peng Dehuai to Moscow. In mid-1959, Liu assumed the post of vice-commander of the PLA Air Force, and six years later was appointed PLA Air Force Academy President. In 1967, he was stripped of his posts by Red Guards, who attacked him as a supporter of He Long. With the posthumous rehabilitation of He Long by late 1976, however, the way was paved for Liu's reassignment to a responsible position.⁵³

Liu's posting to Xinjiang was significant for several reasons. First, he had long experience in a strategic frontier region. Second, he presumably

supported the renewed emphasis being placed by Hua Guofeng and other military leaders upon the program of upgrading and modernizing the PLA. Third, it was probably felt by Peking that he would bring any remaining radical elements within the PLA and Air Force units stationed in Xinjiang into line.

Wang Feng spent most of his career in the Northwest as a specialist in minority nationality affairs, and led the Party's efforts to integrate the non-Han peoples into the Chinese mainstream. After 1949, he had held leading posts in the Party's UFWD in the Northwest and Peking, was chairman of the Nationalities Committee of the NWMAC and vice-chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the State Council, and was Northwest Nationalities Institute President. From 1958 to 1968, Wang successively served as first secretary of the Party committees of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and Gansu province. In 1968, he was purged as an "agent of China's Khrushchev," but the real reason for his demise was probably based upon the prevailing radical belief that the moderate nationalities policies which he had supported were akin to "capitulationism."

Wang Feng's appointment to Xinjiang reflected the general return to moderate policies following Mao's death and the smashing of the "Gang." Being both a Han national and an expert in minority affairs, his position as the number-two Party man in the region was of the utmost importance. It is likely that he assumed much of the work of Saifudin, who spent increasing amounts of time in Peking.⁵⁴ Significantly, Wang's post of XJMR Political Commissar made him the leading Party figure within the regional military establishment. In this position, he not only filled in for Saifudin when the latter was occupied with other duties elsewhere, but he also was able to oversee the activities of his Han and non-Han counterparts.

The composition of the Xinjiang elite in late 1977 remained collective in nature and closely tied to Peking. It was dominated by veteran Party and military cadres and there were no purely radical representatives. De facto power was probably retained by the Han members, although minority elements who had been fostered by the Party since liberation, such as Simaiyi Aimaiti and Jianabuer, were being given increasing responsibilities. Eight Xinjiang leaders were elected to the Eleventh Party Central Committee in August 1977. Saifudin was retained as an alternate member of the Politburo, while Wang Feng, Liu Chen, and Simaiyi Aimaiti be-

came full members of the Central Committee. Alternate members of the Central Committee from Xinjiang included: Zheng Sansheng; Hu Liangcai, head of the Xinjiang Federation of Trade Unions; Jianabuer, first secretary of the strategic Yili Zhou; and Ruzi Turdi, a Uighur peasant from Turfan.

It is interesting to note here that Wang Enmao, the top leader in Xinjiang until his removal in 1969, reappeared as a political commissar in the Nanjing Military Region in late 1975. On March 30, 1977, Changqun Radio announced that he had been appointed first secretary of the Jilin province CCP Committee, chairman of the Jilin Revolutionary Committee, and first political commissar of the Jilin Military District.

The reasons for Wang's rehabilitation to a leading provincial Party post are not too clear. Obviously, his resistance to the radical leaders of the GPCR made his complete political comeback difficult until Mao's death and the elimination of his radical detractors. It may be that his "strong man" reputation, his long experience in the frontier region of Xinjiang, and his proven moderate orientation were seen as something which a leading industrial region in the strategically important Northeast needed. It is also possible that the central leadership wanted such a man in Jilin due to its proximity to Liaoning province, where the "Gang" had established considerable authority.

SAIFUDIN'S REPLACEMENT

The progress of the campaign against the "Gang" in Xinjiang by late 1977 was summarized by Saifudin on November 10, when he spoke at a rally in Urumqi to launch the third round in the struggle. He stated then that

... compared to the advanced provinces and regions of the country, Xinjiang still has a long distance to cover. The movement has not developed in a balanced way. Leaders in some localities and units have fallen behind the masses and have failed to grasp the movement seriously. Some of them have been soft-hearted in their actions and have worried too much.

Some people and matters related to the 'Gang's' conspiratorial activities ... have not been thoroughly uncovered. Some backbone personnel of the 'Gang's' factional set-up in Xinjiang are still making last ditch struggles and are unwilling to clarify their problems com-

pletely. They wave red flags to oppose the Red flag under the cloak of leftists, they used the power they had usurped and the mass media they controlled as tools for [their] intrigues. This influence has also found its way into political, economic, ideological, cultural, military and Party activities. We should not underestimate the confusing effect they had. All elements must be screened; there must be mass investigations; and special investigative groups must be established.⁵⁵

Later these words proved to be rather prophetic. In a highly significant development, Saifudin himself became an apparent victim of the campaign to smash the "Gang of Four." On January 31, 1978, Urumqi Radio announced that Wang Feng had assumed Saifudin's posts of Xinjiang Party First Secretary, chairman of the XJ Revolvy. Cmte., and XJMR First Political Commissar. The radio explained that Saifudin, who had been an expert in the art of political survival since 1949, had been relieved of his regional positions due to "personal ties" with the "Gang." At about the same time, books that he had authored were reportedly removed from bookstores in Urumqi.⁵⁶

It was also strongly rumored that he had lost his Politburo membership as well, but his appearance at Peking's Spring Festival celebrations in February discounted this speculation. His election as a vice-chairman of the Fifth NPC on March 5 confirmed that he still remained in the central leadership, nominally at least.⁵⁷ His retention of these two posts in Peking may have been part of a "deal" made in 1977 during the second rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping which required that the Politburo, once confirmed by the Eleventh Party Congress, should suffer no more purges.⁵⁸

It is also possible that Saifudin had gotten into trouble on account of his wife, Aimu, who was reportedly arrested and purged from her post as chairman of the Xinjiang Women's Federation for avowedly being "a Soviet revisionist spy." In fact, however, her crime may have been that she had tended toward the radical line of Jiang Qing. Saifudin's "guilt by association" was apparently challenged by some of the top leaders in Peking who sought to give him some protection against a total disgrace. For example, a pro-CCP newspaper in Hong Kong argued that

In dealing with a person who committed serious

crimes, it is reasonable to reject the use of the feudal method--the method which punishes a criminal's husband or wife, father or son and the whole family. Take Saifudin as an example. His wife probably has political problems. It is said that she was arrested because she is a Soviet revisionist spy. Even if Saifudin made mistakes, he should not be treated the same as his wife. Such a policy is correct.⁵⁹

Whatever the reasons were for his survival in Peking he was probably compelled to undertake some mild form of "re-education" to placate those who may have favored his total demise. The nature and scope of his responsibilities in the national capital under these new circumstances are not yet known, however.

Although it was likely exaggerated, the charge that Saifudin had been guilty of having "personal ties" with the "Gang" may have been partially true. During the most chaotic phase of the GPCR he had been shielded from attacks and "cultivated" by the Maoist faction in Peking. In part, he later rose to Politburo status on the coat-tails of the radical "Gang of Four" in the early 1970s. Prior to the demise of the "Gang" in late 1976, he had often taken what could have easily been interpreted as a radical stance on some policy issues. In an October 1977 article Saifudin had laid great emphasis on the importance of promoting non-Han cadres to leading posts in Xinjiang. As one analyst has speculated, it may be that he had fallen out with more senior Party leaders over this and other issues.⁶⁰ A foreign journalist reporting from Peking in early April 1978 cited wall posters and personal remarks by Chinese officials to the effect that Saifudin's name had recently been linked with a "mini-Gang of Four" which included himself, Kang Sheng (who died in 1975), Peking Mayor Wu De, and Peking Military Region Commander Chen Xilian.⁶¹

Despite these criticisms, it is difficult to believe that Saifudin had become a "hardcore radical." He had been an outspoken opponent of the purely separatist tendencies among some of his non-Han brethren in the border region since the CCP takeover. For the most part, he had been a "model Communist" loyal to Peking. Moreover, it would seem that his success under Party rule had come to symbolize Peking's "equitable treatment" of non-Han cadres, and his perceived stature had been an important factor in swaying many of the region's minor-

ity nationalities to support the CCP. Nonetheless, it was the perception of the leaders in Peking as of 1978 that counted.

It would appear that the way was carefully paved for Saifudin's removal from Xinjiang several months before the official announcement. He had spent most of his time in Peking during 1977 and many of his regional duties had been taken over either by other non-Han Party leaders, such as Simaiyi Aimaiti and Jianabuer, or by Han elements like Wang Feng. The cautious approach taken on his removal can be seen in the fact that it occurred many months after the Eleventh Party Congress, by which time most high-level purges had already been carried out in the anti-"Gang" campaign. This probably reflected Peking's appreciation of the impact such a move could have on the sensitive ethnic relations in Xinjiang. Moreover, the central leadership likely realized that his total disgrace might have aroused a sympathetic "anti-Han backlash" in the border region that would have provided fertile soil for Soviet meddling.⁶² Other measures were taken by Peking that may have been partially designed to soften the impact of Saifudin's removal. For example, the Nationalities Affairs Commission was revived during the Fifth NPC after having been disbanded by Red Guard attacks some twelve years earlier during the GPCR. A former Islamic iman, Yang Jingren, was chosen to head this body. In addition, the National Constitution ratified by the Fifth NPC placed greater emphasis on the multi-national character of the Chinese state. The right of the ethnic minorities to "preserve or reform" their own customs was also restored to the position it held in the 1954 Constitution, after having been dropped in 1975.

SUMMARY

For over two years, from early 1969 to late 1971, Xinjiang was ruled by the centrally sponsored group headed by Long Shujin and dominated by military men who were either directly affiliated with Lin's PLA 4th F.A., as was Long, or who were cadres belonging to the radically oriented Unit 7335 of the PLA 9th A.F. During his tenure, Long undertook protracted campaigns to establish subregional revolutionary committees and rebuild Party organs throughout the region. When such institutions finally re-emerged, they were normally dominated by military cadres aligned with Long and the Mao-Lin faction in Peking.

After the fall of Lin Biao in 1971, however,

Long and other suspected pro-Lin elements, were either removed from power or their role in regional affairs was drastically reduced. Increasing numbers of cadres loyal to the new Mao-Zhou Enlai coalition in Peking were transferred to Xinjiang to fill posts they left vacant. Significantly, cadres who had previously held high-ranking positions in the regional hierarchy under Wang, but who had been purged or criticized by Red Guards and subjected to remodeling, were rehabilitated in greater numbers after 1972. Included were several members of the PLA 1st F.A. faction. The interim collective leadership which then emerged stepped up the resettlement of educated youths in the countryside, thus ridding the cities of potential troublemakers who might foment factional activities. The new leaders, moreover, sought to de-emphasize the military's political role in Xinjiang by putting it under the direct control of Party organs.

Following the brief period of interim collective rule in Xinjiang, a new regional leadership headed by Saifudin was officially sanctioned by Peking in the autumn of 1973. The new Xinjiang leadership was not dominated by any one individual, nor was it monopolized by any single factional group, military or otherwise. In fact, the collective nature of the leadership, nominally headed by Saifudin, was a carefully balanced composite of "insiders" and "outsiders," old and new cadres, and military and non-military elements. The majority of the top regional leaders were moderates who bound together those of more conservative or radical leanings. Saifudin himself was neither a mere "non-Han figurehead," nor was he an all-powerful satrap with few constraints on his authority. In essence, Saifudin became increasingly involved in Party work in Peking as an alternate member of the Politburo. He also became more active as a member of several PRC delegations visiting foreign countries. Thus, he spent less of his time in the regional capital.

What had emerged with the collective leadership in Xinjiang by August 1973 was a system of "checks-and-balances," which in the end made the regional elite more responsive to central authority and control. Significantly, the removal of Long Shujin had been an important demonstration of Peking's ability to change Xinjiang's leadership a second time.

As Wang Enmao was removed from Xinjiang, the new regional leadership under Long had attempted to introduce more radical policies. These included the abolition of material incentives and private

ownership, egalitarianism in distribution, and attacks against the "four-old's." This new policy line generally took little cognizance of local conditions and peculiarities in Xinjiang, and as a result it contributed to political turmoil and socio-economic dislocations there.

As a result of the continued threat of Soviet invasion and meddling, incipient minority unrest caused by the turmoil of the GPCR, and the serious problems in Xinjiang's economy, Peking made what amounted to a virtual retreat on most of its more radical policies in the border region beginning in mid-1971. It once again returned to material incentives, limited private plots and livestock, the work point system of distribution, and the selective toleration of the "four-old's" especially among the minorities. There were also a renewed emphasis on implementing policies according to the realities of Xinjiang.

Virtually all of the available indicators for the period from 1971 to 1973 suggested a slow return to stability and relative prosperity in the region under these conditions of policy moderation, liberalization, and retrenchment. In the economic sphere, agricultural and animal husbandry production were returning to pre-GPCR levels after serious shortages from 1967 to 1970, and industrial output was also increasing rapidly. Undoubtedly, these factors contributed substantially to the growing stability and normality in the region.

By August 1973, the authorities had basically returned to many of the more developmental policies which had previously been advocated, and implemented, in Xinjiang by Wang Enmao. While the major policy themes of the new regional leadership stressed unity, solidarity, antirevisionism (anti-Sovietism), and production, there was an undeniable moderation and gradualism to "continuing the revolution" in distant Xinjiang. While Peking had largely been successful in its earlier efforts to displace the well entrenched leadership of Wang in Xinjiang, it had so far been compelled to retain the basics of his policy line.

Although this moderate trend generally continued after the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973, it did not go unchallenged by the radicals. The resulting "two-line struggle" over power and policy intensified, and both national and subnational developments became quite complex. The deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in January and September 1976, respectively, ushered in periods of radical ascen-

dency and moderate response. By late 1976, Hua Guofeng secured his position as Mao's successor (with the aid of the PLA), purged the radical "Gang of Four," and emphasized a more normative, developmental policy line.

When the XUAR celebrated its twentieth anniversary on October 1, 1975, there were said to still be shortcomings in work including a failure to fully mobilize local resources and energies due to an excessive reliance on state aid; a continued lagging behind in industry and agriculture; and problems with "bourgeois factionalism" and a "handful of national splittist elements" who were "throwing themselves into the arms" of the Soviets. The themes of unity and stability were stressed amidst what was described as "an acute and complex struggle between the two lines" in the region.

As an apparent measure to rectify these budding problems and strengthen their position in Xinjiang, the moderates under Zhou Enlai transferred several loyal cadres to the region from Peking, Canton, and Sha'anxi. Also, two non-Han cadres, Simaiyi Aimaiti and Jianabuer, rose rapidly in status in Xinjiang.

With the death of Chairman Mao and the smashing of the "Gang of Four" in late 1976, several radically inclined cadres were purged in Xinjiang, including two unnamed vice-chairmen of the XJ Revoly. Cmte. At the same time renewed emphasis was placed upon respecting the customs and habits and improving the livelihood of the ethnic minorities.

In July 1977, Yang Yong was transferred to Peking and Wang Feng and Liu Chen were brought in to fill his posts as Xinjiang Party First Secretary and XJMR commander, respectively. Significantly, both were Han nationals who had been purged during the GPCR and subsequently rehabilitated. Wang Feng had been a leading Party figure in the Northwest since 1949, and had long experience in minority nationality affairs. Liu Chen had prior close connections with both He Long and Peng Dehuai. In a related and highly significant development elsewhere in China, Wang Enmao achieved a total comeback some eight years following his purge in Xinjiang. On March 30 he was officially recognized as Party First Secretary, Revolutionary Committee Chairman, and first political commissar in strategic Jilin province.

In late 1977, the campaign against the followers of the "Gang" in Xinjiang was proving to be a rather prolonged and delicate piece of "political surgery." Saifudin candidly revealed that it had not developed in a "balanced way" and that "backbone personnel" of

the "Gang's" factional set-up in Xinjiang were still making last-ditch struggles. It is not inconceivable that the campaign had spawned factional clashes there, and had also let loose a barrage of spontaneous criticisms against the radicals from the minority groups. If true, the latter phenomenon must have particularly frightened the Peking leadership who feared that such an "enthusiastic response" from the non-Han groups could easily swell into a tidal wave of criticism against Party (and Han) rule generally.

After what appeared to be several months of cautious preparations, Peking removed Saifudin from his regional posts and elevated his Han "subordinate," Wang Feng, to the top position in Xinjiang. Knowing that such a move could have easily aroused the ethnic sensitivities of the local peoples and provided soil for Soviet meddling, the central authorities attempted to soften the impact of removing the Uighur leader by several tactical devices, such as allowing Saifudin to at least nominally retain his Politburo membership and appoint him as a Fifth NPC Vice-Chairman.

Although it is much too soon to gauge the long-term implications of Saifudin's removal from Xinjiang, there seems to be little doubt that it reflects the fact that the current Party leadership regards Xinjiang as too strategically important to be governed effectively by anyone but a Han. It is of no little significance that the central authorities were able to reach into the distant border region and pluck out the leading post-liberation minority leader without fomenting a massive reaction. It is interesting to note, moreover, that by early 1978 Chinese Communist power and policy in the region, in a sense, seemed to have gone full circle since 1949--from Wang to Wang.

20. Conclusion

Between 1949 and 1966 there had emerged in Xinjiang a well-entrenched Party-military elite under Wang Enmao and his Han comrades from the PLA 1st Field Army. For a decade and a half, Wang concurrently held the top posts in the border region, including Party First Secretary, XJMR Commander and Political Commissar, and Xinjiang PCC Political Commissar. His Han Party colleagues from the PLA 1st Field Army came to dominate all key positions in the region's Party, government, and military establishments, while representatives of the non-Han ethnic groups were largely relegated to more nominal positions of prestige and subordinated to their Han comrades.

During Wang's long tenure as leader of Xinjiang, his goal of achieving the ultimate political, socio-economic, and cultural integration of the region and its predominantly Muslim inhabitants with the rest of China was in complete harmony with the aspirations of the central Party leadership in Peking. Before 1949, however, the Han areas of China had achieved a higher degree of integration with the center than had Xinjiang. This had been the result of the emergence of a greater cultural and ethnic homogeneity in China Proper, which had been accompanied by the traditional ebb and flow between political and socio-economic integration along feudal lines and political and socio-economic integration in bureaucratic terms. Prior to liberation Xinjiang had largely remained outside the mainstream of political power and cultural tradition in China Proper. Thus, with the Communist victory there existed a basic dichotomy between the degree of prior integration within China Proper and the degree of previous integration between Xinjiang and the Han areas of China. As a result, there emerged two divergent components in the integrational process under CCP rule. One component, stressed by Mao Zedong, was the revolutionary reintegration of China, while the other component, recognized to varying degrees by all CCP leaders, was the

achievement of integration de novo in the Chinese borderlands.

The Maoist view concerning the basic form this process should take following liberation emphasized the need to optimize political-ideological integration. Accordingly, it was not the degree but rather the quality of integration that was most important. Politics and ideological consciousness were seen as being inseparable in the Maoist vision of integration and modernization. But, unlike the more advanced Han areas of China to which the Maoist vision undoubtedly had more immediate relevancy, the situation in Xinjiang was different. There, the initial concern was with the crucial need to achieve the non-Han border region's integration de novo with the new Chinese Communist state so as to set the stage for the Maoist model of revolutionary development. In other words, both the degree and the political quality of integration came to be viewed by Wang Enmao as being mutually important.

Because of Wang's practical, on-the-spot experience as the top Party and military leader in Xinjiang, he determined that the integrational process there could best proceed by taking into account the region's special conditions and problems when implementing policies. These included the traditional predominance of non-Han Muslim groups whose anti-Han sentiments and separatist aspirations had long plagued Chinese rule; the region's strategic location along the Sino-Soviet border, which had historically allowed Russian penetration and influence among the indigenous peoples to complicate Chinese control; the relative economic backwardness of the region; and the wealth of natural resources there that had long awaited Chinese exploitation.

Based upon his perceptions of these special conditions and problems, Wang generally came to favor moderate policies, and advocated that the Party should firmly but gradually bring about Xinjiang's integration with the People's Republic. By adopting what may be termed "developmental integration," Wang sought to enhance national defense, internal security and law and order, nationality unity under CCP (and Han) guidance, and economic growth and modernization in the region. Accordingly, he cultivated a preference for such policies as the maintenance of a modern, highly-trained and professionalized military establishment; technical and scientific expertise; material incentives and limited private ownership; and the selective toleration of those ideas, customs and habits of the national minorities which were not

separatist or pro-Soviet in orientation.

In contrast to Mao, Wang generally did not emphasize those policies that were, in his view, excessively radical unless they contributed to the objectives outlined above. As a rule, the Maoist policies tended to pay less attention to local conditions and problems, and were thus less flexible and more universalistic in nature.

While Wang's stance was certainly less radical than the Maoist model demanded, this did not mean that he had simply surrendered to regional demands, or to his own power-hungry ambitions. On the contrary, he had remained firmly committed both to bringing about the region's eventual integration with China and to promoting, albeit gradually, those revolutionary Communist principles that were basic to the Maoist design. But, since Wang and Xinjiang had so intimately shaped each other's character for a decade and a half it was only natural that he would often display what appeared to be parochial attitudes and preferences in policy matters. Wang did not deny the future validity of the Maoist vision for Xinjiang, rather he realized that the region and its peoples were simply not yet ready for many of Mao's revolutionary aspirations. What Wang attempted to do was to make Han rule and the integrational process as palatable as possible to the region's sensitive minorities. Although Wang's approach was basically "soft," he did on occasion resort to "harder" and more coercive measures.

It is not surprising that Wang faced the serious dilemma of being a strong regional leader who had to implement policies in such a way that they did not totally deviate from the Maoist model and yet were flexible enough to take into account the realities of Xinjiang's special conditions and problems. At the risk of losing the trust of Mao, Wang cautiously and selectively adopted policies which would bring about the integration and modernization of Xinjiang. On the eve of the GPCR, the Maoist ideologues must nonetheless have seen Wang's policies as being a perversion of the socialist revolution in China.

Despite this, Wang's policy line had largely succeeded in bringing Xinjiang to the "threshold" of integration with the People's Republic of China by 1966. First, Wang had firmly established Party, and Han, control and authority in the border region. Soviet presence in Xinjiang had been terminated, and pro-Soviet and separatist ambitions among the local non-Han groups had been countered with a high degree of success. Wang had secured the frontiers and es-

tablished the basis for law and order internally. As a result, on the eve of the GPCR Xinjiang was unquestionably an integral part of China.

Second, Wang had stabilized the regional economy and his regional policies had resulted in relative prosperity despite the fact that Xinjiang still lagged behind the rest of China in some respects economically. Under his rule, the Xinjiang PCC had stimulated economic development and modernization, and had begun the exploitation of the region's valuable resources for China. The border towns such as Yining that had long been geographically, economically, and politically oriented toward the Soviet Union were reoriented toward Urumqi and China Proper by the work of the Xinjiang PCC, the construction of a highway network centered on the regional capital, and the completion of the Xin-Lin Railroad in 1961. Not only was Xinjiang approaching basic economic self-sufficiency by 1966, it was also beginning to contribute substantially to the national economy of China.

Finally, great strides had been made under Wang's direction in achieving Xinjiang's social and cultural integration with the rest of China. The traditional composition of the region's population, which had been over 90 percent non-Han, was significantly altered by the large-scale resettlement (colonization) of Han people from China Proper. A large proportion of these were educated urban youths, the majority of whom were assigned to the various units of the Xinjiang PCC. By 1966, the influx of Han settlers into Xinjiang had resulted in an approximate numerical parity between the Uighur and Han nationalities in the total regional population. Moreover, the non-Han peoples had been incorporated into the multi-nationality communes throughout Xinjiang; the independent-minded herdsmen had been pacified, settled, and organized along socialist lines; and the pro-Soviet intellectuals of the former "Eastern Turkestan Republic" in the Yili area had either been eliminated or remolded. The Party had also undertaken vigorous measures to restrict, control, and abolish the traditional power and influence of Islam in Xinjiang, including its organized religious activities. Language reforms had been promoted among the region's non-Han groups so as to cut them off from their Islamic and ethnic traditions, as well as from their kinsmen in the Soviet Union, and introduce communist ideology.

Despite the significant social and cultural changes that had taken place under Wang's leader-

ship, however, a complete transformation had not been achieved in the region. Given the sensitivities of the non-Han peoples and the strategic importance of the border region, Wang had come to realize that some of their unique characteristics should be selectively tolerated and respected for the interim. The elimination of the old ideas, customs, habits, and beliefs of the minorities, with the exception of any lingering pro-Soviet or separatist sentiments, was deemed to be a long-term process. As a result, Wang emphasized the methodology of "accommodation," which viewed the transformation of Xinjiang's ethnic groups (i.e., their ethnic and cultural fusion) as an on-going process. On the whole, nonetheless, Wang had patiently but firmly paved the way for total Party control and authority in Xinjiang and had brought about the conditions for the region's ultimate political, socio-economic, and cultural integration with the rest of China. In this regard, it can be said that Wang had successfully guided Xinjiang more than 25,000 li (Chinese miles) on its 30,000 li journey toward total integration by 1966.

Because of his well-entrenched power base in Xinjiang and his generally more moderate policy stance, Wang Enmao constituted a logical target for the emerging radical tide generated by the Maoist ideologues in Peking during 1963-66. In Mao's eyes, Wang had come to personify the evils of regionalism and revisionism. When the GPCR unfolded with great violence in China, Wang attempted to isolate Xinjiang from the worst excesses of the campaign for as long as possible. In essence, his stance was that socialist legality rather than proletarian violence should govern the movement in the strategic border region. Until late 1966, the GPCR in Xinjiang was played out almost wholly by local Han actors under Wang's close supervision and control. When the leftist Red Guards from Peking brought the movement with all of its extremism into Xinjiang, however, Wang responded with repression. In part, his actions were also undoubtedly based upon a desire to save his own position in Xinjiang.

From late 1966 to September 1968, the radical Red Guards continuously challenged Wang's leadership and sought to destroy his power base in Xinjiang. Factionalism between the leftist and pro-Wang elements spawned increasing political turmoil and virtual anarchy. During this period, the debate over policies was almost wholly subsumed in the larger issue of power struggle. Moreover, in their ideo-

logical fervor the young Maoist-supported radicals tended to overlook Xinjiang's complicated historical problems and special conditions in attacking Wang.

When violence in Xinjiang became so widespread as to threaten complete socio-economic dislocation, renewed minority unrest, and Soviet meddling in regional affairs, the Mao-Lin group in Peking felt compelled to make what amounted to a series of strategic retreats in 1967. These included the official suspension of the GPCR in Xinjiang, which Peking hoped would restore a degree of normality. While these measures had the effect of supporting Wang's position and delaying his removal from power, as well as inhibiting the introduction of more radical policies by the Maoists, factional violence nonetheless continued. The available evidence suggests that while the Maoist group in Peking had officially postponed the GPCR in Xinjiang, it (especially Lin Biao and Jiang Qing) unofficially continued to encourage the radical elements to undermine and attack Wang's power base. The net result was that during 1967 neither Wang, who managed to retain substantial support and influence within the region, nor the Maoists, whose power gradually increased, could yet garner sufficient strength to win an outright victory in the power struggle.

By mid-1968, however, Wang's position had eroded significantly as a result of the unrelenting attacks of the radical Red Guards in Xinjiang and Peking, the infiltration of pro-Maoist cadres from China Proper belonging to Lin Biao's PLA 4th Field Army group who were assigned to positions of authority within the regional hierarchy, the entry of the radically inclined A.F. Unit 7335, and the increasing purge, neutralization, or defection of many of Wang's former allies in the regional elite. Shortly thereafter, with his regional power base being rapidly undermined, Wang was subjected to struggle by Red Guards while in Peking. During his absence from Xinjiang, PLA units loyal to the Mao-Lin faction were dispatched to the region.

In September 1968, the Xinjiang Revolutionary Committee was established after prolonged negotiations in Peking between Wang and the central authorities. Long Shujin, who was affiliated with Lin's PLA 4th Field Army, was named chairman. Wang, whose influence within Xinjiang remained a factor to be reckoned with, was demoted to a vice-chairmanship, but nevertheless was retained in the regional leadership. With the creation of what was to be a brief Long-Wang coalition in Xinjiang, it was apparent

that the previous monopoly of power and authority which Wang and his PLA 1st Field Army colleagues had held in the region since liberation was now crumbling. Peking had gained sufficient power to reach into the border region and alter its leadership.

Subsurface tensions lingered in Xinjiang following the formation of the regional revolutionary committee, however. Prolonged negotiations and behind-the-scenes maneuvering between Long and Wang also continued. In November 1968, Long took over Wang's post of Xinjiang Military Region Commander, and thereafter Wang was attacked in all but name, carefully removed from the regional political scene, and disappeared from the ranks of the Party leadership by mid-1969.

Wang Enmao's eventual demise was occasioned by the fact that he had built up a strong, well-entrenched regional power base and had come to advocate policies which were, in the eyes of Mao, revisionist. Wang's opposition to the GPCR in Xinjiang, which had been based on his perception of regional conditions and needs as well as his own personal power aspirations, had not endeared him to the Mao-Lin faction. Mao must have felt that Wang constituted the most serious obstacle to regional unity and to greater central control. Wang's removal, in fact, strongly suggested that the Maoist leadership in Peking had reservations about continuing to entrust leadership to a man like Wang who might encourage what it considered to be regionalist tendencies or who might fail to unite the various rival groups on account of his previous actions or his remaining conservative inclinations. In part, Wang was also a victim of the Maoist attacks on those central Party and military figures, such as He Long, Wang Zhen, and even Liu Shaoqi, with whom he was either factionally aligned or ideologically identified. The end result was that the Maoist challenge to Wang's regional power base was successful. By mid-1969, there had emerged a regional leadership which was more ideologically in tune with and more responsive to the Maoist central leadership.

Significantly, as the power struggle against Wang Enmao was being resolved in 1969, the new regional leadership under Long Shujin attempted to introduce more radical, ideologically oriented policies in Xinjiang. While the regional leadership was, in this regard, showing its responsiveness to the policy line of the central authorities, the new policies it promoted did not show a corresponding responsiveness to the realities of Xinjiang's spe-

cial conditions and problems. As a result, the socio-economic dislocations which had arisen during the earlier period of political turmoil in Xinjiang were further aggravated by the new policy line. These included minority restiveness which accompanied and may have been partially responsible for the renewal of hostilities along the Sino-Soviet border; a crisis in industrial and, especially, agricultural production; and growing apathy, hoarding, and speculation within the rural and pastoral communes. Thus, while a degree of reconsolidation and political stability was achieved under Long's leadership, subsurface tensions and socio-economic problems nevertheless continued to plague the new regime.

Following the "Lin Biao Affair" in late 1971, a second leadership change occurred in Xinjiang. Long Shujin and other pro-Lin elements in the regional elite were removed from their positions. An interim collective leadership emerged that sought to de-emphasize the military's pre-eminent role in regional political affairs and place the army under increasing Party control. Greater numbers of former Red Guards were sent to the rural areas to settle permanently, thus ridding the cities of potential factional troublemakers.

By late 1973, a collective leadership nominally headed by Saifudin was sanctioned in Xinjiang by the Mao-Zhou Enlai coalition. This leadership was notably balanced between "insiders" and "outsiders," Party and military elements, and new and old cadres (some of whom were PLA 1st Field Army group members who had been removed from their posts during the GPCR and subsequently rehabilitated). While both radicals and conservatives were included in the regional elite, it was now composed primarily of moderates. No one individual or factional group monopolized the new regional elite and a system of "checks-and-balances" operated against the re-emergence of an entrenched, Wang-type power base. Indeed, the new collective elite, which continued to be Han-dominated, was more responsive to the central authorities, who had now twice reached into the region to change its leadership.

The new collective leadership of Xinjiang tended to return to many of the more moderate and gradual policies implemented previously by Wang. Renewed emphasis was placed upon implementing policies according to the special conditions and problems of Xinjiang and its peoples. Material incentives and limited private ownership were reintroduced, distribution according to work points was

again allowed, the system of accounting and ownership within the region's communes was returned to the production brigades (and, subsequently, to the production teams), and more toleration and respect was given to those old customs and habits of the non-Han peoples which did not have pro-Soviet or local nationalist overtones. Under these conditions of relative policy moderation and liberalization, and with the return of political stability, signs of normality began to reappear. Industrial and agricultural production recovered and was showing a definite trend of growth, schools were reopened, and little was said about unrest among the region's non-Han ethnic groups. On the whole, law and order had been re-established in the strategic and sensitive border region by 1973.

Thus, in contrast with its successful efforts to change Xinjiang's leadership on two occasions, the Maoist leadership in Peking had been basically unsuccessful in introducing its more revolutionary policy line in the region. To a significant degree, Mao had either not understood or accepted the importance of the special conditions and problems accruing to Xinjiang and its peoples. From his vantage point in Peking, the chairman did not fully appreciate the extent to which these factors affected Party power and policy in the distant border region. As a result, Mao had basically maintained that power and policy in Xinjiang, as elsewhere in China, were synonomous, believing that if power could be attained by leaders who were more sympathetic to his revolutionary vision it would naturally follow that more radical policies could be easily implemented there. Significantly, the Party's revolutionary experiences in the Han areas of China were not totally relevant to the development of Chinese Communism in Xinjiang. Many aspects of Mao's more universalistic revolutionary vision for China were simply not yet applicable or workable in Xinjiang. From all indications, Wang had recognized this during his long tenure in the region.

But, this is not to deny that Xinjiang and its peoples had changed substantially under Party rule since 1949, nor can it be said that Wang had felt Mao's revolutionary vision to be totally irrelevant in the region. It can be concluded, nonetheless, that Wang and, especially, Mao had often been compelled to recognize the fact that what they wanted to do in Xinjiang was different from what they were obliged by circumstances there to do. Certainly there had been some revolutionary policy input which

lingered in Xinjiang after the GPCR. In the end, however, the more moderate and gradual policy line which had been previously advocated by Wang in Xinjiang was basically retained.

The events which occurred after 1973, especially following the death of Chairman Mao and the purge of the radical "Gang of Four" in late 1976, support the foregoing analysis. Despite momentary radical rumblings in Xinjiang during the period of leadership transition in Peking, there was little doubt that with the emergence of Hua Guofeng as Party Chairman the trend toward more normative, developmental policies aimed at unity, discipline, and modernization for all of China was being institutionalized.

The relevance of this for Xinjiang was that the tendency to return to many of those programs and perspectives previously advocated by Wang Enmao was strengthened. Coincidentally, Wang himself reappeared as the top Party and military leader in the strategic province of Jilin. As for the Xinjiang elite, Peking once again exhibited its ability to reshuffle leaders there with relative impunity. In addition to the purge of several avowedly radical elements within the regional hierarchy during the campaign against followers of the "Gang," two Han cadres were moved to the region in mid-1977 to fill important Party and military posts vacated by Yang Yong, who was transferred to Peking. Both individuals, namely Wang Feng and Liu Chen, had been purged during the GPCR for "surrenderist mistakes" or "revisionist tendencies." Wang Feng had long experience in the Northwest prior to the GPCR, and had built up a reputation of being a specialist in minority nationality affairs. Liu Chen had previous connections with He Long, who was the de facto head of the PLA 1st Field Army faction throughout the 1940's. Significantly, two minority cadres, Simaiyi Aimaiti (a Uighur) and Jianbuer (a Kazakh), were moved up rather rapidly within the regional hierarchy. It was notable that Simaiyi Aimaiti, in particular, began assuming duties that would normally have been undertaken by Saifudin, who was spending a large portion of his time in Peking. Nonetheless, the real leadership of the region remained in the hands of the Han leaders Wang Feng and Liu Chen, who were without a doubt sympathetic and responsive to the new leadership in Peking.

That the central authorities wanted to underline Han authority in the region was reflected by the carefully planned removal of Saifudin from his

Xinjiang posts in January 1978. That Saifudin apparently retained his positions in the central leadership, however, must mirror the Party's recognition and concern about the potentially damaging impact his total disgrace may have had upon the sensitive balance of ethnic relationships and Soviet meddling within the strategic border region. In a sense, these considerations harkened back to the days of turmoil during the GPCR when Wang Enmao himself was being "struck down."

Notes

NOTES TO PREFACE

1. James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912-1949 (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 5.
2. James D. Seymour, China: The Politics of Revolutionary Reintegration (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1976), p. 6.
3. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 8-9.
4. June Teufel Dreyer, China's Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People's Republic of China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 1.
5. This has inspired two scholars to postulate that there may be a "threshold of integration." Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community," in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1964), p. 8.
6. See, e.g., Seymour, op. cit., p. 8.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. Theodore Shabad, China's Changing Map: A Political and Economic Geography of the Chinese People's Republic (London: Methuen and Company, 1973), p. 253.
2. One observer, for example, has pointed out that one of the striking characteristics of Xinjiang's external trade in 1949 was that its trade with China Proper was essentially, in both economic and political terms, trade with a foreign country. Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), p. 172.
3. The desert areas of Xinjiang total nearly 549 million mou (one-sixth of an acre), or almost one-half of China's total desert area.
4. Chen Zhenxiang, Talimu pen di [The Tarim Basin] (Chungking: National Central University, 1944), cited in Ye Xueji, Talimu pen di (Shanghai, 1957), p. 21. See also,

Harold J. Wiens, "Cultivation Development and Expansion in China's Colonial Realm in Central Asia," Journal of Asian Studies, 26:1 (November, 1966), p. 77. The total area of the Tarim oases in 1943 was 21,638,400 mou, with the largest oasis being that of Kazgar whose area constituted 21 percent of the total.

5. Francis Watson, The Frontiers of China: A Historical Guide (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 37.

6. Dagong bao (L'impartial), Peking, September 30, 1965.

7. Wiens, op. cit., p. 84.

8. Shabad, op. cit., p. 309.

9. Zeng Wenwu, Zhongguo jingying xiyu tuan [A History of the Chinese Administration of the Western Regions] (Shanghai, 1936), p. 281.

10. Kang Chao, Agricultural Production in Communist China, 1949-55 (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1970), p. 318.

11. In fact, until 1955 the region's petroleum and mineral resources were almost wholly exploited by two Sino-Soviet joint-stock companies.

12. By 1960, the production of crude oil from the Karamai fields reached an estimated 670,000 tonnes. Saifudin, "Report on the Readjustment of Principal Targets Set in the 1959 National Economic Plan of the XUAR and Unfolding the Movement for Production Increase and Economy", Xinjiang ribao (Xinjiang Daily), September 5, 1959. Hereafter Xinjiang ribao will be cited as XJRB.

13. Ibid.

14. Chinese Communist Affairs: Facts and Features, Taipei, 1:2 (June 1964), cited in China Topics, No. 487 (June 18, 1968), Appendix A, p. 4.

15. Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History (New York: Capitol Publishing Company, 1962), p. 127.

16. Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Asia (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 183.

17. See also Robert M. Field, "Chinese Provincial Data", The China Quarterly, No. 44 (October-December 1970), p. 198.

18. New China News Agency (hereafter cited as NCNA), Urumqi, September 30, 1976.

19. XJRB, September 30, 1958.

20. Saifudin, "Achievements in Xinjiang Province," speech delivered to the First Session, Second National People's Congress, NCNA, Peking, April 23, 1959.

21. According to Chinese Communist sources, there had only been about a dozen small handicraft-type factories in all of Xinjiang in 1949. Peking Review, October 18, 1963.

22. See, e.g. Harold J. Wiens, "The Historical and Geographical Role of Urumchi: Capital of Chinese Central Asia," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 53:4 (December, 1963), pp. 441-64.

23. Freeberne, op. cit., p. 111.

1. Sources dealing with Xinjiang during the pre-1949 period include: Alexander Barmine, One Who Survived (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1945); A. Doak Barnett, China on the Eve of Communist Takeover (London: Thames and Hudson, 1961); Zhang Dajun, Sishinian dongluan Xinjiang [Forty Years of Turmoil in Sinkiang] (Hong Kong: The Asia Press, 1956); O. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia: The Great Game" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948); Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Owen Lattimore, Pivot . . .; Owen Lattimore, Studies . . .; MacKerras, Colin, The Uighur Empire, According to the T'ang Dynastic Histories: A Study in Sino-Uighur Relations (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1972); Morris Rossabi, China and Inner Asia, from 1368 to the Present Day (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975); Denis Sinor, Inner Asia: A Syllabus (Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1969); Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia (Princeton N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1956); Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958).

2. Jackson, op. cit., p. 17. Eastern Central Asia approximately corresponds to the area now constituting Xinjiang. From about the tenth century A.D., the region was also referred to as Chinese Turkestan by the Imperial authorities.

3. Lattimore, Pivot . . ., p. 51.

4. See, e.g., Xiang Da, "The Friendly Relations Between Xinjiang's Nationalities and the Han Chinese in the Past 2,000 Years," Guangming ribao (Bright Daily) [hereafter cited as GMRB], Peking, September 20, 1955.

5. For more detailed accounts of the rebellion and its aftermath, see: Hsu, op. cit.; Mark Mancall, "The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay," The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations, (ed.) John K. Fairband (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 70ff; and Claude Buss, The Far East (New York: Macmillan, 1955) p. 103.

6. Watson, op. cit., p. 36; and Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 382-88.

7. Russian activities in the Xinjiang area during the late-nineteenth century have been summarized in Richard A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917 (Berkeley: California University Press, 1960); Gavin Hambly, Central Asia (New York: Delacorte Press, 1966); Dallin, op. cit.; and Wei, op. cit.

8. These mixed brigades, numbering between 2,000 and 6,200 men each, probably consisted primarily of Han Chinese

assigned from China Proper or recruited locally. Only a very small percentage of these troops, presumably, were recruited from among the local non-Han groups in the province. "Annual Report, 1910," British Foreign Office, FO 371/1089, p. 71.

9. For more detailed treatments of this period, see: Barnett, op. cit.; Fook-lam Gilbert Chan, "The Road to Power: Sheng Shih-ts'ai's Early Years in Sinkiang, 1930-34", Journal of Oriental Studies, Vol. VII, No. 2 (July 1969), pp. 224-60; Zhang, op. cit.; Clubb, op. cit.; Lattimore, Pivot . . .; George Moseley, A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The Ili-Kazakh Autonomous Chou (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966); Wei, op. cit.; and Whiting and Sheng, op. cit.

10. Wei, op. cit., p. 126

11. Alexander Barmine, One Who Survived (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1945), pp. 231-32.

12. See, e.g., Dallin, op. cit., p. 103.

13. Whiting and Sheng, op. cit., p. 130 and Appendix B.

14. See, e.g., Whiting and Sheng, op. cit., pp. 232 and 62; and Wei, op. cit., p. 156.

15. See, e.g., K.F. Kotov, The Autonomy of Local Nationalities in the Chinese People's Republic: Citing as an Example the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Moscow: 1959), translated and abridged in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), No. 3457 (July 18, 1960); Whiting and Sheng, op. cit., pp. 270, 281-20, and 255-56; and XJRB, June 3, 1953.

16. See, e.g., Barnett, op. cit., pp. 250-52; Kotov, op. cit., p. 443; Clubb, op. cit.

17. Kotov, op. cit., p. 443.

18. China News Analysis (CNA), Hong Kong, No. 103 (October 7, 1955), p. 2.

19. Dallin, op. cit., p. 364; and Wei, op. cit., p. 205.

20. Lattimore, Pivot . . ., pp. 89-91; Barnett, op. cit., pp. 250-52; and Whiting and Sheng, op. cit., p. 110.

21. For instance, Akhmedjan was appointed as a vice-chairman, Abdul Karim Abasov as deputy secretary-general, Rakhimjan Sabir Klojaev as assistant commissioner of civil affairs, and Saifudin as commissioner of education.

22. The "C-C Clique," which controlled more political machinery and more key appointments than any other GMD faction in the Central Government at that time, was known for its impatient policy of direct repression, and its preference for the use of force in extripating any challenge to its supremacy. Its strength came from the brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, nephews of an early political patron of Chiang Kai-Shek and confidential secretaries to Chiang, who had helped to engineer his original rise to power. See, e.g., Lattimore, Pivot . . ., pp. 81-82.

23. See, e.g., N.N. Mingulov, "The National Liberation Movement in Sinkiang as a Part of the Chinese Revolution," Voprosy Istorii Kazakhstana I Vostochnogo Turkestana (Alma Ata, 1962), cited in "The Uprising in the Northwest of Sin-

kiang, 1944-49," Central Asian Review, 11:2 (1963), pp. 189-95. Hereafter Central Asian Review will be cited as CAR.

24. For further discussion of this subject, see Moseley, *op. cit.*, especially chapter 1.

25. Burhan was born in Aksu, Xinjiang. He received his middle school education in Kazan, Russia, and graduated from Berlin University in political economics in 1916. Subsequently, Burhan returned to Xinjiang and served in various administrative positions under both Yang Zenqin and Jin Shuren. In 1937, he was appointed Chinese Consul at Zaysan, U.S.S.R., but upon his return to the province was imprisoned by Sheng Shicai on the charge of spying for Nazi Germany. In October, 1944, he was released from imprisonment and appointed deputy commissioner of the Xinjiang provincial government. In 1946, Burhan was made vice-chairman of Xinjiang, and a year later was named as a state councillor of the GMD Central Government. Being a "progressive," Burhan was neither a Communist nor an out-and-out reactionary at this time.

26. See, e.g., Hong Zunyuan, Xinjiang (Taipei, 1960), p. 154; and NCNA, Urumqi, September 16, 1965.

27. More detailed biographical information about Saifudin will be provided in the next chapter.

28. Clubb, *op. cit.*, p. 371. See also XJRB, May 19, 1949 and September 30, 1949, as quoted in Mingulov, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-93.

29. Whiting and Sheng, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-18.

30. "The Peaceful Liberation of Xinjiang," Renmin shouce [People's Handbook] (Shanghai: Dagong bao, 1950), cited in Current Background, No. 365 (October 25, 1955), Appendix, p. 44; and XJRB, September 28, 1949.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. On the eve of Communist victory in China, there were five large, relatively independent field armies which had established control in East China, Northeast China (Manchuria), North China, South-Central China, and Northwest China. In 1948-49, these field armies received a numbered designation, with the exception of the North China F.A. which was given the unofficial title of 5th F.A. A useful definition of the field army elite system that has generally been used herein can be found in William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A History of the Communist Military Politics, 1927-71 (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 498-99.

2. Sources for these biographical sketches are the same as those for Table 3.1.

3. In the complicated evolution of the field army system which emerged in China prior to 1949, the creation of the PLA 1st F.A. can be traced primarily to the work of He Long, who later was assigned the rank of Marshal of the PLA. In the late 1940s Peng emerged as the nominal head of the field army

when He was involved in activities elsewhere.

4. When Peng was later purged from his central military and Party posts in 1959 on the charges that he had led an "anti-Party clique" in attacking Mao's socio-economic policies and leadership at the Lushan Conference there were no known cases of leading Party or military cadres in Xinjiang being removed on the grounds of their former "ties" to Peng. Presumably, He Long managed to "shield" his former PLA 1st F.A. colleagues during the purge of Peng, largely because of his "revolutionary prestige" and his continued trust by Mao.

5. Including Wang Enmao, Guo Peng, Zhang Zhonghan, Li Quan, Zuo Qi, Xu Guoxian, Xiong Huang, He Jiazhan, and Ma Sen.

6. One scholar has described Burhan as having been a member of what he terms the "Xinjiang Group of the CCP" in the 1940s. Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, A Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-65 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), Vol. II, p. 1068.

7. In the cities, except for those in the "Three Districts", the populace was organized into lane, street, and district committees under Party leadership, thus replacing the baojia system or organization and control which had existed under the former GMD regime. In early 1955, urban residents' committees were established by districts in the major cities of the province. GMRB, Peking, January 1, 1955.

8. See, e.g., John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 268.

9. Burhan, "General Report on Five Months' Work in Xinjiang Province," Xinhua yuebao (New China Monthly), Peking, 2:4 (1950), pp. 764-65, cited in CNA, No. 103 (October 7, 1955), p. 2.

10. See, e.g., Chen Ling, "Xinjiang's New Era," Renmin zhongguo (People's China), Peking, 3:10, (May 16, 1951), p.11; and NCNA, Urumqi, January 22, 1951.

11. The Yili, Tacheng, and Altai Special Districts were jointly administered from Yining.

12. Chen, op. cit., p. 10.

13. Wang was also a member of the NWMAC-NWAC and its Finance and Economics Committee.

14. Chu Wen-ch'ang, "Structure of Government," in Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington, Publication No. 5, A Regional Handbook of Northwest China (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, Inc., 1956), Monograph 59, Vol. 2, pp. 468ff. Hereafter cited as RHNWC (1956).

15. With the end of the Korean conflict, China's leaders saw as their primary task the creation of a central national apparatus in place of the decentralized arrangement of the Great Areas, such as that in the Northwest, and their corresponding military establishments based primarily upon the field armies. The first step in this process was taken during the Korean conflict in November 1952 when Peking decreed that civil rather than military rule should prevail. See, e.g., Xinhua

yuebao, Hong Kong, December, 1952, p. 3.

16. One source claimed that 76 of the 80 xian and shi administrative heads were minority nationals. Ibid., p. 11.

17. For example, Qu Wu, former GMD mayor of Urumqi and director of the Xinjiang Civil Affairs Department, was retained as mayor of the provincial capital.

18. Wang Zhen, "The Past Year in Xinjiang Province," RMRB, October 1, 1950.

19. Xinhua banyuekan (New China Semi-Monthly), Peking, 1:4 (1950), pp. 876-77. See also, Burhan, op. cit., p. 765. Although little information is available, it can be assumed with a fair degree of accuracy that a significant number of personnel from the pre-1949 period were removed from office.

20. Originally there were said to be 3,243 cadres at and above the xiang (village) level in the Yili Special District alone. XJRB, January 18, 1953. According to a later report, however, it was estimated that some 17,000 minority nationality cadres and activists associated with the former Yili rebel group were utilized by the CCP in Xinjiang after liberation. GMRB, September 30, 1955.

21. These "leading cadres" from the former Yili group probably numbered about 1,100, and were subsequently enrolled in the CCP. NCNA, Urumqi, July 3, 1955.

22. Burhan, "Struggle to Strengthen the Friendly Solidarity of All Races under the Leadership of the CCP," RMRB, November 20, 1951. Later, at a memorial service held in Urumqi to celebrate the eighth anniversary of the beginning of the Yili revolt in 1944, Saifudin expressed regret that the revolution there had not been guided by the CCP. Quoted in RMRB, November 19, 1952.

23. Wang, op. cit., p.2.

24. Kotov, op. cit., p. 449.

25. NCNA, Xi-an, May 30, 1951.

26. NCNA, Xi-an, May 13, 1951.

27. Burhan, "Report on the Implementation of Nationality Regional Autonomy in Xinjiang," XJRB, June, 30, 1953.

28. The mid-1953 official census in Xinjiang revealed a population of 4,874,000. Seventy-four percent, or 3,640,000 were Uighurs, while Kazakhs numbered 475,000, Han 200,000, and others 259,000.

29. In some cases, autonomy had been granted only after "protracted class struggles" during the various associated campaigns. NCNA, Urumqi, August 7, 1954. Saifudin later revealed that prior to the establishment of regional autonomy in October 1955, "some people" in the province had advocated the creation of a union republic or autonomous republic on the model of those which had been established in the Soviet Union. This, he commented, did not suit the objective conditions in China, and for a long time study and discussion was held both within and outside the CCP on the correctness of the Party's policy on regional autonomy. Saifudin, Speech to the Eighth

CCP Congress on September 25, 1956, NCNA, Peking, September 25, 1956.

30. They were, in order of establishment: Chabuachaer Sibo Autonomous Xian (A.X.), Yanqi Hui A.X., Mulei Kazakh A.X., Bayinguoleng Mongol Autonomous Zhou (A.Z.), Kizilsu Kirghiz A.Z., Changji Hui A.Z., Boertala Mongol A.Z., Hebukesaiier Mongol A.X., Tash Kurghan Tadzhik A.X., Balikun Kazakh A.X., and Yili Kazakh A.Z.

31. XJRB, September 7, 1955; and Li Honglie, "The Important Significance in Establishing the XUAR," Sishi shouce (Current Events), No. 17 (October, 1955), p. 10. See also, Lo, "Political Dynamics," p. 521.

32. NCNA, Urumqi, April 25, 1954.

33. NCNA, Urumqi, August 26, 1954.

34. See, e.g., Current Background (CB), No. 365 (October 25, 1955), p. 1. Hereafter, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region will be cited as the XUAR.

35. NCNA, Urumqi, September 11, 1955.

36. NCNA, Peking, August 23, 1955.

37. On the eve of the founding of the XUAR, there were reportedly over 36,000 minority cadres in Xinjiang, comprising two-third's of the regional total. The minority "government cadres" numbered 12,600, or 35 percent of the total minority cadre force. Of the total, some 5 percent held "leading positions" at the xian level and above, thus accounting for about one-third of all cadres holding "leading positions" at this level. See e.g., Burhan, "The Mounting Solidarity of Xinjiang's Nationalities," RMRB, September 24, 1966; and Li, op. cit., p. 10.

38. RMRB, September 22, 1955. See also, J.P. Lo, "Political Dynamics," RHNWC (1956), Vol. 2, p. 528.

39. NCNA, Urumqi, October 1, 1955.

40. Zhang Fengqi, "Rapid Growth of Nationalities' Cadres in Xinjiang Under the Fostering and Education of the Party," Minzu tuanjie (Solidarity of the National Minorities), No. 7 (July 6, 1961). Hereafter cited as MZTJ.

41. Saifudin, "Hold High the Great Red Banner of the Thought of Mao Zedong, Build a Revolutionary New Xinjiang," RMRB, September 30, 1965, p. 5. Saifudin claimed that there had only been about 3,000 minority cadres in Xinjiang during the early days after liberation. See also, NCNA, Urumqi, September 15, 1965; and He Long, Speech to Celebration Meeting in Urumqi on the Tenth Anniversary of the Founding of the XUAR, NCNA, Urumqi, September 30, 1965.

42. By the early 1960s, there were 451 communes in Xinjiang (subsequent reports claimed that there were over 700 communes, however). By 1965, the administrative divisions of the XUAR included five autonomous zhou and six administrative districts, two regional-level municipalities (Urumqi and Karamai), seventy-four xian (three of which were under direct regional administration, including Tokexun, Shanshan, and Turfan)

and six autonomous xian, and two xian-level municipalities (Kazgar and Yining). See, e.g., "Handbook on Administrative Divisions of the People's Republic of China, 1965," in JPRS, No. 32,223 (October 1, 1965), pp. 49-53.

43. According to one source, 64 percent of all identifiable elite members within the XJMR by 1966 were affiliated with the PLA 1st F.A. group, while 24 and 12 percent were associated with the central elite and Lin Biao's PLA 4th F.A. group, respectively. Whitson, op. cit., p. 509.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. XJRB, March 10, 1954.

2. "Defend and Build Our Motherland, Serve the Peoples of All Nationalities in Xinjiang Whole-heartedly," Xinjiang jiefangjun bao (Xinjiang Liberation Army Daily) editorial, reprinted in XJRB, February 14, 1953.

3. The 4th Independent Division, for example, was stationed at Hetian in southern Xinjiang since the early 1950s.

4. Bruce J. Esposito, "China's West in the 20th Century," Military Review, 54:1 (January, 1974), p. 69.

5. One observer claimed that: "In addition to the troops already stationed there, an additional 200,000 soldiers of the PLA were reckoned to have arrived in Kuldja [Yining] and other parts of northern Sinkiang during the first six months of 1964. Thirty or more trucks a day, each carrying about forty soldiers, had been arriving since January." George N. Patterson, The Unquiet Frontier: Border Tensions in the Sino-Soviet Conflict (Hong Kong: International Studies group, 1966), p. 13. Presumably, however, a large portion of these troops belonged to the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (hereafter cited as the Xinjiang PCC), about which more will be said below.

6. Zao Jing, "An Analysis of the Situation in the XUAR," Issues and Studies, Taipei, 5:2 (November, 1968), p. 10. The frontline PLA troops and garrison forces in Xinjiang were backed up by the demobilized armymen and members of the Xinjiang PCC, as well as the various armed militia units within the region whose membership has been estimated to be about 275,000. Bruce J. Esposito, "The Militiamen of Sinkiang," Asia Quarterly, 1977/2, p. 164.

7. See, e.g., Zao, op. cit., pp. 10-16; Zhang Yuntian, "The Establishment and Expansion of Communist China's 'Production-Construction Corps': A Study of Its Conditions and Functions," Zhonggong yanjiu (Studies on Chinese Communism), Taipei, No. 3 (March, 1970), pp. 12-34; and Wu Zhao, "A Study of the Chinese Communist Build-up of the Production and Construction Corps along the Sino-Soviet Frontiers," Issues and Studies, Taipei, 6:2 (November, 1969), pp. 56-61.

8. XJRB, March 10, 1954; and Tao Zhiyue, "PLA Units Engaged in Production and Construction in Xinjiang Struggle to Realize All Tasks of the Transitional Period," RMRB,

September 27, 1955.

9. Wang Jilong, "Strive to Strengthen Further the Solidarity of All Nationalities in Building a New Xinjiang Together," MZTJ, No. 12 (December 6, 1961).

10. A.G. Yakovlev, "The Role of the PLA in Economic Construction in the Outlying Districts of the Chinese People's Republic in 1950-55, Citing Xinjiang as an Example," Kratkiye Soobschcheniya Instituta Vostokovedeniya, No. 21 (1956), cited in CAR, 5:2 (1957), p. 148.

11. As the Korean Conflict cooled down and increasing numbers of Chinese troops were demobilized, it is likely that a portion were sent to settle in areas such as Xinjiang.

12. Lu Xinliang, "Why Has the Army Production Corps Decided to Establish a Trade Union?", Gongren ribao (Worker's Daily), Peking, May 4, 1957.

13. The Han settlers initially came primarily from Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan, and Anhui provinces, but thereafter largely hailed from Shanghai and its environs. For a more detailed discussion of the resettlement movement, see Lynn T. White, "The Road to Urumchi: Rustication from Shanghai Through the Cultural Revolution," unpublished paper presented at the 27th Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, San Francisco, March 25, 1975.

14. By March 1966, for example, the "veteran fighters" who had pioneered farming in Xinjiang reportedly represented only 20 percent of the various farms of the Xinjiang PCC. NCNA, Urumqi, March 13, 1966.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. In September 1956, Saifudin was elected an alternate member of the Eighth CCP Central Committee. One of the youngest elected, he was among the very few non-Han members (and the only Uighur). Wang Enmao, Saifudin's superior in Xinjiang, was also elected an alternate member of the same committee, placing second on the official list of alternates. Following the death of two full members of the Eighth CCP Central Committee, Wang was promoted to full membership at the Fifth Plenum held immediately after the Second Session of the Eighth CCP Congress in May 1958.

2. In 1958, however, Wang Zhen was identified as being the chairman of the financial and economic committee of the XUAR People's Council, a post which he probably held nominally since his main duties were in Peking.

3. For example, Saifulaev was dismissed from membership on the regional Party committee and from his post of procurator-general, while A. Aixia, Aisihaiti, and M. Iminov were suspended from membership on the regional Party committee for advocating local nationalism. The latter two individuals were subsequently rehabilitated as members of the regional CCP committee.

4. Burhan, "General Report on Five Months' Work in Xinjiang Province," p. 756.
5. XJRB, September 27, 1959. Some 2,000-3,000 Party cadres were fostered in the "Three Districts," which was said to be "far from adequate to meet the requirements of the developing revolutionary situation." Zhang Fengqi, "Rapid Growth of Nationalities' Cadres in Xinjiang Under the Fostering and Education of the Party," MZTJ, No. 7 (July 6, 1961).
6. RMRB, July 1, 1953.
7. Lo, "Political Dynamics," pp. 521 and 525.
8. XJRB, February 11, 1954.
9. Wang Enmao, "Work Report of the XUAR CCP Committee," delivered at the First XUAR CCP Congress on July 10, 1956, XJRB, September 1, 1956. The NDYL in Xinjiang, which numbered over 57,000 by late 1955, had supplied 3,900 of the new Party members.
10. Ibid., p. 5. Of the new Party members, 27,833 (or 81.8 percent) were said to be minority nationals.
11. "Ten Years of Growth of the CCP in Xinjiang," XJRB, September 27, 1959.
12. Mamutofu, "Development of Party Organs, the Fundamental Guarantee for Victory in Socialist Revolution and Construction," XJRB, September 27, 1959. Membership in the Xinjiang NDYL was 220,000 in 10,280 branches. Lo, "Five Years of the SUAR," p. 103.
13. The organization department of the XUAR CCP Committee, "Strengthen Communist Education for Party Members," XJRB, July 1, 1960.
14. Zhang, op. cit. This claim would have made the number of minority Party members in Xinjiang only about 35,000 based upon a 1962 official report of 111,500 minority cadres. The official 1960 figure for minority Party membership was already over 70,000.
15. Ibid. According to official reports, the percentage of minority nationals on Party committees at and above the xian level in late 1959 was 50 percent. XJRB, September 27, 1959. The mid-1961 figure, therefore, indicated a significant decrease in the proportion of minority nationality members in the Party committees at this level.
16. Saifudin, "Hold High the Great Red Banner . . .," RMRB, September 30, 1965.
17. Ibid.
18. These "leading positions" were described as secretaries of commune, xian and autonomous xian, administrative district, autonomous zhou, and regional CCP committees, and "other high posts in government organs at all levels." Dagong bao, Peking, September 30, 1965.
19. In part, this may be attributed to the influx of young Han settlers from China Proper, a significant number of whom were either CCP members or were fostered as members after their arrival.

20. Saifudin, "Hold High the Great Red Banner . . .," RMRB, September 30, 1965.

21. Wang, "Work Report . . .," delivered on July 10, 1956, XJRB, September 1, 1956.

22. Based upon estimated Party and population figures of 20 million and 738,453,000-746,600,000, respectively, the ratio at the national level was approximately 3.69-3.78 percent in 1965. See, e.g., James P. Harrison, The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-72 (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 460; and John S. Aird, Population Estimates for the Provinces of the People's Republic of China: 1953 to 1974, International Population Reports, No. 73 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1974), pp. 22-23. These latter figures, however, reflect no attempts to break down the totals into nationality groupings.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. Quoted in MZTJ, No. 8 (1965).

2. Wang Zhen, "The Past Year in Xinjiang Province," RMRB, October 1, 1950. "Commandism" was defined as doing things by issuing orders without explanation.

3. Burhan, "Struggle to Strengthen the Friendly Solidarity of all Races Under the Leadership of the CCP," RMRB, November 20, 1951.

4. Quoted by Saifudin, "The Revolution of the Chinese People and China's Minority Races," RMRB, October 2, 1951.

5. See e.g., Qunzhong ribao, Xi-an, October 8, 1951.

6. NCNA, Xi-an, December 2, 1951.

7. "Xiache Xian's Experience in Training Nationality Cadres in the Campaign of Rent Reduction and Despots," commentary in XJRB, December 14, 1951.

8. NCNA, Xi-an, April 25, 1954.

9. See also, XJRB, May 30, 1954.

10. Wang, "Work Report . . .," delivered on July 10, 1956, XJRB, September 1, 1956.

11. "Are There Truly No Problems?" RMRB editorial, December 2, 1956.

12. RMRB, February 28, 1957, cited in Peter Cheng, A Chronology of the People's Republic of China, from October 1, 1949 (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1972), p. 70.

13. Wang Enmao, "Report on the Strengthening of Ideological Leadership in Xinjiang," XJRB, February 27, 1957. See also, "Going Into Everyday Realities and Improving the Leadership," XJRB editorial, March 7, 1957.

14. NCNA, Urumqi, May 6, 1957. See also, Wang Enmao, "Earnestly Study and Discuss the Problems Concerning the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," speech at the opening session of the Enlarged Conference of the XUAR CCP Committee on April 26, 1957, XJRB, May 7, 1957; and XJRB, May

11, 1957.

15. Cited in XJRB, May 31 and June 9, 1957.

16. Most of the Han elements who were attacked in Xinjiang during the early phase of the campaign were former GMD officials.

17. Cited in Wenhui bao, Shanghai, May 28, 1957.

18. Lu Jianren, "Concluding Report to XUAR CCP Conference on Propaganda Work in Xinjiang," cited in XJRB, November 17, 1957. On February 10, 1958, Pathan Sugurpaev mentioned that a "simplification of structure" and a program of dispatching cadres to the rural areas was progressing smoothly. Some 50,000-60,000 cadres were to be "sent down" in the whole region. Pathan Sugurpaev, "Xinjiang Must Depend on the Support of the State and the Han People to Build Socialism with Success," speech to Fifth Session, First NPC on February 10, 1958, RMRB, February 14, 1958.

19. XJRB, September 28, 1957.

20. XJRB, November 18, 1957.

21. XJRB, December 17, 1957.

22. XJRB, January 10, 1958. Neither the composition nor the aims of the "National Salvation Army" are known.

23. See, e.g., CNA, No. 238 (July 25, 1958), p. 3.

24. Saifudin, "Report on Local Nationalism at the Enlarged Conference of the XUAR CCP Committee on December 16, 1957, RMRB, December 26, 1957." See also, P.H.M. Jones, "Sinkiang-The Road to Communism," FEER 30:7 (November 17, 1960), p. 280; and CNA, No. 238 (July 25, 1958), p. 4.

25. One report, for example, later revealed that some minority intellectual cadres within the united front work department of the Xinjiang NDYL had advocated Soviet-style nationalities policies, had blamed Xinjiang's economic backwardness on Han presence and exploitation, and had favored the creation of a minority nationalities youth league. T. Ahemaiti-jiangnuofu (Director, XUAR NDYL United Front Work Department), Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth Daily), Peking, February 22, 1958.

26. Xia Furen, "Marxism vs. Nationalism in Xinjiang: A Major Debate," GMRB, April 10, 1958.

27. Wang Enmao, "Struggle to Implement the Party's Marxist-Leninist Line for the Solution of Nationalities Questions," RMRB, June 27, 1958.

28. Saifudin, "Resolutely Implement the Party's Nationality Policy, Thoroughly Overcome Local Nationalism," RMRB, June 27, 1958.

29. "Why Is It Necessary to Oppose Local Nationalism?" RMRB editorial, June 27, 1958.

30. Wang, "Struggle to Implement the Party's Marxist-Leninist Line . . .," RMRB, June 27, 1958.

31. The latter three, all Kazakhs, were purged from their respective posts of "head" of the Yili Zhou, vice-director of the Yili Zhou CCP Propaganda Department, and president of the

Yili People's Court. See e.g., RMRB, May 25, 1958; and "Important Victory Won in the Struggle Against Local Nationalism in Xinjiang," GMRB, September 11, 1958.

32. Among them were: the Uighurs A. Said, a deputy mayor of Urumqi, Ziya Saimaiti, director of the XUAR Culture Department and chairman of the Xinjiang Writer's Federation, Ibrahim Turdi, "director" of the XUAR Civil Affairs Department, Abritz Kali, deputy director of the XUAR Commerce Department, A. Iminov, commissioner of Kazgar District and member of the CCP Standing Committee there, Yumaishelai, chief procurator of the Kazgar District, Abdubahai Xitula, a "leading cadre" in the Kazgar District Public Security Department, Abritz Abdula, head of the Kazgar District Public Health Department; and the Kirghiz, Aixia Niuz, vice-director of the Kizilsu Rural Work Department, and Ablayt Zhaoridong, secretary of the Artush xian CCP committee. Sutik Aishan, a "leading cadre" of the Karamai Petroleum Administration, and Ablayt Ahmad, a "leading cadre" of the Dushanzi Petroleum Administration, both of whom were Uighurs, were also expelled from posts in organs which had formerly been subjected to significant Soviet influence. See, e.g., Wang, "Struggle to Implement the Party's Marxist-Leninist Line . . .," RMRB, June 27, 1958; XJRB, September 6, 1958; "Important Victory . . .," GMRB, September 11, 1958; and Xinjiang shiyu gongren bao (Xinjiang Petroleum Worker's Daily), no date given, quoted in XJRB, August 25, 1958.

33. One source quoted the figure of 98,781 cadres from the xian level and above in Xinjiang who were "sent down" to the local levels to participate in manual labor. Zhang Fengqi, "Continue to Intensify Labor Training and Promptly Raise the Communist Consciousness of Cadres," XJRB, April 20, 1960.

34. Zhang, "Rapid Growth . . .," MZTJ, No. 7 (July 6, 1961).

35. Ibid.

36. Saifudin, "Strengthen Further the Solidarity of the Nationalities, Take Courage to March Forward Along the Road to Socialism," MZTJ, No. 12 (December 6, 1961).

37. Cited in the Hong Kong Standard, February 8, 1964.

38. The criticism of Burhan for alleged pro-Soviet tendencies may have been the result of the Party's desire to find a leading minority cadre in Xinjiang other than Saifudin (who had been won-over by the Party) as a scapegoat and example for all the avowed problems that it was having with the lingering influence of the Soviets and local nationalist elements. Paradoxically, it was Saifudin who had been more closely associated with the CPSU prior to liberation and would have been the more natural target of attack.

39. Saifudin, "Hold High the Great Red Banner . . .," RMRB, September 30, 1965.

40. Ibid.

41. "Excerpts from Wang Enmao's Report 'The Great Victory of the Thought of Mao Zedong in Xinjiang,'" NCNA, Urumqi,

October 7, 1965.

42. Ibid.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. NCNA, Xi-an, December 10, 1950.
2. NCNA, Xi-an, April 6, 1951.
3. NCNA, Xi-an, May 5, 1951.
4. Those who were most likely branded as counterrevolutionary or criminal elements included known or suspected anti-Communists from the various nationalities, anti-Han elements, reactionary Muslim leaders, and former landlords and capitalists.
5. Quoted in CAR, 7:1 (1959), p. 95.
6. XJRB, March 10, 1954.
7. Zhang Bangying, "Report at the Conference of Cadres of the Province and Municipal Levels in Xinjiang" on February 1, 1954, XJRB, February 11, 1954.
8. Saifudin, "Speech to First NPC" on July 26, 1955, RMRB, July 27, 1955.
9. Zeng Di, "Speech at the Meeting to Support the Army and Give Preferential Treatment to the Families of Soldiers," XJRB, January 28, 1955.
10. XJRB, August 18, 1955; and Shih Ch'eng-shih, People's Resistance in Mainland China, 1950-55 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1956), p. 110.
11. "A Group of Counterrevolutionaries and Criminals Arrested in Southern Xinjiang," Tiannan ribao (Southern Xinjiang Daily), cited in XJRB, December 2, 1955.
12. XJRB, May 26, 1957. See also, XJRB, June 6, 1957.
13. XJRB, August 25, 1957.
14. XJRB, November 12, 1957.
15. Cited in RMRB, December 17, 1957.
16. See, e.g., Zhang Zhonghan, "The Production-Construction Corps in Xinjiang," RMRB, July 31, 1960; Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966); Mao Tse-tung, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966); and Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965, 1967 and 1977), Vols. II, III, and V. Scholarly studies of Mao's military thought can be found in John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Samuel B. Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967); and Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).
17. Yang Guanzhi, "Continuously Raise Labor Productivity, Strive for Continuous Leaps Forward," Xinjiang shengchan zhan-xian bao (Xinjiang Production Front Daily), quoted in XJRB, November 9, 1960.

18. Liu Yunzheng, "The Militia in the People's Revolutionary Wars of China," cited in SCMP, No. 2780 (July 18, 1962), p. 1.
19. In mid-1960, for example, Zhang Zhonghan called upon the members of the Xinjiang PCC to continue to fight against the remnant thoughts of "Great Hanism" and to organize and train local militia. Zhang, "The Production-Construction Corps in Xinjiang."
20. Gongzuo tongxun (Bulletin of Activities), No. 23 (June 13, 1961).
21. Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), November 30, 1961.
22. See, Cheng, op. cit., p. 158. For the text of these articles, see Jiefangjun bao, January 22, 1964.
23. He Long, "The Democratic Traditions of the Chinese PLA," RMRB, August 1, 1965. See also, Lin Biao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," text in NCNA, Peking, September 2, 1965.
24. Cited in The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, September 10, 1963. A subsequent report claimed that about 9,000 PLA troops had revolted in August with the aid of food and ammunition supplied by the Soviets. The attacks had supposedly been launched from Soviet soil and were led by "Soviet-educated, Major-General Zhu," (possibly Zunin Taipov) who was formerly a vice-commander of the PLA 5th Army Corps. China Post, Taipei, October 9, 1963. A similar incident was reported by the Central News Agency (Taipei) and quoted in the Hong Kong Standard, October 17, 1963.
25. Cultural Section, XJMR Political Department, "Let a Large Number of Warrior-Writers Grow Up," Jiefangjun wenyi (Liberation Army Art and Literature), No. 8 (August 1, 1965).
26. XJRB, January 1, 1965.
27. See, e.g., He, "Speech to the Celebration Meeting in Urumqi on the Tenth Anniversary of the Founding of the XUAR," NCNA, Urumqi, September 30, 1965.
28. RMRB, October 10, 1965.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

1. For more detailed treatments of the national minorities under CCP rule, see June Teufel Dreyer, China's Forty Millions, Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People's Republic of China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); Morris Rossabi, China and Inner Asia, from 1368 to the Present Day (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975); and Anon., China's Minority Nationalities, Selected Articles from Chinese Sources (San Francisco: Red Sun Publishers, 1977).
2. Quoted by Saifudin, "The Revolution of the Chinese People and China's Minority Races," RMRB, October 2, 1951.
3. Report of the Central People's Government Mission to Northwest China," NCNA, Peking, March 22, 1951.

4. Wang Enmao, quoted in XJRB, July 2, 1954.
5. Quoted in XJRB, February 25, 1955.
6. XJRB, April 14, 1955.
7. Burhan, speech to the First NPC on July 24, 1955, in CB, No. 355 (September 12, 1955), p. 6. See also, Saifudin, speech to the First NPC on July 26, 1955, RMRB, July 27, 1955.
8. The inference was that many of the non-Han elements felt that such a federated republic would more fully symbolize their autonomy and their historical culture and traditions.
9. Ibid.
10. CNA, No. 431 (August 3, 1962), p. 4; and CAR, 6:1 (1958), pp. 82-83.
11. M. Iminov, "Report on Political and Judicial Work in the XUAR," delivered at the Third Session, First XUAR People's Congress on July 30, 1956, XJRB, August 2, 1956.
12. XJRB, September 23, 1956.
13. See, e.g., RMRB, December 1, 1957.
14. XJRB, December 9, 1957.
15. Saifudin, "Report on Local Nationalism. . ." on December 16, 1957, RMRB, December 26, 1957.
16. Zunin Taipov, "The Feats of the PLA in Xinjiang Cannot Be Obliterated by Local Nationalists," XJRB, January 10, 1958.
17. Xia, op. cit.
18. Saifudin, "Resolutely Implement the Party's Nationalities Policy. . .," RMRB, June 27, 1958.
19. RMRB, August 22, 1958, p. 6.
20. Cheng, op. cit., p. 89.
21. Lu Jianren, "For the Further Development and Elevation of the Socialist Relations Among the Nationalities," Xinjiang hongqi (Xinjiang Red Flag), No. 17, no date given, quoted in XJRB, August 22, 1959.
22. Scholarly accounts of the Tibetan revolt include: George Ginsburgs and M. Mathos, Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1964); Alastair Lamb, The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1964); and Neville Maxwell, India's China War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970).
23. O. Edmund Clubb, "The Sino-Soviet Frontier," Military Review, 64:7 (July, 1964), p. 9.
24. George N. Patterson, The Unquiet Frontier: Border Tensions in the Sino-Soviet Conflict (Hong Kong: The International Studies Group, 1966), p. 102.
25. XJRB, January 7, 1958.
26. Saifudin, "Strive for a Great Victory in the Socialist Revolution on the Linguistic Front and Strengthen the Solidarity of the People of All Nationalities in the Country," XJRB, March 21, 1960.
27. There is no doubt that the Party was using Saifudin to explain its nationalities policy in Xinjiang, since it had more of an impact than if a Han national would have done so.

28. Jiakeluofu, "Strive for the Successful Realization of the Great Leap Forward Plan Language Reform," XJRB, March 23, 1960.
29. United Front Work Department, XUAR CCP Committee, "New Stage in the Development of Socialist Relations Among the Nationalities," Xinjiang hongqi, No. 23 (1960), in XJRB, December 11, 1960.
30. Lu Jianren, "Continue to Successfully Carry Out the United Front Activities among the Nationality Religious Hierarchies," MZTJ, No. 3 (March, 1962).
31. RMRB, June 3, 1962.
32. For Chinese and Soviet accounts of the Yili crisis see, RMRB, September 6, 1963; "Soviet Government Statement," Pravda, September 21, 1963; and "National Minorities Incidents on the Xinjiang Frontier," Pravda editorial, September 23, 1963.
33. See, e.g., Moseley, op. cit., pp. 107-116, for a more detailed account of the 1962 Yili crisis.
34. See, e.g., Patterson, op. cit., pp. 8-12; and Clubb, op. cit., pp. 3-13.
35. See also, Moseley, op. cit., p. 107.
36. See, e.g., Zunin Taipov, "On the Other Side of the Barricade," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, Alma Ata, September 29, 1963; Sotsialistik Kazakhstan, Alma Ata, September 27, 1963; and Literaturnaya Gazetta, September 26, 1963. Saifudin also condemned propaganda broadcasts emanating from Soviet soil in a speech to the First Session, Third XUAR People's Congress in April, 1964. Urumqi Radio, April 28, 1964.
37. "Learn from Lei Feng's Class Position of Uncompromising Love and Hate," MZTJ editorial, No. 4 (April, 1963).
38. Renmin shouce (Peking, 1963), p. 4.
39. See, Liu Qun, "The Nationality Problems and Class Struggle in China Today," Hongqi, No. 12 (June 30, 1964), pp. 16-25.
40. Zhou Enlai reiterated this line in his report to the Third NPC in December 1964. See Cheng, op. cit., p. 191.
41. See, e.g., RMRB editorial, December 30, 1964.
42. In early 1964, for example, a group of White Russians arrived in Hong Kong from Xinjiang, after having been approached by the regional authorities with the request that they renew their applications to go abroad via the colony. They later claimed that the Chinese authorities even offered to pay for the fares of those who lacked funds to make the journey, and were of the opinion that the Chinese action was based upon a desire to counter Soviet intrigues among them by getting them away from Soviet intelligence agents. See, Patterson, op. cit., p. 12.
43. Stanley Karnow, "Tension at the Border," Hong Kong Standard, April 24, 1964.
44. He, "Speech to Celebration Meeting in Urumqi . . .," NCNA, Urumqi, September 30, 1965.
45. Ibid.

46. Wang, "The Great Victory . . .," NCNA, Urumqi, September 30, 1965.
47. Ibid.
48. Chu, op. cit., p. 35.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

1. Liu Shaoqi, "On the Agrarian Reform Law," People's China, 2:2 (July 16, 1950), p. 7.
2. In essence, then, the goal of agrarian reform during the early 1950s was to confiscate the lands of the landlords and redistribute them to peasant families. An important objective of this "land-to-the-tiller" movement was the abolition of landlordism.
3. The landlord elements attacked in the province represented all nationalities, including the former Sibo, Manchu, and Han colonists who had arrived in Xinjiang prior to 1949. The available sources strongly suggest that the antilandlord campaign cut across ethnic lines, and was generally not aimed at the non-Han elements exclusively. NCNA, Urumqi, November 16, 1950.
4. Chen Ling, "Xinjiang's New Era," People's China, 3:10 (May 16, 1951), p. 11; and NCNA, Urumqi, January 23, 1951. MAT's averaged about five peasant households each. In the MAT's, labor was exchanged and tools and animals were shared, but the peasant households retained their landholdings.
5. Throughout the discussion of agricultural policies in Xinjiang, the author will be dealing primarily with the rural economy of the oases.
6. Zhang Bangying, quoted in XJRB, December 14, 1951.
7. Zhang Shigong, "Several Experiences Concerning the Mobilization of the Masses from the Trial Work of the Land Reform Campaign in the Urumqi Region," XJRB, February 4, 1953, p.2.
8. See, e.g., Saifudin, speech to Fourth Session, First CPPCC on February 6, 1953, XJRB, February 12, 1953.
9. See, e.g., Yang Zengwen, "Victoriously Conclude the Work of the Second Stage of Land Reform in Shule xian," XJRB, April 3, 1953; and XJRB, June 19, 1953.
10. Yang, "Victoriously Conclude the Work. . ."
11. G. Bakhamov, The Collectivization of Agriculture in the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Rayon of the Chinese People's Republic (Moscow, 1959), quoted in CAR, 8:3 (1960), pp. 332-33; and XJRB, April 3, 1953.
12. NCNA, Urumqi, November 10, 1953.
13. RMRB, August 28, 1954; GMRB, September 15, 1955; Burhan, speech to First NPC; and Kang Chao, Agricultural Production in Communist China, 1949-55 (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1970), p. 296.
14. "Defend and Build Our Motherland"
15. Gao Jinchun, quoted in XJRB, February 24, 1954.

16. Muniti, "Xinjiang Takes on a New Look," RMRB, August 24, 1954.

17. Saifudin, "Ten Years of Progress in the XUAR," RMRB, October 25, 1959. These latter figures must be considered with caution, since there is the likelihood that a sizeable proportion of the lands said to be confiscated and redistributed during the land reform campaign were actually not handled in such a manner until after the announced conclusion of the movement, i.e. during the 1955-59 period. Such may have been the case in the Yili area. Also, the final total probably included some lands which were developed by the Xinjiang PCC and subsequently turned over to local management units (such as coops). Furthermore, the implication of the final figures revealed by Saifudin was that the land reform campaign had probably continued beyond the date of its proclaimed "victorious conclusion" in early 1954 due to organizational problems and resistance.

18. Muniti, op. cit.

19. XJRB, January 5, 1954.

20. Wang Enmao, Report to Enlarged Conference of XJ CCP Sub-Bureau, quoted in XJRB, March 2, 1955.

21. Saifudin, "Achievements in Economic Construction in the Xinjiang Region," RMRB, March 2, 1955.

22. Bakhanov, op. cit., p. 333. The "fraternal help of the Soviets" to Xinjiang's agriculture from 1949 to 1955, for example, was said to have totalled 1,066 tractors (fifteen horsepower units), 140 combines, and 4,000 tractor-ploughs, seed drills, and cultivators. Soviet specialists had aided in the construction of several large water conservancy projects, gave instruction in the use of new machinery and technology, and carried out large-scale aerial insecticide spraying in Xinjiang.

23. See, e.g., NCNA, Peking, October 21, 1955; NCNA, Urumqi, October 20, 1955; and XJRB, November 15, 1955; NCNA, Urumqi, November 18, 1955; and NCNA, Urumqi, January 7 and 17, 1955, respectively.

24. As one measure undertaken to speed up cooperativization, the Xinjiang PCC assigned about 100 of its skilled agricultural cadres to various APC's to supervise their production, and several hundred additional cadres were dispatched to other lower-stage APC's to assist in their organization into higher-stage APC's. NCNA, Peking, February 22, 1956; and NCNA, Urumqi, August 2, 1956.

25. Wang, "Work Report . . .," on July 10, 1956.

26. "Urgent Instructions on Distribution Work in the Summer Harvest," XJRB, September 13, 1956.

27. "Continuously Work to Overcome the Style of Coercion and Commandism," XJRB editorial, December 9, 1956.

28. See, e.g., NCNA, Urumqi, February 25, 1957; and Pathan Sugurpaev, "Xinjiang Must Depend on the Support of the State and the Han Chinese People to Build Socialism with Success," speech to Fifth Session, First NPC on February 10, 1958, RMRB,

February 14, 1958.

29. See, e.g., Lu, "Report at Party Conference on Propaganda Work in the XUAR."

30. NCNA, Urumqi, February 2, 1958.

31. XJRB, September 8, 1957.

32. XJRB, June 6, 1958.

33. Cited in XJRB, June 8, 1958.

34. Wang Enmao, "Agricultural Production Should Enter a New Stage of Development in the Autonomous Region," XJRB, July 18, 1958.

35. "XUAR CCP Committee Directive Concerning Preparations for Achieving a Still Bigger Leap Forward in Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Production in 1959," XJRB, July 28, 1958.

36. XJRB, September 6, 1958. At the same time, all Muslim holidays and ceremonial observances were cancelled.

37. XJRB editorial, September 25, 1958.

38. Ibid.

39. XJRB, September 30, 1958. At the time of commune-building in Xinjiang in the fall of 1958, there were some 7,000 higher-stage APC's and pastoral coops in the region with a total membership of 96.6 percent of all peasant and pastoral households. Saifudin, "Xinjiang's Great Achievements in Agriculture During the Past Ten Years," Zhongguo nongbao (Chinese Agriculture), No. 19 (October 8, 1959).

40. "Enlarged Session Held by the XUAR CCP Committee to Carry Out the Spirit of the Sixth Plenary Session, Eighth CCP Central Committee," NCNA, Urumqi, January 12, 1959.

41. One source, however, claimed that there were over 37,000 industrial enterprises at the commune-level, presumably including the "backyard furnaces." P.H.M. Jones, "Sinkiang: China's Last Frontier," FEER, 30:5 (November 3, 1960), p. 204.

42. "In Refutation of the Fallacious Representation that 'Industry Has Crowded-Out Agriculture' by the Rightist Opportunists," Xinjiang hongqi (Xinjiang Red Flag), No. 21, cited in XJRB, October 21, 1959; and XJRB, March 10, 1959.

43. Cited in Byung-joon Ahn, "The Political Economy of the People's Communes in China: Changes and Continuities," Journal of Asian Studies, 34:3 (May, 1975), p. 634.

44. NCNA, Urumqi, January 12, 1959.

45. Saifudin, "Celebrate the Tenth National Day with Tremendous Achievements in Production Increase and Economy," MZTJ, No. 10 (October 6, 1959).

46. Saifudin, "Report on the Readjustment. . . ." See also, "Xinjiang Party Committee Calls Meeting on Socialist Education and Overhaul of the Communes," XJRB, November 25, 1959.

47. "Launch a Mass Campaign to Implement the Economic Use of Grain," XJRB editorial, February 3, 1960.

48. Yang Heting, "Work Report of the XUAR People's Council" at Second Session, Second XUAR People's Congress on May 28, 1960, XJRB, May 29, 1960. Cadres were also warned to

measure all sown land carefully, not to include unsown land in their reports, and verify grain output by weight.

49. Wang Enmao, "We Must Continue to Take a Big Leap Forward This Year," speech to Second Session, Second XUAR People's Congress on June, 2, 1960, XJRB, June 20, 1960.

50. "Xinjiang Developing Agricultural Production in Areas Along the Xinjiang-Lanzhou Railroad," RMRB, June 25, 1960. In addition, the Xinjiang PCC was reported to have transferred 300 "outstanding Party cadres" to participate in the 10,000-man work force which was sent to the basic levels within the region's communes to aid in "readjustment and consolidation" work. Li Bingda, "Do More Good Deeds for the People of Xinjiang," MZTJ, Nos. 10-11 (October-November, 1963).

51. Lu Jianren, "Hold Higher the Three Red Flags of the General Line, the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes, and March Forward in Large Strides Cheerfully," XJRB, October 3, 1960.

52. Ahn, op. cit., p. 635.

53. "Draft Regulations of the Party Central Committee Concerning the Rural Communes," cited in *Ibid.*

54. Wang Zhen, "Strengthening the Building of State Farms," Hongqi (Red Flag), April 1, 1961, cited in Peking Review, No. 17 (April 28, 1961).

55. See, e.g., NCNA, Urumqi, November 8, 1961; RMRB, November 11, 1961; Dagong bao, Peking, November 11, 1961; P.H.M. Jones, "Sinkiang Gets to Work," FEER, 35:12 (March 22, 1962), p. 654; Wang Jilong, op. cit.; and NCNA, Urumqi, November 30, 1961.

56. Li Bingda, op. cit.

57. RMRB, January 27, 1962.

58. See, e.g., Michael Oksenberg, "Communist China: A Quiet Crisis in Revolution," in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, ed., Communist China: Revolutionary Reconstruction and International Confrontation, 1949-Present (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 394.

59. Ahn, op. cit., p. 641.

60. See, e.g., NCNA, Urumqi, October 31, 1964; and NCNA, Urumqi, August 9 and 24, 1965. In fact, the consolidation and levelling of smaller plots into larger plots, which was said to be necessary for mechanization, was probably an indication that the regional authorities were striving to gradually amalgamate the semisocialist APC's into higher-stage coops or communes. By August, 1965, some 3 million mou of small, irregular farm plots, which were described as the "vestiges of the former small peasant economy," were consolidated into strip fields of about 200-300 mou each within the communes.

61. Wang Enmao, "Work Report to Second Session, Third XUAR People's Congress," quoted in NCNA, Urumqi, November 5, 1964.

62. NCNA, Urumqi, October 1, 1964. This figure may not have included the output from the Xinjiang PCC farms.

63. No explanation was given by the regional authorities for the low cotton production output in 1964, but it can be assumed that the above figure did not include the PCC's cotton harvest.

64. See, e.g., Saifudin, "Hold High the Great Red Banner . . ."; and He, "Speech to Celebration Meeting in Urumqi," NCNA, Urumqi, September 30, 1965.

65. In fact, the cultivated area apparently once again reached the same level as 1958, while foodgrain output equalled that of 1959.

66. Wang, "The Great Victory. . .," NCNA, Urumqi, September 30, 1965.

67. Xiao Jiyong, "An Analysis of Land Reclamation and the Establishment of State Farms on the Chinese Mainland," Issues and Studies, 2:2 (November, 1965), p. 26.

68. Wang, "The Great Victory. . .," NCNA, Urumqi, September 30, 1965.

69. Dagong bao, Peking, April 24, 1965.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 10

1. Zhang Bangying, quoted in XJRB, December 14, 1951.

2. Ibid.

3. NCNA, Urumqi, September 20, 1954.

4. NCNA, Urumqi, September 19 and 20, 1954.

5. See, e.g., NCNA, Urumqi, October 7, 1954.

6. Ibid.

7. XJRB, July 2, 1954.

8. RMRB, October 1, 1955; Gao Jinchun, quoted in XJRB, March 13, 1955. Livestock figures for Xinjiang during the 1949-65 period are given in Table 9.2.

9. Saifudin, "Report to First NPC" on July 26, 1955, RMRB, July 27, 1955.

10. Saifudin, "Achievements in Economic Construction in the Xinjiang Region," RMRB, September 30, 1955.

11. NCNA, Urumqi, December 29, 1955. For example, in the Yili Zhou, where fourteen of twenty-four xian were described as being pastoral, 630 pastoral MAT's and one trial pastoral coop had been organized by December, with 14 percent of the pastoral households of the zhou as members. NCNA, Urumqi, December 2, 1955.

12. See, e.g., RMRB, September 25, 1955; and NCNA, Urumqi, December 5, 1955.

13. See also, Davidson, op. cit., p. 73.

14. Wang, Work Report. . .," on July 10, 1956. It is probable, however, that the Party had been obliged to pursue more gradual policies due to the pastoralists' resistance to collectivization.

15. "May All Understand the Socialist Transformation of the Pastoral Industry," XJRB, editorial, October 16, 1956.

16. NCNA, Urumqi, February 25, 1957.

17. NCNA, Urumqi, November 9, 1957.
18. Saifudin, "Work Report to First Session, Second XUAR People's Congress," on January 22, 1959.
19. NCNA, Urumqi, January 12, 1959.
20. "The XUAR Struggles to Develop Pastoral Industry," MZTJ, No. 6 (June, 1959).
21. "Life of Kazakh People Leaps Into New Stage," RMRB, June 21, 1959. This report claimed that over 80 percent of the Kazakhs of the Yili Zhou had settled down. At the same time it was reported that 90 percent of Xinjiang's herding families belonged to 108 communes. MZTJ, No. 6 (June, 1959).
22. NCNA, Peking, December 13, 1959.
23. XJRB, November 25, 1959.
24. Moseley, op. cit., p. 145, note 17.
25. One of the Party's objectives in setting up the pastoral communes was the dissolution of the traditional uru units and the inauguration of a pattern of individual labor units among the pastoralists. This process was encouraged by mixing the ethnic composition of the communes, combining agricultural and animal husbandry production for all commune members, and transferring the pastoralists' dependence on the old uru to their total dependence on the state.
26. Wang Enmao, "Long Live the People's Commune," preface to the book The People's Commune is Good, quoted in RMRB, February 5, 1960.
27. See, e.g., Xiu Yong, "Urban People's Commune Movement Vigorously Unfolded in Yining," Yili ribao (Yili Daily), Yining, April 7, 1960, in SCMP Supplement, No. 10 (July 11, 1960), p. 12.
28. See, e.g., NCNA, Urumqi, August 9, 1962.
29. Zhao Huaibi, "Agricultural Production is Continuously Leaping Forward in the Yili Kazakh Autonomous Zhou," MZTJ, No. 6 (June 6, 1961), p. 11.
30. Pastoral production figures for the period 1959-1963 were generally not revealed, or when they were reported they were very vague. For example, 24.98 million head of livestock were reported in 1959, but in 1960 there were probably no more than 25 million head of livestock in Xinjiang. Thus, there was little, if any, increase in 1960. Furthermore, no livestock figures at all were given for the years 1961-63. This was probably the result of serious declines in the number of livestock due to the dislocations of the GLF.
31. See, e.g., NCNA, Urumqi, October, 15, 1963. One source claimed that a settled life for all the Kazakhs of Xinjiang had been achieved by 1963. "Minority Herdsmen in Northwest China," NCNA, Urumqi, September 6, 1963.
32. To what extent the Party returned to the traditional uru unit of socio-economic organization within the "pastoral communes" is unknown. It can be speculated, however, that the uru did in most cases once again become the basic unit of the production brigades.

33. Zhang Shigong, "Advancing Along the Socialist Road," MZTJ, No. 9 (September, 1964).

34. NCNA, Yining, September 2, 1964.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 11

1. Zhongguo jinrong (Chinese Finance), Peking, No. 53 (October 28, 1959).

2. Shanghai News, September 21, 1951.

3. See, e.g., XJRB, September 6, 1955.

4. XJRB, September 8, 1957; and Saifudin, "Hold High the Great Red Banner. . .," RMRB, September 30, 1965.

5. Saifudin, "Report on Local Nationalism. . .," RMRB, December 26, 1957. One of the more important aspects of central aid to Xinjiang was that it brought about a significant degree of compliance by the regional authorities to policies emanating from Peking, and helped to tie the region more firmly to China.

6. See, e.g., Taipov, op. cit., p. 1; Lo, op. cit., pp. 98-99; XJRB, September 7, 1955; and Urumqi Radio, April 18, 1969.

7. CAR, 4:1 (1956), p. 74.

8. Zhang Banging, "Report at the Conference of Cadres"

9. "Keypoint" (zhongdian) means "with discrimination."

10. XJRB, September 9, 1955. Some 43.72 percent of the total volume of retail trade was handled by the state-owned commercial enterprises and coops in Xinjiang in 1954. RMRB, September 30, 1955.

11. XJRB, September 6, 1955.

12. In mid-October 1954, the Xinjiang Trade Union Congress formally established trade unions in the province with a total of nearly 50,000 members primarily in Urumqi, Yining, and Kazgar. NCNA, Urumqi, October 18, 1954.

13. Quoted in RMRB, September 30, 1955.

14. XJRB, August 3, 1955.

15. In fact, the authorities proclaimed that by the end of 1955 Urumqi had been transformed from a consumer's city into a producer's city with a population of 140,000 people. It was well on the road to becoming a modern diversified industrial center, was the regional trading and transportation center with over 8,000 kilometers of highways linking it with all parts of the region, and was fostering the region's first group of modern industrial workers of all nationalities. Xu Shuzhao, op. cit.

16. XJRB, September 6, 1955.

17. Saifudin, "Speech to the First NPC," on July 26, 1955, RMRB, July 27, 1955.

18. In addition, it must be assumed that the central authorities had to provide continued large subsidies for industrial development since agriculture had not yet shown the ability to finance it.

19. Wang, "Work Report. . .," on July 10, 1956.

20. Although Saifudin had proclaimed in October 1956 that 83.8 percent of the region's handicraftsmen had been organized, and between 94 and 95 percent of the private industries and commercial enterprises had undergone "basic socialist transformation," later Chinese sources claimed that these achievements had not been made until 1958. See. Saifudin, "Achievements in Economic Construction. . .," RMRB, September 30, 1955; and NCNA, Urumqi, September 21, 1965.

21. Kotov, op. cit., pp. 451-52.

22. Quoted in XJRB, September 6, 1958.

23. NCNA, Urumqi, October 6, 1958.

24. Saifudin, "Achievements in Xinjiang Province," on April 23, 1959, NCNA, Peking, April 23, 1959.

25. Cited in Lo, "Five Years of the SUAR," p. 94. Altogether, central investments and subsidies to Xinjiang had totalled 273 percent of the local revenues and expenditures.

26. Xinjiang hongqi (Xinjiang Red Flag), "In Refutation of the Fallacious Representation That 'Industry Has Crowded-Out Agriculture'."

27. See, e.g., Saifudin, "Report on the Readjustment of Principal Targets Set in the 1959 National Economic Plan of the XUAR. . . ."

28. A part of this increase in industry's share of the gross value of all production was plainly due to the serious drop in agricultural production.

29. "Launch a Mass Campaign to Implement the Economic Use of Grain," XJRB editorial, February 3, 1960.

30. Wang Enmao, "We Must Continue to Take a Big Leap Forward This Year," XJRB, June 20, 1960. In part, this was necessitated by the fact that construction on the railroad had been slowed by nearly insurmountable topographical obstacles and by the withdrawal of Soviet aid and advisors at about the same time.

31. NCNA, Urumqi, September 8, 1963.

32. NCNA, Urumqi, July 12 and August 21, 1963.

33. RMRB, October 10, 1965.

34. Dagong bao, Peking, September 30, 1965; and CNA, No. 591 (December 3, 1965), p. 6.

35. Shi Jinhe, "The Thought of Mao Zedong Scores a Brilliant Victory on the Finance-Trade Front in Xinjiang," Dagong bao, Peking, October 10, 1965.

36. Saifudin, "Hold High the Great Red Banner. . . ."

NOTES TO CHAPTER 12

1. Song Richang, "Shanghai Youths Can Do Much in Xinjiang," Wenhui bao, Shanghai, January 17, 1966.

2. NCNA, Urumqi, March 17, 1966.

3. See, e.g., Jiefangjun bao, August 20, 1966.

4. Ibid.

5. Urumqi Radio, June 20, 1966.
6. "Study and Apply Chairman Mao's Works More Creatively During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," XJRB, June 27, 1966, text broadcast by Urumqi Radio, June 27, 1966.
7. Urumqi Radio, June 1, 1966.
8. Ibid.
9. Urumqi Radio, August 10, 1966. A Soviet source claimed that Liu had been removed not only because he had opposed the posting of Mao quotations, but also because he had held a gloomy view of the communes and had appealed for greater friendship with Moscow. Tass, Moscow, October 8, 1966.
10. China Notes, No. 406, (December 21, 1966), p. 10.
11. Chinese Communist Affairs: Facts and Features (a bi-weekly supplement to Issues and Studies), Taipei, 1:2 (November 15, 1967), pp. 11-13.
12. There is no way of telling how many Red Guards there were in Xinjiang since both radicals and conservatives organized such groups.
13. Urumqi Radio, August 24, 1966. See also, The Great Power Struggle in China (Hong Kong: Asia Research Centre, 1969), p. 15.
14. NCNA, Peking, August 25, 1966.
15. The Red Guard group was said to be composed of twelve student militants and ten girls from Peking Middle School No. 36.
16. William Hinton, 100-Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 87-88.
17. Ibid., p. 90.
18. Urumqi Radio, September 3, 1966; and Facts and Features, 1:2 (November 15, 1967), p. 11.
19. Hinton, op. cit., p. 90.
20. Urumqi Radio, September 14, 1966.
21. See, e.g., NCNA, Peking, September 19, 1966.
22. Urumqi Radio, September 16, 1966.
23. "Learn from the Peking Red Guards," XJRB editorial September 16, 1966, text broadcast by Urumqi Radio, same date.
24. Joint telegram sent by the Peking Red Rebellion Team to Safeguard Mao Zedong's Thought, the Red Rebel Long March Team of the Peking International Relations Institute, the Red Rebel Long March Team of Peking Middle-School No. 107, and the Red Rebel Long March Team of the Peking Mechanical College, dated September 22, 1966, held by Union Research Institute, Hong Kong, and translated by the author.
25. Hinton, op. cit., pp. 93-94.
26. NCNA, Peking October 2, 1966.
27. Peking Radio, September 29, 1966. It may very well be that the Maoists had invited Saifudin to the capital in order to gain his support against Wang, or at least to obtain his neutrality in the Maoist struggle against the Wang-dominated regional Party establishment. It is now inconceivable that Mao's strategy in having Saifudin in Peking at this time was

also designed to placate the minorities in Xinjiang who might have been fearful that the GPCR was nothing more than another Han campaign directed at them and their customs, habits, and beliefs.

27. Tanjug (Belgrade Radio), October 6, 1966, cited in the China Mail, Hong Kong, October 7, 1966, p. 2.

28. No mention was made of Wang attending any of the meetings of this organization, rather Wang's indirect control of it was instituted through his subordinates on the regional Party committee who attended as his representatives. Wang was wise enough not to publicly associate with it, since doing so would have added even more fuel to the fire which the radicals were building under him.

29. Urumqi Radio, November 2, 1966. The Red Second Headquarters was said to have been born on September 3 when the curtain was raised on the struggle between the two roads in Xinjiang. Bei Douxing, "The Law of History," Xinjiang Hongweibing (Xinjiang Red Guard), published by the Xinjiang Red Second Headquarters, June 17, 1967.

30. See, e.g., Union Research Service, Hong Kong, November 27, 1966.

31. Urumqi Radio, November 19, 1966.

32. Ibid.

33. Urumqi Radio, November 30, 1966; and Chu, op. cit., p. 38.

34. Soviet propaganda claimed that since the start of the GPCR Muslim refugees had fled from Xinjiang in increasing numbers. Although it is very likely that some of the regional minorities might have sought refuge in the Soviet Union so as to escape from the turmoil and dislocations in the region, there were no reports in the regional or national media to confirm or deny such movements.

35. Reuters dispatch from Peking, February 1, 1967.

36. Ibid.; and Chu, op. cit., p. 39.

37. See, e.g., Stephen Pan and Raymond J. deJaegher, Peking's Red Guard: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (New York: Twin Circle Publishing Company, 1968), p. 257; and Sankei, Tokyo, January 19, 1967.

38. Red Guard wall poster in Peking, January 17, 1967, reported in dispatch from Peking by Sankei, Tokyo, January 18, 1967.

39. The PCC August Frist Field Army and its supporters reportedly numbered between 10,000-20,000. See, e.g., Zhao Zong "An Account of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (Part 31)" Zuguo yuekan (China Monthly), Hong Kong, No. 77 (August 1, 1970), pp. 17-18; and Prague Radio, March 3, 1967.

40. Pan and deJaegher, op. cit., p. 358.

41. P.H.M. Jones, "Autonomous Wang," FEER, 58.13 (December 28, 1967), p. 569.

42. Shanghai youth interviewed by the author in Hong Kong, June 11, 1973.

1. Urumqi Radio, January 10, 1967.
2. NCNA, Peking, January 14 and 23, 1967.
3. Peking Radio, January 12, 1967.
4. See e.g., "CCP Central Committee Circular Prohibiting the Directing of the Spearhead of Struggle Against the Armed Forces," in CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), pp. 181-182.
5. "Decision of the CCP Central Committee, State Council, Military Affairs Committee, and CCP Cultural Revolution Group Concerning the Resolute Support of the PLA for the Revolutionary Masses of the Left," translated in Current Background (CB), No. 852, pp. 49-50.
6. From a report in Jinggangshan, a Red Guard tabloid, cited by Prague Radio, January 23, 1967. He was also charged as being one of the leaders who had avowedly attempted a coup d'etat in February 1966. See, e.g., Whitson, op. cit., p. 508.
7. Keesing's Research Report, The Cultural Revolution in China: Its Origins and Causes (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 25. It was reported on February 11 that He Long had been removed from the Military Affairs Committee. See also, Whitson, op. cit., p. 608, n. 18.
8. Cited in China Topics, No. 206 (March 16, 1967), p. 2; and Jones, "Autonomous Wang," p. 569.
9. See also, Ibid. Another source said that Wang could count on nine of the ten divisions under the PCC to follow his lead. "The Diary of the Cultural Revolution," Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, May, 1967, p. 48.
10. "The 'January 26' Counterrevolutionary Sanguinary Incident at Shihezi, Xinjiang," a mimeographed handbill jointly prepared by the Revolutionary Rebel Regiment of the Xinjiang Corps' August First Agricultural Institute, the Red Rebel Column of the Chu Opera Troupe of the Seventh Agricultural Division of the Corps, the Hongqi Combat Column of the Revolutionary Rebel Regiment of the Corps' Gonger Opera Troupe, and the Red Rebel Column of the Xiaoxing Opera Troupe of the Corps' First Agricultural Division on January 30, 1967, full text from a Hong Kong Mingbao report, translated in SCMP, Supplement No. 188 (June 22, 1967), pp. 28-31.
11. Another source claimed that the toll was 120 killed and over 500 missing. Facts and Features, 1:2 (November 15, 1967), p. 12.
12. See, e.g., "Smash the Fascist Concentration Camp of the 23rd Regiment, Eighth Agricultural Division, Xinjiang Construction Corps," Tianshan fenghuo (Tianshan Beacon Fire), published by the Eighth Agricultural Corps of the Xinjiang Red Guard Revolutionary Headquarters and the Revolutionary Workers of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, Nos. 4-5 (January 15, 1968), in Current Background, No. 855 (June 17,

1968), pp. 5-8.

13. Facts and Features, 1:2 (November 15, 1967), p. 12.

14. "The 'January 26' Counterrevolutionary Sanguinary Incident at Shihezi, Xinjiang," p. 30.

15. According to a poster of the Red Missile Military Corps of the PCC August First Agricultural Institute, quoted in Asahi Shimbun, January 28, 1967.

16. Kyodo News Agency, Tokyo, January 30, 1967.

17. China Notes, No. 458 (January 17, 1968), p. 3.

18. Stanley Karnow, op. cit., p. 252; and P.H.M. Jones, "Sensitive Sinkiang," FEER, 55:6 (February 9, 1967), p. 190.

19. See, e.g., "The Crimes of Liu Shaoqi in Blocking the Democratic Reform of Xinjiang's Livestock Areas," Dongfanghong zhanbao (The East-Is-Red Combat News), published in Peking by the Agricultural Mechanization Institute, affiliated with the Red Guard Congress of Capital Colleges and Universities, No. 44 (May 12, 1967), p. 3, translated in JPRS (Political and Social Information), No. 405 (July 1, 1967), pp. 146-152.

20. Translated in CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966-67, op. cit., p. 216.

21. Although the Mao-Lin group in Peking "officially" ordered the cessation of all GPCR activities in these military regions (including Xinjiang), this did not assure that the radical or the conservative factions would abide by such a directive. In fact, much contention and violence continued, despite Peking's public directives to the contrary. There were later indications that the Mao-Lin faction privately sanctioned the radical's continued activities against Wang.

22. Peking wall posters quoted by the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, January 31, 1967, cited in China Topics, No. 516 (February 20, 1969), p. 4.

23. See, e.g., China Topics, No. 458 (January 17, 1968), p. 4; and Moscow Radio, February 25, 1967.

24. Urumqi Radio (quoting Xinjiang Daily), February 3, 1967; and CAR, 15:2 (1967), pp. 187-90.

25. Ibid.

26. Urumqi Radio, February 5, 1967.

27. XJRB editorial, February 8, 1967.

28. See, e.g., XJRB editorial, February 9, 1967; and a Urumqi Radio broadcast of the same date.

29. Urumqi Radio, February 11, 1967.

30. Cited in China Topics, No. 458 (January 17, 1968, p.5).

31. "Account of the 'February 11' Incident in the Xinjiang Military Region," undated handbill published by the Revolutionary Rebel Regiment of the Xinjiang PCC' August First Agricultural Institute, translated by the author in Hong Kong, 1973.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 14

1. "Regulations of the CCP Central Committee, the State

Council, and the Military Affairs Committee of the CCP Central Committee Placing the Cultural Revolution in the Sinkiang Production and Construction Corps under Military Control," CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966-67, op. cit., pp. 258-61

2. Tokyo Radio, February 15, 1967, quoting the Hong Kong Star, same date.

3. See, e.g., China Topics, No. 458 (January 17, 1968), p. 6.

4. "How Wang Enmao Exaggerated His Achievements," Red Flag Combat News, No. 7 (February 17, 1967), p. 4.

5. Urumqi Radio, February 19, 1967.

6. "Revolutionary Leading Cadres Come Forth!" XJRB editorial, undated, broadcast by Urumqi Radio, February 19, 1967. See also reports by Japanese news agencies Yomiuri and Sankei, February 20, 1967, cited in the Hong Kong Standard, February 21, 1967.

7. China Topics, No. 458 (January 17, 1968), p.5.

8. Czechoslovakian News Agency (hereafter cited as CTK), March 1, 1967, cited in China Topics, No. 516 (February 20, 1969), p. 4.

9. Quoted by CTK, March 3, 1967.

10. See, e.g., Moscow Radio, February 20, 1967. Generally, the Chinese Air Force tended to support the radicals throughout China and to align itself with Lin Biao during the GPCR.

11. CTK, March 9, 1967, quoting XJRB of the same date; China Topics, No. 458 (January 17, 1968), pp. 6-8; and China Topics, No. 424 (April 25, 1967), p. 10.

12. Urumqi Radio, March 12, 1967.

13. Urumqi Radio, March 17, 1967.

14. Urumqi Radio, March 30, 1967.

15. Tianshan fenghuo (Tianshan Beacon Fire), Nos. 4-5 (January 15, 1968).

16. Cited in China Topics, No. 516 (February 20, 1969), p. 5.

17. Cited in China Topics, No. 431 (June 9, 1967), p. 2.

18. See, e.g., a report filed by Minoru Shibata, Peking Branch Bureau Chief, Sankei News Agency, June 6, 1967; and Asahi, Tokyo, June 7, 1967. It can be reasonably speculated that the military units which supported the radicals were those which had come under the influence of Unit 7335 or those like Zuo Qi who had "defected" from the camp of Wang. The military units who supported the conservatives included the majority of those led by PLA veterans within the Xinjiang PCC and XJMR.

19. See, e.g., China Topics, No. 516 (February 20, 1969), p. 5; the Scotsman, May 10, 1967, cited in China Topics, No. 458 (January 17, 1968), p. 8; Kyodo News Service reported from Peking, May 8, 1967, in Mainichi, Tokyo, May 9, 1967; Tokyo Radio, May 10, 1967; and Asahi, Tokyo, May 10, 1967, cited in CNA, No. 667 (July 7, 1967), p. 4.

20. Dispatch from Peking by Egashira, June 3, 1967,

Mainichi, Tokyo, June 5, 1967; and Xinjiang hongweibing (Xinjiang Red Guard), published by the Xinjiang Red Second Headquarters, June 17, 1967, p. 4.

21. "Circular Order of the CCP Central Committee, State Council, Military Affairs Committee, and the Cultural Revolution Group of the CCP Central Committee on Maintaining Law and Order," June 6, 1967, Xin beida (New Peking University), published by the Peking University Cultural Revolution Committee, June 14, 1967.

22. "Resolutely Curb Struggle Through Force," XJRB editorial, June 7, 1967, broadcast by Urumqi Radio, same date.

23. CAR, 16:1 (1968), p. 88.

24. Facts and Features, 1:2 (November 15, 1967), p. 12.

25. Hong Kong Star, June 20, 1967.

26. London Sunday Times, July 2, 1967.

27. See SCMP, No. 4069 (November 29, 1967), pp. 1-9.

28. Tianshan fenghuo, No.s 4-5, 2nd Ed. (January 24, 1968), p. 8.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, p. 9. Subsequently, Zuo was summoned to Peking where he and Qi Benyu worked with the Cultural Revolution Group as advisors on Xinjiang matters. See, e.g., Dahan dazhao (Outcry), published by the Red Flag Commune of the Canton Printing School, Steel Third Headquarters, No. 8 (January 30, 1968); and The Fierce Fire of Hilly City, published by the Number 27 Revolutionary Workers' Rebel Headquarters of the Guangxi 4-22 Wuzhou Revolutionary Rebel Army, No. 17 (March 1, 1968), p. 3.

31. NCNA, Peking, October 2, 1967.

32. Tianshan fenghuo, Nos. 4-5, 2nd Ed. (January 24, 1968), p. 8.

33. Facts and Features, 1:12 (April 3, 1968), p. 4.

34. *Ibid.*; China Topics, No. 516 (April 20, 1969), p. 5; and Moscow Radio, December 10, 1967.

35. Tianshan fenghuo, Nos. 4-5 (January 15, 1968), p. 5.

36. Facts and Features, 1:12 (April 3, 1968), p. 12.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 15

1. CAR, 16:2 (1968), p. 181.

2. Tianshan fenghuo, Nos. 4-5 (January 15, 1968), p. 6; and Dahan dazhao, op. cit., p. 4.

3. Facts and Features, 1:25 (October 2, 1968), p. 11.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Facts and Features, 1:20 (July 24, 1968), p. 17.

6. Facts and Features, 1:25 (October 2, 1968), p. 11.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 12. Unconfirmed reports claimed that the Red Second Headquarters had also attacked some of the support-the-left troops of Unit 7335 when they were ordered to cease their extreme leftist tactics and abide by the earlier Central Committee directives that forbade armed violence.

8. *Ibid.*; and Dahan dazhao, op. cit., p. 5.

9. NCNA, Urumqi, January 29, 1968.
10. Ibid.
11. NCNA, Urumqi, January 31, 1968.
12. See, e.g., RMRB, February 20, 1968; and Peking Radio, February 27, 1968.
13. See, e.g., RMRB, March 30, 1968 and April 7, 1968.
14. RMRB, April 19, 1968; and RMRB editorial, April 27, 1968.
15. Hongqi tongxun (Red Flag Bulletin), published by the Hongqi tongxun Society of Jiangmen, Guangdong, No. 14 (May 26, 1968); and 'Steel 81' Bulletin, published by the 'Steel 81' Rebel Group of the Number One Light Industry System General Headquarters in Canton, No. 1 (June 1968).
16. Ibid.; and Facts and Features, 1:19 (July 10, 1968), p. 16.
17. Issues and Studies, 5:2 (December, 1968), p. 15. The same source also claimed that refugee reports emanating from Central Asia disclosed that there had been some 5,000 border incidents in 1966 alone.
18. Facts and Features, 1:25 (October 2, 1968), p. 12; and Tongfanghong (East-Is-Red News), edited by the East-Is-Red Work-Study Group of the Red Third Corps of Canton, No. 3 (July, 1968).
19. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
20. Whitson, op. cit., p. 533.
21. FEER, No. 35 (August 29, 1968), pp. 377-78; and Richard Baum, "China: The Year of the Mangoes," in China in Ferment: Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution, ed. Richard Baum with Louise B. Bennett (Englewood Cliffs, N.Y.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 151.
22. Facts and Features, 1:25 (October 2, 1968), p. 12.
23. Ibid.
24. Parris Chang, "Decentralization of Power," Problems of Communism, No. 21 (July-August, 1972), p. 73.
25. NCNA, Peking, September 6, 1968.
26. Quoted in Current Scene, 6:18 (October 18, 1969), pp. 23-24.
27. NCNA, Peking, September 6, 1968.
28. In fact, it would appear that while Peking felt that Wang's continued personal leadership constituted the main obstacle to achieving unity within the region, the central leadership recognized that Wang's complete disgrace might result in strong counteractions by his supporters. In the turmoil which might follow if Wang was treated badly, it was feared that the Soviets might launch an armed invasion in Xinjiang along the same lines of their invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968.
29. It is likely that Zuo Qi had not been given a vice-chairmanship because of Wang's objections during his negotiations in Peking. It may have also been a symbolic compromise made by the Mao-Lin faction to gain Wang's collaboration in

forming the XJ Revoly. Cmte. There is some reason to believe that although Zuo Qi had only been selected to the Standing Committee, his influence may have actually been greater.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 16

1. Peking Radio, September 6, 1968.
2. NCNA, Urumqi, September 6, 1968.
3. Quoted by Urumqi Radio, September 9, 1968.
4. Ibid.
5. See, e.g., CNA, No. 730 (October 25, 1968), p. 5.
6. Elegant, op. cit., p. 429.
7. See, e.g. Urumqi Radio, November 12, 1968.
8. Urumqi Radio, November 11, 1968.
9. See, e.g., Ibid; and Urumqi Radio, November 13 and 14, 1968.
10. Urumqi Radio, November 11, 1968.
11. Ibid.
12. During the previous year, Zhang Xiqin had served as the acting commander of the Xinjiang PCC when Tao was being criticized by radical Red Guards.
13. Urumqi Radio, November 21, 1968.
14. See, e.g., "Consolidate and Develop the Newborn Red Political Power in the Storms of Class Struggle," XJRB editorial, November 14, 1968.
15. The "three-support and two-military" policy implemented by PLA units included providing support to the leftists, support to industrial production, support to agricultural production, establishing order, and training and re-educating Red Guards. Various leaders of the XJ Revoly. Cmte. also went to the lower levels to undertake propaganda and organizational work.
16. Urumqi Radio, November 20 and 21, 1968.
17. Urumqi Radio, November 19, 1968.
18. Urumqi Radio, November 21 and 23, 1968.
19. Ibid; and Urumqi Radio, December 18, 1968.
20. Zao, op. cit., p. 13; and Central News Agency, Taipei, December 6, 1968.
21. Urumqi Radio, January 10, 1969.
22. Quoted in Urumqi Radio, January 16, 1969.
23. Ibid.
24. See, e.g., Urumqi Radio, January 12 and 23, 1969. In fact, this new organization was merely a preparatory committee set up for the purpose of guiding the formation of a revolutionary committee for the whole PCC.
25. Urumqi Radio, January 12, 1969.
26. Urumqi Radio, January 28, 1969.
27. Urumqi Radio, February 6, 1969.
28. Urumqi Radio, January 25, 1970.
29. Urumqi Radio, February 23, 1969.
30. Quoted by Urumqi Radio, March 5, 1969. See also,

Saifudin's remarks quoted by RMRB, April 9, 1969.

31. Hong Kong Star, January 20, 1969.

32. "The Working Class Listens to Chairman Mao Most," XJRB editorial, April 12, 1969.

33. Urumqi Radio, April 16, 1969.

34. Wang Zhen and Ding Sheng, both of whom had formerly held high positions in Xinjiang, were also elected full members of the Ninth Party Central Committee, Ding for the first time. Wang, who had been a full member of the previous Central Committee (ranked 86th of 91 full members) managed to retain his position despite the fact that he had been seriously criticized by Red Guards during the height of the GPCR. Other leading figures of the PLA 1st Field Army faction who had ties with Xinjiang did not fare so well, however, and lost their positions on the new Central Committee. Among them were Peng Dehuai and He Long.

35. Hong Kong Star, June 22, 1969.

36. These radical policies, as we shall see, included ideological incentives, egalitarianism in economic distribution and social status, the abolition of limited private ownership, and the extirpation of all old ideas, customs, habits, and beliefs.

37. See, e.g., "Carry on the Struggle Between the Two Lines in a Deep-Going Way," XJRB editorial, no date given, Urumqi Radio, December 18, 1968; "Let the Great Red Banner of Mao Zedong's Thought Fly High Over the Countryside and Grassland," XJRB editorial, no date given, Urumqi Radio, November 22, 1968; and Urumqi Radio, February 6, 1969.

38. Quoted by Urumqi Radio, December 18, 1968.

39. Urumqi Radio, February 8, 1969.

40. "Joint Directive of the Xinjiang Revolutionary Committee and the XJMR CCP Committee on Agricultural Production," Urumqi Radio, March 1, 1969.

41. "Strengthen the Viewpoint on Policy and Enhance the Awareness of Policy Implementation," XJRB editorial, no date given, Urumqi Radio, May 30, 1969.

42. "Unite, Fight, and Strive to Win a New Victory in the Summer Harvest," XJRB editorial, no date given, Urumqi Radio, June 27, 1969.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 17

1. "Hold Aloft the Great Red Banner of Mao Zedong Thought and Strengthen Revolutionary Unity to Win Still Greater Victories," XJRB editorial, no date given, broadcast by Urumqi Radio, May 17, 1969.

2. Urumqi Radio, May 27, 1969.

3. Ibid.

4. "Heighten Vigilance and Step Up Combat Readiness," XJRB editorial, no date given, broadcast by Urumqi Radio, June 3, 1969.

5. Urumqi Radio, June 13, 1969.
6. United States Information Service, "Tension on the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan Border," China Reporting Service (Hong Kong: Green Pagoda Press), No. 16 (June 30, 1969), pp. 1-3.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
8. China Topics, No. 541 (January 28, 1970), p. 1.
9. Urumqi Radio, June 12 and 13, 1969.
10. Urumqi Radio, July 1, 1969.
11. Cited by Urumqi Radio, June 12, 1969.
12. China Topics, No. 541 (January 28, 1970), Appendix A, pp. 1-2.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
14. This "transformation" was to include the extirpation of all heterodox ideas and beliefs of the non-Han peoples which stood in the way of their ethnic and cultural fusion with the Han people on the road to communism. These heterodox ideas and beliefs included Islam, pro-Soviet sentiments, and the desire for independence.
15. Quoted by Urumqi Radio, September 5, 1969.
16. "Unite to Consolidate the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," XJRB editorial, September 6, 1969.
17. "Continue Doing a Good Job in Re-educating Young Intellectuals," XJRB, no date given, broadcast by Urumqi Radio, September 13, 1969.
18. Urumqi Radio, November 24, 1969.
19. See, e.g., "It is Necessary to Purify the Thoughts of Cadres on the One Hand, and Unite with Them on the Other," XJRB no date given, broadcast by Urumqi Radio, January 14, 1970; and Urumqi Radio, February 2, 1970.
20. Urumqi Radio, January 23 and March 3, 1970.
21. Long Shujin, quoted by Urumqi Radio, July 1, 1970.
22. Urumqi Radio, July 7, 1970.
23. See, e.g., Urumqi Radio, October 29 and November 2, 16, and 20, 1970.
24. Urumqi Radio, December 21, 1969.
25. Quoted by Urumqi Radio, January 15, 1971.
26. Urumqi Radio, February 16, 1971.
27. Urumqi Radio, March 31, 1971.
28. Urumqi Radio, March 29, 1971.
29. RMRB, May 8, 1971.
30. Peking Radio, August 17, 1969; and Urumqi Radio, September 27, 1969.
31. Urumqi Radio, December 16, 1969; and Zhang Yuntian, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
32. Urumqi Radio, July 1, 1970.
33. Urumqi Radio, August 16, 1970.
34. Urumqi Radio, January 21, 1971.
35. Urumqi Radio, May 5, 1970. The more rapid recovery of industry compared to that of agriculture and animal husbandry was partially due to the fact that the region's industrial labor force, including that of the Xinjiang PCC, was predominantly

Han while most of the peasants and herdsmen were minority nationals.

36. Urumqi Radio, January 14, 1971.
37. Urumqi Radio, April 6, 1971.
38. See, e.g., Urumqi Radio, July 28, 1970.
39. Urumqi Radio, January 30, 1970.
40. Urumqi Radio, December 30, 1970.
41. See, e.g., Urumqi Radio, November 17, 1971.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 18

1. See, e.g., Urumqi Radio, November 17, 1971.
2. For a more detailed account of the attempted coup by Lin, and the nature of the top secret Party documents related to it, see Michael Y.M. Kau, ed., The Lin Biao Affair: Power Politics and Military Coup (White Plains, New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975) and an article by the same author entitled "The Case Against Lin Biao," Chinese Law and Government, 5:3-4 (Fall-Winter, 1972-73), pp. 5-30. See also, Zhongyang ribao (Central Daily News), Taipei, April 13, 1972, p. 2; Xindao zhoubao, Hong Kong, August 10 and 17, 1972, p. 2; CNA, No. 870 (February 18, 1972); CNA, No. 871 (February 24, 1972); CNA, No. 896 (October 6, 1972); CNA, No. 897 (October 13, 1972); CNS, No. 395, (November 18, 1971); CNS, No. 404 (January 27, 1972); and CNS, No. 468 (May 24, 1973).
3. "Document Number Four," which was revealed by the Central Committee on October 13, 1971, reportedly indicated that Xinjiang had served as a major base of operations for Lin's armed coup. Chu, op. cit., p. 12.
4. See, e.g., Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army After the Cultural Revolution: The Effects of Intervention," China Quarterly, No. 55 (July-September, 1973), pp. 472-73.
5. Subsequently, Long made no public appearances and was not mentioned in the Chinese press.
6. See, e.g., Urumqi Radio, January 14, February 7, and March 10, 1972.
7. Urumqi Radio, October 16, 1971.
8. See, e.g., Urumqi Radio, August 1, 1972.
9. Urumqi Radio, May 7, 1971.
10. Urumqi Radio, March 21, 1972.
11. Quoted by Urumqi Radio, September 23, 1972.
12. Urumqi Radio, September 25, 1972.
13. Urumqi Radio, December 21 and 22, 1972.
14. See, e.g., Urumqi Radio, March 12 and December 21, 1972.
15. Urumqi Radio, July 3, 1973.
16. Urumqi Radio, April 26, 1971.
17. See, e.g., Urumqi Radio, September 28, 1971.
18. Urumqi Radio, July 11, 1971.
19. Significantly, the provisions allowing for limited private plots, sideline production, and material incentives

were later written into the 1975 National Constitution of the PRC. Moreover, further commune retrenchment was indicated by a clause in the document which stated that the production team was the basic accounting unit. See, e.g., Peking Review, January 24, 1975.

20. NCNA, Urumqi, October 8, 1971.

21. RMRB, May 20, 1973. Based upon the official regional population figure of 8 million people, the total foodgrain production would have been 5,892,000 tonnes.

22. Urumqi Radio, April 20, 1973.

23. NCNA, Urumqi, October 8, 1971.

24. NCNA, Urumqi, April 26, 1972.

25. Urumqi Radio, March 25 and November 5, 1972.

26. Urumqi Radio, February 13, 1972.

27. Urumqi Radio, July 18, 1973. The total student population, then, would have been approximately 1.35 million. The sources did not specify the composition of the pupils in terms of nationality, nor did they make any distinctions between full and part-time regular schools, technical schools, vocational schools, or literacy schools in Xinjiang.

28. See, e.g., Urumqi Radio, January 26, 1971.

29. Urumqi Radio, September 27, 1971.

30. In fact, Wang Enmao was subsequently identified as a deputy political commissar in the Nanjing Military Region under Ding Sheng, his old associate in Xinjiang. His reappearance coincided with the brief re-emergence of Deng Xiaoping under the presumed sponsorship of Zhou Enlai in 1975. See CNA, No. 1052 (September 3, 1976). As of August 1977, Wang had again risen to full membership on the Eleventh CCP Central Committee and to membership on its Presidium. Peking Review, No. 35 (August 26, 1977), pp. 14-15.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 19

1. A recently published work attempts a preliminary analysis of Chairman Mao's role in China's revolutionary struggle. See Dick Wilson, ed., Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

2. The "new-born things" that the radicals wanted to protect were discussed in a RMRB editorial, February 20, 1974.

3. Ibid.

4. See, e.g., Parris Chang, "The Anti-Lin Piao and Confucian Campaign: Its Meaning and Purposes," Asian Survey, XIV:10 (1974), pp. 871-86; and Merle Goldman, "China's Anti-Confucian Campaign, 1973-74," The China Quarterly, No. 63 (September 1975), pp. 435-62.

5. That Mao was not pleased with the continued rise of Deng, nor the moderate trends in policy, can be inferred from the fact that he was not in attendance at these central meetings in January 1975.

6. See Peking Review, No. 4 (January 24, 1975).

7. In mid-1975, industrial workers in Hangzhou apparently took advantage of their right to strike, and PLA units had to be called in to restore order and production.

8. For example, Mao was quoted to the effect that "stability and unity does not mean writing off class struggle; class struggle is the key link and everything else hinges on it." RMRB, February 2, 1976.

9. RMRB, February 14, 1976.

10. See, e.g., Peking Review, No. 12 (March 19, 1976).

11. NCNA, Peking, September 19, 1976.

12. RMRB editorial, December 17, 1976.

13. Peking Review, No. 1 (January 1, 1977).

14. The Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China [Documents] (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977).

15. Quoted by Urumqi Radio, September 30, 1975.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Saifudin, "Advance Victoriously Under the Guidance of Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line--Greeting the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the XUAR," Hongqi, No. 10 (1975), quoted by Urumqi Radio, October 6, 1975.

19. Another report claimed that "every year Xinjiang receives a special subsidy of 5 percent of its budget, has priority in getting personnel and materials, and, like other border areas of China, is allowed a 7 percent tax reduction by the Finance Ministry." NCNA, Urumqi, September 25, 1975.

20. Quoted by Urumqi Radio, September 30, 1975.

21. Ibid.

22. Saifudin, "Advance Victoriously..."

23. Quoted by Urumqi Radio, September 30, 1975.

24. Especially those reforms sponsored by Jiang Qing and the radicals, who sought to create a "new literature and art with socialist content and national minority flavor." Included were their attempts to reform the Uighur and Kazakh written languages, and to restage revolutionary model theatrical works such as "The Red Lantern," "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy," and "Azalea Mountain" by adapting the languages and traditional styles of the region's minorities. Minority resistance to these reforms was noted by Jianabuer in an article in GMRB on August 13, 1976.

25. See NCNA, Peking, January 12, 1974; and Urumqi Radio, September 30, 1975.

26. Saifudin, "Advance Victoriously..." The percentage of minority Party members probably increased from the regional level down.

27. NCNA, Urumqi, October 21, 1976.

28. NCNA, Urumqi, June 21, 1976 and September 30, 1976.

In part, this rise was due to the fact that some 450,000 youths were resettled in the countryside of Xinjiang after 1968, and some of them may have obtained these positions after re-education. See also, Urumqi Radio, September 18, 1975.

29. NCNA, Urumqi, September 25, 1975 and October 21, 1976.
30. Ibid.
31. NCNA, Peking, November 30, 1975.
32. Saifudin, "Advance Victoriously..."
33. Urumqi Radio, September 30, 1975.
34. Urumqi Radio, October 22, 1976.
35. Urumqi Radio, October 23, 1976.
36. Urumqi Radio, November 2, 1976.
37. XJRB editorial, November 7, 1976.
38. XJRB editorial, November 14, 1976.
39. Urumqi Radio, December 16, 1976.
40. Ibid., and XJRB, December 2, 1976.
41. Urumqi Radio, January 13, 1977.
42. Urumqi Radio, February 25, 1977.
43. XJRB editorial, March 16, 1977.
44. Urumqi Radio, April 14, 1977.
45. XJRB editorial, May 4, 1977.
46. Ibid., and China Record, No. 1/6 (June 1977), p. 3.
47. Urumqi Radio, May 20, 1977.
48. Urumqi Radio, May 23, 1977.
49. Urumqi Radio, May 28, 1977.
50. Urumqi Radio, June 11, 1977.
51. NCNA, Urumqi, April 27, 1977. At the same time, the regional authorities publicized their concern about increasing the production of special consumer goods that met the needs of the non-Han peoples. Urumqi Radio, February 4, 1977.
52. NCNA, Peking, March 4, 1977. She was also said to be guilty of attempting to "strangle" national minority art and literature. NCNA, Peking, April 6, 1977.
53. At about the same time as Liu's appearance in Urumqi, a long article by Wang Zhen appeared which paid great homage to He Long. Wang remarked that both Lin Biao and Jiang Qing had colluded to persecute He on trumped-up charges during the GPCR, and that this had incriminated many of his old comrades. Cited by NCNA, Peking, July 27, 1977.
54. Coincidentally, the same thing could be said of Simaiyi Aimaiti, who, as secretary of the regional Party committee, was notably assuming many of Saifudin's duties pertaining to the Party's programs among the minorities of Xinjiang.
55. Quoted by Urumqi Radio, November 11, 1977.
56. David Bonavia, "Axe Falls on a Survivalist," FEER, Vol. 99, No. 6 (February 10, 1978), p. 24.
57. Peking Review, No. 10 (March 10, 1978), p. 41.
58. FEER, Vol. 99 No. 7 (February 17, 1978), p. 4.
59. Chengming (Hong Kong), No. 7 (May 1, 1978), p. 10.
60. Bonavia, op. cit., p. 24.
61. Reported by Francis Deron, Agence France Presse, April 5, 1978.
62. The Soviet danger was underlined on May 9 when a border incident occurred at Yueh Ya in Heilongjiang province. Moscow later apologized for the "accidental intrusion" there.

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